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DANCING BEFORE THE LORD:
RENAISSANCE LUDICS AND INCARNATIONAL DISCOURSE
Jarrell D. Wright, Ph.D.
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
Play is a manifestation of overflowing excess.  When applied to the study of discourse, this bounty
can be understood in terms of figurativeness and depth.  If “degree-zero” discourse is the almost
entirely unfigured language of an instruction manual, then verse lies near the other extreme: highly
figured and elaborate language open to rich interpretive possibilities.  I posit a further pole yet on
this continuum: the hyperabundant texts of the Renaissance, when ludics were at a height partially
quashed by the Enlightenment preference for the plain style.  These ludic texts are not merely
decorative but rather reflect the incarnational impulse of Renaissance Christian thought; they attempt
to praise and to imitate the power of Divine language, in which Word is made Flesh in the West’s
master model of superabundance, grace through Christ’s Incarnation and Sacrifice.  
This project conducts three case studies of playfully incarnational discourses during the
Renaissance: in speech, in imagery, and in verse.  First, it analyzes sermons by John Donne that
reflect candidly on the power of Donne’s own ludic speech, concluding that his transgressive,
gamelike rhetoric was oriented toward stimulating responsive action.  Next, it examines period
images through the lens of contemporary popular works that conceive of images as puzzles to be
decoded, solved, and read, concluding that period anamorphoses and similar works were efforts to
infuse images with lively presence in a way that helps to account for iconophobic and iconophilic
iv
strains in English Reformation thought.  Finally, it reads George Herbert’s deceptively simple poem,
“The Altar,” examining how the piece may be understood as an intervention into the shaped-verse
tradition and how it reflects on period debates about Church fabric, concluding that the toylike or
tricklike construction evokes the Eucharistic presence of the Divine in Herbert’s worshipful
meditation.
At stake are a greater appreciation for Renaissance artistry, a fuller understanding of the
complexity of the English Reformation, and a richer vocabulary for play theorists working with ludic
discourses.  A conclusion considers these implications and explains why Renaissance thinkers might
have chosen a ludic mode of imitative worship—God’s grace and creation are themselves forms of
play.
v
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A broken altar, Lord, thy servant reares
xv
Is it possible from now on, to maintain and defend, or even to
reconquer, the right and claims of leisure, in the face of the claims of
“total labour” that are invading every sphere of life?  Leisure, it must
be remembered, is not a Sunday afternoon idyll, but the preserve of
freedom, of education and culture, and of that undiminished humanity
which views the world as a whole.  In other words, is it going to be
possible to save men from becoming officials and functionaries and
“workers” to the exclusion of all else?  Can that possibly be done, and
if so in what circumstances?  There is no doubt of one thing: the
world of the “worker” is taking shape with dynamic force—with such
a velocity that, rightly or wrongly, one is tempted to speak of
daemonic force in history.
—Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture (1948)
[T]he highest things, even prayer and belief, require a certain
playfulness about them.  It is only when we realize that human affairs
stand not simply by themselves but relate us to our end—to our
transcendent destiny—that we can relax about what we are, indeed,
become what we are.
—James V. Schall, On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs (2001)
xvi
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Figure 1.  Nicolas de Larmessin II, “Habit de tabletier,” Les costumes
grotesques et les métiers, c. 1700.  Bibliothèque des arts décoratifs,
Paris. 
Play is incarnated in this grotesque of a game-board maker composed of the
products of his trade.  Incarnationally ludic discourse—communicative acts that
playfully seek to emulate the perfect creative power of Divine speech, in which Word
is made Flesh—is the subject of the pages that follow.  Discourse practitioners
during the Renaissance, and more particularly during the English Reformation,
offered their speech, images, and verse as modes of imitative worship.  To
understand this phenomenon is to appreciate more fully the relationships between
discourse and the English Reformation.  
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PREFACE
My interests in literature and art—or discourses, as we call them today—fall principally within the
traditional realms of aesthetics and formalism, if not entirely under the aegis of the New Criticism. 
I do not consider myself a New Historicist, nor do I conceive of my critical practice as being
consistently within the currently dominant mode of cultural studies, although Chapter III is a bit of
an exception with its emphasis on popular culture.  To see why I tend to resist these movements, take
for instance Stephen Greenblatt’s seminal exploration of the relationships between Shakespeare’s
King Lear and period discourses on exorcism.   Despite its status as a brilliant piece of scholarship,1
and regardless of how enjoyable it might be to read about such a juicy topic, I emerge from the essay
feeling as though I have learned altogether too much about Renaissance exorcisms and altogether
too little about King Lear.  This is not the kind of critical work that I wish to do, for I sense that
within his pages—where he takes such great pains to distance himself from the critical tradition that
came before him —Greenblatt has neglected the more interesting and significant text in his concern2
not to neglect its cultural context: not to be a New Critic.  I sense, in other words, that he has missed
the trees for the forest.  But take on the other hand a monument of the New Critical enterprise,
“Shakespeare and the Exorcists” (1985), in Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s King Lear, ed. Jay L. Halio,1
Critical Essays on British Literature (London: G. K. Hall, 1996), 88–121.
Assuming the position of a New Critic, Greenblatt proclaims, “As a freestanding, self-sufficient,2
disinterested art work produced by a solitary genius, King Lear has only an accidental relationship to its sources: they
provide a glimpse of the ‘raw material’ that the artist fashioned.”  Ibid., 89.  One wonders what kind of New Critic takes
such an extreme position about the hermeticism of literary texts or about their selective impermeability to their sources. 
My impression is that Greenblatt is erecting a kind of straw man, exaggerating the excesses of the New Criticism in order
more powerfully to position himself as doing something new and different.
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Cleanth Brooks’ marvelous close reading of John Donne’s “The Canonization.”   Despite Brooks’3
great gifts for delicacy and nuance, I emerge from his essay feeling that I have learned about . . .
what, exactly?  To be sure, I now know more, perhaps the very nearly definitive word, about how
Donne’s poem works as an artifact of verse language, but the piece in some senses feels like a mere
exercise, one in which too little is at stake.  Perhaps W. H. Auden was right that “poetry makes
nothing happen,”  but that is not to say that language does not ultimately matter to history and to4
other salient pieces of life’s business.  In the work that follows, one of my objectives is to balance
and bridge the gap between these two modes of critique, paying keen and respectful attention to the
pieces of literary and visual art that I consider, which will be of cardinal importance here, but also
considering the question of what is at stake in my close readings and analyses for the community of
scholars of the English Renaissance and Reformation.
To explore play in our contemporary moment might be considered in some quarters a trivial,
regressive, even reactionary move —matters more closely connected with the triad of race, class, and5
gender seem to be more in vogue.  But the spirit of this dissertation is very much in line with the
thinking of the period that I am examining, a period during which ludics were at a cultural height that
the West has never since regained (although some of the features of postmodern thought come
achingly close) and during which play was a matter, as we shall see, of great seriousness.  As a result,
“The Language of Paradox,” in The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry (New York:3
Reynal and Hitchcock, 1947), 3–31.
“In Memory of W. B. Yeats” (1939), in Collected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson (New York: Modern4
Library, 2007), 245–47, 246.
See, for example, Teresa L. Ebert, Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late5
Capitalism, Critical Perspectives on Women and Gender (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).  See also
James V. Schall, On the Unseriousness of Human Affairs: Teaching, Writing, Playing, Believing, Lecturing,
Philosophizing, Singing, Dancing (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2001), 5 (“In times of wars and rumors of wars, which
I suppose may be any time in some part of the world, I know it will seem strange, even a bit improper, to talk of play and
not of peace or victory or protest”).
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the project that unfolds in these pages might be best conceived as one that carries on the tradition
of serio ludere: play that sportively engages with serious and even grave affairs, not in order to
dismiss them casually as unworthy of conscientious treatment but rather in order to see them from
a slanted, creative angle that can be surprisingly productive and also refreshing.  The serious play
at issue in this dissertation involves the most important matter imaginable for the Christian mind,
whether during the Renaissance or today: the nature of the human relationship with the Divine.  If
my own work is not necessarily playful in its tone or approach, then at least the figures whom I
consider can be said to epitomize that ludic spirit in their contemplation of this central question.
This project engages with two distinct yet closely related movements, the Renaissance and
the Reformation.  I have attempted with great care to distinguish between them, at least insofar as
it is possible to separate them at all.  Where I refer to the period in general I have used the term
Renaissance (or occasionally the phrase early modern), but where my emphasis specifically pertains
to issues of theology or religious praxis I have used the term Reformation.
Whenever it has been feasible to do so, I have relied on period versions of the texts that I
consider, and in those cases I have elected to maintain those sources’ original spellings, including
vv for w, u for v (and vice versa), and i for j.  I have only altered the long s for typographical reasons;
were I able to reproduce it in this document, I would have kept it in the interests of purity.
In the perennial debate—footnotes versus endnotes—I have chosen the former.  As befits my
legal background, my notes are often long and discursive rather than serving as mere citational
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apparatus.   Accordingly, the balance between advantages and disadvantages seemed to favor6
footnotes.  Although they might occasionally disrupt the formatting of the document and although
I run the risk of distracting my reader, footnotes will spare him or her the frustration of having to flip
back and forth from text to notes, and they will make my scholarship more readily visible, an
important consideration in a document of this nature.
I have followed the citation style and other formatting directives contained in the 16th edition
of The Chicago Manual of Style, a more mature, complete, and scholarly alternative to the MLA
Handbook for Writers of Research Papers.  At appropriate junctures I have departed modestly from
Chicago style in the interests of clarity, precision, and depth of detail.
My tendency is to quote liberally from my sources, allowing them to speak for themselves
as part of the dialogue that I wish to create.  This, too, is a part of the tradition of legal scholarship
from which I emerge, although I have found the practice to be somewhat less common in the
humanities.  Because images are central to Chapters III and IV, and because they have been a delight
to engage with elsewhere, I have used many of them throughout the following pages.  Unfortunately,
the result of these choices was that the task of obtaining the requisite permissions became somewhat
time-consuming and unwieldy.  Many people and rights-holders graciously cooperated in that
endeavor, and they receive credit following my bibliography.
With respect to quotations, I have assiduously attempted to maintain each author’s language
and to distinguish clearly between my interpolations, ellipses, and emphases and the author’s own. 
Consult any law review article and you will immediately notice that the ratio of footnotes to main text is6
often absurdly unbalanced, with footnotes (even though printed in smaller type) regularly consuming more of each page
than the text of the article itself.  Composing in this style—in which every observation or claim, no matter how apparently
uncontroversial, must be diligently and forthrightly annotated—is an old habit that is dying hard, but I have attempted
to extract most of the integral material from my notes and to place it instead in the main text.  Where I have been unable
to resist (as here in this meta-note), I ask for my reader’s kind understanding and forbearance.
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In this regard, please note that all non-original ellipses are bracketed.  Bracketed ellipses are used
to open a quotation beginning with a capital letter in order to indicate that the capital letter in the
original is not the start of a sentence; bracketed ellipses between sentences indicate that I have
omitted one or more complete sentences in quoting the original source; bracketed ellipses have
generally been omitted before final punctuation where a sentence continues in the original beyond
the scope of my quotation.  All emphases in bold and italic type are my own; these are to be
distinguished from emphases in italics alone: these are the authors’ original emphases when they are
seen in quotations, but in my text they are used for identifying words and terms.  In all quotations,
footnotes have been omitted; citations and source references in quotations are omitted except where
in my judgment they may be useful for the reader.
In the interest of clarity, I have shortened long titles of period works sub silentio in the main
text and footnotes; in the bibliography, I have used non-bracketed ellipses, in conformance with
Chicago style, in order to indicate which titles I have shortened in this fashion.
I made the somewhat unorthodox choice to compose this document on Corel WordPerfect
X5, mediated by Parallels Desktop 9 for Mac; the principal alternative is simply not well suited to
producing anything more complex than a grocery list, at least not with ease or grace.  WordPerfect
is responsive rather than dictatorial, intuitive rather than Byzantine, and effortlessly generates
footnotes without recourse to a clumsy interface.
Finally, I consider this dissertation not merely as a work of scholarship but also as an
expression of my deeply held Christian faith.  The process of completing it has been a devotional
exercise, and indeed, conceiving of it as such was one of the primary reasons why I was able to
complete it at all.  The first epigraph that I have chosen for the dissertation, immediately following
my dedication page, is the first line of George Herbert’s “The Altar,” a poem which I shall consider
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near the end of the project: A broken altar, Lord, thy servant reares.  It speaks with greater clarity,
compactness, and poignancy than I possess in my own words to what this work ultimately represents
for me.
^
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Figure 2.  Francesco Salviati, David Dancing in front of the Ark,
1552–54.  Sala dell’Udienza d’Inverno, Palazzo Sacchetti, Rome.
Through a choice of sun-drenched colors and a vivid rendering of David’s flowing
and billowing garb, Salviati in this image captures something of the Hebrew king’s
enthusiasm as he dances exultantly before the ark of the covenant in praise of God. 
Worship in the Judeo-Christian tradition can be an act of joy, even an instance of
play.  In this dissertation and in the introduction that follows, I shall explore the
implications of playfully worshipful discourse during the Renaissance and more
specifically in the English Reformation.  As I shall attempt to suggest, an awareness
that certain Renaissance discourse practitioners expressed devotion to God through
play might provide new insights about how to characterize Protestant discourse
during the period.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Word/Play
And Dauid daunced before the LORD with all his might.
—2 Sm 6:14 (AV 1611)
Scripture tells us that David, after his triumphant installation of  the ark of the covenant in Jerusalem,
danced before it (and therefore before the face of God Himself) in an act that one scholar describes
as “extravagant revelry.”   Because an analysis of the original Hebrew text reveals that David’s dance1
was an expression of a specifically ludic impulse,  play—as odd or as counterintuitive as it may seem2
to some observers of Christianity—is a biblically sanctioned mode of worshiping the Divine.3
This dissertation is an attempt to illustrate, through an analysis of three discrete yet
interconnected case studies, a phenomenon that has long gone unnoticed.  Practitioners of many
forms of discourse during the Renaissance harness the creative force and pleasures of play in the
direction of a very particular kind of worship.  They engage in a form of imitatio Christi in which
play becomes a means to praise and honor the perfect generative power of Divine discourse: the
David P. Wright, “Music and Dance in 2 Samuel 6,” Journal of Biblical Literature 121, no. 2 (Summer1
2002): 201–25, 221.  The ark was the symbolic representation of God’s presence.  Steven L. McKenzie, King David:
A Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 135.
Wright, “Music and Dance,” 217 (the verb used to describe David’s dance elsewhere in 2 Samuel “can be2
used of playing or sporting” or of “joke making”).  For a treatment of David’s dance as a ludic act—an instance of the
Bakhtinian carnivalesque—see Bruce Rosenstock, “David’s Play: Fertility Rituals and the Glory of God in 2 Samuel 6,”
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 31, no. 1 (March 2006): 63–80.
David’s wife Michal promptly voiced her disapproval of this dance; “Therefore Michal the daughter of Saul3
had no childe vnto the day of her death.”  2 Sm 6:23 (AV 1611). 
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Word that creates, the Word incarnated as Flesh that re-creates the relationship between man and
God, and the Word through which God dispenses superabundant grace upon His Creation.  My thesis
is that this phenomenon merits close attention from and thorough investigation by scholars of
Renaissance discourse, for this widespread pattern has the potential to illuminate the relationships
between discourse and the Reformation, particularly as that movement was manifested in early
seventeenth-century England.
Beyond concerns relating to English Reformation discourse on a broad scale, I hope that this
dissertation will also enlighten us with regard to the less fully historicized question of what the
elaborate and beautiful words and images by these discourse practitioners actually mean. 
Throughout this project, one of my main concerns will be to shine light on the texts themselves,
offering a new perspective on them that I hope will be rewarding, interesting, and (dare I say it?) fun. 
I intend never to forget that this is ultimately a dissertation about play.  The works that we shall
consider should be enjoyed, and the readings that I offer should bring pleasure.  Although I subscribe
whole-heartedly to Stanley Fish’s since-recanted formulation that there is a valuable distinction
between being “right” and being “interesting” and that sometimes it is more important to be the latter
than the former,  I hope that I can succeed in this dissertation in being both.4
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an orientation to the central phenomenon that I wish
to describe: an explanation of the concepts that are necessary to appreciating it and also to
understanding the argument that follows.  This introduction will proceed in five phases.  In the first
section, I shall offer a summary of the literature that exists on the two major strands of my
argument—the idea that play was a pervasive force in the Renaissance and the notion that
Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard4
University Press, 1980), 43.
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incarnational discourse was an ideal to which many artists aspired during the period—and I shall
begin to knit those two strands together by surveying English Reformed notions of imitatio Christi,
establishing that an imitative practice links the playfulness of Renaissance discourse together with
its ambitions toward incarnational status.  The second section will turn to the key task of defining
discursive play; as we shall see in this section, the field of ludology has advanced several mutually
compatible definitions of play, but critics and scholars who have thus far considered play in the
context of discourse have tended to be somewhat imprecise in explaining what makes a text or an
image ludic.  Against this gap in our knowledge of play, I shall offer a definition that builds upon
prior work in the field but that extends it more specifically to the context of discourse study in a way
that I hope will be useful for other scholars interested in ludics.  Next, in the third section, I shall
examine another phenomenon that has plagued the field of ludology, a tendency toward inexactitude
in writing about different types of play; critics in the field all too often use terms like game and
puzzle quite casually, as if those words were interchangeable synonyms or as if they were suitable
substitutes for the term play.  What the field needs, I shall explain in this section, is a workable
typology of different forms of play; more specifically, scholars of ludic discourse might benefit
considerably from a matrix on which different types of playful discourse can be plotted and
compared.  I shall construct and present such a matrix in this section, with the goal of demonstrating
in the remainder of the dissertation how it might function in actual critical practice.  The fourth
section introduces a schema of confessional positions during the English Reformation that will guide
my discussion of the historical implications of my close readings of individual works and texts. 
Finally, in the fifth section, I shall transition to my case studies by presenting the methodology that
I shall follow in describing the phenomenon in which I am principally interested, explaining also the
rationale according to which the case studies will be ordered and arranged.
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A.  BACKGROUND
The State of the Game
The insight that I am offering in this dissertation—that discourse practitioners during the English
Renaissance used play as a form of imitative worship in praising the incarnational capacity of Divine
language—is comprised of two threads or strains of thought that have long been part of our
knowledge of early modern culture: the notion that Renaissance discourse is capable of extravagant
playfulness and the observation that it is at times incarnational in nature, design, or effect.  What is
new and different in my argument is the recognition that these two ideas are deeply imbricated with
each other in ways that might either clarify or add texture to existing scholarly debates; the specific
link between the two strands of thought is the practice of imitatio Christi during the period of the
English Reformation.  All three ideas—play, incarnationalism, and imitation—have developed a
massive collection of scholarly and critical literature behind them.  The goal of this section is to
begin piecing together the components of my argument while at the same time providing the reader
with a sense of its relationship with and indebtedness to earlier critical conversations.
1. Play
The pervasiveness of a play-spirit in the Renaissance is a well-established proposition: “the
whole mental attitude of the Renaissance,” Johan Huizinga confidently declares, “was one of play.”  5
Imagining the period as one in which the dominant mode of play was imitation,  a “striving, at once6
Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1938) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 180.  All5
further citations to Homo Ludens (HL) will appear as parenthetical references in the main text and footnotes.  See also
Frank J. Warnke, “Sacred Play: Baroque Poetic Style,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 22, no. 4 (Summer 1964):
455–64, 459 (“the Baroque period [. . .] is also an age in which all art is conspicuously played”).
Imitation or “mimicry” is one of the four cardinal categories of play identified by Roger Caillois in his6
important critique of and response to Huizinga’s Homo Ludens.  Man, Play and Games (1958), trans. Meyer Barash
(1961) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 19–23.  All further citations to Man, Play and Games (MPaG) will
appear as parenthetical references in the main text and footnotes.
5
sophisticated and spontaneous, for beauty and nobility of form” in “a gorgeous and solemn
masquerade in the accoutrements of an idealized past,” Huizinga argues that the Renaissance in some
senses epitomized the ludic: “If ever an élite, fully conscious of its own merits, sought to segregate
itself from the vulgar herd and live life as a game of artistic perfection, that élite was the circle of
choice Renaissance spirits” (HL, 180).7
In considering this period of play, Alessandro Arcangeli has productively analyzed what he
describes as “a distinctive leisure culture” that developed in Europe during the fifteenth, sixteenth,
and seventeenth centuries,  exploring a number of discourses surrounding recreation and8
play—medical, moral, and legal, for example—from the flowering of the Renaissance to the dawn
of the Enlightenment.  Peter Burke has gone so far as to opine that early modern culture saw the
beginnings of what we would call leisure, including play and recreation, and has amassed a
collection of evidence to support this claim.   Andrew Leibs would concur with Burke’s analysis,9
for he argues that the Renaissance was an especially playful period because of its new notions of
time: the division of leisure time from time devoted to work along with the advent of time-measuring
technologies that enabled this division on a daily scale and that permitted men and women on an
The elitism and high-culture bias of this passage are palpable, and many subsequent critics would rightly7
point out that, beyond the fact that they might give offense in a more egalitarian age like ours, they present distinct
conceptual problems.  See, for example, Joan-Lluís Marfany, “Debate: The Invention of Leisure in Early Modern
Europe,” Past and Present, no. 156 (August 1997): 174–91, 175 (noting that another critic “seems to be concerned solely
with the leisure of those who never worked”).  On the issue of labor, a period voice is best suited to respond: “Man would
not have needed either play or amusements, had he remained in the blessed state of innocence in which God had created
him.  In fact, [. . .] his work would have been pleasant for him, far from being a pain [. . .].  Consequently, he would not
have needed to relax either his spirit or his body.  Therefore, to be accurate, play and amusements have become necessary
for us because of sin.”  Jean Baptiste Thiers, Traité des jeux et divertissements (1686), quoted in Alessandro Arcangeli,
Recreation in the Renaissance: Attitudes towards Leisure and Pastimes in European Culture, c. 1425–1675, Early
Modern History (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 10.
Recreation in the Renaissance, 1.8
“The Invention of Leisure in Early Modern Europe,” Past and Present, no. 146 (February 1995): 136–50, 9
144–49.
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annual scale to “count the days until the next holiday or feast day and the revels associated with
them.”10
Included among the seven points that Burke presents in order to contend that leisure emerged
during the Renaissance is the fact that treatises on the subject began to flourish.   Although he11
surveys such works from throughout Europe, several from England in particular are worth noting
here.  Roger Ascham’s The Schole Master appeared in 1579,  and within its pages we see a number12
of themes and motifs that recur throughout the literature on play during the English Renaissance. 
Indeed, even the text’s title and emphasis on education highlight an important element of Western
discourse on play: The word school derives from the ancient Greek scholé or σχολη, meaning
leisure,  so that there is an intrinsic connection at the very deepest conceptual levels between play13
and intellectual activity.  Ascham alludes to a common trope that had long governed discourse
regarding the need for play in human nature, the metaphor of the archer’s bow that must not
constantly be bent lest the string prematurely break (4).   He calls wit “a singular gift of God” (7)14
and links the proper manner of recreation—be it “playing, dauncing, or doing any thing els”—in
Sports and Games of the Renaissance (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 59.10
“Invention of Leisure,” 144–46.11
Roger Ascham, The Schole Master (London: Iohn Daye, 1579).  Subsequent citations in this paragraph12
appear as parenthetical references in the main text.
Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., s.v. “school.”  Another fascinating etymological anomaly13
involving Western terms for play is the case of the Latin pair of words otium and negotium, meaning, respectively, play
and business.  We are conditioned in the contemporary West to see business, labor, or earnest as the primary element
in this binary, with rest, leisure, or play coming only in the absence of work.  Warren Motte, “Playing in Earnest,” New
Literary History 40, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 25–42, 25.  However, the Latin binary is reversed and positions business, or
neg-otium, as the absence or negation of play.
The genealogy of this idea, which goes back at least as far as the early Church fathers, is too extensive to14
trace here.  An interested reader may consult Thomas Merton’s The Wisdom of the Desert (1960) (New York: New
Directions Books, 1970): “The hunter said: If I bend my bow all the time it will break.  Abbot Anthony replied: So it is
also in the work of God.  If we push ourselves beyond measure, the brethren will soon collapse.  It is right, therefore,
from time to time, to relax their efforts.”  Ibid., 63.
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“weight, measure, & number” to the precision of the way in which “God made the world” (12). 
Literature is specifically singled out as a source of recreation, because reading is both “pastime and
pleasure” (27) and because words are to the mind as “choice meates” are to the body as food
(46–47).15
The unmistakably Puritan inflection of Samuel Byrd’s 1580 treatise notwithstanding, A
Friendlie Communication or Dialogue between Paule and Demas is notable principally for the
manner in which the concept of recreation is used: “When we exercise or recreate our selves, our
recreation must tend to edificing and to the building up of our faith: for example.  When we plaie
at tennis, we refresh our wearied spirits and memories, by the which meanes we are better able to
studie, and to get knowledge whereby our faith is strengthened.”   The sense in which the term16
recreation is applied to the game of tennis is common enough in contemporary English usage, but
during the period the term was also used in the contemporary sense of re-creation or refreshment or
On this score, Glending Olson has produced an illuminating work on the role of literature as an amusement15
during an earlier period of European history.  Literature as Recreation in the Later Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1982).  Olson considers, among other things, the role of literature as a kind of delivery mechanism for
moral truth, the Horatian and later Sidneyan idea that literature can both teach and delight, and the role of literature as
a curative agent for physical ailments.  See also Phillips Salman, “Instruction and Delight in Medieval and Renaissance
Criticism,” Renaissance Quarterly 32, no. 3 (Autumn 1979): 303–32.
Samuel Byrd, A Friendlie Communication or Dialogue between Paule and Demas (London: Iohn Harison,16
1580), 62 (emphasis supplied).  To classify Byrd’s treatise as a text about play is in some senses problematic, precisely
because his view of recreation is instrumental—play is directed toward the achievement of some other non-play
objective.  For Huizinga, for example, play of this type is no play at all.  See HL, 13 (play is “an activity connected with
no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it”).  See also MPaG, 10 (characterizing play as unproductive).  On
the other hand, the kind of play that I am imagining in this dissertation—play as worship—is not instrumental.  Citing
figures like Plato and Romano Guardini, Huizinga conceives of play and holiness as inextricably connected (HL, 19). 
Understood in this fashion, play as worship is not play turned in the direction of some other end; it is play at its purest
and play in its highest form. 
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renewal.   To play, to rest, to relax, or to engage in recreation is to re-create ourselves in a more17
literal sense.  This usage—uncommon or at worst a bad pun for us —is central to the ideas that this18
dissertation will more fully develop in the following chapters, particularly in connection with George
Herbert’s ludic poem, “The Altar.”
John Harington’s 1597 A Treatise on Playe appears to be the first English treatment of the
subject that attempts a comprehensive and disinterested inquiry.  Harington defines play by recourse
to “the awncient schoolemen, (who were the narowest examiners and suttellest distinguyshers of
wordes)” and pronounces that “Ludus, id est, loculus vel operatio in quo nihil quæritur nisi
delectatio animalis.  [Play, that is to say, the place or process by which nothing is sought other than
simple pleasure].  A spending of the tyme eyther in speeche or action, whose onely end ys a delyght
of the mynd or speryt.”   Notably, he also sees biblical precedent for “play or recreacion” in David’s19
dance before the ark of the covenant: “Ludam & fiam vilior [I shall play and become the more vile]”
(158).  Therefore, it should not be surprising that Harington declares, “for Gods law, I must confess
I finde no commandement that says, Thow shalt not play, neyther in precise wordes, neyther yet by
Etymologically, the terms recreation and, as we would have it today, re-creation are closely linked.  Oxford17
English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., s.v. “recreation.”  The same etymology holds true in other languages.  See Burke,
“Invention of Leisure,” 146; HL, 28–45; and Laura Kendrick, “Games Medievalists Play: How to Make Earnest of Game
and Still Enjoy It,” New Literary History 40, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 43–61, 49–54.  We see this parallel between the two
concepts throughout the period’s literature on play.  See, for example, Richard Flecknoe, A Treatise of the Sports of Wit
(London: Simon Neals, 1675), 3 (games and play are for “recreating our Spirits when tired and spent with Worldly
businesses”); and John Harington, A Treatise on Playe (1597), vol. 2 of Nugae Antiquae, ed. Thomas Park (London: T.
Cadell, 1804), 170 (“worthy persons [. . .] recreate themselves at play”).
But for a fascinating piece of critique based almost entirely on bad puns, see Giambattista Vico, New18
Science (1725), trans. Dave Marsh, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Classics, 2000).  Anna K. Nardo points out that both
Rosalie Colie and Joan Webber frequently rely upon “The recreate/re-create pun” in their works on literary play, but
she does not recognize the etymological histories of the words that render the comparison more than a simple instance
of wordplay.  The Ludic Self in Seventeenth-Century Literature, SUNY Series: The Margins of Literature (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1991), 221n33.
Treatise on Playe, 157.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the19
main text.
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implicacion; and therfor I sayde at the first, it is in ytselfe a thinge indifferent” (190).  Advocating
throughout his text the golden mean, a component of Western discourse on play since Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics,  Harington for example notes with regard to gambling “that the wager in play20
should bee as it wear sawce, and not the substance of it” (177); he warns that those who violate this
precept cease to play at all: “Whearfore let them not call it theyr play, but theyr labor, theyr trade,
theyr occupacion, that playe only for gayne; for greedines breeds earnestnes, and earnestnes
overthrows quite the very nature of all game” (188).
Later English treatises on play, which generally date to the Interregnum or even to the
Restoration, include John Denham’s The Anatomy of Play (1651), Michael Mayerus’ Lusus Serius
(1654), Francis Willughby’s Book of Games (1672), and Richard Flecknoe’s A Treatise of the Sports
of Wit (1675).
More germane to the present summary, in terms of period works, are James I’s Basilikon
Doron (1599) and The Book of Sports (1618), the latter revised and reissued by Charles I in 1633,
both of which saw the institutionalization of play in affairs of government and politics.  Basilikon
Doron was a treatise on governing and kingsmanship written by James as advice to his first son and
then-apparent heir in Scotland.  Among the principles that James sets forth is the recommendation
that “certaine daies in the yeare would bee appointed, for delighting the people with publike
spectacles of al honest games.”   England had a long tradition of Church festival days going back21
to the medieval period, and those occasions as well as most Sundays were typically marked by games
See, for example, Arcangeli, Recreation in the Renaissance, 50–51.  Aristotle advocated the virtue of20
eutrapelia, a capacity for wit and amusing oneself moderately, which he set against the vices and extremes of boorishness
(or rusticity) and buffoonery.  “[T]he notion proved quite influential” during the Renaissance.  Ibid., 51.
James I, Basilikon Doron (1599) (London: Richard Field, 1603), 53.21
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and sports.   According to Leah S. Marcus, James “tended to regard traditional English customs as22
an integral branch of his power.  He viewed any attempt to suppress them as an affront to his
prerogative.”   As a result, in The Book of Sports James directed that these traditional holiday and23
Sunday pastimes be permitted, although he did not go so far as to require that they be observed. 
Charles I’s republication and revision of the directive was a gambit to retain power against the
growing influence of Puritan forces in the kingdom; “The fostering of old festival pastimes,” Marcus
explains, “became very closely tied to the vexed matter of enforcing religious conformity, and the
pastimes were increasingly perceived as extensions of liturgical worship.  [. . .]  The old pastimes
were a way of taking the Church out into the world and molding the countryside into an image of
ecclesiastical order; they became an extension of sacred space.”24
Returning as I conclude this summary to contemporary assessments of play during the
Renaissance, an important entry in scholarly and critical discourse on Renaissance play is Anna K.
Nardo’s The Ludic Self in Seventeenth-Century Literature.  Nardo contends that “In the first half of
the seventeenth century, England produced an extraordinary array of self-conscious literary players,
both fictional and real,”  and she proceeds to use that claim to anchor a number of rich readings of25
period texts, ultimately arguing that play during the Renaissance was a matter of self-creation.  And
Gregory M. Colón Semenza likewise contends that play, or sport, was a core feature of the English
Leah S. Marcus has written extensively on this tradition, on debates surrounding its continuing propriety22
in the late-Tudor and early-Stuart eras, and on the effects of those debates upon the discourse of the period.  The Politics
of Mirth: Jonson, Herrick, Milton, Marvell, and the Defense of Old Holiday Pastimes (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1986).  For an historical rather than a literary examination of this phenomenon, see David S. Katz, Sabbath and
Sectarianism in Seventeenth-Century England, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).
Politics of Mirth, 4.23
Ibid., 5.24
Ludic Self, 1.25
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Renaissance: “The practice of sport and exercise was central to Renaissance conceptions of both the
ideal English gentleman and the ideal English nation-state.”26
The concept of play can be understood in this dissertation as a means to an end for the
discourse practitioners whom I consider in the case studies that follow.  The end or aim is worship
of the Divine, and specifically of the Incarnation, to which I now turn.
2. Incarnationalism
Like the impulse toward play, a theology revolving around the physicality of Christ—both
in the doctrine of the Incarnation and in the practice of the Eucharist—was a consistent theme in the
Renaissance.   Indeed, even beyond that period, the concept of the Incarnation was for Malcolm27
Mackensie Ross “the fixed star at the centre of the Christian firmament”;  for James S. Baumlin,28
“the crisis of presence and absence” that the doctrine continually confronts is “one that lies at the
center of Western metaphysics.”   According to Diarmaid MacCulloch,29
From the church’s earliest days [the Eucharist] has been a way to break down the
barrier between the physical and the spiritual, between earth and heaven, death and
life.  It involves objects made by human beings and therefore part of everyday
society: bread and wine, food and drink, which bring earthly joy, and which are
Sport, Politics, and Literature in the English Renaissance (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003),26
13.
Philip Sheldrake particularly emphasizes the status of the Creation and the Incarnation as “important27
themes” in Caroline Christianity.  Heaven in Ordinary: George Herbert and His Writings, Canterbury Studies in Spiritual
Theology (Norwich, UK: Canterbury Press, 2009), 6.
Poetry and Dogma: The Transfiguration of Eucharistic Symbols in Seventeenth Century English Poetry28
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954), 9–10.
John Donne and the Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991),29
191.  See also Alla Bozarth-Campbell, The Word’s Body: An Incarnational Aesthetic of Interpretation (University:
University of Alabama Press, 1979), 104 (an incarnationalist theology of language would not merely represent but
actually evoke presence). 
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fraught with danger because they can be enjoyed too much.  That is what makes the
Eucharist such a potent symbol of offering what human beings bring to God.  Yet it
is also associated with what Christ offers to humanity through his unique, costly, and
painful offering to God: life and joy, which are much more than a full belly and a
head full of alcohol.30
Debora K. Shuger explains that a rhetorical tradition emerges during the English Renaissance
in which there is a “demand for a vividness enabling the heart to grasp the invisible and distant
reality of God”;  according to Regina Mara Schwartz, as part of an argument very different from31
Shuger’s, much of the literature of the English Reformation is based on a yearning for the touch and
physical presence of the Divine, a desire associated with a critical shift in the era’s doctrine: “the
host no longer became the mystical body of God through a miracle, but became a symbol.”  32
Moreover, critics readily identify the two major poets of the early seventeenth century, John Donne
and George Herbert, with Eucharistic and incarnational practice. Eleanor J. McNees says, “The
coexistence of flesh and spirit [. . .] runs throughout Donne’s writing from his secular songs and
sonnets to his divine poems and sermons.”   And Robert Ellrodt explains that, “With Herbert as33
with Donne, the Incarnation is more than the center of Christian faith: it commands their vision of
The Reformation (New York: Viking, 2003), 1030
Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton31
University Press, 1988), 11.
Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism: When God Left the World, Cultural Memory in the Present32
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 14.  Huldrych Zwingli, however, “would have been horrified” at this
common “caricature” that he converted the Eucharist into nothing more than a symbol: “he saw its celebration as the
highest expression of a Christian community, the outward sacred sign of God’s loving purpose for the world.” 
MacCulloch, Reformation, 582.
Eucharistic Poetry: The Search for Presence in the Writings of John Donne, Gerard Manley Hopkins,33
Dylan Thomas, and Geoffrey Hill (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1992), 33.
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the world and their inspiration as if it were a structure of their minds.”   Robert Whalen, attending34
to works of both poets, has mounted a study based on their relationship to the Eucharist and to
Reformed sacramentalism.35
The three central figures of the continental Reformation shared remarkably similar views of
the Incarnation, although they differed sharply on the nature of the Eucharist.  With respect to the
Incarnation, the full human physicality of Christ—the emphasis on flesh in Scripture’s declaration
in John 1:14 that “the Word was made flesh”—is paramount to all three reformers.
Martin Luther’s examination from the pulpit of the implications of John 1:14 stresses the
fundamental similarity between Christ’s human nature and ours:
Thus the most precious treasure and the strongest consolation we Christians
have is this: that the Word, the true and natural Son of God, became man, with flesh
and blood like that of any other human; that He became incarnate for our sakes in
order that we might enter into great glory, that our flesh and blood, skin and hair,
hands and feet, stomach and back might reside in heaven as God does.36
Luther anatomizes the human body and begins this itemization with the terms of the Eucharist in
order to emphasize the essential parallels between Christ’s physical form and the bodies of his
“George Herbert and the Religious Lyric,” in English Poetry and Prose, 1540–1674, ed. Christopher Ricks34
(London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1970), 173–205, 180.  See also Jeannie Sargent Judge, Two Natures Met: George Herbert
and the Incarnation, Studies in the Humanities: Literature—Politics—Society (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 8 (“In ‘The
Church,’ Herbert seeks to develop a relationship with the Incarnation.  He articulates the poet’s struggle to apprehend
the wonder of the dual nature of Christ and to appreciate the partially restored harmony of the world”).
The Poetry of Immanence: Sacrament in Donne and Herbert (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). 35
Whalen coins the phrase “sacramental puritanism” to describe the fertile interactions between “the potentially contrary
imperatives of sacrament and devotion, an eirenic strategy that allowed for the cultivation of puritan devotional
enthusiasm through an internalized yet fully sacramental and sacerdotal apparatus.”  Ibid., xii.
Luther’s Works, vol. 22, Sermons on the Gospel of St. John Chapters 1–4, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, trans.36
Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1957), 110.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear
as parenthetical references in the main text.
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auditory.  He goes further by explaining that the Scriptures could instead have read that “Word
became man” but for the fact that the term flesh “point[s] out its weakness and its mortality.  For
Christ took on the human nature, which was mortal and subject to the terrible wrath and judgment
of God because of the sins of the human race.  And this anger was felt by the weak and mortal flesh
of Christ” (22:111).  Concluding in the same sermon with a reminder of this “inexpressible
humiliation” (22:111), Luther attempts to describe the extreme debasement to which the living Word
subjected Himself in being reduced to human form.37
Also emphasizing Christ’s corporal commonality with human beings, John Calvin introduces
his discussion of the Incarnation by explaining that Christ chose to be “clothed with our flesh.”  38
Rejecting heresies that would deny Christ’s full human nature, Calvin like Luther returns to the
language of the Scriptures and invokes the term “Son of man,” by which Calvin asserts that God
meant “thereby to explain more clearly that he is a man truly begotten of human seed” (475).  Calvin
exclaims against the heretics, “They thrust upon us as something absurd the fact that if the Word of
God became flesh, then he was confined within the narrow prison of an earthly body.  This is mere
impudence!  For even if the Word in his immeasurable essence united with the nature of man into
one person, we do not imagine that he was confined therein” (481).39
Lee Palmer Wandel would disagree; he declares that Luther, as well as John Calvin, “severed the word in37
the Gospel narrative completely from human experience.  For both, the same word, ‘body,’ did not signify the same thing
in reference to Christ’s person as it did in reference to humankind.” The Reformation: Towards a New History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 237.  Wandel, who turns immediately to the doctrine of ubiquity, seems
to be conflating the Incarnation with the Eucharist, closely related concepts that I have chosen to treat separately.
Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536), ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia:38
Westminster Press, 1967), 474.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main
text.
Jennifer Waldron analyzes in great detail the importance of the body to Calvinistic thought.  Reformations39
of the Body: Idolatry, Sacrifice, and Early Modern Theater, Early Modern Cultural Studies (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), 58–66.  Given Christ’s “miraculous descent into flesh,” “humans can partake of Christ in both body
and spirit.”  Ibid., 64.
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In explaining this mystery of Christ’s dual nature, Huldrych Zwingli relies heavily on the
figures of chiasmus and parallelism in order to emphasize that Christ’s physicality is equally central
to His being as His identity as the second person of the Trinity:
The mediator Christ is therefore not only God but also a human being; and not only
is he a human being, but also God; for if he were only divine, he would not be
suitable to act as mediator.  [J]ust as human weakness was joined to God through
Christ and united with him, we too may be reconciled to God through Christ and
united with him, we too may be reconciled to God through his suffering and sacrifice
of Christ.40
We see in this passage, once again, the critical importance of Christ’s corporeality and its similarity
to that of human beings.  Indeed, Zwingli once proclaimed that “It is wonderfully consoling to me,
each time I think of it: Christ had flesh like I do.”41
With respect to the Eucharist, however, consensus was much more evasive; “The Eucharist,”
according to MacCulloch, “was naturally full of opportunities to emphasize difference, all the more
because its symbolism spoke of communal unity.”   Yet one commonality that existed was the42
reluctance of these three figures, as Whalen puts it, “to varying degrees, to abandon an instrumental
role for sacraments in Christian soteriology and even the carnal understandings it suggested.”  43
Ultimately, for Lee Palmer Wandel, it was the “tiny word,” the mere copula is—in Christ’s scriptural
Writings: The Defense of the Reformed Faith, trans. E. J. Furcha, Pittsburgh Theological Monographs40
(Pittsburgh: Pickwick Publications, 2004), 1:129.
Quoted in Wandel, Reformation, 236.41
MacCulloch, Reformation, 342.42
Poetry of Immanence, 6.43
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commandment from Luke 22:19, “This is my body which is giuen for you, this doe in remembrance
of me” (AV 1611)—that “marked the relationship between matter and God.”44
Luther, of course, rejected the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation and denied that
the Eucharist was a sacrifice, for “Christ on the Cross,” MacCulloch explains, “had been the only
sacrifice.”   Yet as a figure with “deep personal devotion to the Eucharist,” Luther insisted upon45
“the notion that the body and blood of Christ could be physically or corporeally present in the bread
and wine on the eucharistic table.”   In the Marburg Colloquy of 1529, Luther declared that “it46
cannot be proved that ‘This is my body’ is a trope.  If God told me to eat a crabapple, I would eat
spiritually.”   Yet he later invoked the trope of synecdoche in explaining to Zwingli how bread and47
body could be equated:  “For example, when a king tells his servant, ‘Bring me my sword,’ in which
case he wants the servant to bring the sheath at the same time even if he did not in so many words
command him to do so.  So also this form of speech is to be allowed in the sacrament when at times
it is called the bread and when nevertheless the body is also meant, and vice versa.”48
Calvin, on the other hand, MacCulloch says, “devoted much energy to finding a formulation
of the Eucharist to give it due reverence but avoid saying either too little or too much about it.”  49
Refusing to embrace the doctrine of the real presence due to his understanding that it was
Reformation, 241.  See also Baumlin, Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse, 2 (“the Reformation becomes44
no less than a crisis of language”).
Reformation, 126.  See also C. Scott Dixon, Contesting the Reformation, Contesting the Past (Malden, MA:45
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 55.
MacCulloch, Reformation, 139–40.46
Luther’s Works, vol. 38, Words and Sacrament, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann, trans. Martin E. Lehmann47
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 55.
Ibid., 47.  See also Whalen, Poetry of Immanence, 7.48
Reformation, 241.  Whalen describes Calvin’s approach as a “via media.”  Poetry of Immanence, 8.49
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idolatrous,  Calvin nonetheless, as Whalen explains, “accepted the conversion of the species to50
‘something else.’”   “For Calvin, then,” according to MacCulloch, “the signs of bread and wine51
become an instrument of God’s grace in uniting the believer to Christ.”   The relationship expressed52
by the copula is, for Calvin, is an analogical one: “as bread nourishes, sustains, and keeps the life
of our body, so Christ’s body is the only food to invigorate and enliven our soul.”   But more than53
that, “why should the Lord put in your hand the symbol of his body, except to assure you of a true
participation in it?”   Instead, God’s grace for the elect elevates them in the sacrament of the54
Eucharist to the real presence of Christ in heaven.55
Zwingli interpreted the words “This is my body” as purely metaphorical and rejected the
notion that Christ was in any way actually present in the Host; Christ’s body, Wandel explains, “like
all human bodies [. . .] could only be in one place at a time.”   He objected, says MacCulloch, “that56
the physical body and blood of Christ were in heaven and that it was against nature for them to be
everywhere in the world in the forms of bread and wine.”   For Zwingli, the act of the Eucharist was57
Idolatry here is meant in the sense of “fundamentally wrong conceptualizations of the relationship between50
God and humankind, between God and the material world.  [I]dolatry named a way of thinking about God that misplaced
God, located him in things and actions where he was not to be found.”  Wandel, Reformation, 227.  See also Dixon,
Contesting the Reformation, 55; MacCulloch, Reformation, 241; and Waldron, Reformations of the Body, 59.
Poetry of Immanence, 9.51
Reformation, 243.  Brian Gerrish characterizes this as “sacramental instrumentalism” as opposed to52
Zwingli’s “symbolic memorialism.”  “The Lord’s Supper in the Reformed Confessions,” in Major Themes in the
Reformed Tradition, ed. Donald McKim (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), 245–58.  
Institutes, 1363.53
Ibid., 1371.54
MacCulloch, Reformation, 243.55
Reformation, 236.56
Reformation, 341.  In response, Luther, in “a central plank of developed Lutheran eucharistic doctrine,”57
insisted that the Divine and human natures of Christ, being fused, could partake of one another, so that the ubiquitous
quality of the Divine could be attributed to the human, bodily physicality of Christ.  Ibid.
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memorialistic in purpose, “an attempt,” as C. Scott Dixon characterizes it, “to ‘render present’
Christ’s act of sacrifice.”   But the Eucharist was not a sacrifice in itself, or if it was, then58
MacCulloch says it “was one of faith and thankfulness by a Christian to God—a way of
remembering what Jesus had done for humanity on the Cross and the promises that followed in
Scripture.”  59
In England, as on the continent, three distinct Reformed thinkers shared much in common
with regard to their views of the Incarnation.  To represent the Elizabethan via media, we may take
as an example Richard Hooker,  who struggles and at times stumbles through a series of awkward60
phrasings, as if overwhelmed by Christ’s entry into history, in describing the Incarnation in terms
that evoke its mystery and paradox:
Wherefore taking to him selfe our flesh and by his incarnation making it his own
flesh, he had now of his owne although from us what to offer unto God for us.  And
as Christ tooke manhood that by it he might be capable of death whereunto hee
humbles him selfe, so because manhood is the proper subject of compassion and
feeling pittie, which maketh the sceptre of Christes regencie even in the kingdome
of heaven amiable, he which without our nature could not on earth suffer for the
synnes of the world, doth now also by means thereof both make intercession to God
Contesting the Reformation, 55.58
Reformation, 143.59
Michael Brydon, The Evolving Reputation of Richard Hooker: An Examination of Responses, 1600–171460
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.  Peter Lake describes Hooker quite differently: “he can be seen almost to
have invented the style of piety associated with the rise of English Arminianism and the ecclesiastical policies pursued
by Charles I, Laud and their supporters during the personal rule.”  “Lancelot Andrewes, John Buckeridge, and Avant-
Garde Conformity at the Court of James I,” in The Mental World of the Jacobean Court, ed. Linda Levy Peck
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 113–33, 113.  MacCulloch, however, says that “[. . .] Hooker’s
theology is truly Elizabethan.”  Reformation, 491.
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for synners and exercise dominion over all men with a true, a natural, and a sensible
touch of mercie.61
The Incarnation is thus a complex dialectical exchange in which Christ borrows a fleshly form from
humanity only to offer it back in mortified form to God in remission of the sins of humankind.  The
flesh is again central to this description, as Hooker describes it as the only and exclusive means by
which eternal salvation could be effected.
Lancelot Andrewes, fairly considered as a figure closer to the Avant-Garde Conformist pole
on the spectrum of English Reformed belief, describes the Incarnation in the following terms during
a Christmas sermon in 1609:
And so have we here now in one, both twaine his Natures.  God sent his Sonne,
There his Divine: made of a woman, Here his humane Nature, That, from the bosome
of his Father, before all worlds: this, from the wombe of his mother, in the world.  So
that, as from eternitie, God his Father might say, that verse of the Psalme.  Filius
meus es tu, hodie genui te: Thou art my Sonne, this day have I begotten thee.  So, in
the fulnesse of time, might the Virgin his mother, no lesse truely say, Filius meus es
to, hodie peperi te: Thou art my Sonne, this day have I brought thee into the world.62
The transcendent moment of the Incarnation is captured here in the contrast between “all worlds”
that represent the Divine nature of Christ and “the world” or this world that represents Christ’s
localized and historical human form.  The emphasis on Christ’s delivery from the mortal womb of
Quoted in Jesse David Sharpe, “‘And the Word Was Made Flesh’: The Problem of the Incarnation in61
Seventeenth-Century Devotional Poetry” (PhD thesis, University of St. Andrews, 2012) (ProQuest U611652), 9.
Selected Sermons and Lectures, ed. Peter McCullough (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 169.62
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Mary stresses the humble origins which He chose for His entry into the world as well as the fleshly
character of His existence here.
Archbishop James Ussher, staunch Calvinist and a man whom Richard Snoddy says was
“fêted by English Puritans,”  begins his treatise on the Incarnation in rhetorical mode by asking how63
“that the Father of Eternity should be born in time? And that the mighty God should become a
Childe; which is the weakest state of Man himselfe?”   The answer is a thing greater than both “the64
creation of all things out of nothing” and “the resurrection from the dead, and the restauration of all
things, the last workes that shall goe before that everlasting Sabbath” (3).  Christ’s Incarnation,
however, is ultimately too large a mystery for Ussher to address; it “is an inquisition fitter for an
Angelical inteliigence, than for our shallow capacity to look after” (13), and Ussher wonders that the
fusion of Christ’s two natures did not swallow the flesh in flames like the burning bush in which God
manifested himself to Moses on Mt. Sinai: “With what astonishment then may we behold our dust
and ashes assumed into the undivided unitie of gods own person; and admitted to dwell there, as an
inmate, under the same roofe? and yet in the midst of those everlasting burnings, the bush to remain
unconsumed, and to continue fresh and green for evermore” (16).  The poetic nature of Ussher’s
expression is itself astonishing in its poignant linkage of the ashes and dust that are the symbols of
fleshly, human mortality with the flames of Christ’s Divine nature that bestows upon us unending
life.
The Soteriology of James Ussher: The Act and Object of Saving Faith, Oxford Studies in Historical63
Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3.  Elsewhere, Ussher is described as a “high Calvinist.”  Peter
Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 225.
Immanvel, or the Mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God (1638) (London: Leonard Lichfield, 1643),64
2.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main text.
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On the matter of the Eucharist, however, these figures would likely not reach a consensus,
for one was just as elusive in England as it was on the continent.  Hooker argued that because the
Divine was conjoined with human nature in the Incarnation, the sacrifice represented in the Eucharist
possessed a greater force, presence, and efficacy:  “because this substance is inseperablie joyned to65
that personall worde which by his verie divine essence is present in all thinges, the nature which
cannot have in it selfe universall presence hath it  after a sorte by beinge no where severed from that
which everie where is present [. . .] preasence by waie of conjunction is some sort of presence.”66
William Laud for the high-Church party once famously declared that “the altar was the
greatest place of God’s residence on earth”:  “yea, greater than the pulpit; for there ’tis hoc est67
corpus meum, ‘this is my body’; but in the pulpit ’tis at most hoc est verbum meum, ‘this is my
word.’”   Thus, Avant-Garde Conformists and later Laudians would value the sacraments, including68
and especially the Eucharist, over the ordinance of preaching.  Yet Laud was careful to circumscribe
exactly what the Eucharist was: it was a sacrifice, to be sure, but one of a memorial sort rather than
Waldron, Reformations of the Body, 65.65
Quoted in Whalen, Poetry of Immanence, 12.  Peter Lake has identified Hooker as among the first members66
of the English Reformed Church to emphasize ceremonialism as essential to worship rather than regarding it as
adiaphora; nowhere, however, does Hooker explicitly attack Calvinist thought.  See Anglicans and Puritans? 
Presbyterian and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 155–57; and
“Calvinism and the English Church,” Past and Present, no. 114 (February 1987): 32–76, 42.  Early English reformers,
against their conservative counterparts, adopted a position on the Eucharist “not unlike Calvin’s virtualist position, but
which was nevertheless an attempt to go beyond the Genevan reformer’s symbolic understanding.  While not containing
the substance of the body of Christ, the sacramental sign nonetheless is involved in ‘a systematic connection between
the virtual, figurative substance and divinity.’”  Whalen, Poetry of Immanence, 10 (quoting Judith H. Anderson,
“Language and History in the Reformation: Cranmer, Gardiner, and the Words of Institution,” Renaissance Quarterly
54, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 20–51, 40–41).
John Spurr, The Post-Reformation: Religion, Politics and Society in Britain, 1603–1714, Religion, Politics67
and Society in Britain Series (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2006), 74.
William Laud, The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, ed. William Scott (Oxford:68
John Parker, 1949), 6:59.
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one in which, as James F. Turrell puts it, “Christ was [. . .] sacrificed again”;  denying the Roman69
Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, Laud nevertheless affirmed a “real presence” in the
sacrament, albeit one “after a mysterious, and indeed an ineffable, manner.”70
William Perkins, on the other hand, rejected the doctrine of the real presence and saw the
sacraments instead as, in Turrell’s phrasing, “visible words” that confirmed one’s faith:71
[W]e hold and teach that Christs body and blood are truly present with the bread and
wine, being signes in the sacrament: but how? not in respect of place or coexistence:
but by Sacramentall relation on this manner.  When a word is uttered, the sound
comes to the eare; and at the same instant, the thing signified comes to the minde;
and thus by relation the word and the thing spoken of, are both present together. 
Even so at the Lords table bread & wine must not be considered barely, as substances
and creatures, but as outward signes in relation to the body and blood of Christ.72
The Eucharist was therefore “not an instrument having the grace of God tied to it [. . .] but an
instrument to which grace is present by assistance in the right use thereof”; it was a “moral and not
a physical instrument.”   Perkins in this regard compared taking the Eucharist to swearing an oath73
“Anglican Theologies of the Eucharist,” in A Companion to the Eucharist in the Reformation, ed. Lee69
Palmer Wandel, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition (New York: Brill, 2014), 139–58, 154
Laud, Works, 2:323.70
“Anglican Theologies,” 150.71
Quoted in Bryan D. Spinks, Do This in Remembrance of Me: The Eucharist from the Early Church to the72
Present Day, SCM Studies in Worship and Liturgy (London: SCM Press, 2013), 326.  The sacraments were “an outward
seale or instrument to confirme faith.”  Ibid.
Quoted in Brian Douglas, A Companion to Anglican Eucharistic Theology (New York: Brill, 2012), 1:126.73
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of loyalty,  and he believed that, although the sacraments were not instruments of conveying grace,74
they could increase grace in the person receiving them.75
The fields of play and of incarnationalism having been surveyed, it remains to connect those
two realms to one another.  Imitation is the third member of this triad of concepts that I have been
exploring, and it conjoins the ideas of play and the Incarnation in the chapters that follow.
3. Imitation
At first glance, there would appear to be little within the tradition of imitatio Christi that
could be productively linked to the notions of incarnationalism and play.  With respect to
incarnationalism, it is metaphysically impossible for a mere human successfully to imitate Christ’s
power as the Word spoken at Creation or to imitate the Word incarnated as Flesh;  and, indeed, the76
tradition of imitatio Christi was largely focused not on the imitation of Christ’s Divine nature but
rather on his earthly work and ministry as a human being.   With respect to play, most texts in the77
tradition of imitatio Christi are entirely free of any ludic spirit; stressing the mortification of the flesh
rather than an exultantly celebratory worship, Thomas à Kempis, for example, includes in his famous
volume chapters entitled “That vain hope and elation of mind are to be fled and avoided,” “That we
Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Later Reformation in England, 1547–1603, British History in Perspective (New74
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 75.
Turrell, “Anglican Theologies,” 150.75
Christopher Sutton, Disce vivere, Learne to Live (London: Cuthbert Burtby, 1602), 78 (“for howe could76
a weake creature any way imitate him who was higher then the heauens as the Apostle speaketh”).
Ibid., 74 (“As he was God, hee was he obiect of our faith, as he was man, the instruction of our life”).77
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should avoid superfluity of words and the company of worldly-living people,” and “Of the profit of
adversity.”78
The connections that I wish to trace begin, however, as far back as St. Francis of Assisi in
the early-thirteenth century.  Francis’ imitative practice has been described as less an imitatio Christi
than “an imitatio Incarnationis.”   Key to understanding this idea are the words of Paul in his epistle79
to the Philippians:
Let this minde bee in you, which was also in Christ Iesus: / Who being in the forme
of God, thought it not robbery to bee equall with God: / But made himselfe of no
reputation, and tooke vpon him the forme of a seruant, and was made in the likenesse
of men. / And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became
obedient vnto death, euen the death of the Crosse. / Wherefore God also hath highly
exalted him, and giuen him a Name which is aboue euery name.80
For St. Francis, this passage from the Scriptures represented a close link between the Incarnation and
the notion of voluntary poverty; when He became Flesh, Christ relinquished an incomparable wealth
and richness at the right hand of the Father, and this formed the basis of St. Francis’ renunciation of
the world and its trappings in imitation of his Savior.   The Incarnation therefore resides near the81
The Imitation of Christ (1418), trans. Richard Whitford (1530), ed. Edward J. Klein (New York: Harper78
& Brothers, 1941), lxi.  The chapter entitled “That we should avoid superfluity of words and the company of worldly-
living people” would seem to contradict my argument in the next section, in which I rely in part on the concept of
superfluity in the rhetorical sense as a way to define discursive play.  That chapter, however, treats a different kind of
superfluity, the act of speaking instead of more judiciously remaining silent: “I would I had holden my peace many times
when I have spoken,” Thomas says.  Ibid., 16.  There will therefore be no discordance between the definition that I shall
offer soon and the notion of imitatio Christi.
Kenneth Baxter Wolf, The Poverty of Riches: St. Francis of Assisi Reconsidered, Oxford Studies in79
Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 43.
Phil 2:5–9 (AV 1611).80
Wolf, Poverty of Riches, 42.81
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very center of imitatio Christi, and, indeed, we see similar ideas emerge throughout Thomas’ text:
“All that is in this world is vanity, but to love God and only to serve him.  [. . .]  It is therefore a great
vanity to labour inordinately for worldly riches that shortly shall perish.”   “[H]old thyself as an82
exile and as a pilgrim here in this life, and be glad, for the love of God, to be holden in the world as
a fool and a vile person, as thou art” (28).  “For all possessors of worldly goods [. . .] all who pursue
the delectable things in this world, greedily seeking things that shall not long endure [. . .] be as men
fettered and bound with chains” (156).
In England, at least, the imitatio Christi tradition becomes thoroughly “Protestantized,” as
Elizabeth K. Hudson puts it, by the time of Thomas Rogers’ 1580 publication of a translation of
Thomas à Kempis’ work.   Reformed England even begins to produce original works that build83
upon that tradition, most notable among them being Christopher Sutton’s Disce vivere, Learne to
Live (1602).   Sutton echoes many of the ideas originated by St. Francis and Thomas à Kempis, but84
they become more Anglicized and much more amenable to a tradition that valued play and
recreation.  We see first of all the Franciscan idea that the Incarnation is imitable in terms of Christ’s
renunciation of riches and status: “he exhorted to be poore in spirit, who is poorer then he, who
Imitation of Christ, 4.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main82
text.
“English Protestants and the imitatio Christi, 1580–1620,” Sixteenth-Century Journal 19, no. 4 (Winter83
1988): 541–58, 543.  Imitatio Christi was not merely a Roman Catholic phenomenon.  To the contrary, Daniel W.
Doerksen explains that it was an essential part of Calvinist practice.  Picturing Religious Experience: George Herbert,
Calvin, and the Scriptures (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 132–33.  See also J. A. W. Bennett, Poetry
of the Passion: Studies in Twelve Centuries of English Verse (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 145; Sheldrake, Heaven
in Ordinary, 5; and Adrian Streete, Protestantism and Drama in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).  “Catholic devotional writing and practices were Rome’s almost uniquely acceptable offering
to Protestant England.”  William H. Halewood, The Poetry of Grace: Reformation Themes and Structures in English
Seventeenth-Century Poetry (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 73. 
It is “the one original treatise of the period devoted specifically to the subject of Christ as exemplar.” 84
Hudson, “English Protestants,” 543.
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became from beeing equall with God, farre lower then the Angels?”   Notice, however, that Sutton85
stresses not material poverty but rather poverty “in spirit”; as he says later in his treatise, “To call
in question whether Gods people may possesse earthly commodities is an inuention more straunge
then true [. . .] hee hath giuen the earth & earthly things vnto the sonnes of men, but that they should
enjoy the same” (380).  Sutton distinguishes carefully between “the matter of money” and “loue of
money, that is, the roote of euill,” contending that riches are appropriate to Christian life as long as
rich men do not become “so carried away with the loue of riches, as they oftentimes forget and forgo
the loue of God for a little drosse and baggage of the world” (385).   Likewise, Sutton’s Savior is86
a festive Christ: “so it was that Almighty God did permit, nay expresly enioyne his people to the
keeping of the Saboath, and the solemne obseruation of other Festiuall times, and seasons, both of
which might bee as memorialles of some publike benefite receiued from him” (440–41).  Sutton
reminds his readers that the hereafter is like a “ioyfull Sabboath” that with “festiuall solemnity, they
should one day keepe (by the grace of God) in the kingdome of heauen.  For very fitly doe the Fastes
which are appointed to goe before the Feastes, signifie our condition in the life present, but the feasts
themselves our happie estate, be enioyed in the life to come” (441).
Sutton, Disce vivere, 87.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the85
main text and footnotes. 
Taking the opportunity to criticize Anabaptists, and by extension other radical Reformers, Sutton notes that86
they “wold bring in a mingle mangle [. . .] of affected pouertie,” which “is most dissonant for the state and gouernment
of Christians, especially, when God hath giuen them the blessing of peace, wherein they should honor him with all
seemlines in the bewtie and holines of his Temple” (383–84).
It is in part on this basis that W. Sears McGee proclaimed that “The puritan relationship with Christ was often
intimate, but seldom imitative.”  “More optimistic views of human nature caused anglicans, on the other hand, to look
to Christ as the exemplar for human behavior.”  The Godly Man in Stuart England, Yale Historical Publications (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 107.  Elizabeth K. Hudson concurs that this view is “well founded.”  “English
Protestants,” 555.  She goes further to state that “It is also likely that meditation upon the life of Jesus and
encouragements to emulate his human nature were too closely associated with traditional Catholic piety for puritan minds
to be comfortable with that form of spiritual practice.”  Ibid., 556.
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Alongside the “sacred” tradition of imitatio Christi, a “secular” practice of literary and
rhetorical imitatio existed during the English Renaissance.   Not only does this practice have87
important connections to the imitatio Christi tradition, but it also provides further connections
between play and incarnationalism in the thinking of the period.  “[T]he Incarnation,” Wandel says, 
“invited both representation and mimesis: the conscious effort on the part of many different
Christians to bring the living of their lives into an enactment of something they saw in Christ’s.”  88
This impulse led to the sorts of “self-fashioning” that we see in the imitation of Christ,  and it89
prompted writers, thinkers, and discourse practitioners of the day to turn their creative artistry to
visual and textual representations of Christ and of Christian themes.  The points of contact between
these two sets of practices—imitatio and imitatio Christi—are intense and profound.
According to Nandra Perry, “early modern imitatio is always, even if at some remove, a
religious project, a tribute to and (partial) rehabilitation of humanity’s original creation in the image
and likeness of God.”   Brian Cummings identifies Desiderius Erasmus’ translation of the Bible as90
a key moment in reformulating the connections between the two realms: “By performing a
reformation in reading practices, Erasmus proposed to reform Christian doctrine and moral life.”  91
Hermeneutics and sacred devotion are joined in this effort, in which, as Perry says, “imitatio Christi
We should bracket the terms secular and sacred because—“insofar as [the period’s culture] recognized87
a sacred/secular binary at all—[it] tended to identify [that binary] as an unfortunate and at least partially reparable
consequence of Original Sin.”  Nandra Perry, Imitatio Christi: The Poetics of Piety in Early Modern England (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 3.
Reformation, 8.88
See Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (1980) (Chicago:89
University of Chicago Press, 1984).
Imitatio Christi, 3.90
Brian Cummings, The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace (Oxford: Oxford91
University Press, 2002), 104–105.
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can be construed as virtually synonymous with literary imitatio,”  for Erasmus celebrates Christ “as92
the pre-eminent writer of literature,” according to Cummings, “and literature as his pre-eminent
creation.”   The trope of God as author of the text of Creation, by means of the spoken Word that93
is Christ, was common during the Renaissance, and it resonates with this idea of literature as itself
a work of Divine authorship—if God is an author and if the Divine is subject to imitation in the
person of Christ, then the Divine text of nature is also imitable and there is hope for a redemption
of human discourse in the wake of the Fall.
We can witness the dynamic between these two practices by placing the opening epistle of
Rogers’ translation of The Imitation of Christ into conversation with Philip Sidney’s A Defence of
Poetry.   As Perry has established,  Rogers begins his translation by positioning Thomas within the94 95
discourse of Renaissance humanism and poetics:  “A shame were it therefore for vs to imitate so
painefulie as manie do in eloquence Cicero; in philosophie Aristotle; in lawe Iustinian; in Physick
Galen for worldlie wisedome [. . .] and not to folowe our Sauior Christ in heauenlie wisedome, and
in al godlines of manners.”   Imitation for Rogers is a distinctly human impulse—“Who entereth96
into a due consideration of mans nature, shal easilie perceaue that most stranglie it is addicted vnto
Imitation”—and it must be harnessed to proper examples in order for it to yield good rather than evil
Imitatio Christi, 6.92
Literary Culture, 105.  “Scripture, truth, presence, authorship, are synonymous.  Christ is our author; his93
authorship is present in his words; his presence guarantees truth; the truth is delivered in these words, written in scripture.
Scripture presents a living and breathing Christ, ‘almost more effectively,’ Erasmus breathtakingly declares, than when
he dwelt among men.”  Ibid.
Perry, Imitatio Christi, 20 (“[. . .] Rogers and Sidney were participating (albeit in different ways) in the94
same broad cultural conversation”).
Ibid., 22.95
“The First Epistle of the Translator,” in Of the Imitation of Christ (London: Henrie Denham, 1580),96
unpaginated.  Because the epistle is unpaginated, further citations, which would be of limited utility to the reader, will
be omitted.
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results; if we find it proper to imitate the luminaries of classicism in worldly affairs, then it is only
appropriate that we strive toward an imitation of Christ in “al godlines.”  Imitating Christ is
therefore, according to Perry, “as much about good hermeneutics as it is about holiness”;  it is “less97
a time-honored technique of assimilation to the divine than an ex tempore concession to fallen
human nature and culture, both of which are too tragically subject to the passions to be ‘moved’ by
reason alone.”   In the human world of fallen models, fallen nature, and fallen discourse, it is only98
Christ as a model of behavior that can salvage the human subject.
Sidney, too, in his narratio, emphasizes hermeneutics within the humanist tradition of the
Renaissance, reminding his readers that both philosophy and history are indebted to poets and to
poetry: “to all them that, professing learning, inveigh against poetry, may justly be objected that they
go very near to ungratefulness, to seek to deface that which, in the noblest nations and languages that
are known, hath been the first light-giver to ignorance.”   It is therefore unsurprising that Sidney99
turns promptly to the notion of Divine language and discourse; speaking of the poet in terms that
evoke the Creation, Sidney proclaims—in what Michael Mack describes as “playful
pneumatology” —that “with the force of a divine breath he bringeth things forward” (344). 100
Sounding on the theme of imitation, Sidney defines the art in Aristotelian terms as “an art of
imitation” and then immediately emphasizes that “The chief” kind of imitation, “both in antiquity
and excellency, were they that did imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God” (345), principally
Imitatio Christi, 22.97
Ibid., 23.98
A Defence of Poetry (1595), in English Renaissance Literary Criticism, ed. Brian Vickers (1999) (Oxford:99
Clarendon Press, 2007), 336–91, 338.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the
main text.
Sidney’s Poetics: Imitating Creation (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 82.100
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David in the Psalms.  The role of nature as an object of imitation does not receive short shrift
(342–43), but Sidney’s discussion in that regard is clearly keyed to the following passage: “Neither
let it be deemed too saucy a comparison to balance the highest point of man’s wit with the efficacy
of nature; but rather give right honour to the heavenly Maker of that maker, who having made man
to His own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second nature: which in nothing
he showeth so much as in poetry” (344).  The difference between God the Creator and the human
poet, for Sidney, consists in merely a capital letter.   Given Christ’s status as a speaker (or more101
properly the spoken), whose holy name uttered across the dark waters gives life to Creation, Sidney
perceives the proper role and task of the poet as that of re-creation or recreation.102
Play, incarnationalism, and imitation: these three concepts are the essential strands of my
central argument, and they are pervasive in the thinking of the early modern period to which I am
attending in this dissertation.  Play and incarnationalism, I contend, are respectively the means and
ends of much Renaissance discourse; play was the vehicle through which the Renaissance discourse
practitioners that I shall consider here endeavored to achieve in their works a sense of Christ’s
incarnational presence.  Imitation links these two concepts; through play, masters of speech, imagery,
and verse during the period sought to imitate Christ’s Incarnation as the Word made Flesh.  In the
If Sidney was not “saucy” enough to take explicitly the next logical step—“the conclusion that the poet,101
being a creator ex nihilo, is like a God” (Cummings, Literary Culture, 266)—then George Puttenham, Sidney’s
predecessor, was willing to do so: “It is therefore of poets thus to be conceiued, that if they be able to deuise and make
all these things of them selues, without any subiect of veritie, that they be (by maner of speech) as creating gods.”  The
Arte of English Poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), 4.  On the boldness of this comparison, see Mack, Sidney’s
Poetics, 10.
Mack, Sidney’s Poetics, 113 (“The relation here is the traditional typological understanding of creation as102
a foreshadowing of the recreation in grace”).  See also A. J. Smith, Metaphysical Wit (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 11 (“Poetic invention itself amounts to a rediscovery of the hidden articulation of the creation, the recovery
by human wit of the infinitely subtle interconnections of all the forms of being”).  For a discussion of Sidney’s treatment
of the role of pleasure in poetry, see Robert Matz, “Sidney’s Defence of Poesie: The Politics of Pleasure,” English
Literary Renaissance 25, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 131–47.
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next section, I shall focus more intently on the first of these three concepts, play, from the
definitional standpoint, attempting through a review of contemporary scholarly literature on play to
extend common definitions of play into the discursive realm.  The question of why the discourse
practitioners whom I consider might have chosen play as a means of imitative worship is one that
I shall defer until Chapter V, the conclusion. 
B.  DEFINITION
What Is Discursive Play?
The project of defining play is a surprisingly difficult endeavor, perhaps because, in Huizinga’s
famous words, “the fun of playing, resists all analysis, all logical interpretation” (HL, 3).  Caillois
concurs in this assessment: “The multitude and infinite variety of games at first causes one to despair
of discovering a principle of classification capable of subsuming them under a small number of well-
defined categories.  Games also possess so many different characteristics that many approaches are
possible” (MPaG, 11).   These observations can be viewed as somewhat disheartening, for they103
appear not to bode well for the enterprise undertaken in this section.  As a field of inquiry, the study
of play is immense both in terms of the quantity of existing research and the number of disciplines
with which the field potentially intersects.   Indeed, because poiesis itself is a mode of play (HL,104
Other figures in ludology concur.  See, for example, Stephen Nachmanovitch, “This Is Play,” New Literary103
History 40, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 1–24, 15 (“Play is easy to recognize but impossible to define”).
See Brian Edwards, Theories of Play and Postmodern Fiction (New York: Garland Press, 1998), 12 (“the104
number and variety of studies of play yields a multiplicity that interferes with both definitions and comparative
analyses”); Peter Hutchinson, Games Authors Play (London: Methuen, 1983), 4 (“play in literature [is] an area which
seems to resist the generalizations which can quite easily be applied to sporting as well as to social games”); and R.
Rawdon Wilson, In Palamedes’ Shadow: Explorations in Play, Game, and Narrative Theory (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1990), 76 (“The play concept’s multiple formulations and pervasive applicability exceed, elude one
might say, the boundaries of any single model of literary analysis”).
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119), any act of discursive creation may accurately albeit inconsequentially be characterized as
ludic.105
Yet these difficulties also suggest a tentative hypothesis.  If play in its freedom and
abundance does not easily succumb to analytical or taxonomical strictures,  then it is because play,106
as Brian Edwards explains, is “Associated with movement rather than conclusion, involving action
of enquiry and process while resisting resolution”; as a consequence, “its definitions are, by
definition, provisional.”   Accordingly, the task at hand requires the avoidance not only of107
inexactitude but also of facile comprehensiveness, the propounding of an analytical framework too
rigid and brittle to withstand the flux and variability that characterize play itself.  And because even
“provisional clarity,” according to Robert R. Wilson, can render “the concept of game [. . .] a useful
analytic concept,”  progress toward defining discursive play depends less upon developing a108
definitive model of play in its totality than upon obtaining an incrementally more sound approach
specifically tailored to the manifestations of the ludic impulse in the study of discourse.
But see Warnke, “Sacred Play,” 463 (“however universally applicable the play-concept of art may be, we105
are left with the fact that Baroque art is playful in a special and particularly intense way”).
Game theory, from the disciplines of mathematics and economics, offers a “structure for clarifying strategic106
issues in plot design and character development that most literary theories do not.”  Steven J. Brams, “Game Theory and
Literature,” Games and Economic Behavior 6, no. 1 (January 1994): 32–54, 34.  However, research in this direction has
not been productive because literary scholars—including myself—typically lack the expertise required to conduct
meaningful game theory analyses, just as experts in game theory tend not to possess the skills of literary critics.  Ibid.,
50.  See also Elizabeth W. Bruss, “The Game of Literature and Some Literary Games,” New Literary History 9, no. 1
(Autumn 1977): 153–72, 170 (“Many of the qualities of mind, motivation, and individual behavior upon which formal
game theory is predicated seem primitive in comparison to literary treatments of these same phenomena”).
Theories of Play, 273.107
“Rules/Conventions: Three Paradoxes in the Game/Text Analogy,” South Central Review 3, no. 4 (Winter108
1986): 15–27, 26 (“denied [a provisional clarity], it will behave rather like a chesspiece transformed, by the exigencies
of a child’s informal play, into a mere plaything, or like a gameless shuttlecock”).
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Huizinga’s Homo Ludens is often cited as the seminal work on the study of play as a cultural
phenomenon;  it therefore provides a rational point of entry into the definitional enterprise. 109
Huizinga, after an extended analysis of the various features that characterize play, propounds the
following definition: “play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits
of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself
and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness that it is ‘different’ from
‘ordinary life’” (HL, 28).
The first component in this definition, the idea that play is voluntary, must be dressed further
because it proves to be the most common element of scholarly definitions of play, the most widely
accepted facet of Huizinga’s investigation.  The importance of a sound definition to anchor the
analysis contained in the following chapters warrants an extended quotation:
Play to order is no longer play: it could at best be but a forcible imitation of it.  By
this quality of freedom alone, play marks itself off from the course of the natural
process.  [. . .]
[F]or the adult and the responsible human being play is a function which he
could equally well leave alone.  Play is superfluous.  The need for it is only urgent
See, for example, James H. Evans, Playing: Christian Explorations of Daily Living, Compass109
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 4; Ronald E. Foust, “The Rules of the Game: A Para-Theory of Literary Theories,”
South Central Review 3, no. 4 (Winter 1986): 5–14, 6; Rabia Gregory, “Citing the Medieval: Using Religion as World-
Building Infrastructure in Fantasy MMORPGs,” in Playing with Religion in Digital Games, ed. Heidi A. Campbell and
Gregory P. Grieve (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 134–53, 140; Kim Kullman, “Caillois: Man, Play
and Games,” in Encyclopedia of Play in Today’s Society, ed. Rodney P. Carlisle (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications, 2009), 107–10, 107; and Mechthild Nagel, Masking the Abject: A Genealogy of Play (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2002), 5n6.  See also Jacques Ehrmann, “Homo Ludens Revisited,” trans. Cathy Lewis and Phil Lewis,
Yale French Studies, no. 41 (1968): 31–57, 31 (“it is impossible to ignore Huizinga’s book [. . .], which inaugurates an
anthropology of play expressing views of remarkable scope and insight.  Huizinga is in fact the first to have undertaken,
in a systematic way, to establish certain relationships between various human activities (law, war, poetry, art, etc.) which
at first glance might appear to have nothing in common”); and Warren Motte, Playtexts: Ludics in Contemporary
Literature, Stages (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 4 (describing Homo Ludens as “the touchstone modern
formulation” of play theory).
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to the extent that the enjoyment of it makes it a need.  Play can be deferred or
suspended at any time.  It is never imposed by physical necessity or moral duty.  It
is never a task.  It is done at leisure, during ‘free time’.  Only when play is recognized
as a cultural function—a rite, a ceremony—is it bound up with notions of obligation
and duty.
Here, then, we have the first main characteristic of play: that it is free, is in
fact freedom.  (HL, 7–8).
As I take it, the crucial portion of this analysis is the notion that “Play is superfluous” (HL,
8).  One plays because he or she wishes to do so, not because he or she must, and in playing nothing
tangible is gained—play is unnecessary, and its enjoyment as a kind of surplus activity beyond the
needs of mere subsistence is precisely what makes it playful, recreative, or ludic in its spirit.  The
Renaissance mind in its conception of play also understood this dimension of the phenomenon, as
we can see in the remarks of John Harington to the effect that play or gambling for profit is akin to
work as well as in his definition of play itself.   Moreover, other leading figures in ludology concur110
in this assessment.   Most famously, Caillois has called play “an occasion of pure waste: waste of111
time, energy, ingenuity, skill, and often of money” (MPaG, 5–6).  Peter Gray has identified this
Treatise on Playe, 157, 188.110
My omission of Jacques Derrida from among the number of play theorists whose works I shall consider111
in this analysis is not accidental, despite the fact that he has written influential texts relevant to the study of play.  See,
for example, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1966), in Writing and Difference
(1967), trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 278–93.  This dissertation is so fundamentally
committed to the notion of logocentrism and to the idea that Renaissance discourse does indeed possess a stable center
that Derrida’s voice would be decidedly out of place.  See Baumlin, Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse, 161
(poststructuralist theory “would seem to question the very possibility of an incarnationalism that asserts the unity of
speech, meaning, and subjective consciousness—in terms of Christian theology, of the Word made Flesh”); and
Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics, 8 (“in the Incarnation, the sign is identical to its referent”).  See also John M. Ellis,
Against Deconstruction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Raymond Tallis, Theorrhoea and After (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and R. V. Young, At War with the Word: Literary Theory and Liberal Education
(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1999).
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element of freedom as the cardinal shared feature among contemporary definitions of play.   And112
Bruce Michelson, in his suggestion that Roland Barthes’ jouissance is an apt critical basis for a
theory of literary wit,  points us yet again toward the concept of the gratuitous.  For Barthes, “The113
brio of the text (without which, after all, there is no text) is its will to bliss: just where it exceeds
demand, transcends prattle, and whereby it attempts to overflow, to break through the constraint of
adjectives—which are those doors of language through which the ideological and the imaginary
come flowing in.”114
I pause at this juncture because of my sensitivity to what might seem incongruous in my
analysis: applying contemporary play theory to period discourses.  On this score, several points
might be marshaled in answering a possible objection.
First, Huizinga, at least, was not attempting just to describe play in the early twentieth century
during which he wrote; rather, his objective was to explain what play at a more fundamental level
strictly speaking is—“The incidence of play is not associated with any particular stage of civilization
or view of the universe” (HL, 3).  Although inadequately historicized by today’s critical standards,
Huizinga’s point possesses some degree of merit to the extent that play may properly be described
as instinctive, a feature of both the animal and the human domains alike.  
Second, this potential objection has been addressed before: Burke calls that objection “the
discontinuity thesis” and describes it for the sake of argument as “The greatest danger facing
historians of our topic”—“to assume continuity and to work with the modern concepts of leisure and
“Definitions of Play,” Scholarpedia 8.7 (2013), doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.30578.112
Literary Wit (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 3–4.113
The Pleasure of the Text (1973), trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), 13–14.  See also114
ibid., 19 (“an excess of the text [. . .] what in it exceeds any (social) function and any (structural) functioning”).
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sport, projecting them back on to the past without asking about the meanings which contemporaries
gave to their activities.”   His response to the discontinuity thesis is to counter-object that it is based115
on a false binary, one that cuts “European history into two slices, pre-industrial and industrial. 
Unfortunately, the binary opposition between what one might call a ‘festival culture’ and a ‘leisure
culture’, like many dichotomies and polarities, is as misleading as it is convenient.”  116
Third, the objection tends to assume that the Renaissance mind possessed an adequately
developed theory of play that could be erected as a model over against contemporary theories, but
this simply is not the case.  Although Renaissance figures wrote at length about play, nothing as
developed as the ideas of Huizinga and other contemporary theorists existed during the period, nor
could it by the very terms in which the objection must be framed.  Anticipating Burke’s idea of a
discontinuity thesis, Jürgen Moltmann explains that “Play has become a theoretical problem only
since man has been forced into disciplined, rationalized labor at constantly growing industrial
complexes and since playfulness has been banned from the realm of labor as mere foolishness.”  117
In other words, if the differences between contemporary and period play are sufficiently significant
to make us suspicious of applying theories of the former to the latter, then they must also be so
different that period play might not have been perceived as adequately problematic even to prompt
the generation of a tenable play theory of a native nature. 
Fourth, this position takes for granted that there was a monolithic Renaissance position on
games and play, a coherent view that could be applied to Renaissance discourses in lieu of
contemporary theories.  Of course, this was not the case then any more than it is true of today’s play-
“Invention of Leisure,” 138.115
Ibid., 138–39.116
Theology of Play, trans. Reinhard Ulrich (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 3–4.117
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theory landscape: “During the Renaissance period,” Arcangeli says, “there was never such a thing
as a universally shared paradigm, a single intellectual or ideological scheme against which pastimes
were conceived, organized and valued.”  118
To conclude, and on my own account, the differences in perceptions of play between the
Renaissance and the contemporary era are no more significant than the differences that exist among
contemporary play theories themselves, meaning that one could equally well object that I have
chosen to base my definition of discursive play on one set of contemporary arguments rather than
another.  But by relying principally on contemporary works universally regarded as seminal in the
field and by focusing on widely shared facets from contemporary views of play, I have been able to
guard against that possible objection.
Returning to the notion of excess in Barthes, waste in Caillois, and superfluity in Huizinga
provides us with a common element in definitions of play, but it remains to extend this idea to the
discursive realm.  Ronald E. Foust is a critic who both recognizes the need for a theory of textual
play and then supplies the demand.  His error, however, is in rushing toward a typology of literary
games before defining what textual or discursive play is in the first instance.  He perceives four types
of textual play: first, “the synecdochical game,” in which a game actually takes place within the text
(Sir Gawain and the Green Knight is his cardinal example);  second, “the structural game,” in119
which the author constructs an agon within the text in order to generate a compelling plot and
capture the reader’s attention (8–9); third, “the logos game,” in which the author gestures self-
reflexively back toward his or her own text (Barth, Coover, Gass, and Barthelme are his prime
Recreation in the Renaissance, 108.118
 Foust, “Rules of the Game,” 7–8.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references119
in the main text.
38
examples) (9); and finally, “the anagogic game, the game that encompasses all the others and toward
which each has been tending”—“it is the serious game conducted between the absent author and the
present reader, and it is, teleologically, the goal of both literary and critical texts” (9).  Peter
Hutchinson’s effort in the direction of a comprehensive theory of literary games is also admirable
but ultimately suffers from the same neglect, a tendency toward typology over definition.  Indeed,
Hutchinson’s definition of literary play is intrinsically circular: “a literary game may be seen as any
playful, self-conscious and extended means by which an author stimulates his reader to deduce or
to speculate, by which he encourages him to see a relationship between different parts of the text,
or between the text and something extraneous to it.”120
So, assuming for the moment that play in general can be typified or described as a kind of
excess, waste, or superfluity, to what extent does that insight supply us with a basis for defining play
specifically in the discursive realm?  As it happens, the field of rhetoric supplies a ready conceptual
structure onto which the notion of excess may be mapped in order to advance us toward such a
definition.
Jeanne Fahnestock has surveyed in extensive detail a wide range of theories of figuration that
rhetoricians, and scholars and critics of rhetoric, have invoked to explain the functioning of metaphor
in language.   In her effort to explain those theories to her audience and to situate them with respect121
to one another, she confronted a provocative set of questions: “Any definition of the figures as
formal devices that depart from a norm in linguistic usage begs the question of how that norm should
be defined.  Is the normal in a language defined as the set of acceptable usages?  Or is it defined in
Games Authors Play, 14 (emphasis original).120
Rhetorical Figures in Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  Subsequent citations in this121
paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main text.
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the sense of the typical, the most frequently occurring among possibilities?” (15).  As one proposed
answer to those questions, Fahnestock suggested the hypothetical concept of “an unfigured or
degree-zero style,” against which “The figures become markers of the literary text, removed from
the world of functional discourse” (20).  Although she notes that the idea, as an explanatory tool,
“seem[s] inescapably sensible” (20), Fahnestock is careful to register the fact that the tool is a purely
hypothetical one, because even “‘flat’ or ‘plain’ or ‘bald’ sentences” apparently free of figuration
“can still be said to convey an emotion: the emotion of flatness or calmness, seriousness, steady-eyed
contemplation, or straight conviction” (21).  In other words, figuration in language is largely
inescapable,  even in what we might imagine as the epitome of a “degree-zero style,” a telephone122
book or an instruction manual.
Figure 3.  A Continuum of Discursive Figuration.
See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore:122
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 33.
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If we join with Fahnestock in employing this notion of “degree-zero style” as a useful
heuristic toward a definition of discursive play, then we can imagine a continuum of discourses with
degree-zero, perfectly flat, and completely unfigured prose at one fixed pole on the spectrum (Figure
3).  Ordinary prose and speech—the textbook or the conference paper, for example—would reside
near that pole but not at it, for tropes and metaphors are natural and inherent parts of language. 
Literary prose might be imagined further along this continuum, with verse positioned yet more
distant from degree-zero—this is highly figured and elaborate language that opens itself to rich
interpretive possibilities.  Some thinkers, Paul de Man and Jean Paulhan among them, have
approached literary language as “the place,” Michael Syrotinski explains, “where language’s
rhetorical energy is most playfully exploited.”   But I posit a further pole yet on this123
continuum—the hyperabundant text that more conspicuously still revels in its own ripeness of
figuration, that is extraordinarily dense with meaning and signification, and that, in short, engages
in excessive figuration not only beyond the strict demands of communication but also beyond our
expectations for the more aureated language of literary texts.  According to Stephen Nachmanovitch,
“The opposite of play is not work or seriousness, because work can be play and play can be serious. 
[. . .]  The opposite of play is one-dimensionality or literal-mindedness.”  124
This notion of ludic discourse as excessive figuration far beyond a hypothetical flat or
“degree-zero style” is, of course, not native to the Renaissance, but connate ideas are already nascent
in many rhetorical manuals from throughout the period.  Thomas Wilson in 1553 describes the art
Defying Gravity: Jean Paulhan’s Interventions in Twentieth-Century French Intellectual History, SUNY123
Series: The Margins of Literature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 15.  Significantly, Fahnestock
has recognized an indebtedness to Paulhan’s thinking.  Rhetorical Figures, 17.  Paulhan considered literary language
in much the same way that I am characterizing it here: a “fatter” or “expanded” version of regular discourse.  Syrotinski,
Defying Gravity, 10.  De Man recognized Paulhan himself as an eminently playful figure.  Ibid., 13.
“This Is Play,” 12.124
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of figuration by analogy to the clothing of the body, thus imagining rhetoric and figuration to be
things in excess of the natural state of language: 
If we thinke it comelinesse and honestie to set forthe the bodie with handsome
apparil and thinke them worthie to haue money, that bothe can and wil use it
accordingly: I can not otherwise see but that this parte deserueth praise, which
standith whollie in settyng forthe the matter, by apt wordes and sentences together,
and beautifieth the tonge with great chaunge of colours, and varietie of figures.125
More directly, Wilson defines a figure as “a certaine kinde, either of sentence, Oration, or woorde,
vsed after some newe or straunge wise, much unlike to that whiche men commonly vse to speake,”126
expressing in this passage an understanding that figuration is a departure from what Fahnestock
describes as a “degree-zero style.”  George Puttenham in 1589 writes that “As figures be the
instruments of ornament in euery language, so be they also in a sort abuses or rather trespasses in
speach, because they passe the ordinary limits of common vtterance.”   Continuing, Puttenham127
describes figurative speech as “a noueltie of language euidently (and yet not absurdly) estranged
from the ordinarie habite and manner of our dayly talke and writing.”   Again, therefore, we see an128
idea in the Renaissance that is remarkably similar to Fahnestock’s contemporary notion.  In around
1599 John Hoskyns states simply that “all metaphors go beyond the signification of things,”  but129
he continues on to note that this transgression of metaphor against the literal is a source of
The Arte of Rhetorike (1553) (London: Ihon Kingston, 1584), 164.125
Ibid., 172.126
The Arte of English Poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), 129.127
Ibid., 132–33.128
“Sidney’s Arcadia and the Rhetorics of English Prose (c. 1599),” in Vickers, English Renaissance Literary129
Criticism, 399–427, 400.
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pleasure.   Henry Peacham, too, emphasizes the pleasure to be gained from rhetoric when he offers130
his treatise for “ease, release, and recreation.”   And finally, more than a century after Thomas131
Wilson’s treatise, Thomas Blount demonstrates for us that this same constellation of ideas still
possesses currency during the period.132
I must be careful at this juncture, however, to distinguish between the kind of language that
I am characterizing as excessive, playful, or ludic and the kind of language that falls within a pre-
existing and already very well-discussed category: Erasmian copia.  Copia as a term refers to the
concept of abundance —“The speech of man is a magnificent and impressive thing when it surges133
along like a golden river, with thoughts and words pouring out in rich abundance.”   But abundance134
is a thing distinct from excess.  “In general,” Angela Locatelli says, copia “meant all the devices that
were necessary in order to make discourse more persuasive and elegant.”   We see again here the135
idea of necessity as a baseline against which higher forms of rhetoric can be judged, although the
necessities of copia are surely more elaborate than the demands of “degree-zero style.”  Excessive
or ludic discourse, therefore, can be considered that which goes beyond the needs of copia: the
discourse at issue may be “persuasive and elegant” already, yet it proceeds to offer greater richness.
Ibid., 401.130
Garden of Eloqvence (1577) (London: H. Iackson, 1593), i.131
See The Academie of Eloquence (London: Humphrey Mosely, 1654), 2–3.132
Angela Locatelli, “The Land of ‘Plenty’: Erasmus’ De Copia and English Renaissance Rhetoric,” in133
Silenos: Erasmus in Elizabethan Literature, ed. Claudia Corti, Studi di letteratura moderne e comparate (Pisa: Pacini,
1998), 41–57, 44.  Locatelli also reminds us that a second definition of copia is imitation.  Ibid.
Desiderius Erasmus, Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style (1534), trans. Betty I. Knott, in vol. 24 of134
Collected Works of Erasmus, Literary and Educational Writings 2, ed. Craig R. Thompson (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1978), 279–659, 295.
“Land of ‘Plenty,’” 48 (emphasis supplied).135
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None of this is to say that excessive, ludic discourse affirmatively violates the Erasmian ideal
of copia or that the excesses of ludic discourse are merely decorative ornament superadded to the
raw content of the discourse.  To the contrary, Erasmus was quite clear about how copia could be
improperly exceeded by those who “pile up a meaningless heap of words and expressions without
any discrimination, and thus obscure the subject they are talking about, as well as belabouring the
ears of their unfortunate audience.”   “[W]e find that unskilled practitioners of the full style chatter136
on without restraint, and yet say far too little, omitting a good many of the things that need to be
said.”   The ludic discourse practitioner, rather, provides an excess of content, meaning, and137
signification, as well as an excess of figuration; the discourse he or she offers is richly multivalent,
containing a diversity of parallel ideas superimposed upon one another so that they become mutually
reinforcing.   Just as copia itself was not considered by Erasmus to be simply138
ornamental —instead, the style and the substance of the discourse “are so interconnected in reality139
that one cannot easily separate one from the other” —neither is the excess of ludic discourse.140
To summarize, my notion of ludic discourse in this dissertation—provisional and tentative
as it must be—is based upon the ideas of excess, superfluity, and gratuitousness, the most common
elements of definitions of play from the most prominent contemporary theorists in the field:
discourse that is excessive, both in terms of its use of figuration and in terms of its tendency
Copia, 295.136
Ibid., 301.137
This “surplus of signification” is the state in which a “fictive text is subject to multiple interpretations, and,138
more generally, there is always more going on than we can know at any given place in time.”  Susan Stewart, Nonsense:
Aspects of Intertextuality in Folklore and Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 93.
Copia, 301 (copia involves not just “Richness of expression” but also “Richness of subject-matter”).  See139
also Locatelli, “Land of ‘Plenty,’” 45–46.
Erasmus, Copia, 301.140
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toward surpluses of signification, as judged against the needs of a hypothetical “degree-zero style”
discourse, and that is distinct both from Erasmian copia and from the indecorous violation of
copia.  I expect that this definition will serve for the time being to illuminate the reader’s encounter
with the case studies that follow in subsequent chapters and also that those case studies will in turn
help to add clarity and substance to the definition.
C.  MATRIX
Toward a Typology of Discursive Play
Even as scholars and critics have grown in the direction of taking play seriously, a salutary
movement, there has also been a tendency in some quarters toward what Bernard Suits calls “loose
talk” about games,  a “definitional flaccidity,” in R. Rawdon Wilson’s terms, difficult to avoid141
because it arises necessarily from the nature of play.   In other words, not only have many critical142
voices been fairly careless with the matter of defining play,  but they have also not taken pains to143
distinguish between and among different types of play.  It is the second problem that this section will
attempt to address by developing and presenting a typology of playful discourses.
By way of illustration, take Nardo’s statement on the ludic practice of George Herbert: “By
creating poetic puzzles, Herbert invites readers to engage in a game that the poet wins only when we
“The Detective Story: A Case Study of Games in Literature,” Canadian Review of Contemporary Literature141
12, no. 2 (June 1985): 200–19, 215.
In Palamedes’ Shadow, 79.142
As one example among many, I shall summarize the case of Louis Untermeyer, who long ago embarked143
upon the promising thesis that “poetry is as playful as it is profound.”  Play in Poetry: The Henry Ward Beecher Lectures
Delivered at Amherst College; October, 1937 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938), 4.  Yet his definition of play was
deeply problematic from the outset: “By ‘playful’ I do not mean merely the outburst of high spirits or the formal light-
heartedness of light verse.  I mean the essential spirit which unites and intensifies the figures of speech, the hyperboles
and similes, all of which represent the poet’s varying use of the invariable impulse to play.”  Ibid.  To the extent that it
is not simply hollow (“the essential spirit which unites and intensifies”), the proposed definition is strikingly circular:
He means by “playful” that which represents “the invariable impulse to play.”  Ibid. 
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discover the solution.”   In my mind, Nardo here has conflated two quite distinct aspects of144
discursive play.  On one hand, a game is primarily characterized by an active and on-going
relationship between or among multiple “players” (an author and his or her reader), while a puzzle
is a play occasion with no opportunity for such an interchange, as the poet simply creates an artifact
for the reader to decipher.  Moreover, a discourse that works like a puzzle is a highly telic one (in
general there is only one solution toward which the play action drives), while one that functions as
a game does generally admits of multiple possible outcomes (any one of two or more “players” can
“win”).
Consider also R. Darby Williams’ study of George Herbert’s poem “Paradise.”   The poem145
that Williams examines is indeed conspicuously ludic in design—relying not merely on the common
poetic device of rhyme but also accentuating those rhymes through excessive typography and
wordplay—as well as incarnational in aspiration: its construction on the model of pruning described
in the piece itself seeks to enact what the words of the poem describe:
I blesse thee, Lord because I GROW
Among thy trees, which in a ROW
To thee both fruit and order OW
What open force, or hidden CHARM
Can blast my fruit, or bring me HAR M,
While the inclosure is thine ARM?
Inclose me still for fear I START.
Be to me rather sharp and TART,
Then let me want thy hand & ART.
Ludic Self, 102 (emphasis supplied).144
“Two Baroque Game Poems on Grace: Herbert’s ‘Paradise’ and Milton’s ‘On Time,’” Criticism 10, no.145
3 (Summer 1970): 180–94.
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When thou dost greater judgements SPARE,
And with thy knife but prune and PARE,
Ev’n fruitfull trees more fruitfull ARE.
Such sharpness show the sweetest FREND:
Such cuttings rather heal than REND:
And such beginnings touch their END.146
Williams’ response to the ludic design of the piece is very much in the mold of “lyric
cryptography”;  he arranges the capitalized words at the ends of the first lines of each stanza into147
a “ROW,” following Herbert’s cue to associate “the ‘trees’ which are said to contain the message (“I
GROW / Among thy trees”) with the final capitalized letters”:
IGROWCHARMISTARTSPAREFREND.148
“From this arrangement,” Williams says,” the gardener-decoder begins to ‘pare’ or ‘inclose’ certain
of the letters by cutting and removing them from the series,” revealing a hidden message in the piece:
IGROWCH(A)R(M)IST(ART)S(PARE)FREND =
I GROW CHRISTS FREND.149
Needless to say, it can be objected that Williams has taken too many liberties with Herbert’s text,
interpreting it too aggressively,  but the larger point for the purposes of this discussion is the way150
in which he describes what Herbert has done: “to find Christ the reader must play the game.  And,
George Herbert, The English Poems of George Herbert, ed. C. A. Patrides (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and146
Littlefield, 1974), 143–44.
John Shoptaw, “Lyric Cryptography,” Poetics Today 21, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 221–62.147
Williams, “Two Baroque Game Poems,” 183–84.148
Ibid., 184.149
Indeed, this is at least part of the reason that I selected Williams’ interpretation for this example: It is so150
strong as to be almost grotesquely ludic in itself, and it sets very nearly the outer limit for what might be counted as a
credible reading of the poem.  Although I shall offer some exceptionally close, and in some cases rather strong, readings
in the following pages, I shall not cross the threshold that Williams has established here.  See also Roy Neil Graves,
“Herbert’s ‘The Collar,’” Explicator 54, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 73–77 (plotting the rhyme scheme of the poem in the
standard A, B, C fashion and then reading hidden messages within the letters corresponding to each rhyme).  
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as in reading so many of Herbert’s poems, by playing the game and uncovering the trick being used,
the reader also comes to discover the hand of God at work.”   As I perceive these two key terms,151
they are diametrically opposed rather than cognate with one another: a game permits engagement
between reader and writer, while a trick only permits the reader passively to observe the writer’s
ingenuity or to be stunned by his or her unexpected innovation.
Given the need for a more precise typology of discursive play, therefore, the first step in this
endeavor should be an attempt to define as clearly as possible the two broad terms that regularly
emerge as central in discussions of ludic discourse: game and play.  Huizinga generally speaks in
terms of play; Caillois, however, focuses on games.   Other forms of play such as puzzles and152
tricks, as we have seen, are often cited as well.  Because game and play are not necessarily
synonymous,  and because the distinction between game and play has been described by Wilson153
as the “most important problem to be solved” in penetrating the definitional morass that can engulf
the study of ludics,  this inquiry appears to be one that cannot be deferred, and it thus provides a154
rational starting point for this analysis.
On an intuitive level, the difference between play and games seems to be one that can be
easily stated: play is a general term that denotes a broader range of ludic activities than the word
“Two Baroque Game Poems,” 184 (emphasis supplied).151
According to Warren Motte, Caillois’ major critique of Huizinga’s work was Huizinga’s emphasis on agon152
to the exclusion of other types of play.  “Playing in Earnest,” 28.
Edwards, Theories of Play, 12.153
In Palamedes’ Shadow 72.  Brian Edwards considers the potential confusion between these terms as one154
of the two main problems facing criticism based on concepts of play, ranking on a par with the sheer volume of research
that exists on the subject.  Theories of Play, 12.
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game, which represents only a particular kind of playing.   For example, a child running through155
a field is engaged in play regardless of whether he or she is pretending to be an airplane or
participating in a round of tag, but only in the latter case would one ordinarily characterize that
activity as a game.  A deck of cards might be used for a hand of poker or to construct a fragile tower
on a table-top; both activities could be characterized as playful or as examples of play, but only the
former would usually be considered a game.  In Edwards’ succinct formulation, “games involve play
but play is not bound to games.”   But on closer examination, this distinction proves to be less156
clear.  Although the Super Bowl is nominally a game of football in which the members of each team
play, one would be hard-pressed to characterize either the behavior or the attitudes of the participants
as playful.  The game is a serious business—the participants are being paid to take part in an activity
which is highly profitable for them (and for others), and thus they are in a very real sense working. 
Whether or not they are enjoying the activity, “having fun,” is entirely incidental; indeed, one can
easily imagine that the physical pain and the high stakes involved can make this particular play-
experience extraordinarily stressful rather than recreational.   These fundamental terms therefore157
require closer critical attention.
Definitions of game are not in short supply.  According to Elliott M. Avedon and Brian
Sutton-Smith, a game is “an exercise of voluntary control systems in which there is an opposition
As Hutchinson explains, play is a “wider, all-embracing” term than game.  Games Authors Play, 2.  See155
also Wilson, In Palamedes’ Shadow, 76 (“One might suppose that play must be the more general concept and that though
all games presuppose playfulness, not all play leads to gamefulness”).
Theories of Play, 12.156
This example bolsters Jacques Ehrmann’s critique of the ideas of play developed by Huizinga and Caillois. 157
For Ehrmann, both theorists assume a binary opposition between work and leisure that is not borne out by human
experience and that “corresponds to a conception of culture limited to the industrial phase of our civilization.”  “Homo
Ludens Revisited,” 46.  Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning have attempted to create a taxonomy of recreation based upon
precisely this objection—that the realm of leisure or non-work is not necessarily coextensive with that of play.   Quest
for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1986).
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between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order to produce a disequilibrial outcome.”  158
Suits asserts that to play a game is “to engage in activity directed towards bringing about a specific
state of affairs, using only means permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour
of less efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such
activity.”   Taking these definitions as representative of those which other critics and scholars have159
advanced, three common features immediately emerge as central to the notion of games.
First, games are governed by rules.   Caillois’ seminal definition makes the existence of160
rules—or “conventions that suspend ordinary laws, and for the moment establish new legislation,
which alone counts” (MPaG, 10)—a necessary constituent of game-playing.  Huizinga also
associates games with “rules freely accepted but absolutely binding” (HL, 28).   Second, games are161
directed toward finite outcomes—they are, in other words, telic in the sense that they contemplate
some spatial, temporal, or situational point at which the participants are configured in a manner that
“Introduction,” in The Study of Games (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), 1–8, 7.158
The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 34.  In briefer159
terms, Suits says that “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”  Ibid., 41.  He insists
elsewhere that avoiding “loose talk” about games requires “a reasonably clear idea of what a game is, or at least a
reasonably clear idea of what the investigator believes a game to be, or at least a clear statement of what the investigator
means by the word ‘game.’”  “Detective Story,” 215.
The literature on play is rife with observations about the essential connection between rules and games. 160
See Edwards, Theories of Play, 12 (“As activities that are finite and rule-governed, games involve play but play is not
bound to games”); Hutchinson, Games Authors Play, 14 (“Unlike ‘play,’ the word ‘game’ suggests a more developed
structure”); and Wilson, In Palamedes’ Shadow, 77 (“If any single thing distinguishes games from mere (or pure, or
informal) play, it will be the presence of at least one constitutive rule, a piece of enabling legislation that makes possible
precise directions, objectives, and even modes in play”).
Both Huizinga and Caillois conflate the notions of game and play by conceiving of games as things that161
are played and of play as an activity characteristic of games; for example, Caillois states that his project is “to define the
nature and the largest common denominator of all games,” but then frames his definition under the rubric of play (MPaG,
9).  Although he acknowledges that “Many games do not imply rules”—his examples of such games include playing with
dolls and playing “cops and robbers”—Caillois explains that the component of fantasy or role-playing in such games
becomes operationally equivalent to the rules that govern more formal ludic activities: “the sentiment of as if replaces
and performs the same function” (MPaG, 8).
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terminates the game.   According to Caillois, “the game starts and ends at a given signal.  Its162
duration is often fixed in advance,” and when extensions occur they are permitted only by the
participants’ consent or a rule-based judgment; “In every case, the game’s domain is therefore a
restricted, closed, protected universe: a pure space” (MPaG, 6–7).  Huizinga concurs, noting that
“the essence of play” consists in the idea of something being “‘at stake’” or subject to determination
based upon a game’s outcome: “But this ‘something’ is not the material result of the play, not the
mere fact that the ball is in the hole, but the ideal fact that the game is a success or has been
successfully concluded” (HL, 49).  Finally, games are inherently antithetical; they either implicate
or require some form of opposition between or among distinct game participants.   For Huizinga,163
this element of antithesis or “tension” (HL, 11) is so central to the notion of game-playing that he
declares them to be synonymous: “Play is battle and battle is play” (HL, 41).   Caillois takes164
Unlike other forms of play, games are not “open-ended with respect to outcomes.” Avedon and Sutton-162
Smith, “Introduction,” 7.  The word game can “suggest something which needs to be solved” (Hutchinson, Games
Authors Play, 14), and solution implies resolution, the successful completion of a finite task.  The systematic and rule-
governed nature of games gives game-play an impetus in the direction of “absolute goal-oriented behavior.”  Robert
Chumbley, “Introductory Remarks toward a ‘Polylogue’ on Play,” SubStance 8, no. 4 (1980): 7–10, 7–8.  As Wolfgang
Iser argues, “because of their forms, games must inevitably be limited; in contrast with play, they are designed for
endings.  The result ends play.”  The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 265.
Many critics concur.  See, for example, Avedon and Sutton-Smith,”Introduction,” 7 (“games imply some163
opposition or antithesis between players”).  “All games imply some interdependence,” at least in the sense that
“Competition is an ingredient in most games; the question [. . .] is how intense is the competition and what creates this
intensity.”  Fritz Redl, Paul Gump, and Brian Sutton-Smith, “The Dimensions of Games,” in Avedon and Sutton-Smith,
Study of Games, 408–18, 410, 412.
Huizinga concedes elsewhere that “‘antithetical’ does not necessarily mean ‘contending’ or ‘agonistic’”164
and that in some forms of play antithesis may be entirely absent.  However, the centrality of competitive antithesis or
agon to his approach emerges in his claim that “Tension and uncertainty as to the outcome increase enormously when
the antithetical element becomes really agonistic in the play of groups.”  He considers as “higher forms of social play”
those in which there is some “orderly activity of a group or two opposed groups”; “Solitary play,” he asserts, “is
productive of culture only in a limited degree” (HL, 47).
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Huizinga to task for focusing on competitive games to the exclusion of other ludic forms (MPaG,
4), yet his own more elaborate taxonomy also gives a central role to antithesis and agon.165
Assuming that these three characteristics of games—the existence of governing rules, telic
boundedness, and a component of antithesis or opposition—fairly represent the features that critics
have in mind when they compare discourses to games, to what extent are such comparisons apt?
Motte surely exaggerates in asserting that “when Caillois finally comes to postulate his own model of play,165
it resembles Huizinga’s point by point.”  “Playing in Earnest,” 6.  Indeed, the principal feature of Caillois’ study is its
classification of games into distinct groups, only one of which is “agôn,” the kind of game built upon the idea of
competition.  Caillois also identifies alea (games such as roulette that are based upon the role of chance), mimicry or
mimesis (games that primarily involve a dimension of role-playing), and ilinx or vertigo (games in which “one produces
in oneself, by rapid whirling or falling movement, a state of dizziness and disorder”) (MPaG, 12).  Superimposed on this
classification, however, is the separate binary of ludus and paidia, “not categories of play but ways of playing” (MPaG,
53).  Paidia embraces “spontaneous manifestations of the play instinct” (MPaG, 27–28); ludus constitutes a more
formalized and systematic confinement of that instinct into “arbitrary, imperative, and purposely tedious conventions”
(MPaG, 13).  Yet this continuum is partially defined by the degree to which the forms of play arrayed upon it are
agonistic.  A child’s movement toward the pole of pure ludus involves first the creation of rules and then the making of
“all kinds of bets—which [. . .] are the fundamental forms of agôn—with himself or with his friends” (MPaG, 28–29);
eventually the child becomes concerned with the mastery of a skill or the achievement of an objective, a motivation for
play that is inherently associated with conflict.  Caillois attempts to distinguish ludus from agôn by asserting that in the
latter “the tension and skill of the player are not related to any explicit feeling of emulation or rivalry: the conflict is with
the obstacle, not with one or several competitors” (MPaG, 29).
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First, although surprisingly little research exists on the subject,  we can provisionally166
declare that discourses are governed, if not by strict rules, then at least by conventions or norms.  167
To articulate the simplest possible example, consider the discourse of love within the genre of verse
during the early modern period; the “rules” of that discourse are coextensive with the conventions
and norms that grew out of the Italian sonnet.  The discourse, in formal terms, must be configured
in fourteen lines of iambic pentameter, with varying degrees of departure from strict metrical
consistency being permitted, and with those lines organized in one of a finite number of possible
rhyme schemes.  Norms and conventions govern the content of the discourse as well—the beloved
must be to some degree inaccessible and the speaker unworthy, her beauty must be described using
a certain number of set tropes (“lips like sugar” or “cheeks like roses,” for instance), and the love
expressed must be principally platonic in nature albeit romantic or even sexual in aspiration.
Eugene Goodheart is one of only a few scholars who have investigated the notion that discourses are rule-166
bound in the same sense that games are.  “Literature as Game,” TriQuarterly, no. 52 (Fall 1981): 134–49.  However, his
essay treats the subject as an entry point for a meditation upon the nature of literary criticism and the value of
deconstruction; although interesting, the piece does not meaningfully contemplate the question of what the specific rules
of discourse might be.  Edwards asks the key question at issue here—“If games are indeed rule-governed, how do rules
operate in literary games?”—but he never supplies an answer.  Theories of Play, 13.  Sacvan Bercovitch treats literary
and cultural critique as a set of Wittgensteinian “language games,” so his emphasis is simultaneously more narrow than
and somewhat different from my own.  “Games of Chess: A Model of Literary and Cultural Studies,” in Centuries’ Ends,
Narrative Means, ed. Robert Newman (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 15–57.  Herbert de Ley applies
mathematical game theory to three specific French texts in ways that seem promising and rewarding, but his analysis of
rule-boundedness is limited to the rules erected by the plots and characters within those particular texts, so he does not
have occasion to consider discursive rules more broadly.  “The Name of the Game: Applying Game Theory in
Literature,” SubStance 17, no. 1 (1988): 33–46.  Likewise, Elizabeth Bruss borrows from game theory in characterizing
the rules that govern particular texts, but her discussion is not helpful on the subject of discursive rules in general. 
“Game of Literature.”  Finally, Troy Earl Camplin supplies a productive discussion of how rules in literature can be
generative rather than confining, but except for examples related to specific texts, his investigation does not extend to
the consideration of what the rules of literature might be.  “Literature as a Game: Game-Play in Reading, Creating, and
Understanding Literature,” Consciousness, Literature and the Arts 7, no. 2 (August 2006), https://blackboard.lincoln.ac
.uk/bbcswebdav/users/dmeyerdinkgrafe/archive/camplin.html (accessed February 17, 2015).
This important distinction is one that R. Rawdon Wilson advances: “conventions are looser, less abstract,167
more resistant to formulation, and altogether more flexible than rules.”  In Palamedes’ Shadow, 85.  But see Robert
Rawdon Wilson, “Three Prolusions: Toward a Game Model in Literary Theory,” Canadian Review of Comparative
Literature 8, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 79–92, 80 (“It will not do to speak casually about ‘rules’ or to make an easy (but
fallacious) equation between ‘convention’ and ‘rule’ in literature”).
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But almost as soon as we posit this example, flaws within the game/discourse analogy begin
to emerge.  A discourse of love that too closely follows the norms and conventions of the sonnet is
likely one of two types: a Petrarchan sonnet by the originator of the form or a poor imitation of one. 
Where we begin to see true artistry, and perhaps even traces of the ludic impulse, is where the
discourse’s author selectively tweaks the rules of his or her discourse, playing with the form of the
game itself.  Consider how William Shakespeare’s Sonnet 130 (“My mistress’ eyes”) flouts
Petrarchan convention precisely by refusing to extend those norms to the speaker’s beloved.  More
dramatically still, John Donne’s Holy Sonnet 18 (“Show me deare Christ”) adapts the conventions
of the sonnet form to speak of Divine love, using shockingly sexual rather than platonic imagery as
a metaphor for the speaker’s desire to know the true Church.  Likewise, his Holy Sonnet 14 (“Batter
my heart”) adapts the discourses of rape and force to the form, using them to demonstrate the
speaker’s yearning for communion with the Divine yet his inability to achieve it through his own
action or will.  Accordingly, if the discourse of the sonnet is a game, it is a very strange game indeed,
one in which the playing field itself is subject to change and manipulation in distinct rounds or hands
of play—this kind of metagame is almost as if, analogically speaking, each game in the World Series
yielded not a winner and a loser but rather a new configuration of the field for the next game—bases
could be added or subtracted, the outfield fence and foul poles moved, and the pitcher’s mound
repositioned.   This is a phenomenon that we shall have occasion to observe throughout the three168
case studies that comprise the body of this dissertation: discourse practitioners seem less to be
playing games than to be playing with games—John Donne exceeds the rhetorical norms of sermonic
discourse, refusing to play the game of preaching as its rules had previously been set down but
“[L]iterature,” Edwards opines, “is more playful [than game theory] in its ability to transcend, by mockery,168
parody, or experiment, its own ‘rules’ or conventions.”  Theories of Play, 14.
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rewriting them instead.  Likewise, William Scrots and Hans Holbein exceed the norm of single-point
perspective in their visual discourses, creating a different kind of aesthetic that necessitates a
different kind of viewer response.  George Herbert adapts the conventions of patterned verse to new
purposes in “The Altar,” incorporating them boldly into his text but belating them and converting
them to his own scheme of play.
There should, on the other hand, seem to be little question that literary discourses, at least,
share with games the quality of telic boundedness.  With the exception of the rare text that turns back
on itself like a Möbius-strip, such as James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake with its “commodius vicus of
recirculation,”  texts have first and final pages, and, except in the ficciones of Jorge Luis Borges,169
they do not have a tendency to leak beyond themselves into the “real” world.   Therefore, this170
particular correspondence between games and discourse is arguably a trivial one—it does not allow
us to distinguish among genres or the individual works within them.  There is also an important
sense in which this parallel is simply false, a sense which also reveals problems with ludic metaphors
predicated on the notion of rules.  “Only semantically impoverished games such as chess or poker,
whose rules can generate all conceivable configurations of play, are considered finite,” Peter Swirski
says.   “It is this feature which, despite an astronomic number of possible permutations, makes171
James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (1939) (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 3.169
I am thinking, of course, of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” in which the creation of an encyclopedia for an170
imaginary world called Tlön somehow causes artifacts from that planet to manifest themselves on Earth and ultimately
results in the wholesale adoption of its philosophy, science, and history.  Jorge Luis Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”
(1940), trans. James E. Irby (1962), in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, ed. James E. Irby  (New York:
New Directions, 1964), 3–29.  The narrator concludes that “A scattered dynasty of solitary men has changed the face
of this world” and that it is only a matter of time before “The world will be Tlön.”  Ibid., 18.  But we can understand
Borges’ story not merely as a fanciful (indeed, playful) exposition of a fantastic conceit but also as an entirely serious
metaphor for the real impact that texts have on their contexts in the outside world.  A text, in other words, is not entirely
bound by its bindings; it interacts with and works changes upon the contingent and historical world in ways that a
game—“essentially a separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest of life” (MPaG, 6)—cannot.
“Literary Studies and Literary Pragmatics: The Case of ‘The Purloined Letter,’” SubStance 81, no. 3171
(1996): 69–89, 85.
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them mathematically normalizable.  In contrast, literary works are non-finite and non-
normalizable.”172
If a ludic understanding of discourse based on the existence of rules is basically sound but
imperfect, and if the apparent aptness of comparisons based on finitude begins to show strains when
subjected to analytical pressure, then the semblance between games and discourses virtually
collapses—or at a minimum yields up its problematic complexity—when the element of antithesis
or opposition is carefully examined.
The most obvious question that presents itself in this regard is who or what are set into
opposition by the game of discourse?  Because the answer to that question, regrettably, depends on
the nature of the discourse at issue, I propose to continue this investigation by addressing the type
of discourse that I would argue provides the maximum number of possible answers to this question:
detective fiction.  Although certainly not a component of Renaissance discourse, except perhaps in
a very primitive form,  detective fiction supplies a productive lens through which to view the173
question currently on the table, and it is possible to analogize at appropriate junctures between the
antitheses or oppositions that the detective fiction genre sets into motion and those that we might see
in Renaissance discourses.
In attempts to address the current question, the most common answer to have been offered
is Marjorie Nicolson’s: that “the detective story is a battle royal between the author and the
reader.”   Hutchinson goes so far as to imply that the reader-writer opposition is straightforward174
Ibid.172
See LeRoy Lad Panek, An Introduction to the Detective Story (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State173
University Popular Press, 1987), 4.
“The Professor and the Detective” (1929), in The Art of the Mystery Story: A Collection of Critical Essays,174
ed. Howard Haycraft (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 110–27, 119. 
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and incontestable: “The suggestion of a contest between author and reader is evident in any work
which contains a mystery to be solved.”    But if detective fiction is configured as a game in which175
the narrative’s author is set against its reader, then we are immediately faced with another question. 
In what does winning consist?  In other words, what state of affairs constitutes the telos or endpoint
toward which the game aims?  For what purpose do its rules exist?  The answer appears to be one
that can be easily formulated—the object of the game is, for the reader, to solve the mystery before
the author’s detective can do so and, for the writer, to prevent the reader from anticipating that
solution while still “playing fair” according to the rules of the genre.   However, except in the case176
of the “stripped-down detective story” that Suits calls “the Minute Mystery,”  this answer is entirely177
unsatisfactory.178
Games Authors Play, 6.175
John Dickson Carr is often credited as the first expositor of this model of detective fiction as a contest176
between reader and writer.  “‘I dare you,’ says the reader, ‘to provide a solution which I can’t anticipate.’  ‘Right!’ says
the author, chuckling over the consciousness of some new and legitimate dirty-trick concealed up his sleeve.  And they
are at it—pull-devil, pull-murderer—with the reader alert for every dropped clue, every betraying speech, every
contradiction that may mean guilt.”  “The Grandest Game in the World” (1963), in The Mystery Writer’s Art, ed. Francis
M. Nevins, Jr. (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1970), 227–47, 230.  See also Hal
Blythe and Charlie Sweet, “The Reader as Poe’s Ultimate Dupe in ‘The Purloined Letter,’” Studies in Short Fiction 26,
no. 3 (Summer 1989): 311–15, 312 (“for Poe the detective story was a game and the reader his opponent”); MPaG, 30
(citing detective stories, and specifically the reader’s attempt “to identify the culprit” as an example of ludus); and Heta
Pyrhönen, Murder from an Academic Angle: An Introduction to the Study of the Detective Narrative, Literary Criticism
in Perspective (Columbia, SC: Camden Press, 1994), 10 (“The writing and reading of the whodunit are supposedly
governed by more or less strict rules that involve the reader’s attempt to solve the crime puzzle before the detective
does”).
“Detective Story,” 201.177
We can see a similar dynamic in any number of Renaissance literary works that feature narratives; the178
reader can be imagined as being in opposition to the author in a contest to determine whether the former can anticipate
the narrative’s conclusion before the latter has the opportunity to reach it.  For the reasons discussed in the following
paragraph, however, a literary discourse game in which the reader could conceivably win would likely be considered
unsatisfying.  The “Minute Mystery” exception has an analogue to Renaissance genres in discourses involving riddles,
where we can very clearly see the reader and the writer pitted against each other in a game of wits.  See Katelijne Schiltz,
Music and Riddle Culture in the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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A reader’s victory in this kind of competition would be Pyrrhic indeed—a reader who handily
solves the mystery before arriving at the final chapter would hardly judge the narrative to be an
artistic success within the genre, and he or she would be more likely to experience disappointment
than the exultation of success.  “For the detective story to have a solution that could readily be
guessed by the majority of readers would go clean against the whole nature and character of the
genre,” William O. Aydelotte says: “The solution has to come as a surprise.”   As a result, it is179
simply not possible for the reader to win a game conceived in this manner.  Either the reader fails
to anticipate the culprit’s identity and the author emerges triumphant, or the reader proves to be more
clever than the author’s detective and makes a loser of both players.  Of course, this means that the
detective story is not a game, or at least not the kind of game in which the opponents are the reader
and the writer: most “detective novels,” Suits explains, “are not written as games to be played at
all.”180
Imagining other forms of antithesis between the author and the reader is possible, of course,
but in those relationships the agonistic element diminishes and, at least according to Huizinga, so
“The Detective Story as a Historical Source” (1949), in Nevins, Mystery Writer’s Art, 306–25, 319.179
“Detective Story,” 209 (emphasis original).180
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does the extent to which the relationship resembles game-play (HL, 47).   The most common181
alternative is a model of spectatorship: the antithesis is one in which the author is a performer and
the reader is the audience.  George N. Dove refers to the “game” of detective fiction as one “in which
the reader assumes the role of an interested spectator, who is free to accept or decline the challenges
of the story.”    This formulation resolves the difficulty created by the fact that few readers attempt182
to solve the mystery in a detective story, yet allows for the possibility that some may choose to do
so.  However, by turning the text into “a game that is neither ‘won’ nor ‘lost,’”  this understanding183
of detective fiction seriously undermines the spirit of the ludic metaphor that critics have used in
attempting to describe the genre.   The result is a completely different type of game, one in which
the writer is simultaneously playing with, within, and against the genre itself—the writer must play
Peter Swirski sees the author-reader relationship as a cooperative and collaborative one.  “Literary Studies,”181
71.  George N. Dove suggests the paradigm of “parties to a compact, not contenders for a title.”  The Reader and the
Detective Story (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1997), 3.  Many critics have
suggested a hybrid relationship in which author and reader (or reader and text) are both teammates and opponents.  See,
for example, Robert Champigny, What Will Have Happened: A Philosophical and Technical Essay on Mystery Stories
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 4.  According to Bruss, between zero-sum and cooperative games,
there lies a range of mixed-motive games in which the players share enough mutual concerns to make it
profitable—or at least less dangerous—to refrain from total conflict, while still remaining antagonists to
some extent.  Diplomacy and bargaining are the paradigms here, and it is here as well that the greater
number of literary games is found.  An entirely defeated, gulled, or bewildered audience could hardly
appreciate the skill or even recognize the triumph of an author.  
“Game of Literature,” 159.  See also Foust, “Rules of the Game,” 9 (“literary exchange implies both competition and
cooperation.  The writer must cooperate with the reader in order to communicate at all, but he does not want to be too
cooperative, to be understood too easily”).
Reader, 19.  As Umberto Eco argues in explaining the playful quality of another literary genre,182
it would be more accurate to compare these books to a game of basketball played by the Harlem Globe
Trotters.  [. . .]  We know with absolute confidence that they will win: the pleasure lies in watching the
trained virtuosity with which the Globe Trotters defer the final moment, with what ingenious deviations
they reconfirm the foregone conclusion, with what trickeries they make rings around their opponents.
“The Narrative Structure in Fleming,” in The Bond Affair, ed. Oreste Del Buono and Umberto Eco (London: Macdonald
Press, 1966), 35–75, 58.  See also Roger Callois [sic], The Mystery Novel (1974), trans. Roberto Yahni and A. W. Sadler
(Bronxville, NY: Laughing Buddha Press, 1984), 20 (“You don’t read a mystery novel for the pleasure of hearing a story. 
It is because you want to attend a magic show in which the illusionist promptly reveals the secret”).
Dove, Reader, 20.183
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within the genre, in the sense that he or she accepts and conforms to its conventions or rules, but
plays with the genre by attempting to make those conventions yield an unexpected result, and
sometimes plays against the genre by breaking those rules.  This a highly unorthodox game,184
consisting as it does in a single “move” that is not quite a version of solitaire but that nonetheless
relegates the reader, an erstwhile player, to the largely passive role of observing a solo
performance.185
Likewise, it is possible to posit other antithetical pairs at the center of the detective-fiction
game, but none of them precisely captures the spirit of the game metaphors used in criticism of the
genre.  After the reader-author antithesis—whether conceived as a player versus player relationship,
a spectator-audience relationship, or some hybrid dynamic encompassing both competition and
cooperation—and after a scheme in which the writer and the genre are set against each other, the
next antithesis that presents itself is the competition between detective and criminal.  However, “if
the ‘game’ at issue is one played by (or between) characters in a story, then it is not, of course, really
a game that is being viewed by the reader, but, in Aristotle’s sense of the word, an imitation of a
Irregular as it may be, however, it is still a mode of play within the models that both Huizinga and Caillois184
have articulated.  “For nonparticipants,” Caillois says, “every agôn is a spectacle” (MPaG, 22), and “theatrical
presentations and dramatic interpretations rightly belong in” the play-category of mimicry (MPaG, 21).  See also Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (1960), trans. Joel Weisheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York:
Continuum Press, 1989), 109 (“openness towards the spectator is part of the closedness of play”).  “The function of play
in the higher forms which concern us here can largely be derived from the two basic aspects under which we meet it: as
a contest for something or a representation of something.”  HL, 13.  Suits stresses that a text can be considered a game
even if it is “treated as a spectator sport rather than as a participatory event” (“Detective Story,” 210), and explains that,
even assuming the reader’s passive position, “the game concept is still important in understanding the work, for even in
those cases where the reader is not making the indicated counter-move, he sees the work as a move (the author’s) in a
game” (ibid., 212).
A Renaissance analogue would be a discourse in which the artist’s virtuosity becomes the dominant mode185
for the reader’s enjoyment of the piece.  As a specific example, consider John Donne’s “A Valediction Forbidding
Mourning,” with its famous instances of metaphysical wit and conceits.  One does not read the poem with the expectation
that he or she can predict the ending; rather, the pleasure derived from the reading process is akin to that of spectatorship:
one witnesses with stunned delight Donne’s performance as he generates highly unexpected yet surprisingly apt
metaphors for the lovers’ parting and the speaker’s ultimate, promised return.
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game.”   Understood in this way, the work of detective fiction is still a form of play but only in the186
sense that a play (that is, a drama performed on stage) is also a ludic activity.  This observation is
not intended to limit the ludic significance of the drama or of the detective story conceived as a
similar form of mimesis; rather, it is designed to point out that the game metaphor in detective-fiction
criticism cannot be explained or justified by recourse to this model—it does not distinguish, for
example, between or among Agatha Christie’s Ten Little Indians as a novel, her adaptation And Then
There Were None as a theatrical performance, and the production of any other drama, such as a piece
of Renaissance-era dramatic discourse.  All three are forms of play in virtually the same sense.187
Noting that detective fiction, as S. E. Sweeney says, “is preoccupied with theory [and]
interpretation,”  some scholars have interpreted the detective-culprit binary as itself a metaphor for188
another dichotomy: the relationship between the reader and the text.  According to Jeffrey T. Nealon:
The unraveling work of the detective within the story mirrors and assists the work of
the reader, as both try to piece together the disparate signs that might eventually solve
the mystery.  The reader of the detective novel comes, metafictionally, to identify
with the detective, because both reader and detective are bound up in the
Suits, “Detective Story,” 220.186
Suits goes so far as to conclude that “the detective story, thus conceived, has no bearing whatever on the187
issue of games in literature (or at least no more bearing than anything else in the universe, since anything under the sun
and beyond it can be made a literary subject).”  Furthermore, he questions whether this understanding of detective fiction
can even be viewed as a game at all, “because the fictional detective (and thus the fictional puzzle-solver) is simply not
represented as playing a game at all; he is represented as plying a deadly serious trade.”  Ibid., 211.
“Locked Rooms: Detective Fiction, Narrative Theory, and Self-Reflexivity,” in The Cunning Craft:188
Original Essays on Detective Fiction and Contemporary Literary Theory, ed. Ronald G. Walker and June M. Frazer,
Essays in Literature (Macomb: Western Illinois University Press, 1990), 1–14, 11.
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metaphysical or epistemological work of interpretation, the work of reading clues and
writing a solution or end.189
Yet this antithesis in some sense duplicates the relationship between the reader and the author—it
only substitutes for the writer the textual artifact that he or she has created.  Similarly, it repeats the
model of spectatorship or mimesis; the reader, however, is now the audience not of a game that the
author is playing, or of a game that the author is portraying, but rather of an interpretive act which
stands as a metaphor for such a game and the act of its reception:  “At the metadiegetic level,”190
Sweeney says, “the criminal is the author of a crime that the detective must interpret.”   Another191
difficulty with this model is reflected in Suits’ decision not to consider the reader, along with the
author, as a game-maker; to do so would “presuppose a rather controversial critical (and, more
generally, aesthetic) principle: the principle that it is the right (or perhaps the obligation) of an artistic
appreciator to ‘get out’ of a work of art what he finds there, irrespective of the intention (if any) of
the artist.”   And, indeed, a reader could play this kind of game with any sort of text—a work of192
“Work of the Detective, Work of the Writer: Auster’s City of Glass,” in Detecting Texts: The Metaphysical189
Detective Story from Poe to Postmodernism, ed. Patricia Merivale and Susan Elizabeth Sweeney (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 117–33, 117.
The signal example of a Renaissance-era text that might be said to work in this fashion is William190
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, with The Mousetrap, its play-within-a-play, as a metatheatrical meditation upon the relationship
between audience and performance.  The game between Hamlet and Claudius serves as a metaphor for the game between
Shakespeare and his reader or viewer.
“Locked Rooms,” 8.  According to Heta Pyrhönen, “at the metadiegetic level the criminal ‘writes’ the secret191
story of crime, which the detective, at the diegetic level, ‘reads’ by following the clues the culprit has been unable to
suppress.”  Murder, 34.  The detective’s reading then becomes an act of writing that produces the text itself; “The
criminal as author and detective as reader are engaged in a rivalry over the possession of meaning.”  Ibid.  Although
Robert Champigny asserts that “The criminal, who furnishes problem and clues, is to the detective within the tale as the
text is to the reader outside the tale” (What Will Have Happened, 41), he later posits a somewhat different relationship:
“the conflict between murderer and detective is a conflict between poet and storyteller.  In this perspective, the
detective’s victory is a victory of narrative sense over poetic sense, or at least a superimposition of the former on the
latter” (ibid., 46).
“Detective Story,” 217.192
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detective fiction no more or less than the text of a Ben Jonson masque, or a cookbook, or a grocery
list.193
The term game—at least defined, as it typically is in the literature of play, by the existence
of governing rules, telic boundedness, and a component of antithesis or opposition—therefore seems
insufficient by itself as a conceptual analogue of, or trope for, detective fiction.  Bruss, in fact,
anticipates this conclusion with regard to textual works in general: “the notion of ‘game’ itself may
eventually prove too narrow, suggesting as it does a finite set of rules, a well-defined playing space,
clearly ranked preferences, and conscious calculations.”   Other scholars concur,  and Hutchinson194 195
in particular asserts that
the few existing studies of literary games have tended to be guided by the
terminology and the philosophy of sport.  They have readily taken over concepts such
as ‘agôn’ [. . .] or even ‘payoff’ (the benefit derived by the player).  This, it seems to
me, is a rather procrustean exercise.  All it can ‘prove’ is that certain forms of
literature fit categories which were originally devised for other forms of activity, and
it is not an ideal way of classifying processes which are more diverse and usually far
more complex than those we find on the playing field or even on the chessboard.196
Some scholars have seen the critic’s work of interpretation as a kind of game.  According to Carter Kaplan,193
for example, critics play games with texts and each critical approach amounts to a game played by its own separate set
of rules. “Games Critics Play,” SubStance 25, no. 3 (1996): 56–68.
“Game of Literature,” 170.194
See, for example, Edwards, Theories of Play, 20 (“Even though this categorization of games provides a195
typology that can be used for analysis, it is because Caillois’s study concentrates on games and considers play in terms
of them that it is, finally, so restrictive of the possibilities of play”).
Games Authors Play, 4.196
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This diversity and complexity explain the central problems which have emerged from the
foregoing analysis.  First, the rules or conventions of the genre, albeit strict by comparison to those
which prevail in other literary discourses, are significantly more fluid than the ones that govern
games or sports; they do not mediate the activities of the principal “game” participants, the reader
and the author, in predictable ways, and they do not define a telos toward which their actions should
be directed.  Second, the competitive dimension of games is not well suited to a description of
detective fiction: antitheses certainly exist in the genre, in abundance, but they tend not to be
agonistic.  Interrogating those oppositions by attempting to posit a goal or objective toward which
each partner in a pair is striving fails to render a satisfactory telos.  The rules of the “game” are not
constructed to yield victories and defeats, and because of their inherent instability they cannot serve
as a predicate for a reasonably clear objective that could constitute an end game.
Play, on the other hand, the second basic term that confronts scholars and critics who attempt
to sort through the complexities of ludic behavior,  tends to isolate different features of the ludic197
impulse than those emphasized in definitions of the term game.  These features can supply a
necessary adjunct to supplement the notion of game, which is all too limiting with respect to the
search for a set of appropriate ludic analogues of discourses.  However, I want to suggest at the
outset that these definitions of play should not be understood as delineating a field of activities in
which games are situated as a mere subset.  Instead, I imagine play as a term that addresses a
particular type of activity that coexists with games at the same conceptual level within a more
general set of acts and behaviors that can collectively be described as ludic.
See, for example, Edwards, Theories of Play, 12; and Wilson, In Palamedes’ Shadow, 72.197
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In defining play, particularly as a ludic mode distinct from what the term game implies, it is
helpful to rely on Wolfgang Iser’s contrast between what he calls “instrumental play” and “free
play.”  Iser relies on Gadamer’s idea that the play impulse reflects a “to-and-fro movement that is
not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end; [. . .] rather, it renews itself in constant
repetition.”   This impulse is manifested in games to the extent that rules are superimposed upon198
it,  but this is “instrumental play,” as Paul B. Armstrong puts it, with “a particular goal—the victory199
of one side or the determination of a single result.”   The objective of instrumental play is to close200
the play space and to terminate the actions in which play consists—according to Iser, “games must
inevitably be limited; in contrast with play, they are designed for endings.”   But “free play” plays201
“against endings,”  seeking to perpetuate the to-and-fro movement that Gadamer sees as central to202
ludic phenomena.203
Traces of the concept of free play are also evident in Huizinga’s theory and to a greater extent
that of Caillois, whose taxonomy Iser actually adopts.   Caillois’ concept of ilinx or vertigo204
suggests a certain randomness and disorder that is incompatible with purely instrumental play.  In
fact, Caillois’ example of ilinx—a child “whirling rapidly [until] he reaches a centrifugal state of
flight from which he regains bodily stability and clarity of perception only with difficulty” (MPaG,
Truth and Method, 103 (quoted in Iser, Fictive, 237).198
Iser, Fictive, 266.199
“The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History 31, no.200
1 (Winter 2000): 211–23, 215. 
Fictive, 265.201
Ibid., 237.202
Armstrong, “Politics of Play,” 215–16.203
Iser, Fictive, 258–65.204
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24)—is one whose telos is nothing more than simple pleasure and which admits of no discernible
rules or strictures.  Mimesis or mimicry is a mode of play from which Caillois specifically excludes
the element of rule-boundedness: “the continuous submission to imperative and precise rules cannot
be observed” and the only rule that can be hypothesized for such an activity is merely that of
“fascinating the spectator, while avoiding an error that might lead the spectator to break the spell”
(MPaG, 22–23).  For Huizinga’s part, he understands the essence of play to be fun or pleasure (HL,
3), a telos of some sort to be sure, but one whose contours are barely detectable, if at all.  He
emphasizes this less structured dimension of play by noting that the ludic realm exists apart from the
strictures of logic and necessity (HL, 3–4) and that play is an activity which is voluntary rather than
compelled, disinterested rather than motivated by a telos that exists in the “real world” outside the
necessary confines of play itself (HL, 7–9).  What emerges from these elements of play, divorced as
they are from the relatively more disciplined realm of games, is something more like Barthes’ notion
of jouissance.
And this idea—fundamentally text-based as an erotics of reading—leads back to one of Iser’s
principal insights: “Free play and instrumental play,” Armstrong explains, “are inextricably
intertwined in the games texts play as they range between open-endedness and closure”;  Iser says,205
“the text game is one in which limitation and endlessness can be played to an equal degree.”   This206
suggests that a model of textual play can be constructed based on a continuum.  Some texts can be
described as completely bounded with respect to a particular telos.  In the context of detective
fiction, an example might be an Ellery Queen novel, complete with its “Challenge to the Reader,”
in which the text moves single-mindedly to the revelation of the culprit’s identity.  To borrow from
“Politics of Play,” 217.205
Fictive, 265.206
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the terminology of play, one can refer to texts at this extreme of the continuum with the term
PUZZLE—a text which poses a discrete problem and that unfolds as the process of discovering a
single, unique solution.  At the other end of the telic continuum one could hypothesize the perfectly
open work, in Eco’s sense of the term, or the work of Derridean différance, the unconstrained free
play of meaning that renders the text radically unstable or even entirely atelic.  Paul Auster’s The
New York Trilogy is one example of the texts that might tend toward this pole of the telic continuum,
texts that can be described by the term TOY—a text which is not directed toward a single objective
but that seeks to evoke multiple, even incompatible, sets of meanings and to promote a variety of
readings, none of which can be deemed incorrect.  Most texts will fall somewhere between these
extremes; a novel like Vladimir Nabokov’s The Real Life of Sebastian Knight could be described
as more like a toy than a puzzle, for example.
If the element of telos can serve as one axis in this model, then the antithesis between a text’s
reader and its author can provide the basis for a second.  However, the analysis of games implies that
the reader-author dynamic is not defined in terms of competition.  While there may be cases in which
this paradigm prevails and the reader is required to match his or her wits against the author’s, the
Minute Mystery for instance, there will be many others in which the reader is essentially a passive
spectator.  Yet the reader will never be completely uninvolved: works like mysteries “force the
reader’s speculation,” Hutchinson says: “they encourage him to guess, or rather, to deduce, the
identity of the culprit.”   Speculation is a form of interaction, for it involves the reader on a more207
Games Authors Play, 24.  See also Avedon and Sutton-Smith, “Introduction,” 7 (“Even in solitary games207
(puzzles) it seems that this same sense of opposition is present.  That is, the player contends against impersonal obstacles
or against fortune, or he mentally pits one aspect of himself against another”); Helen Hovanec, The Puzzler’s Paradise:
From the Garden of Eden to the Computer Age (New York: Paddington Press, 1978), 10 (puzzle-solvers mobilize “their
own ingenuity against that of the constructors”); and Hutchinson, Games Authors Play, 13 (“Behind much playful writing
there is a clear creative zest.  It is the sort of writing which is, to use the concepts of Roland Barthes, ‘writerly’
(‘scriptible’) rather than ‘readerly’ (‘lisible’): it does not aim to encourage passivity on the part of the reader, but rather
to draw him in so fully into the process of ‘reading’ that he actually participates in the production of the text”).
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active level than does simple observation of a performance, but speculation falls far short of
competition.  Likewise, the genuine interplay of games is not possible simply by virtue of the fact
that reader and author are not present to each other, and at least in Gadamer’s conception of games
a necessary element is an opponent or an oppositional force “which automatically responds to [the
player’s] moves with a countermove.”   “An obvious and major difference between reading and208
all forms of social interaction,” declares Iser, “is the fact that with reading there is no face-to-face
situation.  A text cannot adapt itself to each reader it comes into contact with.”   This axis of the209
model is defined not by degrees of competition but rather by the extent of a reader’s involvement
or participation, and the term I shall use for this axis is methexis.   The polar extreme at which the210
reader’s involvement most resembles competition may be designated by the term GAME—the Minute
Truth and Method, 105–106.  Although games with only two moves rarely occur, “there is at least one class208
of games whose members appear to be precisely of this kind, namely, puzzles.  The truth of this is perhaps made less
obvious by the fact that both moves in such games (the move made by the puzzle-maker and the move made by the
puzzle-solver) are much more complex than are the moves of a single pitch and a single swing in baseball.”  Suits,
“Detective Story,” 204.
Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology (1989) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins209
University Press, 1993), 32.
For Huizinga, the idea of mimesis does not quite capture the dynamic of some forms of play, like rituals:210
The word “represents” [. . .] does not cover the exact meaning of the act, at least not in its looser, modern
connotation; for here “representation” is really identification, the mystic re-presentation of the event.  The
rite produces the effect which is then not so much shown figuratively as actually reproduced in the action. 
The function of the rite, therefore, is far from being merely imitative; it causes the worshippers [sic] to
participate in the sacred happening itself.  As the Greeks would say, “it is methectic rather than mimetic”. 
It is “a helping out of the action.”
HL, 14–15 (quoting Jane Harrison, Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1912), 125).
Freda Scott Giles discusses methexis in the context of “African-American ritual-based theatre”: “Mimesis
connotes emphasis on the solo performer (the hero) separate from the audience, who works from a predetermined, linear
text,” whereas the African-American theatrical tradition is derived from a church practice of audience response and
participation.  “Methexis v. Mimesis: Poetics of Feminist and Womanist Drama,” in Race/Sex: Their Sameness,
Difference, and Interplay, ed. Naomi Zack (New York: Routledge, 1997), 175–82, 180.  Whereas mimesis constitutes
a representation of an action, methexis is “a communal ‘helping-out’ of the action by all assembled.  It is a process that
could be described alternatively as a shift from drama—the spectacle observed—to ritual—the event which dissolves
traditional divisions between actor and spectator, between self and other.”  Kimberly W. Benston, “The Aesthetic of
Modern Black Drama: From Mimesis to Methexis,” in The Theatre of Black Americans: A Collection of Critical Essays,
ed. Errol Hill (New York: Applause Press, 1987), 61–78, 62–63.
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Mystery is the paradigm case of this type of reader participation.   On the other hand, texts which211
do not anticipate, solicit, or require any brand of reader engagement beyond spectatorship can be
described with the word TRICK—in texts like this the author’s performance and virtuosity are central
to the work, which can be understood as little more than a vehicle or venue for his or her act of self-
display.
This model of play can be graphically rendered as in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4.  A Typology of Discursive Play.
“We may say [. . .] that some detective novels are overridingly games in the required sense, others are211
games but not overridingly so (that is, they contain character or other elements which are as important to the reader as
is the puzzle plot), others are games only subordinately, while others are not games at all.”  Suits, “Detective Story,” 208.
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I want to stress that this model is not offered dogmatically, but rather heuristically.  The foregoing
analysis has revealed that textual manifestations of ludic phenomena are extraordinarily complex and
that traditional ways of speaking about those phenomena are seriously limiting to the extent that they
have been unable to capture those subtleties.  Although this model might supply a more nuanced and
precise vocabulary for organizing a discourse about modes of textual play, it remains provisional,
and we shall see how it operates in the case studies that follow.
D.  SCHEMA
A View of the English Reformation
The Reformation is a richly complex historical phenomenon, or rather a set of phenomena, for it
unfolded quite differently in the multiple regions of Western Christendom that it affected,  and in212
its broad sweep it left no aspect of culture untouched or unaltered: theology and religion, of course,
but also politics, architecture, art, literature, and discourse more broadly were all caught up in its
field of cultural change.  Nowhere, however, I would suggest, was the Reformation more fecund in
its radical reworking of culture—and in its inherent complexity—than in England during the late
Tudor and early Stuart periods at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the
seventeenth.  My aims in this section are, first, to provide a summary account of a key development
in the recent history of scholarship on the English Reformation, including a discussion of some of
the definitional problems that emerge from efforts to describe this pivotal historical and cultural
MacCulloch, Reformation, xvii (“there were very many different Reformations, nearly all of which would212
have said that they were aimed simply at recreating authentic Catholic Christianity”).
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movement,  and second, to introduce and elaborate upon a schematic view of English Reformation213
belief systems that will guide and inform my work in the case studies that follow this chapter.
Antonio Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador to the Court of James I, reported to Venice in
1616 that twelve different religious parties existed in England during his tenure there: “three of
Catholics, three of the merely indifferent, ‘four of the religion of his Majesty, and two Puritan
parties.’”   Two conclusions are therefore unsurprising.  First, as Ritchie D. Kendall explains, “The214
efforts to establish a phylogeny and taxonomy of religious belief in this period have proved almost
as divisive as the theological conflicts that they help document.”   Indeed, by this stage in the215
development of period scholarship, the vast array of models of English Reformation belief systems
available for the burgeoning critic to follow is mind-boggling.  Second, a former era of criticism that
tended to perceive the English Reformation in terms of a simple “Anglican”/“Puritan” binary failed
Examples of texts that have meaningfully informed my work in this regard include Achsah Guibbory,213
Ceremony and Community from Herbert to Milton: Literature, Religion, and Cultural Conflict in Seventeenth-Century
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?; Lake, “Calvinism and the
English Church”; Lake, “Lancelot Andrewes”; Lake, Moderate Puritans; MacCulloch, Later Reformation; MacCulloch,
Reformation; Anthony Milton, Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant
Thought, 1600–1640, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995); Doreen Rosman, From Catholic to Protestant: Religion and the People in Tudor England, Introductions to
History (London: University College of London Press, 1996); John Spurr, English Puritanism, 1603–1689, Social
History in Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Spurr, Post-Reformation; and Gene Edward Veith, Jr.,
Reformation Spirituality: The Religion of George Herbert (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1985).  Anthony
Milton’s Catholic and Reformed has been particularly useful; Daniel W. Doerksen describes the source as
“authoritative.” “‘Generous Ambiguity’ Revisited: A Herbert for All Seasons,” George Herbert Journal 30, no. 1–2 (Fall
2006–Spring 2007): 19–41, 20.  
Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 7.214
The Drama of Dissent: The Radical Poetics of Nonconformity, 1380–1590, Studies in Religion (Chapel215
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 3.
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to provide a suitable schema for understanding the period as fully as might be possible,  with the216
result that scholars have developed more suitable tools and terms for analyzing the history of the
period.  
Not only does this binary lack the subtle gradations that are necessary for capturing the fine
differences among confessional positions that existed during the period, but its two central terms are
problematic as well.  Anglican is anachronistic, according to MacCulloch: “the distinctive and
complex theological approach which Anglicanism represents can hardly be found until the proto-
Arminians and Hooker had begun to have their effect on the Church of England’s thinking.”  217
Puritan, Gene Edward Veith, Jr., explains, “is so vague in its meaning, so difficult in its application,
[. . .] that many Church historians no longer find it useful.”   John Spurr’s view is that “many,218
indeed most, puritans differed from their neighbours in the degree not the kind of their religiosity. 
To put it another way, they were simply more intensely protestant than their protestant neighbors or
even the Church of England.”   But other scholars perceive that uses of the term during the period219
As Peter Lake characterizes the state of scholarship several decades ago, “Anglicanism [. . .] represented216
the official position of the English church, constituting a sort of via media between Rome and Geneva, protestant but
not Calvinist, episcopalian yet reformed, sacrament- and ceremony-centred although in no sense crypto-popish.” 
Anglicans and Puritans?, 4–5.  Puritanism, on the other hand, “was seen as the radical protestant opposition to that
mainstream; Calvinist, presbyterian or presbyterianizing, word-centred and austere in its attitude to the role of ceremony
and liturgy in the life of the church.”  Ibid., 5.
Later Reformation, 99.  Indeed, MacCulloch elsewhere asserts that it is only after the Civil Wars of the mid-217
seventeenth century that it truly makes sense to speak of an “Anglican” Church.  Reformation, 513.  See also Milton,
Catholic and Reformed, 1 (in more recent decades of scholarly investigation, “historians have questioned the existence
of an ideologically coherent, unitary and stable ‘Anglicanism’, distinctly of the English Church and dedicated to a self-
consciously achieved golden mean between Rome and Geneva”); and Veith, Reformation Spirituality, 16 (“For this
period it is not necessary, and in fact it is highly misleading, to contrast ‘Anglican’ and ‘Protestant’ as if they were two
separate categories”).
Reformation Spirituality, 16.  See also Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 1 (the term Puritan “cannot be used218
to explain the religious divisions of the period as straightforwardly as past historians have tended to employ it”).
English Puritanism, 4.  See also Lake, Anglicans and Puritans?, 5 (describing a group of critics for whom219
the use of the term Puritan is based “on the fact that contemporaries did indeed acknowledge the existence of protestants
whose enthusiasm and zeal in the cause of true religion marked them off from their more lukewarm and profane
contemporaries”).
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ranged from the merely pejorative, on the one hand,  to a more sophisticated usage in which leading220
Conformists, according to Lake, “defined puritans almost exclusively in terms of their attitude
toward the power of the prince and to the government and ceremonies of the church, and not in terms
of their doctrinal beliefs or style of piety.”   Some Puritans, however, embraced the term; William221
Bradshaw, for instance, “flaunted and gloried in the word,” Lake explains, “using it to denote simply
the most godly and zealous of English protestants, as opposed to their corrupt and careerist
conformist opponents.”   And many respected scholars still find it to be a meaningful descriptor222
worth retaining.223
As this discussion should establish, there was in Anthony Milton’s words a “ubiquity of
religious labels in the period leading up to the outbreak of civil war,”  and indeed, “The biggest224
hindrance to a correct understanding of this period,” says Veith, “probably has to do with
terminology.”   This is of a piece with the fact that, as MacCulloch puts it, “Reformation disputes225
were passionate about words.”   Accordingly, it is essential to establish a clear set of terms to guide226
See Lake, Moderate Puritans, 13 (“the term ‘puritan’ was a loaded one, its use charged with ambiguity and220
polemical edge” as an epithet used against “the godly”). 
“Lancelot Andrewes,” 113.221
Moderate Puritans, 13.222
See, for example, MacCulloch, Later Reformation, 80 (“The term ‘Puritan’ has meaning, albeit an elusive223
one”).  “Puritanism is a label which has proven its usefulness [. . .].  The term could remain useful because people could
identify Puritans; despite their dislike of this term, Puritans themselves knew their own, although they preferred such
identifications as ‘the godly’.”  Ibid., 82.  Moreover, even Anthony Milton finds himself constrained to adopt the term
in describing the period under consideration.  Catholic and Reformed, 8.
Catholic and Reformed, 5.224
Reformation Spirituality, 16.225
Reformation, xviii.  “[W]ords were myriad refractions of a God whose names included Word.”  Ibid.226
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the work that follows.  A good place to begin that endeavor is in a schema developed by Daniel W.
Doerksen and Christopher Hodgkins, an adaptation of which appears below as Figure 5.
Figure 5.  A Schema of the English Reformed Church.  Adapted from
“The Late Tudor and Early Stuart English Middle Way,” in Daniel W.
Doerksen and Christopher Hodgkins, eds., Centered on the Word:
Literature, Scripture, and the Tudor-Stuart Middle Way (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 2004), 24.
The schema, based on scholarship generated since the “Anglican”/“Puritan” binary has fallen out of
vogue, is centered around the critical insight that most members of the English Reformed Church
were Calvinists in confessional belief and practice; the English via media therefore hangs suspended
not between Rome and Geneva but “with Geneva and midway between Rome and Amsterdam
(associated with Anabaptists).”227
Daniel W. Doerksen and Christopher Hodgkins, “Introduction,” in Centered on the Word: Literature,227
Scripture, and the Tudor-Stuart Middle Way, ed. Doerksen and Hodgkins (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004),
13–27, 24.
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Given the centrality of this insight to the schema that I am adapting for the purposes of this
dissertation, it therefore makes sense to start with a definition of Calvinist; Doerksen and Hodgkins 
adopt Anthony Milton’s perspective on the term:  it “is used, in common with current228
historiography, to denote a general sympathy with the continental Reformed tradition in all its purely
doctrinal aspects, and a sense of identification with the West European Calvinist Churches and their
fortunes.”   Calvinism, Doerksen notes elsewhere, “should not be confused with puritanism or with229
necessarily extremist positions.”   Defining features of Calvinist belief were a commitment to230
Word-centered piety and the doctrine of predestination as well as a view of the Eucharist that
rejected Luther’s notion of consubstantiation but that saw the sacrament as an instrument for the
elevation of the communicant to the real presence of Christ in heaven. 
The other central term in this schema is Conformist, and Doerksen and Hodgkins treat it “as
a replacement for the former ‘Anglican.’”   Acknowledging that Conformist is also an imperfect231
term, Doerksen and Hodgkins define it to include “those people who conformed willingly to the rules
Ibid., 23.228
Catholic and Reformed, 8.  However, Milton observes that “[. . .] English Protestants formally resisted the229
label ‘Calvinist’.  This did not reflect an ‘Anglican’ desire to be depicted as independent of the religious divisions on
the Continent” but rather a view that the Church represented something more catholic—more universal—than such a
limiting term could properly describe.  Ibid., 407.
Conforming to the Word: Herbert, Donne, and the English Church before Laud (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell230
University Press, 1997), 17.
Centered on the Word, 25.  Although many critics whom I shall cite use the term “Anglican,” which I must231
therefore retain in these pages to that extent, outside of quotations and paraphrases I have accepted Milton’s advice
regarding the term: “The protean character of the Church of England” at around the turn of the century “renders the
application of the term ‘Anglican’ to any single group within it essentially meaningless, if not positively misleading.” 
Catholic and Reformed, 10.
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and practices authorized by the Church of England.”   This is distinct from Lake’s usage of the232
term, according to which it captures a narrower segment of the English Church: “those men who
chose to make a polemical fuss about the issues of church government and ceremonial conformity
and who sought to stigmatize as puritans, those less enthusiastic about such issues than
themselves.”   Certainly, Doerksen and Hodgkins’ category of “Conforming Puritans” would not233
overlap with Lake’s notion of conformity, and I have adopted the former understanding of this term
for the purposes of my work in this dissertation.
Puritan in the following pages is used in a guarded sense and with an understanding that the
term is at least somewhat problematic: As Patrick Collinson explains, “There is little point in
constructing elaborate statements defining what, in ontological terms, puritanism was and was not,
when it was not a thing definable in itself but only one half of a stressful relationship.”   Despite234
its fraught nature, arguably still contaminated by its original polemical contexts, I find the term to
be a more established one than the alternative of “the godly,” which is how members of this group
would likely have characterized themselves, and there are sound scholarly precedents for embracing
the term.  Lake in particular uses it in the following sense: “those advanced protestants who regarded
themselves as ‘the godly’, a minority of genuinely true believers in an otherwise lukewarm or corrupt
Centered on the Word, 25.  Elsewhere, Doerksen uses the term in a sense that excludes Puritans from its232
ambit: “those people in the church who, unlike the puritans, accepted the disputed forms and rites without any hesitation.” 
Conforming to the Word, 25.  This formulation is similar to Milton’s in this regard: “a divine who not only conformed
to the ceremonies of the English Church, but did so with alacrity, and was prepared both to make an issue of ceremonial
conformity and points of church government, and to use the epithet of ‘puritan’ against his opponents.”  Catholic and
Reformed, 8.  In the schema that will govern this dissertation, however, exists a category of Conforming Puritans,
Puritans who, for whatever reason, were willing to comport with official directives regarding Church government and
style of worship.
Anglicans and Puritans?, 7.233
The Birthpangs of Protestant England: Religious and Cultural Change in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth234
Centuries, Anstey Memorial Lectures in the University of Kent at Canterbury (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
1988), 143.
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mass.  It is therefore used as a term of degree, or relative religious zeal rather than as a clear-cut party
label.”235
The final key term in Doerksen and Hodgkins’ schema is Avant-Garde Conformist, a term
coined by Peter Lake to account for the fact that some churchmen, like Lancelot Andrewes and John
Buckeridge, came before Laud’s ascendancy to power under Charles I and therefore cannot with
strict chronological propriety be dubbed Laudians.   Apart from that consideration, the semantic236
content of the two terms is the same, and both designate a highly sacramental and ceremonialist
Church practice not entirely consistent with Calvinism yet certainly not in any sense “Anglo-
Catholic,” another term that has properly fallen out of favor due to its associations with the much
later Oxford Movement.   Another term that has been used to designate this segment of English237
Reformed belief and practice, Arminian, has been rejected here on the grounds that, as MacCulloch
argues, it “was a foreign name in allusion to the disputes about predestination that were currently
tearing apart the Dutch Reformed Church.”   As Lake defines Avant-Garde Conformist, it238
epitomizes an “insistence on the central role of the sacrament and public prayer in the worship of
god, [an] intense concern with external uniformity and the beauty of holiness and [a] revaluation of
the value and significance of the traditional feasts of the church.”239
Anglicans and Puritans?, 7.235
See generally, Doerksen and Hodgkins, Centered on the Word, 25; and Lake, “Lancelot Andrewes.”236
See Doerksen, Conforming to the Word, 16 (“the term ‘Anglo-Catholic’ [. . .] is not particularly helpful237
in describing any significant part of the Jacobean Church”).
Reformation 497.  See also MacCulloch, Later Reformation, 94 (“The problems with the label are evident238
if one realises that the English ‘Arminians’ were already developing their ideas in the 1580s, while their first contacts
with Arminius seem to date from the 1590s”).
“Lancelot Andrewes,” 131.239
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In addition to these terms from Doerksen and Hodgkins’ schema, I shall occasionally use two
others.  First, I shall occasionally use the term high-Church to refer to people within the Avant-Garde
Conformist or Laudian category or to refer to practices that would have been endorsed by those
figures.  MacCulloch finds the term “High Churchmanship” to be “vague” and asserts that it “begs
many questions”;  however, by anchoring my usage of the term to a more firmly established240
definition, I hope to avoid at least the first of these problems.  The second term that I shall add to this
schema is radical or radical Reformer, which will be used synonymously with the term Non-
Conforming Puritan.  As Milton observes, radical is a relative term that depends on one’s
perspective of normativity, and for many churchmen during the period “the radicals were in fact a
small group of anti-Calvinist or ‘Arminian’ divines grouped around Archbishop Laud.”   However,241
this term is consistent with the way in which some scholars have characterized the discourse
practitioners that I shall consider in this dissertation.242
Finally, although one could conceivably take issue with this schema, arguing that it is
insufficiently nuanced to capture fully the confessional positions of the discourse practitioners whom
I shall consider, I must note that Doerksen and Hodgkins offer it provisionally, as a heuristic rather
than as the definitive, final word on the English Reformed Church: “the situation,” they concede,
“was flexible, with a range of views within categories, and some movement even during the
Jacobean period.”243
Reformation, 493.240
Catholic and Reformed, 2.241
See, for example, Richard Strier, “Radical Donne: ‘Satire III,’” ELH 60, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 283–322.242
Centered on the Word, 24.243
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E.  METHODOLOGY
The Case-Study Approach
My goals in this dissertation are to show that a discernible pattern of thought exists, to explain how
it emerges in a number of representative examples, and to suggest some reasons why the pattern
might be significant and worthy of fuller scholarly attention.  Given these objectives, a case-study
approach seemed to be the most appropriate manner of proceeding and the most effective way to
begin the kind of investigation that I hope to prompt.
This approach has both advantages and disadvantages.  On the negative side, it will leave
much unsaid and many questions unanswered.  I expect that the ideas that I present will ricochet off
one another from one case study to the next in such a way that each phase of my investigation will
illuminate the others.  If this is the case, then a more finite number of contact points will necessarily
limit the things that I can say and the depth at which I can say them.  Likewise, the necessarily
abbreviated scope of each case study will in turn leave some issues unresolved—the sermons of John
Donne, for example, consist in ten hefty volumes, so an exploration of only one of them will, in a
relative sense, contribute only marginally to our understanding of his homiletical discourse as a
whole; the central portion of George Herbert’s The Temple, entitled “The Church,” contains more
than 150 poems, so a close examination of only “The Altar” (along with the handful of other lyrics
that I shall explore more briefly) might seem to say little about the volume in its entirety.  On the
positive side, however, the case-study approach makes possible the beginnings of a critical
conversation.  An encyclopedic treatment of the phenomenon that I shall consider, which I suspect
is pervasive in the discourse of the English Renaissance, is simply beyond the scope of this
document’s intended purpose, and to defer even a preliminary examination of that phenomenon in
favor of a more complete treatment would likely result in silence.
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The following case studies each partake of a different brand of discourse: speech is
represented here by the sermons of John Donne; imagery by a number of anamorphic works
examined in relationship to contemporary popular texts like Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code; and
poetry by George Herbert’s “The Altar.”  The investigation of other types of discourse (long-form
prose, for example, might be considered productively in the context of Izaack Walton’s The
Compleat Angler and the drama could be explored through Margaret Cavendish’s The Convent of
Pleasure) must await another occasion.
We shall commence with Donne and the sermon in Chapter II primarily because my approach
to ludic discourse owes considerable debts to rhetorical theory, the lens through which I shall
approach the sermons.  Because pulpit rhetoric goes hand-in-hand with imagery during the
Renaissance,  we shall next proceed in Chapter III to the examination of visual discourses: a244
number of anamorphic paintings and similarly outré works viewed from the perspective of
contemporary popular texts on Renaissance imagery.  Poetry will follow imagery in Chapter IV
because, as James Simpson has noted, “The Herculean struggle for supremacy between Word and
non-scriptural image was in England won by the Word, but also by the poetic word and the poetic,
verbal image.  That victory shaped and energized a grand tradition of English poetry.”   Finally,245
in Chapter V, I shall conclude by outlining some of the contributions that this dissertation will have
made to the fields in which it is situated and by offering some personal reflections about why
discourse practitioners during the English Renaissance might have chosen play as a mode of
imitative worship.
Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 211 (“During the Renaissance, images play an especially vital role in sacred244
rhetoric because of their capacity to make what is unseen accessible to both thought and feeling”)
 Under the Hammer: Iconoclasm in the Anglo-American Tradition, Clarendon Lectures in English (Oxford:245
Oxford University Press, 2010), 9.
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Let David’s dance begin.
^
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Figure 6.  Albrecht Dürer, Allegory of Eloquence, c.1498.
Dürer’s image reflects the equivocal attitude toward rhetoric that often prevailed
during the Renaissance.  Eloquence, depicted as a wing-footed Mercury figure
bearing a caduceus, ensnares the mortals below, including a cleric, by chains linked
to their ears.  Yet the term eloquence bears a positive connotation, suggesting a
degree of skill in the deployment of the spoken word, as illustrated by the fact that
the figure rises from the ground on the power of his speech.  We shall observe John
Donne grappling with the same tensions in the following case study.
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II.  A CASE STUDY OF LUDIC SPEECH IN THE RENAISSANCE
“How empty a thing is Rhetorique?”:
The Speaking and the Doing Word in John Donne’s Sermons
And if they deride us, for often preaching, and call us fooles for that,
as David said, He would be more vile, he would Dance more, So let
us be more fooles, in this foolishnesse of preaching, and preach
more.1
—John Donne
With this gesture toward the concept of Erasmian folly and its implicit reminder that we are
commanded to be “fooles for Christ’s sake,”  John Donne signals to us with a palpable clarity and2
with an admirable (if uncharacteristic) compactness the many connections that exist within his
sermon practice among three realms of ideas: the ludic; an incarnational discourse in which Word
is made Flesh; and the imitation, through play, of Divine recreation and re-creation in the
Incarnation.
Desiderius Erasmus, one of the most playful minds of the late medieval period and no one’s
meager rhetorician,  famously links the Incarnation to a form of play in his notion, expressed by3
John Donne, The Sermons of John Donne, ed. Evelyn M. Simpson and George R. Potter (Berkeley:1
University of California Press, 1953–62), 5:43.  All further citations to Donne’s sermons (S) will be to volume and page
number of this edition and will appear as parenthetical references in the main text and footnotes.
1 Cor 4:10 (AV 1611).  “For the preaching of the Crosse is to them that perish, foolishnesse; but vnto vs2
which are saued, it is the power of God.”  1 Cor 1:18 (AV 1611).
“Erasmus!” Johan Huizinga exclaims, “his whole being seems to radiate the play-spirit” (HL, 181).  See3
also Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style (1534), trans. Betty I. Knott, in vol. 24 of Collected Works of Erasmus,
Literary and Educational Writings 2, ed. Craig R. Thompson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 279–659.
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Folly herself, that Christ “in some manner became a fool when taking upon him the nature of man.”  4
As Christ’s representative in the pulpit, Donne the preacher must assume the same role, one
reinforced by his analogy between preaching and David’s exultantly ludic praise of God before the
ark of the covenant.  Donne’s insistence on the cardinal importance of the ordinance of preaching,
especially in this era when the sermon begins to fall out of favor under the influence of William
Laud’s more sacrament-centered theology,  is itself a marker of ludic extravagance echoed by5
Donne’s call for more, for preaching in excess.  And his adamant challenge that we follow the model
of David as set forth in Scripture represents a form of imitation, of following and hearkening to the
Word.
On this brief passage, which so neatly encapsulates the threads of my central argument,
David’s dance pivots into my first case study: an examination of the playful speech of one of the key
ludic figures in the English Renaissance, speech from a site where some might least expect to find
play in action, the Reformed pulpit of the Stuart dynasty’s United Kingdom.  I hope to demonstrate
or suggest the truth of two propositions in the following pages: first, that the vigorous debates about
preaching that prevailed during this tumultuous period were remarkably fertile ground for Donne’s
playful mind; and second, that his ludic and incarnational sermon practice, rarely noted or fully
appreciated by scholars of English Reformation ars praedicandi, can complicate and enrich our
understanding of period discourses.  More specifically, conceiving Donne’s homiletics as playful and
incarnational is helpful not only in positioning Donne among his contemporaries in terms of where
In Praise of Folly (1511), trans. John Wilson (1668) (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), 66.4
See Ramie Targoff, John Donne: Body and Soul (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 158.  Given5
the fact that Donne tended to resist the temptation to use the pulpit for polemic, as Jeanne Shami has argued, his unusual
flouting of Laud’s decrees is all the more noteworthy.  John Donne and Conformity in Crisis in the Late Jacobean Pulpit,
Studies in Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2003).
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they stood on the vexed status of preaching in the English Reformation but also in locating Donne’s
perspective about the proper role of rhetoric in the discourses, sermonological and otherwise, that
surrounded the English Reformed Church. 
Central to the methodology of this case study is Donne’s frequent tendency toward self-
reflexivity in his sermons—he commonly speaks about speaking.  Most of the texts that I shall
examine are examples of this Donnean practice, and the strategy of this case study will be to examine
Donne’s sermons in terms of both substance and style.  In other words, what Donne says about
preaching, the content of his discourse, will be no more important than how he says it, the manner
of his discourse.  As we shall see, the two strands of his speech are not always necessarily consistent,
for Donne as a preacher remains a stubbornly slippery and evasive force, likely owing to the great
need for delicacy during a transformative and turbulent period during which he positioned himself
squarely within a number of what we might consider to be minority factions.
The case study will unfold in five overlapping phases.  I shall begin with an overture of sorts,
a close look at a significant instance in which Donne comments on the art of rhetoric.  This section
will establish through an analysis of his commentary some preliminary evidence for the claim that
Donne’s sermonology is both ludic and incarnational.  The next section of the chapter will turn to
a more detailed analysis of one particular sermon in which Donne considers the art of rhetoric in
order to illustrate more fully how (and how much) Donne plays with his discourse.  My argument
in this section will be that Donne’s sermon language is excessive to the degree that I have defined
as playful.  In the third section, I shall establish a connection between the ludic nature of the sermons
and their incarnational dimension, arguing for my central proposition that recreative discourse during
the period effectively imitated the power of the divinely incarnated Word.  The fourth section of the
chapter will consider some of the implications of my analysis, attempting on one hand to position
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Donne along a complex and non-linear continuum of period debates on ars praedicandi and on the
other hand to crystallize Donne’s notion of what rhetoric is for homiletical purposes.  This section
will further support my contention that Donne’s sermonology is distinctly ludic, and it will also
explain that what is at stake in my analysis for the work of other Renaissance scholars is a fuller and
better understanding of Reformed English sermonology during the period.  A brief coda in the form
of a fifth section will extend my observations into the realm of Donne’s verse and serve as a
transition point to my next case study.
A.  OVERTURE
A Donnean Meta-Rhetorical Commentary
At St. Paul’s on the morning of Easter Sunday in 1622, John Donne preached a sermon in which he
emphasized to his auditory the richness of the reward awaiting the saved.  Finding words inadequate
to express the overwhelming abundance of this reward, Donne turned instead to the subject of his
own mode of addressing the assembled congregants.  He exclaimed:
How barren a thing is Arithmetique? (and yet Arithmetique will tell you, how many
single graines of sande, will fill this hollow Vault to the Firmament)  How empty a
thing is Rhetorique? (and yet Rhetorique will make absent and remote things present
to your understanding)  How weak a thing is Poetry? (and yet Poetry is a counterfait
Creation, and makes things that are not, as though they were)  How infirme, how
impotent are all assistances, if they be put to express this Eternity?  (S, 4:87)
In considering this passage, there are three things to which we should pay particular attention. 
First, Donne is using the rhetorical art of which he speaks, and he is doing so adeptly.  We see
ecphonesis in his exclamations framed as questions; anaphora in the sets of repeated words that
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begin each rhetorical question and each interposed answer; parenthesis in the asides that qualify
those outbursts of wonder; erotesis in the framing of rhetorical questions; apophasis in the ironic
affirmation of the power of rhetoric, which Donne at least on the surface seems to reject; antithesis
in the pairings of questions and answers that contrast one another; hypophora in his use of the
question-answer pattern to structure the discourse; and isocolon in the rhythmic sets of repeating and
balanced sentence structures.   This is not simply an example of Erasmian copia,  for what we see6 7
even in this very small passage is an excess of tropes piled and mounted so heavily upon each other
that, despite the soaring nature of the discourse itself, the passage seems to teeter under the
overwhelming weight of words arranged and deployed systematically and with utmost care.  It is a
For definitions of the tropes referenced in the main text, see Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical6
Terms, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).  All further citations to A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms
(HoRT) will appear as parenthetical references in the main text and footnotes.  In most instances later in this case study,
rhetorical tropes in the principal texts under review will be identified and defined in the footnotes accompanying my
close readings.  The existence of a vast number and variety of rhetorical devices in Donne’s sermon is an important piece
of evidence supporting my argument, but relegating this work to the footnotes will spare the reader significant potential
distraction from the consistent interruptions of appositio.
Lanham’s Handlist provides an invaluable guide for navigating the various taxonomies and systems of
nomenclature that have emerged from the study of rhetoric since fifth-century Greece.  Another useful source—in
narrative rather than glossary form—is Arthur Quinn, Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase (Davis, CA:
Hermagoras Press, 1993).  Gideon O. Burton of Brigham Young University has created a searchable and well indexed
database of rhetorical tropes entitled “Silva Rhetoricae: The Forest of Rhetoric” at rhetoric.byu.edu (last modified
February 26, 2007); it is especially useful for the scholar who wishes to identify the names of unknown or unfamiliar
tropes according to the known or recognized functions that they serve in a text under examination.  For the seminal guide
to rhetoric written during the period under consideration, see Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloqvence (1577) (London:
H. Iackson, 1593).  All further citations to The Garden of Eloqvence (GoE) will appear as parenthetical references in
the main text and footnotes.
Donne’s use in the quoted passage of antithesis coupled with a cumulative three-stage parallelism or isocolon
is part of a pattern that has been observed in many of his sermons.  Jerome S. Dees, “Logic and Paradox in the Structure
of Donne’s Sermons,” South Central Review 4, no. 2 (1987): 78–92, 82.  See also Evelyn M. Simpson, A Study of the
Prose Works of John Donne, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 257 (“A carefully balanced antithesis marks many
of Donne’s sentences”).
Gale H. Carrithers, Jr., Donne at Sermons: A Christian Existential World (Albany: State University of New7
York Press, 1972), 88 (“mere copiousness might have come easier”).
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microcosm of the complete panoply of rhetorical superabundance available to exceptionally well
trained speakers during the Renaissance and an example of ludic discourse.8
Second, Donne is strikingly, even confusingly, ambivalent about the power of his art.   Not9
only does he use at least half a dozen rhetorical figures (and probably more) in order to express
doubts about the efficacy of figured speech,  but he also undercuts his own skepticism by implying10
that language, despite its shortcomings, can be remarkably potent.  Poetry is not, or not just, mimesis
but an imitation of the Divine act of creation ex nihilo.  Although, according to Raymond-Jean
Frontain, “it is God’s linguistic power—His creation ex verbo—that fascinates Donne” more than
any other theological concern,  Donne argued on at least one occasion that God’s role in preaching11
was even more noteworthy than the Creation itself.  In a sermon delivered at St. Paul’s in January
1626, Donne said:
the Creation, (which was a production of all out of nothing) was not properly a
miracle: A miracle is a thing done against nature; when something in the course of
nature resists that worke, then that worke is a miracle; But in the Creation, there was
Ibid., 89–90.  Characterizing several other examples of Donne’s sermons as having “a taste of exuberance,8
of delighted play,” Gale H. Carrithers, Jr., suggests that this dimension of the sermons “might well reward separate
treatment.”  Ibid., 89.  This chapter is, in part, an effort to accept Carrithers’ invitation to explore this element of Donne’s
homiletic discourse.  
Taking into account the possibility that Donne’s ambiguity was intentional, we might characterize his use9
of language here as a case of skotison, purposeful obscurity (HoRT, 141–42).  See also John Stubbs, John Donne: The
Reformed Soul (New York: Norton, 2007), 361 (noting that it was in Donne’s interest to remain ambiguous on
controversial issues of doctrine).  James S. Baumlin discusses Donne’s equivocation in the quoted passage at length in
John Donne and the Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991), 40–41.
“That Donne was fascinated by such logical conundrums is well evidenced.”  Walter H. Beale, “On10
Rhetoric and Poetry: John Donne’s ‘The Prohibition’ Revisited,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 62, no. 4 (December
1976): 376–86, 381.
“‘Make all this All’: The Religious Operations of John Donne’s Imagination,” in John Donne’s Religious11
Imagination: Essays in Honor of John T. Shawcross, ed. Raymond-Jean Frontain and Frances Malpezzi (Conway:
University of Central Arkansas Press, 1995), 1–27, 14.
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no reluctation, no resistance, no nature, nothing to resist.  But to doe great works by
small means, to bring men to heaven by Preaching in the Church, this is a miracle. 
(S, 7:300–301)12
In both passages, Donne suggestively describes rhetoric and the power of language in terms that
evoke the Eucharist and the perfect creative power of Divine speech.   In short, we see significant13
evidence here already for the proposition that Donne’s interests in incarnational rhetoric are apparent
throughout the work of his pulpit speech, not only in sermons before sophisticated audiences at
Court but also in sermons for the general public at St. Paul’s.14
Finally, Donne is talking about the art of rhetoric, turning the fabric of his sermon inside out
by foregrounding discursive method, by making the manner of his speech part of the matter of his
speech.  Donne uses rhetoric to discuss rhetoric as part of the rhetorical act of preaching.  This aspect
of Donne’s preaching is perhaps the most significant in establishing Donne as a master of prose
rhetoric and as a preacher who was both willing and eager to use the most elaborate devices of the
arts of language in his sermons: “Such a studied exploration of dilemmas as we find here,” Walter
H. Beale says, “seems clearly to presuppose a close acquaintance with the workings of a notoriously
tricky rhetorical (or poetic) device, and at least partly a desire to exhibit one’s skill at composing
In this passage, Donne uses asyndeton, the omission of a conjunction after the penultimate item in his list12
of negating words and phrases (HoRT, 25; GoE, 52); exergasia, the multiple defining explanations of the miraculous
(Burton, Silva Rhetoricae); parenthesis, the insertion of an aside into a sentence complete in itself (HoRT, 108; GoE,
198); and paradiastole, the forcefully repeated words of negation (Quinn, Figures of Speech, 13–15).
See Debora K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance (Princeton,13
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 198; and Robert Whalen, “Sacramentalizing the Word: Donne’s 1626 Christmas
Sermon,” in Centered on the Word: Literature, Scripture, and the Tudor-Stuart Middle Way, ed. Daniel W. Doerksen
and Christopher Hodgkins (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 193–223, 215–16.
See Dennis Quinn, “Donne’s Christian Eloquence,” in Seventeenth-Century Prose: Modern Essays in14
Criticism, ed. Stanley E. Fish (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 353–74, 358.
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such a scheme.”   Manfred Pfister refers to this kind of self-reflexivity as a key mode of15
performative language,  and it also exhibits a distinct form of playfulness.   Donne’s meta-16 17
rhetorical commentary on the act of preaching in this passage is not an isolated self-referential
gesture.  Just as Donne the poet manifested in his verse an acute consciousness of his art and a
propensity toward self-reflexivity, Donne the preacher was keenly aware of language as he prepared
and delivered his sermons and unusually candid in using those homilies to address issues of
homiletics.   He commonly preached what he practiced by using rhetorical concepts as metaphors18
or topoi, and several of his surviving sermons grapple with the subject of preaching.  In this regard,
Donne is unusual among preachers of the period whose sermons have survived in written form.  For
Renaissance theorists of rhetoric, according to James S. Baumlin, “to speak or write is [. . .] to speak
about the possibility of speaking,”  but Donne, if we may properly consider him a theorist, was also19
“On Rhetoric and Poetry,” 382.  See also Herbert H. Umbach, “The Rhetoric of Donne’s Sermons,” PMLA15
52, no. 2 (June 1937): 354–58, 354 (“Donne’s sermons best display his mature ability as a man of letters, wherefore as
a master of English homiletic style Donne deserves his place among the leading writers of his day”).
“‘As an Unperfect Actor on the Stage’: Notes towards a Definition of Performance in Shakespeare’s16
Sonnets,” in Theory into Poetry: New Approaches to the Lyric, ed. Eva Müller-Zettelmann and Margarete Rubik,
Internationale Forschungen zur allgemeinen und vergiechenden Literaturwissenschaft (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005),
207–28, 222.
See Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, Seeing Films Politically, SUNY Series in Radical Social and Political Theory17
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 71.
“Sermons directly on the preacher’s calling, and incidental references to preaching, abound, and his18
language reaches great heights as he considers the preacher’s vocation.”  Frederick A. Rowe, I Launch at Paradise: A
Consideration of John Donne, Poet and Preacher, The Fernley-Hartley Lecture (London: Epworth Press, 1964), 171. 
“Donne’s sermons are interlarded with remarks about the proper manner and matter of preaching.”  William R. Mueller,
John Donne: Preacher (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 80.  Perhaps the best evidence of Donne’s
extensive self-reflexivity in his sermons, however, is the fact that he said so much about preaching, rhetoric, and language
that an entire volume of these statements has been assembled: P. G. Stanwood and Heather Ross Asals, eds., John Donne
and the Theology of Language (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986).  “[T]he passages gathered here display
Donne thinking self-consciously about the nature of his task as a theologian and writer [. . .] [It is] a ‘text’ on the nature
of the written word, sacred, but also at times secular.”  Ibid., 2.  This source has been a remarkably useful digest and
finding aid in connection with my work here.
Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse, 5.19
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a practitioner of rhetoric—an orator who at least once a week nearly every week, from his ordination
in 1615 until 1631 when he delivered what soon came to be considered his own funeral sermon,20
distilled the theories of his art into public discourse.
These three closely related features, as I have suggested, possess a dual significance. 
Initially, they begin to establish that Donne’s sermons are ludic acts,  a proposition that finds further21
support in existing research and commentaries.  For example, Evelyn M. Simpson and George R.
Potter, in their introduction to the final volume of their collection of Donne’s sermons, conclude
among other things that “he found in the great Christian doctrines a perpetual fountain of life on
which the light of his mind could play in many diverse colours” (S, 10:3).  Gale H. Carrithers, Jr., 
has suggested in his study of Donne’s sermons that we see a playful mind at work when we hear
Donne preaching to his congregations.   John S. Chamberlin’s approach to Donne as a homiletician22
refers to the wit of the sermon, its playing with the Word, as “play that is delightful and
“Donne’s last sermon—‘Death’s Duel,’ as it has come to be called—is his own funeral sermon and more. 20
It is a distillation of his preaching of sixteen years, a summation of the pulpit oratory of England’s most famous
preacher.”  Mueller, John Donne: Preacher, 4.
Donne’s sermons on the subject of labor are beyond the scope of this chapter, but for a treatment of his21
view of work as opposed to play, see Thomas Festa, “The Metaphysics of Labor in John Donne’s Sermon to the Virginia
Company,” Studies in Philology 106, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 76–99.  Festa argues that, for Donne, “Labor serves as a form
of redemption.” Ibid., 94.  Donne also makes a “connection between spiritual regeneration and financial productivity.” 
Ibid., 99.  And Walter Ong is quick to remind us that the word “liturgy” means “work of the people.”  “Gospel,
Existence, and Print,” review of Donne at Sermons: A Christian Existential World, by Gale Carrithers, Modern
Language Quarterly 35, no. 1 (March 1974): 66–77, 68.
Donne at Sermons, 89.  Although Walter Ong disagrees with Carrithers’ observation in this regard (“The22
sermon is not fiction, poetry, drama, ‘play’ in Huizinga’s sense, something set off from ‘life’”), he concedes that the
sermon and the liturgy in broader terms “of course may include aesthetic or ‘play’ elements, which do not however
constitute it but rather relate to it dialectically (and in this sense do help define it).”  “Gospel, Existence, and Print,” 68. 
Moreover, Ong concurs with Carrithers’ emphasis on the sermon—and, indeed, on “Christian life itself”—as a free
challenge, “a free response to grace offered freely by God.”  Ibid., 67.  This element of freedom is, of course, central to
Johan Huizinga’s definition of “play” (HL, 7–8; see also MPaG, 6 [“There is [. . .] no doubt that play must be defined
as a free and voluntary activity”]).
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redemptive.”   Anita Gilman Sherman has pronounced Donne’s pulpit language to be “gloriously23
ludic.”   And Anna K. Nardo has productively treated the corpus of Donne’s sermons exclusively24
from the standpoint of ludics.25
Moreover, these three dimensions of Donne’s commentary on the power of rhetoric point
toward his interest in incarnational discourse, another well established idea among the critical
community of Donne scholars.  For example, as Dennis Quinn observes:  
This preaching of God’s word, Donne often says, is an ordinary means of
“manifesting Christ” (e.g., II, 253–254).  This manifestation is a kind of
incarnation—“caro et verbo, he that is made flesh comes in the word, that is, Christ
comes in the preaching thereof” (II, 251).  Just as the Son was made flesh in Christ,
and just as He was incorporated in the Bible, so He is once more incarnated in
preaching the words of the Bible.  Christian eloquence, like Biblical eloquence, has
more than natural power.26
Likewise, Anna K. Nardo discusses “the union between Word and Flesh” in connection with
Donne’s Devotions upon Emergent Occasions.   Ramie Targoff’s biography of John Donne explains27
Increase and Multiply: Arts-of-Discourse Procedure in the Preaching of Donne (Chapel Hill: University23
of North Carolina Press, 1976), 28.
“Donne’s Sermons as Re-enactments of the Word: A Response to Margret Fetzer,” Connotations 19, no.24
1–3 (2009–2010): 14–20, 15.
The Ludic Self in Seventeenth-Century English Literature, SUNY Series: The Margins of Literature25
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 59–69.  “The ars praedicandi (art of discourse) of the Church
Fathers offered a tradition congenial to Donne’s skills as a player.”  This tradition “produced a sermon style in which
the preacher played out the significations of his text, weaving an intricate, often fanciful, network of associations.  [. . .] 
Playing thus with the Word, the preacher brought the congregation into his sacred game.”  Ibid., 63.
“Donne’s Christian Eloquence,” 358.26
Ludic Self, 59.27
92
that “Writing is Donne’s experience of making the word flesh.”   And Horton Davies, establishing28
and investigating a category of preachers whom he describes as “metaphysicals,” finds incarnational
rhetoric to be a defining feature of the sermonology of the members of this group, which of course
includes Donne: “As in the Incarnation where the Word of God took flesh, so at a humbler level their
words must take flesh too; otherwise, their words will only be insubstantial abstractions, mere ghosts
that fade in the memory and in the light of daily duty.”29
Beyond the secondary sources on these two propositions, we see Donne himself pronounce
upon them both in a sermon preached before Charles I at Whitehall on the first Sunday of Lent in
1626:
Never propose to thy self a God, as thou wert not bound to imitate: Thou mistakest
God, if thou make him to be any such thing, or make him to do any such thing, as
thou in thy proportion shouldst not be, or shouldst not do.  And shouldst thou curse
any man that had never offended, never transgrest, never trespast there?  Can God
have done so?  Imagine God, as the Poet saith, Ludere in humanis, to play but a game
of Chesse with this world; to sport himself with making little things great, and great
things nothing: Imagine God to be but at play with us, but a gamester; yet will a
Body and Soul, 24.  Targoff’s central thesis is that the principal preoccupation of Donne’s career as a writer28
is the relationship between the body and the soul.
Like Angels from a Cloud: The English Metaphysical Preachers, 1588–1645 (San Marino, CA: Huntington29
Library, 1986), 431.
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gamester curse, before he be in danger of losing any thing?  Will God curse man,
before man have sinned?  (S, 7:360–61)30
Not only do we see again in this passage subtle references to Erasmian folly (in the paradoxical
notion that God makes the great small and the small great) and the idea, exhibited by 2 Samuel 6:14,
that the Divine provides precedent for recreative forms of worship, but we also see Donne urging
his auditory to imitate this playful God, the substance of my argument in this chapter and throughout
this dissertation.   31
Having preliminarily established that the two elements of my central claim in this case study
are tenable on the basis of a few short passages, it remains to link those two elements together, an
enterprise that will begin with a more detailed analysis not of isolated excerpts but of an entire
sermon.
Donne in this passage uses a modified form of antimetabole or chiasmus in a repetition that inverts his30
initial ordering of words and concepts in “little things great, and great things nothing” (HoRT, 14, 33; GoE, 164).  The
variation, arguably a form of anacoluthon, is the substitution of “nothing” for the expected term in the sequence, “little”
(HoRT, 10).  Anaphora is in evidence in Donne’s choice to repeat the opening phrase “shouldst not” in “shouldst not
be, or shouldst not do,” when he might more simply and directly have said “shouldst not be or do”; the repetition of the
phrase “Imagine God” is an example of the same trope in action (HoRT, 11).  And we once again see favorite Donnean
devices like erotesis in the framing of rhetorical questions (HoRT, 71) and asyndeton in the omission of a final
conjunction at the end of the series of ideas marked by the words “never offended, never transgrest, never trespast”
(HoRT, 25; GoE, 52).
It is only fair at this juncture to observe that, on another occasion in the pulpit, Donne’s attitude toward play31
was anything but positive: “How much happier had that man beene, that hath wasted thousands in play, in riot, in
wantonnesse, in sinfull excesses, if his parents had left him no more at first, then he hath left himselfe at last?” (S, 10:99). 
Yet in this passage, Donne appears to be speaking about play in the peculiar terms of the vice of gambling; he also
addresses excess—a defining feature of play—of a particularly sinful variety, qualifying the term “play” with the ideas
of riot and wantonness, as opposed to the example of the godly excess of abundant grace.  However, the two quoted
passages constitute the entire corpus of Donne’s explicit sermon commentary on ludics.  See Brigham Young University,
Harold E. Lee Library, John Donne Sermons, http://lib.byu.edu/collections/john-donne-sermons/ (accessed May 21,
2014) (a search engine, keyed to the Simpson and Potter edition of Donne’s sermon texts, that is an invaluable resource
for a scholar and far superior to the indices in the edition volumes themselves).  We should therefore, on the whole, judge
Donne’s attitude toward play as ultimately positive and favorable.
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B.  A CLOSE READING
Donne as a Playful Preacher
In this section, I shall attempt to demonstrate that Donne’s pulpit discourse is playful in the sense
that it uses the tools of rhetoric aggressively and extravagantly, more than mere Erasmian copia
would require.  For this purpose I have chosen the first part of an undated two-part sermon probably
delivered late in Donne’s career during the reign of Charles I.   Not only is the sermon fairly32
indicative of Donne’s usual technique in the pulpit, as I have come to understand it from the sermons
that I have encountered, but it also confronts directly and explicitly the role of rhetoric in Christian
ministry.
As a preliminary matter, however, there are at least two respects in which this sermon cannot
be considered typical of Donne’s pulpit oratory.  First, because the sermon was preached before the
Court at Whitehall, it is, at least according to Peter Mack, more likely to exhibit rhetorical polish
than the sermons that Donne would have delivered at St. Paul’s.   Second, as Evelyn M. Simpson33
and George R. Potter explain in their introduction, the sermon represents an unusually vigorous
defense of the English Reformed Church against Roman Catholicism for the very reason that it was
delivered at Court instead of St. Paul’s: “it was largely in Court circles that the Church of Rome
made most headway, while Donne’s audience at St. Paul’s were more likely to be influenced by the
Puritan attacks” against the English Church (S, 10:14).34
Simpson and Potter discuss their dating of this sermon (Sermon No. 6 in Volume 10 of their edition) in their32
introduction to that volume (S, 10:14–17).
Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,33
2002), 279.
For a discussion of the importance of context when considering a preacher’s sermonology, see generally34
Peter McCullough, “Donne as Preacher,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Donne, ed. Achsah Guibbory,
Cambridge Companions to Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 167–81, 168; and Byron Nelson,
“John Donne’s Pulpit Voice,” Prose Studies: History, Theory, Criticism 34, no. 1 (April 2012): 50–58, 51.
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An additional consideration in presenting this sermon as an example of Donne’s pulpit
oratory presents a problem of a more fundamental nature but ultimately one that is unavoidable: “As
early modern preachers liked to point out,” Arnold Hunt reminds us, “vox audita perit, litera scripta
manet—the spoken word perishes, and only the written word remains.”   It goes without saying that35
Donne’s spoken words have not survived and that we must instead rely on his written versions of
his sermons, which might have been heavily edited—and perhaps made more baroque—before being
published after his death by his son.  As Donne himself said in a dedicatory letter accompanying a
transcription of one of his sermons for the Countess of Montgomery, “I know what dead carkasses
things written are, in respect of things spoken” (S, 2:179).
Although this question has not been ignored by Donne scholars, the general consensus is that
the matter cannot productively be explored in depth.   Resignation is the prevailing attitude among36
most critics.   The majority view, however, appears to be that of Herbert H. Umbach: “The modern37
reader can [. . .] rest reasonably assured that in the printed word we have, though perhaps not always
an exact transcript, a faithful record of what was said in the pulpit.”   Because Donne prepared his38
sermons for publication by his son, and because some of his sermons were published during his
lifetime, “We can assume that Dr. Donne is represented as he would wish to be,” William R. Mueller
The Art of Hearing: English Preachers and Their Audiences, 1590–1640, Cambridge Studies in Early35
Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8.
See Carrithers, Donne at Sermons, 168 (“We are unlikely ever to know exactly [how Donne prepared his36
original sermons], since no foul papers have come to light”).  
See Mueller, John Donne: Preacher, 208 (“A twentieth-century critic must, of course, depend on Donne’s37
written sermons, and even then with the knowledge that the written discourse does not accord exactly with the sermon
as it was preached”).
“Rhetoric of Donne’s Sermons,” 356. 38
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says, “that we possess the sermons which he esteemed most highly, and that we possess them in a
text which bears him imprimatur.”39
The text of the sermon is Ezekiel 34:19, “And as for my flock, they eate that, which yee have
troden with your feet, and they drink that which yee have fouled with your feet,” which, as Donne
explains, relates to a period during Israel’s captivity in Babylon when “their own Priests joyned with
the State against them, and infused pestilent doctrines into them, that so themselves might enjoy the
favour of the State” (S, 10:140–41).  At least, Donne says, this is “literall sense,” one that is more
obvious to him and his auditory than to the ancients because “that which was Prophecy to them, is
History to us” (S, 10:141).   The “figurative and Mysticall sense is of the same oppressions, and the40
same deliverance over again” in the persecution of the primitive Church (S, 10:141), and again in
“the oppressions and deliverance of our Fathers, in the Reformation of Religion, and the shaking off
of the yoak of Rome, that Italian Babylon” (S, 10:142).
With this background, it is possible to describe the overall structure of the sermon.  Donne
relentlessly divides his text into ever-narrower binary sections, after the fashion of Petrus Ramus,
and clearly signals each division to his auditory.  This method of organization by bifurcation is best
illustrated by first providing a purely schematic outline and then adding a more detailed explanation:
John Donne: Preacher, 89.  Whether these assurances are convincing or glib is a question beyond the scope39
of this chapter.  Materials with which the reader might begin an independent exploration of this issue may be found in
Carrithers, Donne at Sermons, 168; Mueller, John Donne: Preacher, 208–9; Rowe, I Launch at Paradise, 174; Simpson,
Study of the Prose Works, 258; and Umbach, “Rhetoric of Donne’s Sermons,” 356–57.
The figure or schema that Donne uses here may be described as antithesis by virtue of two facts: the future-40
oriented term “Prophecy” is being opposed to the past-oriented term “History,” and the third-person word “them” is
being opposed to the first-person term “us” (HoRT, 14; GoE, 160).  Donne uses this figure again, twice,  later in the same
paragraph: “In Babylon they were a part, but in Rome they were all; In Babylon they joyned with the State, but in Rome
they were the State” (S, 10:142).  In turn, in this second example, this repeated use of antithesis becomes embraced
within the trope of isocolon, the balanced use of similarly structured items of the same approximate length in a series
(HoRT, 93).
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I.
A.
1.
a.
b.
(1)
(2)
2.
a.
b.
B.
1.
2.
a.
b.
II.
I. Pastores concurrebant: “the greatest calamity of those sheep in Babylon, was that their own
shepherds concurred to their oppression” (S, 10:142).  Properly speaking, this division
constitutes the entirety of the first part of the sermon, dealing with the behavior of the
priests—“the behaviour of the sheep,” Donne indicates in his conclusion, “must be the
exercise of your devotion another day” (S, 10:158).41
Donne’s suspension of his thought in this regard is, of course, another figure.41
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A. What the shepherds befouled42
1. Gramen / Grasse: Donne argues that grass represents “spirituall food”—the
Scriptures and sacraments—and notes that in this division “make we onely
these two stops, that the sheep are to eate their grasse super terram, upon the
ground; And they are to eate it sine rore, when the dew is off” (S, 10:144).43
a. Super terram: “that is, where the hand of God hath set it; which for
spirituall food is the Church” (S, 10:144).
b. Sine rore: “The word of God is our grasse, which should be delivered
purely, simply, sincerely, and in the naturall verdure thereof” (S,
10:145).   Donne explains that “this treading down” of the grass—by44
adulteration of foreign matter, or dew—“will be pertinently
considered two ways.  Tertullian in his Book De habitu muliebri,
notes two excesses in womens dressing; one he cals Ornatum, the
other cultum [. . .] the first is a superfluous diligence in their dressing,
but the other an unnatural addition to their complexion; the first he
Although Donne does not make this division explicitly in his sermon, its existence is clear by implication.42
To define a word or term, as Donne often does in citing Scriptures in their original languages, is called43
distinctio or epexegesis (HoRT, 59, 67; GoE, 191).  Peter McCullough stresses that Donne was less likely to engage in
this practice in Court sermons than in homilies preached to the general public, but this particular sermon is rife with
examples of explicit translation.  “Donne as Preacher,” 168.  See also Nelson, “John Donne’s Pulpit Voice,” 51.
Donne does not mean in this passage that preaching should be in the plain style: “The Dews which we44
intend, are Revelations, Apparitions, Inspirations, Motions, and Interpretations of the private spirit” (S, 10:145).
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pronounces to be always ad ambitionem, for pride, but the other, ad
prostitutionem, for a worse, for the worst purpose” (S, 10:146–47).45
(1) Ornatum: “mingling of too much humane ornament, and
secular learning in preaching” (S, 10:147).
(2) Cultum: “mingling humane Traditions, as of things of equall
value, and obligation, with the Commandements of God”
(S, 10:147).  Donne introduces his next division by saying, “in
this treading down this grasse, this way, this suppressing of it
by traditions, be pleased to consider these two applications”
(S, 10:150).
(a) Sicut Porcus: “some traditions doe destroy the word
of God, extirpate it, annihilate it as when a Hog doth
root up the grass” (S, 10:150).46
(b) Sicut Talpa: “The other sort of Traditions, and
Ceremonies, doe not as the Hog, root up the grass, but
as a Mole, cast a slack, and thin earth upon the face of
the grass” (S, 10:150).
2. Aqua / Water: Donne contends that water represents “The endowments of
heaven [. . .] Joy, and Glory” (S, 10:152), and announces his next division by
explaining, “the shepherds, in our text, troubled the waters; and more then so;
Here we see an example of occultatio in Donne’s refusal to provide an explicit translation of the Latin term,45
which nonetheless clearly alludes to (and would have been understood by his auditory to refer to) prostitution (HoRT,
104).
This is a further instance of asyndeton.46
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for we have just cause to note the double signification of this word, which we
translate Trouble, and to transfer the two significations to the two
Sacraments, as they are exhibited in the Roman Babylon; The word is
Mirpas” (S, 10:152–53).47
a. Conturbationem / Muddling: “in the Sacrament of Baptisme, they
had troubled the water, with additions of Oile, and salt, and spittle,
and exorcismes” (S, 10:153).
b. Obturationem / Interception: “in the other Sacrament they came
[. . .] to a stopping, to an intercision, to an interruption of the water,
the water of life [. . .] in withholding the Cup of salvation, the bloud
of Christ Jesus from us” (S, 10:153).
B. How the shepherds befouled it: Donne reminds his auditory that the grass and
water in his text were corrupted and troubled with the priests’ feet, then proceeds to
his next division: “Now, in the Scriptures, when this word, feet, doth not signifie that
part of mans body which is ordinarily so called, but is transferred to a Metaphorical
signification, (as in our text it is) it does most commonly signifie Affections, or
Power” (S, 10:154).48
The invention of arguments based upon etymologies or multiple senses of a single word is a common47
rhetorical method (see HoRT, 167).  See also Davies, Like Angels, 62 (“An interest in etymology was, of course, not only
an echo of the schooling of the preachers, but a necessity for a learned biblical expositor”).
Another figure of thought that Donne commonly uses in his sermons is this development of an argument48
based upon a word’s multiple significations.
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1. Pes potestatis: Donne discusses the Roman Church’s abuse of its power,
using the image of feet “trod upon the necks of Princes and people” (S, 10:155–56).
2. Pes superbiae: Donne uses the image of one compelled to kiss another’s feet
to address the scorn of the Roman Church, and then presents his final
division: “And this oppressing with scorne, this proceeding without any
respect of fame, we note (for hast) but in two things, in the Italian Babylon
Rome; first, in the Book, their Taxa Camerae, and then in that doctrine, their
Reservatio Casuum” (S, 10:156).
a. Taxa Camera: “an Index, a Repertory for all sinnes, and in which
every man may see beforehand, how much money, an Adultery, an
Incest, a Murder, a Parricide [. . .] will cost him” (S, 10:156–57).
b. Reservatio Casuum: “their Reservation of Cases; that though all
Priests have an equall power of remitting all sins, yet are some sinnes
reserved onely to Prelates, some onely to the Popes Legats, some
onely to the Pope himselfe” (S, 10:157).49
II. Donne begins the second part of the sermon by recapitulating the text: “we have considered
these words, as they concern the iniquity and oppression of the shepheards [. . .] so now in
this exercise are we to consider, the behaviour of the sheep” (S, 10:159).50
In addition to two tropes that we have seen before—asyndeton and anaphora—Donne here also deploys49
the figure of zeugma, the omission of a verb from clauses after the first, in the phrase, “yet are some sinnes reserved onely
to Prelates, some only to the Popes Legats, some onely to the Pope himselfe” (HoRT, 159–61; GoE, 51).
To return in this fashion to one’s text or thesis by recapitulating it is anacephalaeosis.  Burton, Silva50
Rhetoricae.
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This structural overview of the sermon reveals that Donne is operating in an aggressively and
conspicuously rhetorical mode on the large scale of its organizing framework.   He openly51
announces and carefully explains the basis of each division or diaeresis,  and this technique52
provides him with an elaborate set of extended metaphors for amplifying and explicating his text. 
Expanding upon the commonplace of preacher as shepherd and congregation as flock, Donne imbues
a series of associated ideas and images with symbolic meanings—the grass and water of the pasture,
the manner in which the sheep are to graze, the ways in which the grass may be adulterated, and the
effects of different animals upon the wholesomeness of the grass, to trace only one path through the
intricate network of metaphorical connections that Donne establishes.  Indeed, this outline does not
even capture the full extent to which he exploits this device.  In just one of the parts of Donne’s
sermon, corresponding to section I.A.1.b.(1) of the outline, he compares pastures to orchards (“in
sheep-pastures you may plant fruit trees in the hedge-rowes; but if you plant them all over, it is an
Orchard; we may transfer flowers of secular learning into these exercises; but if they consist of
those, they are but Themes, and Essays” [S 10:148]), and introduces other farm animals with their
own symbolic significations to the metaphorical and rhetorical pasture (“After an Oxe that oppresseth
the grass, after a Horse that devours the grass, sheep will feed; but after a Goose that stanches the
grass, they will not” [S 10:149]).  All the while Donne is applying these metaphors simultaneously
to three sets of historical events in the life of the Church: the Babylonian captivity of Israel, the
Roman persecution of the early Christian Church, and the Protestant Reformation.  And he adds a
There is an even larger-scale binary division apparent to the extent that the sermon itself was delivered in51
two parts on two separate occasions.
A diaeresis is a method of division by partition (HoRT, 50; GoE 125).  Other terms that might be used to52
describe Donne’s method in this regard include diallage (the bringing together of multiple arguments to illustrate or
defend a single point) and dinumeratio (a figure of amplification in which the components of an argument are enumerated
to enhance their cumulative effect) (HoRT, 51–52, 55–56).
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fourth—“the little ground that our Separatists can have, for their departing from us, either by Israels
departing from Babylon, or our Fathers departing from Rome”—in his final sentence, promising to
develop it more fully in the second part of his sermon (S, 10:158), a promise which he duly keeps
(S, 10:173–77).  The intricacy, complexity, and richness of Donne’s organizational strategy for this
sermon can be considered as excessive—indeed, contrary to his own advice in the sermon, Donne
runs a distinct risk of confusing even his rather sophisticated auditory with the multitude of ideas and
comparisons that he presents—but it is as if his playful mind cannot resist the overwhelming
temptation to trope and to figure his language ornately.53
 Donne’s sermon is equally revealing on the smaller scale at which we can see specific
references to rhetoric in preaching.  Although he speaks against “the mingling of too much humane
ornament, and secular learning in preaching, in presenting the word of God, which word is our
grasse” (S, 10:147), it could not have escaped the notice of Donne’s auditory that he had just cited
Tertullian’s De habitu muliebri in order to establish a distinction between this type of “treading
down the grasse” and the other type, “mingling humane Traditions [. . .] with the Commandements
of God” (S, 10:146–47).  One could fairly characterize a classical text “on womanly dress”—which
in some versions is joined with a book entitled De cultu feminarum (“On Women’s Fashion”) —as54
a case of secular learning.  “But why insist we upon this?” Donne asks, in another example of
hypophora:  “Was there any such conformity between the two Babylons as that the Italian Babylon55
can be said to have troden down the grasse in that kinde, with overcharging their Sermons with too
Donne once publicly chastised himself for this ludic tendency, explaining in a sermon that he was even53
guilty of involuntarily punning during prayer (S, 10:56).
Roger Pearse, “De cultu feminarum,” http://www.tertullian.org/works/de_cultu _feminarum.htm (accessed54
May 21, 2014) (site discontinued).
Hypophora is a trope in which the speaker asks and then answers a rhetorical question (HoRT, 87; GoE,55
107).
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much learning[?]” (S, 10:148–49).  His fascinating answer is that, in this case, there is no parallel
between Israel’s priests in Babylon and the priests of Rome:
I laid hold of this consideration, the treading down of grass, by oppressing it with
secular learning, there by to bring to your remembrance, the extreme ignorance that
damp’d the Roman Church, at that time; where Aristotles Metaphysicks were
condemned for Heresie, and ignorance in generall made not onely pardonable, but
meritorious [. . .].  This was their treading down of grass, not with over-much
learning, but with a cloud, a dampe, an earth of ignorance.  (S, 10:149)56
I presume that Donne would therefore not consider Aristotle’s Rhetoric to be either heretical or a text
of which a preacher could remain pardonably ignorant.
Given Donne’s comments on the use of secular learning in sermons, it is hardly surprising
that he allows “humane ornament” a role in the pulpit as well.  In his pasture metaphor,
ornamentation is likened to “rare and curious flowers, delightfull onely to the eye, or fragrant and
odoriferous hearbs delightfull onely to the smell.”  If “these specious and glorious flowers, and
fragrant, and medicinall hearbs, be not proper nourishment for sheep, this is a treading down of the
grass”; likewise, if in preachers’ homilies
you exact of us more secular ornament, then may serve [. . .] to convey, and usher the
true word of life into your understandings, and affections, (for both those must
necessarily be wrought upon) more then may serve ad vehiculum, for a chariot for the
word of God to enter, and triumph in you, this is a treading down of the grasse [. . .] . 
Donne’s technique here is remarkably elaborate and sophisticated.  He has contradicted his own advice by56
using secular learning in connection with a condemnation of the same practice, and then recalls this gesture very
explicitly by asserting that it was done merely for the purposes of demonstration!  This might be dubbed an example of
paromologia, “Conceding a point [. . .] to use it to strengthen one’s own argument; giving away a weaker point in order
to take a stronger” (HoRT, 110; see also GoE, 173).
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[I]f your curiosity extort more then convenient ornament, in delivery of the word of
God, you may have a good Oration, a good Panegyrique, a good Encomiastique, but
not so good a Sermon.  (S, 10:147) 
Donne’s willingness to accept metaphorical thinking even extends to some of the ceremonial
traditions that he considers in his next division.  It is only those ceremonies that “doe utterly oppose
the word of God, without having under them, any mysterious signification, or any occasion or
provocation of our devotion” that he would not tolerate (S, 10:150).  And then the preacher must
explain to his congregation the “good and usefull significations” underlying those practices by
unraveling the physical or gestural metaphors of which they are composed—“shew them the grass
that lies under” (S, 10:151), he urges, again suggesting that the preacher is properly an expert on
tropes, not only creating them and using them to illuminate the Word of God but also explaining
them to his potentially less-sophisticated auditory.
We have seen ludic excess in this sermon both at the macro-level scale of structure or
organization and at the intermediate-level scale of Donne’s substance or his commentary on rhetoric;
at the micro-level scale of individual prose techniques (as most of the footnotes accompanying the
foregoing analysis have attempted to illustrate) we can observe the same brand of rhetorical
overabundance.  To dissect the entire nineteen-page sermon at this finest grain of detail would
consume an entire dissertation in itself.  Therefore, I shall present only a sampling of these
techniques by considering two sharply limited segments of the sermon, beginning with the first
sentences of Donne’s exordium, or his presentation of the sermon’s text, which are especially
noteworthy for their interesting rhetorical flair:
Those four Prophets, whom the Church hath called the great Prophets, Esay,
and Ieremy, Ezekiel and Daniel, are not onely therefore called great, because they
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writ more, then the lesser Prophets did, (for Zechary, who is amongst the lesser, writ
more then Daniel who is amongst the greater) but because their Prophecies are of a
larger comprehension, and extent, and, for the most part, speake more of the
comming of Christ, and the establishing of the Christian Church, then the lesser
Prophets doe, who were more conversant about the temporall deliverance of Israel
from Babylon, though there be aspersions of Christ, and his future government in
those Prophets too, though more thinly shed.  Amongst the four great ones, our
Prophet Ezekiel is the greatest.  (S, 10:140).
Donne embarks upon his discourse with an excessively long and flowery periodic sentence
that contains an overabundance of qualifiers and asides in the Ciceronian style (HoRT, 35, 112–13). 
Although the sentence’s meaning, unlike that in most periodic sentences, is not suspended until its
final words—instead, Donne’s central point becomes clear by the time of the “but because”
clause—it nonetheless takes multiple twists and turns before giving up its full content some fifty
words later.   Along the way, however, we see a kind of polysyndeton in Donne’s unusual dual57
pairings of his four prophets with two conjunctions rather than one, “Esay, and Ieremy, Ezekiel and
Daniel” (HoRT, 117; GoE, 53); a further instance of parenthesis (GoE, 198); and embedded within
the parenthesis another case of anaphora.  Yet the most significant feature of this passage is what
happens next: Donne switches abruptly from the Ciceronian and elaborate period to a radically plain
Senecan style with a sentence of only eleven words and—as far as I can ascertain—not a single
Because of this feature, Lanham might rather characterize the sentence as a case of circuitus or “round57
composition” (HoRT, 113).
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trope.   We therefore see in Donne’s opening gambit in this sermon the full range of styles available58
to a classical rhetorician,  a fact which supplies an argument that Donne is, at a minimum, adhering59
to the Erasmian mandate of copiousness in discourse if not engaging in the ludic mode of
superabundant excess. 
But this distinction raises an important question: to what extent are we merely seeing copia
in Donne’s sermon and to what extent is his oratory exceeding that threshold?  According to John
S. Chamberlin, the “most important task of the Renaissance preacher” was itself defined by the
concept of copia—“turning up an abundance of appropriate and effective commonplaces or topics
from the literal sense of a scriptural passage.”   And this task was surely practical rather than60
decorative in nature, oriented toward enlightening one’s auditory and illuminating Scripture in a
meaningful and more fully understandable fashion.   Yet what we see in Donne is, occasionally, the61
voice of a man who is speaking for his own pleasure.  The first sentence of his exordium is clearly
not calculated to engage or capture the listener’s attention immediately and directly—it is rather dry
and pedantic compared to the dynamism that we have seen elsewhere in the sermon—and it is
remarkably difficult to follow even in the frozen form of printed text; imagine trying to understand
Donne’s point from spoken words hanging in the air.  As we shall see later in this chapter, Donne’s
If a trope can be named to describe this brief sentence, it must be brachyologia, from the Greek for “brevity58
in speech or writing” (HoRT, 30), or Peacham’s term for the trope, brachiepia (GoE, 182).
On this score, I am constrained to disagree with Horton Davies’ claim that the “metaphysical preachers,”59
including Donne, favored a Senecan style.  Like Angels, 68.  Although Davies concedes—as we see in the example that
I have analyzed in the main text—that “Donne combines both” Senecan and Ciceronian modes of discourse in his
sermons, on the basis of the passages that we have seen thus far, it does not seem entirely accurate to characterize Donne,
as Davies does, as “dominantly Senecan.”  Ibid., 69.
Increase and Multiply, 67.60
See Ong, “Gospel, Existence, and Print,” 69 (the preacher’s “ultimate purposes are practical [. . .] he wants61
to convince a real audience of some particular thing”).
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style in this regard is excessive precisely to the extent that it transgresses upon the homiletician’s
chief commandment: to be readily understood by one’s auditory.62
Picking up with Donne’s very next sentence, we see him return to the Ciceronian style in full
force:
I compare not their extraction and race; for, though Ezekiel were de genere
sacerdotali, of the Leviticall and Priestly race; (And, as Philo Judæus notes, all
nations having some markes of Gentry, some calling that ennobled the professors
thereof, (in some Armes, and Merchandise in some, and the Arts in others) amongst
the Jews, that was Priesthood, Priesthood was Gentry) though Ezekiel were of this
race, Esay was of a higher, for he was of the extraction of their Kings, of the bloud
royall.  (S, 10:140)
Two significant features of rhetoric, beyond its Ciceronian nature, characterize this passage.  The
first and most obvious is the extended aside in the form of a double parenthesis; it is really two
asides, one nested inside the other.  This is such an aggressive rhetorical move that I can find no term
in the field’s lexicon to describe it—Donne does not merely elaborate upon the idea of a priestly
class but also expounds within that elaboration on the ways in which different classes or tribes within
Jewish society asserted claims to status.  The second feature is a jarring case of reditus ad
propositum, or returning to one’s main proposition after a digression (HoRT, 129).  With Donne’s
lengthy aside omitted, the sentence reads ungrammatically because Donne must pick up his train of
thought in a most conspicuous fashion: “I compare not their extraction and race; for, though Ezekiel
were de genere sacerdotali, of the Leviticall and Priestly race [. . .] though Ezekiel were of this race,
As Chamberlin notes, overly ornamental techniques like Donne’s “were disparaged by both humanists and62
reformers” alike.  Increase and Multiply, 84.
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Esay was of a higher, for he was of the extraction of their Kings, of the bloud royall.”  This case of
anacoluthon, or an ungrammatical construction (HoRT, 129), shocks us with its abruptness and
signals Donne’s zeal for elaborate and playful rhetorical flourishes.
A closer look at micro-scale features of rhetoric in another portion of the sermon will permit
this section of close readings to come to a close.  I turn now to a passage, corresponding to section
I.A.1.b.(2) of the outline, in which Donne considers those preachers who sully the Word of God not
by decorating it with secular learning but rather through their ignorance:
Of which times, if at any time, you read the Sermons, which were then preached, and
after published, you will excuse them of this treading down the grass, by oppressing
their auditories with over-much learning, for they are such Sermons as will not suffer
us to pity them, but we must necessarily scorne, and contemne, and deride them;
Sermons, at which the gravest, and saddest man could not choose but laugh; not at
the Sermon, God forbid; nor at the plainness, and homeliness of it; God forbid; but
at the Solœcismes, the barbarismes, the servilities, the stupid ignorance of those
things which fall within the knowledge of boys of the first forme in every School. 
This was their treading down of grass, not with over-much learning, but with a cloud,
a dampe, an earth of ignorance.  After an Oxe that oppresseth the grass, after a Horse
that devours the grass, sheep will feed; but after a Goose that stanches the grass, they
will not; no more can Gods sheep receive nourishment from him that puts a scorne
upon his function, by his ignorance.  (S, 10:149)
Once again, Donne provides a rich variety of sentences.  As is typical for him, he introduces his topic
with a long period in the Ciceronian style.  Afterward he shifts into a mode of address featuring
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shorter sentence lengths, first with a sentence that is an example of brachyologia but that has some
moderate complexity, next with a sentence of medium length and complexity.  
The long opening period begins with a surprising bit of language called antanaclasis (HoRT,
12; GoE, 56).  Although not quite using a pun or an example of paronomasia (HoRT, 110; GoE, 56),
as most antanaclases can be considered, Donne leads into his theme by equivocating upon the term
“times” or “time”: “Of which times, if at any time, you read the Sermons, which were then preached,
and after published, you will excuse them of this treading down the grass.”  The first use of the term
refers to eras in which ignorant sermons were common; the second use refers to the occasions on
which those sermons might be read by members of Donne’s auditory.  This is an admittedly subtle
shift in meaning, but it produces a distinct effect.  In the span of just a few words, we are swept from
past time to the present or even the future, braced by variations on the same word, which is delivered
twice with a chiming kind of sound.  It is an altogether unusual way to signal a shift in subject
matter, and Donne could certainly have accomplished this objective more directly, albeit with
substantially less charm and variety.
Only a few lines later, Donne comes to a rhetorical technique that is odd even for him, given
his propensity toward using asyndeton; we see polysyndeton or the use of multiple conjunctions
(HoRT, 117; GoE, 53), in the phrase, “we must necessarily scorne, and contemne, and deride them.” 
Whereas an instance of asyndeton tends to speed us along as we read or hear, polysyndeton slows
us down and emphasizes each element in the sequence, in this case adding to Donne’s condemnation
of those preachers who fail to rise above a minimum level of scholarly knowledge in their sermons. 
In contrast, Donne later returns to his more favored method of asyndeton in the phrase, “at the
Solœcismes, the barbarismes, the servilities, the stupid ignorance of those things which fall within
the knowledge of boys of the first forme in every School.”  The speeding effect of asyndeton is
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augmented here by an obvious failure of parallelism among the items in the list: the first three (and
asyndetons are commonly composed in triplets in Donne’s sermons) are each composed of two
words, an article and a noun; the fourth item, already excessive in terms of Donne’s typical practice,
adds an adjective between the article and the noun but then continues on with an entire dependent
clause much lengthier than any of the items listed before it.  The ultimate effect is one of piling-on,
with Donne tossing out repeated examples in a kind of obvious contempt that allows him virtually
to spit the final item in the list—with the alliteration of “first form” for emphasis—in a vinegary tone
of distaste. 
Returning to the first sentence of the quoted passage, the repetition of the interjection, “God
forbid,” implanted within two consecutive phrases, is a rare form of parallelism called
mesodiplosis.   The obviously emphatic nature of this trope is largely unnecessary to Donne’s63
point—it would have sufficed for Donne to interject only once in order for him to ensure that his
auditory did not misunderstand the nature of his critique of some other sermons—but Donne the
player pairs two interjections together, not merely repeating an admonition but also allowing its
repetition to reinforce an additional parallelism where it would not have otherwise been as
noticeable, between the phrases, “not at the Sermon” and “nor at the plainness, and homeliness of
it.”  These two components of the sentence, introduced by their paired negative terms and including
a anaphoric and grammatically superfluous repetition of the preposition, “at,” come to echo each
other in a way that at least appears to soften or moderate Donne’s rather harsh critique.
The next sentence is primarily characterized by another instance of asyndeton at the end of
the tripartite list, “not with over-much learning, but with a cloud, a dampe, an earth of ignorance,”
Burton, Silva Rhetoricae.63
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and by the device of anaphora in the repeated initial preposition, “with,” at the head of both phrases. 
We see the same pattern of these two accompanying tropes at the beginning of the final sentence in
the passage, “After an Oxe that oppresseth the grass, after a Horse that devours the grass, sheep will
feed,” followed by the exceptionally vivid and distasteful image of “a Goose that stanches the grass,”
which with its unusual choice of the term “stanch” might be deemed a kind of enargia or visually
powerful description (HoRT, 64).
At each level of this sermon, we have seen excess going well beyond the requirements of
Erasmian copia.   Whereas Erasmus insists that you “include the essential in the fewest possible64
words so that nothing is lacking,”  Donne never uses the fewest possible words.  Indeed, this65
sermon, at nineteen rather dense pages, is substantially longer than the sermons of another leading
“metaphysical preacher” known for his playful and exuberant language in the pulpit, Lancelot
Andrewes.   Whereas Erasmus insists that you “enlarge and enrich your expression [. . .] that even66
so nothing is redundant,”  a key feature of the sermon considered in this section is redundancy, a67
plethora of tropes and figures not strictly necessary to the substance of his discourse.  Yet Donne
never violates the key Erasmian concern about excess, a poverty of ideas: “we find that unskilled
Although Erasmus’ text was designed primarily for students who were learning Latin, it came to be used64
as a source of advice for rhetoricians more generally, and Erasmian guidance for preachers was remarkably similar to
that offered to secular speakers: the best way for the preacher to accomplish the task of moving his auditory was “by
focusing on some general idea or commonplace drawn from the meaning of a biblical passage and by developing that
with all the resources of ancient forensic rhetoric for the copious amplification of a topic.”  Chamberlin, Increase and
Multiply, 74.
Copia, 301.65
Davies refers to Andrews as “the bishop of bishops” and, with Donne, as one of the “prototypical66
metaphysical preachers.”  Like Angels, 195.  Yet Andrewes’ sermons tend to be significantly shorter and rhetorically
more simple than Donne’s.  See generally Lancelot Andrewes, Sermons, ed. G. M. Story (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967).  The Scottish lord William Lupton complained in 1617 that Andrewes “rather plays with his text than preaches
upon it.”  Quoted in O. C. Edwards, Jr., A History of Preaching (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 376.
Copia, 301.67
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practitioners of the full style chatter on without restraint, and yet say far too little.”   To the contrary,68
Donne’s sermon is a strikingly rich and polysemic example of pulpit oratory that provides an
extensive commentary on and a thorough exegesis of his principal text.  Donne’s excess here is the
exuberance of a man who loves language, who reveres Divine language, and who revels in the arts
of language to an extent that we can code as ludic.  In the following section, I shall consider the
question of why Donne so insistently and playfully uses the full pallette of rhetorical tools at his
disposal; that discussion will support an analysis of what we can learn about Renaissance discourse
from attending to Donne’s playful and incarnational uses of the rhetorical art.
C.  CONSEQUENCES
Donne’s Rhetoric as Incarnational
Excerpts from other sermons that Donne delivered over the course of his pulpit career offer at least
three possible explanations for why the art of rhetoric might have been accorded such a prominent
role in his oratory and ministry.  In turn, each potential explanation points toward the conclusion that
the playfulness of Donne’s rhetoric, its extravagance and overabundant bounty, is not simply
ornamental or decorative; rather, because style is substance, it is a mode of imitating the Divine,
incarnated Word.
First, the use of rhetoric in the pulpit was a matter of reverence or decorum: “God speaks to
us in oratione strictâ, in a limited, in a diligent form; Let us speak to him in oratione solutâ; not
pray, not preach, not hear, slackly, suddenly, unadvisedly, extemporally, occasionally, indiligently”
(S, 2:50).  The careful and conscious use of language is a theme that Donne relies upon frequently
in his sermons.  If the Word of God is honey, then “chosen words, studied, premeditated words,
Ibid.68
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pleasing words [. . .] are as a Hony-combe” (S, 8:271).  Donne even uses rhetorical terms to reinforce
the importance of well crafted speech when he says, “Our communication with God must not be in
Interjections, that come in by chance; nor our Devotions made up of Parentheses, that might be left
out” (S, 9:303).  In the second part of his sermon on the text of Ezekiel, he explains that the failure
of a preacher to take sufficient care in designing, or premeditating, his homily can actually cause
harm:
the lesse we study for our Sermons, the more danger is there to disquiet the auditory;
extemporall, unpremeditated Sermons, that serve the popular eare, vent, for the most
part, doctrines that disquiet the Church.  Study for them, and they will be quiet;
consider ancient and fundamentall doctrines, and this will quiet and settle the
understanding, and the Conscience.  (S, 10:174)
If words are the clothes that ideas wear, as Donne suggests elsewhere,  then the use of rhetoric in69
religious settings can be considered a form of donning one’s Sunday best, a way to show respect on
the occasion of worship and a way to prepare for or to meditate upon the importance of the act of
worship.  “Religion is a serious thing, but not a sullen; Religious preaching is a grave exercise, but
not a sordid, not a barbarous, not a negligent” (S, 2:170).  Because “The style of the Scriptures is a
diligent, and an artificial style” (S, 2:171), Donne “considered that texts contrived by the Holy Ghost
deserved the best of human skill.”70
“Language must waite upon matter, and words upon things.  [. . .]  [T]he matter is the forme; The matter,69
that is, the doctrine that we preach, is the forme, that is, the Soule, the Essence; the language and words wee preach in,
is but the Body, but the existence” (S, 10:112).
 Joan Webber, Contrary Music: The Prose Style of John Donne (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,70
1963), 23.
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Indeed, James Biester has suggested that the occasional moments of baroque obscurity in
Donne’s work can be accounted for by esoteric traditions which “connected obscurity to
reverence.”   There is certainly evidence that Donne adhered to the Augustinian view of metaphor71
as simultaneously concealing and revealing and of Scripture as simultaneously simple and
profound.   And Samuel Johnson’s use of the word occult to describe the resemblances in a72
discordia concors is not coincidental—“he seems to be recalling,” according to K. K. Ruthven,
“earlier theories about the transcendental origins of metaphor and the status of conceits in times
when the universe was imagined to be a vast net-work of symbolic correspondences.”   For Donne73
and many of his contemporaries, both in the Church and in the secular realm, those symbolic
correspondences were real and not merely remnants from a remote, superstitious past.  As Donne
himself says, “The world is a great Volume, and man the Index of that Booke” (S, 7:272).74
Second, language arts serve the fundamentally communicative purposes of preaching.  As
Donne explains in his sermon on Ezekiel 34:19, ornamentation and secular learning can be effective
 Lyric Wonder: Rhetoric and Wit in Renaissance English Poetry, Rhetoric and Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell71
University Press, 1997), 128.  “Obscurity promotes learning by increasing our wonder about that which we do not
understand.”  Ibid., 129.  Donne was fascinated by sometimes obscurantist Christian and Hebraic cabalist traditions and
practices, such as gematria: the rearranging of letters in scriptural words in order to identify meanings trapped beneath
the surface of biblical discourse.  Chamberlin, Increase and Multiply, 105.  This effort at anagramming the Divine Word
clearly resembles contemporary wordplay.  Tony Augarde, The Oxford Guide to Word Games (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984), 71–83.  “The seventeenth century was the high point of faith in the efficacy of anagrams.”  Ibid.,
73.
Biester, Lyric Wonder, 141.72
The Conceit, The Critical Idiom (London: Methuen, 1969), 9.  73
See also Felecia Wright McDuffie, To Our Bodies Turn We Then: Body as Word and Sacrament in the74
Works of John Donne (New York: Continuum Press, 2005), ix (“In Donne’s imaginative universe, the human person lies
at the center of the great interconnected web of God’s signs and acts that is the created order”); Simpson, Study of the
Prose Works, 57 (“to Donne [. . .] anything in heaven or earth could be used to illustrate anything else”); and Webber,
Contrary Music, 123 (for Donne “almost everything in the world made by God is a word of God”).
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conveyances for ideas and concepts that might otherwise not be completely understood (S, 10:147).  75
Indeed, Davies has described sermon audiences as “an assemblage of prisoners” by virtue of the fact
that their attendance was mandatory and became a way of publicly gauging one’s orthodoxy;  it only76
makes sense that preachers would be challenged to maintain attendance and even to entertain their
auditories.  But many critics have gone even further by suggesting that the kinds of preciosity and
wittiness we see in Donne’s homiletic practice are responses to the fundamental problem in the
Christian West of adapting language to the task of describing a God considered to be ineffable and
a set of religious doctrines considered to be mysteries or paradoxes.   According to Donne, the77
imprecise nature of language and the lack of perfect correspondence between word and
referent—what Carrithers calls “the failure of iconicity” —are products of man’s fallen nature, and78
“metaphorical language has the greatest potentiality in the fallen world for equivalence to the
reliability of unfallen language.”79
See Maria Salenius, “True Purification: Donne’s Art of Rhetoric in Two Candlemas Sermons,” in John75
Donne and the Protestant Reformation: New Perspectives, ed. Mary Arshagouni Papazian (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 2003), 314–34, 324 (“the metaphor, for Donne, is clearly a tool for precise expression and apt
argumentation”).
Like Angels, 10.76
Webber, Contrary Music, 26.  Webber cites Walter Ong and Leo Spitzer as specific examples of critics77
who argue that “the baroque writer recognized that words are not enough.”  Ibid.  See also Chamberlin, Increase and
Multiply, 155 (“In the ars praedicandi an assumption that a combined unity in the order of reality corresponds to the
syntactical completeness of the scriptural statement seems to be implied in the rules by which a preacher is to divide his
theme”).
Donne at Sermons, 82.78
Ibid., 76.  “The Fall subverted the intention of Creation to people heaven, leaving man himself unable to79
redress the damage or anesthetize the pain.  The Incarnation, accordingly, acknowledged the needs of the full human
composite, participating in both the human and the divine to restore the purpose of Creation.”  Terry G. Sherwood,
Fulfilling the Circle: A Study of John Donne’s Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 94. “Indeed, a
belief in the sacredness and inerrancy of revelation would tend to lead to the notion that the words of Scripture conform
more immediately to reality than does the rest of language.”  Chamberlin, Increase and Multiply, 157.
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Most important, however, is the existence of both Divine and biblical precedent for the use
of rhetoric in religious contexts, a point which Donne makes again and again throughout his career
as a preacher.  In an especially famous passage, for example, Donne says that
There are not so eloquent books in the world, as the Scriptures: Accept those names
of Tropes and Figures, which the Grammarians and Rhetoricians put upon us, and we
may be bold to say, that in all their Authors, Greek and Latin, we cannot finde so
high, and so lively examples, of those Tropes, and those Figures, as we may in the
Scriptures: whatsoever hath justly delighted any man in any mans writing, is
exceeded in the Scriptures.  (S, 2:170–71)
Simpson and Potter cite this passage as being particularly valuable because it “shows an emphasis
unusual for the early seventeenth century (though not, to be sure, unique) on the literary qualities of
Scripture” (S, 2:22).  While this passage comes from a sermon delivered fairly early in Donne’s
career, Donne only becomes more rhapsodic on this theme toward the end of his life and ministry:
there are not so eloquent books in the world as the Scriptures.  [. . .]  The Holy Ghost
in his Instruments, (in those whose tongues or pens he makes use of) doth not forbid,
nor decline elegant and cheerfull, and delighttfull expression; but as God gave his
Children a bread of Manna, that tasted to every man like that that he liked best, so
hath God given us Scriptures, in which the plain and simple man may hear God
speaking to him in his own plain and familiar language, and men of larger capacity,
and more curiosity, may heare God in that Musique that they love best, in a curious,
in an harmonious style, unparalleled by any.  [T]here is no secular Authour [. . .]
which doth more abound with perswasive figures of Rhetorique, nor with musical
cadences and allusions, and assimilations, and conformity, and correspondency of
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words to one another, then some of the Secretaries of the Holy Ghost, some of the
authours of some books of the Bible doe.  (S, 10:103)
In addition to being a rhetorician, God takes pleasure in His play with language: “the Holy Ghost in
penning the Scriptures delights himself, not only with a propriety, but with a delicacy, and harmony,
and melody of language; with height of Metaphors, and other figures” (S, 6:55).   God, in fact, “was80
well-known for his wit” during the seventeenth century, according to Ruthven, and the idea of the
metaphysical conceit has been linked to this view of “the Holy Ghost’s fondness for puns and
paradoxes.”   Support for this suggestion is close at hand, for, in Donne’s estimation, the elaborate81
series of metaphors around which he organized his sermon on Ezekiel 34:19 were not his creations;
they were the “metaphors of the holy Ghost” (S, 10:142).   Donne’s God, in other words, is82
“radically communicative,” Felicia Wright McDuffie says, and He “continually writes on the pages
of nature, history, the human community, and each individual life.”   As Donne puts it, “God is a83
declaratory God.  The whole year is, to his Saints, a continuall Epiphany, one day of manifestation. 
According to W. Fraser Mitchell, this passage “may be regarded as an apologia for the rhetorical preaching80
of the seventeenth century, and as an explanation of its chief raison d’être, which seems to have been a desire to imitate
the manner of an author who was not man but God.  For Donne and his contemporaries, as for generations of preachers
before them, the vehemence and copiousness which they attributed to the Holy Ghost were things to be imitated.” 
English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson: A Study of Its Literary Aspects (1932) (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1962), 189.
Conceit, 45–46.81
“To the literary skill of the Holy Ghost, who inspired the human hands which penned the words of82
Scripture, Donne responds with an enthusiasm befitting a poet.”  Mueller, Donne at Sermons, 68.
To Our Bodies, ix–x.83
119
In every minute that strikes upon the Bell, is a syllable, nay a syllogisme from God” (S, 10:111). 
“All language,” Chamberlin proclaims, “is a gift” from God.84
Beyond the fact that he considered God to be a kind of rhetorician,  Donne never neglects85
an opportunity to remind his auditory of the even more intimate relationships between God and
language that are suggested by the Scriptures.  The creation was not only ex nihilo but also ex verbo
because God’s speech created the cosmos, to borrow J. L. Austin’s terminology, in the ultimate
performative utterance.   Scripture refers to Christ as Logos, the Word, a highly self-reflexive86
gesture in light of Donne’s interpretation of these references: 
Christ spoke Scripture; Christ was Scripture.  As we say of great and universall
Scholars, that they are viventes Bibliothecae, living, walking, speaking Libraries; so
Increase and Multiply, 157.  No less an authority than Henry Peacham concurred:84
Now lest so excellent a gift of the deuine goodnesse (as wisedome here appeareth to be, and is) should lye
supprest by silence, and so remaine hid in darknesse, almightie God the deep sea of wisedome, and bright
sunne of maiestie, hath opened the mouth of man, as the mouth of a plentiful fountaine, both to powre forth
the inward passions of his heart, and also as a heauenly planet to shew foorth, (by the shining beames of
speech) the priuie thoughts, and secret conceites of his mind.  (GoE, iii)
In attributing rhetorical skill to God, Donne is of course engaging in a rhetorical act of his own.  The rich85
implications of this idea are beyond the scope of this chapter, but there is certainly a basis for scholarship considering,
among other issues, the power relationships that preachers established, maintained, and negotiated by comparing
themselves explicitly or implicitly to a Divine power which speaks.  See, for example, Biester, Lyric Wonder, 21
(preachers “sought to cloak themselves in the reflected aura of the divine” by using obscure language).
How to Do Things with Words indeed!  J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,86
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).  See also Margret Fetzer, John Donne’s Performances: Sermons, Poems, Letters
and Devotions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 2 (a discussion that likens John Donne’s work with
words to the ideas of performative language set forth in Austin’s classic text).  For an abbreviated version of Fetzer’s
argument—that Donne’s preaching “adapts the communicative system of the theatre to the genre of the sermon in order
to re-enact Christ’s sacrifice and resurrection”—see Margret Fetzer, “Donne’s Sermons as Re-enactments of the Word,”
Connotations 17, no. 1 (2007–2008): 1–13, 2.  See also Thomas O. Sloane, “The Poetry in Donne’s Sermons,”
Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 29, no. 4 (Autumn 2011): 403–28 (a discussion of the preacher’s
obligation to emulate the Divine Creation of form from inchoate matter). 
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Christ was loquens Scriptura; living, speaking Scripture.  Our Sermons are Text and
Discourse; Christs Sermons were all Text; Christ was the Word; not onely the
Essentiall Word, which was always with God, but the very written word too. 
(S, 7:400)
Donne even extended this appellation to all persons of the Trinity: “God that created thee was
Verbum, The Word, [. . .] God that redeemed thee was Verbum, The Word, [. . .] God that sanctified
thee is Verbum, The Word” (S, 8:52).
As a result, the preacher as expositor of God’s Word has an affirmative obligation to emulate
the Divine model.   “Preaching is potentially a kind of parallel on a lower plane to divinely87
efficacious language, to words of Godly comfort,” says Carrithers.  “By implication, the preacher’s
great task (at the tactical level) is to mobilize positively all the random and wayward ‘affections’ of
his congregation.”   This is not a peculiar understanding that we can attribute to Donne; it parallels88
the official policy of the English Reformed Church with respect to the duties of parishioners.  Peter
Mack, quoting the Church’s Sermons or Homilies Appointed to Be Read in Churches, says:
“Through diligent reading and pondering, in what amounts to a form of imitation, the Christian in
some sense becomes the book.  The one who benefits most from the Bible is ‘he that is most turned
Dennis Quinn speaks at length about this notion.  “The preacher cooperates in the sacramental application87
of Christ’s methods to men’s souls by imitating the divine process visible in Scriptures.”  “Donne’s Christian Eloquence,”
359.  “In their very structure,” therefore, “the sermons re-enact the truth which Donne sees in the texts, with the result
that the sermons are actions imitative of or analogous to the Biblical action.”  Ibid., 372.
Donne at Sermons, 13.  “Just as, in the beginning, God’s word created the world and, through the person88
of Christ, not only communicated salvation, but actually brought it about, so is the sermon a continuation of these
salvational events in our own present.”  Fetzer, Performances, 61.  See also McDuffie, To Our Bodies, 47 (“Donne
implies that in his use of metaphor he is following the example of the ‘metaphorical God,’ the God who loves to use
metaphors in his actions and his Word”); and Nelson, Holy Ambition, 87–88 (“Donne, the preacher of the Word,
emulates the methods of the divine author of the Word”).
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into it, that is most inspired with the Holy Ghost, most in his heart and life altered and changed into
that thing which he readeth.’”89
And this is the final sense in which Donne’s rhetoric becomes incarnational.  For Donne,
“The best words are but words, but they are the fore-runners of Deeds” (S, 8:342), and “speaking is
not Doing, but yet fair speaking prepares an acceptation before, and puts a value after, upon the best
actions” (S, 8:338).   According to Carrithers, the single most important fact to bear in mind when90
considering Donne’s sermons is that the liturgy of the English Reformed Church “engages a
congregation understood as a local element of the body of Christ in closely communal acts of
worship in response to, or dialogue or unison with, the priest.”   Calling Donne’s homiletic practice91
“fundamentally dialogic,”  Carrithers argues that each sermon seeks to initiate a series of actions:92
“the action of faithfulness in moving the speaking self (1), and hopefully the listener (2), from static,
Elizabethan Rhetoric, 261–62.  Thomas O. Sloane contends that rhetoric for Donne “is a process of in-89
forming.”  Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist Rhetoric (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 187.  In
the process of making “absent and remote things present” and making “things that are not as though they were” (S, 4:87),
“this parodying of God is unquestionably meant to include creating the reader by informing him with the text—any text,
poem or sermon, spoken or written.”  End of Humanist Rhetoric, 206.  “[T]he external world and the interior of the
Christian must interact.”  Ong, “Gospel, Existence, and Print,” 69.  “Donne’s concept of conversion is based on the
understanding that man’s union with Christ is not effected by the Lord’s agency alone but relies on the individual’s
adequate response.”  Fetzer, “Re-enactments of the Word,” 3.  Fetzer invokes the concept of imitatio Christi to elaborate
on her thesis.  Ibid., 10.
This evokes the idea that Donne (and perhaps other preachers of his time) might have viewed the efficacy90
of sermonic discourse as a function of the extent to which that discourse is dialogic—in a Bakhtinian sense:
A passive understanding of the meaning of perceived speech is only an abstract aspect of the actual whole
of actively responsive understanding, which is then actualized in a subsequent response that is actually
articulated.  Of course, an utterance is not always followed immediately by an articulated response.  An
actively responsive understanding of what is heard [. . .] can be directly realized in action, or it can remain,
for the time being, a silent responsive understanding [. . .] with a delayed reaction.
Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres” (1979), in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W.
McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, University of Texas Press Slavic Series (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1986), 60–102, 68–69.
Donne at Sermons, 14.91
Ibid., 18.92
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atomistic nonattachment (3), to (4) a dynamically inclusive attachment (5).  This action works out
in contest with all kinds of adversities (6); that is, apathy or inattention, confusion or error, and
willful or sinful counteraction.”   Therefore, what fulfills or perfects or completes the sermon is, in93
Bakhtin’s terms, its closure as an utterance by the congregation’s responsive act or responsive
speech, in a form as immediate, sincere, and dynamic as possible.   “[S]ince God, in all the three94
Persons, is Verbum, The Word to thee, all of them working upon thee, by speaking to thee, Be thou
Verbum too, A Word, as God was; A Speaking, and a Doing Word” (S, 8:52).
The rhetoric of a sermon is therefore like an opening move in a GAME—“a partnership
game,” Carrithers calls it, “played in utmost seriousness (though not, of course, unwavering
solemnity) with his congregation” —and is performative in multiple senses.  A preacher not only95
communicates to his auditory but also works upon them, stimulating them to responsive speech or
action and simulating the efficacy of Divine rhetoric.  Even the rhetorical question which gives this
chapter its subtitle is a figure of thought, a gesture struck in words, something that is done as much
as said—a speaking and a doing word.  And that question—paraphrased, in essence, as is rhetoric
style or substance?—is answered by Donne’s self-reflexive use of rhetoric as both substance and
style, paralleling and enacting the idea that the two are inextricably linked.  Speech is effective only
Ibid., 29–30.  For a tropological perspective on the question of moving “beyond rhetoric to action,” see93
Ryan McDermott, “‘Beatus qui verba vertit in opera’: Langland’s Ethical Invention and the Tropological Sense,”
Yearbook of Langland Studies 24 (2010): 169–204.
Bakhtin’s thinking is remarkably pertinent to the speech genre of the sermon as Carrithers understands it:94
“The sermon may well of all generic forms be the most fundamentally open-ended or inconclusive or contingent [. . .]
either because all will have to be done over again, or there will be a continuing, incremental effect.”  Donne at Sermons,
30.  
Ibid., 89–90.95
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in proportion to the response it generates, the action or the further speaking that it prompts.   “[D]o96
something,” Donne urges, “that I may hear thee!” (S, 4:823).  Word must be translated into action.  97
Word must be made Flesh.98
D.  IMPLICATIONS
“The Sermon of the Sermon”: Donnean Rhetoric in the English Reformation
“It is hard for us to comprehend the importance of the sermons” of the English Reformation of the
early to middle seventeenth century,  the period which Davies dubs “the golden age of Anglican99
eloquence.”   They were, according to John Stubbs, “the most effective medium through which100
official policy and wisdom could be expressed and indeed contested, and public opinion moulded.”  101
Yet, for Lori Anne Ferrell and Peter McCullough, because sermons are considered “one of the most
lifeless, ancillary aspects of Renaissance literary culture,” they have “suffered an indulgent, even
In commenting upon the sermon that gives this chapter its subtitle, David L. Edwards notes that it is96
ultimately about “the power of preaching and poetry to describe a world which, however, actually exists only in the
responses of readers.”  John Donne: Man of Flesh and Spirit (London: Continuum Press, 2001), 32.
Others have commented upon Donne’s propensity to convert word into action in his sermons.  Daniel97
Derrin, for example, emphasizes the ways in which Donne transmutes emotional responses into constructive directions
and community-building.  “Engaging the Passions in John Donne’s Sermons,” English Studies 93, no. 4 (June 2012):
452–68.  John Stubbs similarly notes that “The most important thing for Donne was that everyone took their place,
involved themselves in society.”  Reformed Soul, 323.  And Anna K. Nardo has emphasized Donne’s imperative that “the
Word must not remain in the memory alone; the hearer must write it in his life.”  Ludic Self, 64.
For an extended treatment of this idea as a mode of understanding Donne’s sermons, see Whalen,98
“Sacramentalizing the Word.”
Davies, Like Angels from a Cloud, 10.99
Ibid., 8.  On the importance of the sermon, Mitchell has spoken eloquently: “To the Englishman of the100
seventeenth century, whether Puritan, Laudian, Platonist, or whatever we may choose to call him, the sermon was
intimately bound up with the Oracles of God, whether he believed those to be derivable from the Scriptures, the Church,
or certain philosophers; it was the explication of these Oracles, a message promulgated by God Himself, and
consequently of the most infinite importance.”  English Pulpit Oratory, 42.
Reformed Soul, xviii.101
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condescending neglect.”   Understanding period attitudes toward rhetoric is, in turn, enormously102
important for understanding sermons and other features of the age: “Rhetoric is the greatest barrier
between us and our ancestors,” C. S. Lewis writes; “Probably all our literary histories [. . .] are
vitiated by our lack of sympathy on this point.  If ever the passion for formal rhetoric returns, the
whole story will have to be rewritten and many judgments reversed.”   During the early seventeenth103
century, Debora Shuger reminds us, the rhetoric of sermons is “the only kind still supported by a
living and culturally significant oratory.  It is also the only large body of rhetoric designed for
adults.”   It therefore occupies a central space in the era’s discourse.   Moreover, as many scholars104 105
have observed, rhetoric and theology during this period—and particularly in the English Renaissance
and Reformation—are not readily compartmentalized on discrete sides of a hermetically
impermeable disciplinary boundary: to engage with one is necessarily to comment on the other.  106
“Revising the Study of the English Sermon,” in The English Sermon Revised: Religion, Literature and102
History, 1600–1750, Politics and Culture in Early Modern Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000),
2–21, 3.
English Literature in the 16th Century, Excluding Drama (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 61.  According103
to Brian Vickers, critics require a “sharper historical sense” of rhetoric’s significance, especially in considering pre-
nineteenth-century texts.  Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry (1970) (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1989), 86.  Vickers’ preface to the 1989 second printing of this text (v), and his book In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988), indicate that—at least in his assessment—developments in literary criticism since 1970
had not yielded significant improvements in this regard.
Sacred Rhetoric, 12.104
Shuger argues that sermonic discourse “offers a window on the process by which the Christian West105
transformed its Classical heritage and a model for how theories of language relate to the larger concerns of a society, to
its religion, psychology, and politics.”  Ibid., 13.  See also Carrithers, Donne at Sermons, 4 (“The Renaissance preachers
attempted to remobilize classical oratory in biblical terms”).
“The problem of how to speak of God appropriately could not fail to present itself to a preacher during the106
seventeenth century.  It was a question of rhetoric and also of theology.”  Winfried Schleiner, The Imagery of John
Donne’s Sermons (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1970), 45.  “For Donne the phenomenon of human speech
cannot be separated from its paradigm—the language of God.”  Stanwood and Asals, Theology of Language, 11. 
“Human discourse [. . .] remains thoroughly an aspect of creation and a reflection of its own fallen (or, at best, partially
redeemed) nature; in this radical sense, rhetoric is always, we shall find, no less than a theology of language, and
Renaissance theological controversy is itself implicated in the conflict among competing rhetorics.”  Baumlin, Rhetorics
of Renaissance Discourse, 44. 
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Maria Salenius goes so far as to call the Reformation “a linguistic phenomenon,”  and it would be107
difficult to charge her with exaggeration.  After all, one of the key points of contention was the
nature of the Eucharist, essentially a hermeneutic controversy about the words of Matthew 26:26,
“this is my body,” and what the meaning of is is—one’s religious affiliation was largely determined
by whether one interpreted Christ’s words literally or viewed them as a metaphorical and thus
rhetorical act.   As a consequence, an understanding of Donne’s sermons—including their ludic and108
incarnational nature—is critical for a fuller appreciation of the period’s theological debates, a subject
of great interest to many scholars of English Reformation discourse.
Any effort to situate Donne within those debates, however, must necessarily be a tentative
one, for critics are sharply divided over Donne’s attitudes to the incipient Laudianism in the English
Reformed Church of his day.   Part of the reason for these deep rifts among scholars is that the state109
of historical knowledge about the period remains disturbingly unsettled.  For example, there exists
surprisingly little consensus on the seemingly foundational question of whether Elizabeth approved
of preaching.  Doreen Rosman asserts that Elizabeth disliked the practice, at least the extemporal
variety of “prophecying,”  whereas Targoff insists that it was “central to church piety” under both110
Elizabeth and James;  a third view, McCullough’s, is that “James liked sermons more than his111
“True Purification,” 316.  She also notes that Richard Mallette has described English Protestantism in the107
immediate aftermath of the Reformation as “a religion of words.”  Spenser and the Discourses of Reformation England
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 12.
Salenius, “True Purification,” 318.  See also Fetzer, Performances, 5–6.108
See Fetzer, Performances, 45; and McCullough, “Donne as Preacher,” 168.109
From Catholic to Protestant: Religion and the People in Tudor England, Introductions to History (London:110
University College London Press, 1996), 50.
Body and Soul, 158.  See also Matthew Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, St. Andrews111
Studies in Reformation History (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 294.
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predecessor: Elizabeth had tolerated them, James revelled in them.”   Another problematic issue112
is that Donne himself is extraordinarily reluctant to take sides as a polemicist in period debates;113
if it is difficult to position Donne among the various factions in which the English Reformed Church
consisted, then that is “probably how he wanted it,” Stubbs concludes.   Some scholars have114
therefore given up on the enterprise of attempting to ascertain Donne’s religious politics.  Margret
Fetzer, for example, says that “Pronouncing a verdict on John Donne’s religious allegiances is
problematic” because of the fact, perhaps surprising to some, that “the denominational factions in
early modern England were by no means as distinct from one another as might be expected,
considering the heated, sometimes bitter arguments Donne and his contemporaries were both
involved in and exposed to.”   And Brent Nelson even questions the value of the endeavor, saying115
that “We are on much safer, indeed more fertile ground, when we look for the rhetorical motives of
the preacher rather than for his absolute theological position.”116
Sermons at Court: Politics and Religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean Preaching, Cambridge Studies in112
Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 126.
Targoff, Body and Soul, 158.113
Reformed Soul, 361.114
Fetzer, Performances, 18.  In light of this difficulty, Fetzer’s approach was not to assign Donne “to any115
particular religious confession,” instead approaching his works as neutral performances.  Ibid., 271. 
Holy Ambition: Rhetoric, Courtship, and Devotion in the Sermons of John Donne, Medieval and116
Renaissance Texts and Studies (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005), 5.
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Venturing a general account of period views on preaching,  we can say in a necessarily117
schematized fashion that there were three broad schools or families of thought within the English
Reformed Church.  However, an important prefatory note is in order: contemporary historical
scholarship establishes that “there was no great gulf,” as David L. Edwards puts it, between Puritans
and high-Church figures about the centrality of preaching to Protestant doctrine.   Rather, he says,118
“what united these two movements was far larger than any division.”119
With that caveat in place, we can begin to generalize with the conservative end of the
spectrum, the Laudians—Archbishop William Laud and his followers led a movement to suppress
preaching late in James’ reign —and, before them, the Avant-Garde Conformists.   For this120 121
faction, as for Laud personally, who was also known for his emphasis on a beautiful and highly
Although there is certainly no dearth of research on preaching during the English Reformation, I have not117
found any source that provides a much-needed general overview of the positions that were in play during the period. 
With the exception of instances in which I provide citations to other sources, the following account is indebted to, and
is a synthesis of, the following materials: J. W. Blench, Preaching in England in the Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Centuries: A Study of English Sermons, 1450–c. 1600 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964); Chamberlin, Increase
and Multiply; Daniel W. Doerksen, Conforming to the Word: Herbert, Donne, and the English Church before Laud
(Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1997); Hunt, Art of Hearing; McCullough, Sermons at Court; Milner, Senses
and the English Reformation; and Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory.
Man of Flesh and Spirit, 109.  See also Hunt, Art of Hearing, 30 (“The traditional opposition between118
‘radical’ Puritanism and ‘moderate’ Anglicanism has now been decisively discredited”).  For important contributions
to contemporary scholarship in this regard, including the notion that Richard Hooker was the founder of “Anglicanism”
rather than its epitome, see Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and Conformist Thought from Whitgift
to Hooker (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).  
Edwards, Man of Flesh and Spirit, 109.  I have omitted the Roman Catholic position as beyond the scope119
of this chapter; for treatments of issues related to Donne’s former Catholicism, see Nelson, “John Donne’s Pulpit Voice”;
and Stubbs, Reformed Soul.
See generally Hunt, Art of Hearing, 43 (Laudianism “amounted to a radical downgrading of the role of120
preaching which went far beyond anything previously seen in the Elizabethan or Jacobean Church”).
Mitchell considers a category of Anglo-Catholic preachers, a group into which he places Donne.  English121
Pulpit Oratory, 180.  The term “Anglo-Catholic,” however, has since been recognized as problematic to the extent that
it bears associations with the much later Oxford Movement; moreover, recent scholarship based on a more refined
understanding of English Reformed Church history has shunned this category, rather than embracing it, and would
certainly not situate Donne within this realm.
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ceremonial liturgy, Davies explains, “the altar was more important than the pulpit”:  “a greater122
reverence, no doubt,” Laud himself said, “is due to the Body than to the Word of the Lord.”   But123
on the basis of the sermons that survive to this day, Davies has classified Laud as a “metaphysical
preacher,” one who exhibited great wit in the pulpit, albeit perhaps not to the same extent as Donne
or even Andrewes.   Although these high-Church figures often defended the use of secular learning124
and wit in pulpit discourse,  the belief that preaching in the English Reformed Church eschewed125
rhetoric is not without a foundation.  Many manuals on preaching published during Donne’s era
emphasized the importance of the preacher maintaining a proper distance from the conventions of
secular oratory.  126
On the left end of the spectrum, likely the largest contingent of preachers during the period,127
Reformed theology becomes one primarily of homiletics, to such an extent that the sermon tends to
rival even the Eucharist in terms of its ritual importance.   The ordinance of preaching was central128
to their views of Church piety, but their sermons were often dry and brittle, with a tight focus on the
Like Angels, 192.122
The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, ed. William Scott (Oxford: John Parker,123
1949), 6:56.
Like Angels, 192–95.  John Tillotson, with his “simple presentation of reasonable piety and everyday124
morality,” and Andrewes himself, who was skeptical about the value of preaching in the parishes (“he thought that most
of the clergy would talk nonsense if they preached too often”), might also be placed within this family of positions. 
Edwards, Man of Flesh and Spirit, 113–14.  See also McCullough, Sermons at Court, 161 (“Few passages in Andrewes’s
court sermons cackle with more righteous indignation than those against infatuation with sermons”).  O. C. Edwards, Jr.,
also classifies Donne (along with Andrewes) as a “metaphysical preacher.”  History of Preaching, 344.  Although he
notes that “the metaphysical style was not confined to one ecclesiastical party,” Edwards opines that “it was more
characteristic of Anglo-Catholics than of any other group.”  Ibid., 370.
Like Angels, 269–70.125
Umbach, “Rhetoric of Donne’s Sermons,” 355.126
Edwards, Man of Flesh and Spirit, 111.127
Fetzer, Performances, 28.128
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biblical text, with an insistent moralizing tone, and without the use of secular anecdotes or obscure
references to the Church Fathers.   Noted Puritan homiletician William Perkins is perhaps a figure129
most representative of this movement; he had no objection to the preacher’s reliance on scholarship
and other secular knowledge—“the Minister may, yea and must privately use at his liberty the arts,
philosophy, and variety of reading, whilst he is in framing his sermon,” he said—“but he ought in
public to conceal all these from the people,”  maintaining a preaching voice that was much more130
plain and transparent to the members of his presumably less-educated auditory.131
Somewhere in between these two poles of the spectrum might be situated the positions of
moderate Conformists.   The ordinance of preaching, central to Protestant doctrine, was clearly an132
important element of the liturgy for these figures, but the preaching that they favored tended toward
Edwards, Man of Flesh and Spirit, 111–12.  See also Edwards, History of Preaching, 364 (a “humbling129
of rhetoric” was central to Puritan homiletical style).  Davies notes, however, the existence of a “not-so-plain” Puritan
style of preaching.  Like Angels, 274–77.  Left-wing Protestants, sometimes labeled as “Puritans,” of “the ‘hotter’ sort,”
as Jennifer Waldron describes them, engaged in passionate preaching in the extemporal style.  See Reformations of the
Body: Idolatry, Sacrifice, and Early Modern Theater, Early Modern Cultural Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), 11.  See also Achsah Guibbory, Ceremony and Community from Herbert to Milton: Literature, Religion, and
Cultural Conflict in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13.  To the extent
that this homiletical practice diverged from that of mainstream or prayerbook Protestants, they tended to draw the ire
of conservative and moderate forces within the Church.  See Milner, Senses and the English Reformation.
The Arte of Prophecying (London: Felix Kyngston, 1607), 133.  This passage of Perkins’ text is discussed130
at some length in Winfried Schleiner, The Imagery of John Donne’s Sermons (Providence, RI: Brown University Press,
1970), 58; and Bryan Crockett, “The Act of Preaching and the Art of Prophesying,” Sewanee Review, no. 105 (1997):
39–52.  David L. Edwards argues that Perkins was one of the most influential preachers of the period, Puritan or
otherwise.  Man of Flesh and Spirit, 111.
The homiletical critics among the Puritans [. . .] objected to the word-play in quips, puns, and paronomasia131
as trivializing the encounter between divine communication and human response mediated by the preacher. 
Gravity rather than levity should characterize sermons.  They also deplored the pedantic citation of the
Church Fathers in the original Greek or Latin, and the historical narrations and “unnatural” natural history
employed, not to mention the elaborate rhetorical ornamentation of style, since all this drew attention to
the preacher, not to the treasure (the gospel) in the earthen vessel (the preacher).
Davies, Like Angels, 46.
“[. . .] Laudianism can be seen as an outgrowth of the existing conformist position.  [. . .]  More specifically,132
it can be seen as a development of some lines of thought begun by Richard Hooker in his classic defence of the
Elizabethan settlement, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.”  Hunt, Art of Hearing, 43.
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a plainer style than that employed by the “metaphysicals” whom Davies identifies.  In particular, says
Hunt, Conforming Puritan preachers
were clearly worried by the Laudian attempt to demote preaching to a lesser position,
and one might have expected them to respond by reasserting the primacy of
preaching as the essential duty of the godly minister.  But what one finds instead is
a search for compromise, and an increasingly agonised attempt to mediate between
the two opposing positions by avoiding any comparison between preaching and
prayer.133
Moderate preaching, especially among those homileticians who were influenced by the work of
Ramus, was generally, according to Chamberlin, “extreme in its plainness,”  yet Calvinist134
Conformist preachers were still invited to deliver sermons at Court, particularly under James.  135
Many moderate and learned Puritans supported the display of secular learning in the pulpit, but the
more common position was that witty performances based on that kind of knowledge were better
reserved for secular oratory.136
In positioning Donne’s sermon practice among this array of competing views, it is important
first to note that his preaching style was by no means typical of the period: Edwards explains, “most
Ibid., 53.133
Increase and Multiply, 89.  Nonetheless, Davies identifies a number of Calvinist homileticians among his134
category of “metaphysical preachers.”  See Like Angels, 133–87.  Those ranks are dominated, however, by Avant-Garde
Conformists and high-Church figures.  Ibid., 189–265.
Davies, Like Angels, 28 (“Calvinists he approved, but not Puritans”).135
Ibid., 268–69.  See also Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory, 367 (the “rhetorical sermon” was also a feature136
of “those Calvinists who were not so puritanically affected as to adhere to the precepts of strict Scriptural exposition laid
down by Perkins”).
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of the preachers were not major poets, deep thinkers or magnificent orators.”   To the contrary, we137
can consider Donne’s pulpit oratory to be in some senses transgressive, at odds with nearly every
fixed point on this continuum.   His insistence upon the centrality of preaching to Protestant138
doctrine finds him allied with the left pole of the spectrum, but his florid and heavily rhetorical style
is, “of course, highly unpuritan,” Salenius writes, “and to that extent anti-reformational.”  139
Likewise, Donne’s appeal as a preacher to the Crown  and his ludic practice in the pulpit might by140
some accounts seem to ally him with the conservative pole of the spectrum, but his differences with
Laud—both in style and on theological matters—prevent us from classifying him unproblematically
at the point on the continuum that would intersect with official Church policy.  The key preliminary
point to keep in mind is that, in both senses in which Donne was transgressive against period
Man of Flesh and Spirit, 111.137
Although Donne was a favorite of James, this fact does not mean that he can be considered a mainstream138
figure.  The monarch’s appointed preachers did not, of course, comprise a majority of preachers during the period, and
sermons at Court were not necessarily representative of pulpit discourse more broadly.  See generally McCullough,
Sermons at Court.
“True Purification,” 324.  See also Ruthven, Conceit, 58 (“conceits have been regarded sometimes as a139
Papist extravagance, a stylistic disease contracted during periods of monkish ignorance and intolerable among members
of a Reformed Church”).
Thomas Fuller once used the term “mirth”—clearly a ludic descriptor—to characterize James’ tastes in140
preaching.  Davies, Like Angels, 126.  See also McCullough, Sermons at Court, 156 (“James’s brusque elevation of
sermon over service focused and fueled a debate over the efficacy of preaching versus prayer that had simmered in
England since the Reformation”).
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orthodoxies—his Puritan focus on the centrality of preaching and his generous use of tropes and
figures—we see markers of excess and therefore of the ludic.141
Yet some ambivalence about preaching was necessary for survival in his age,  during which,142
Carrithers explains, an “uneasy balance of power obtained between proponents [. . .] of the
conviction that language is a part of creation, a component of reality glorious in itself, and
proponents of the notion that language serves only as a beggarly handmaiden to some more
fundamental reality.”   That ambivalence becomes institutionalized in what Jerome S. Dees calls143
“a paradox inherent in the Protestant conception of the ordinance of preaching”:  the preacher has144
a duty to deliver, and his auditory a duty to hear, the Word of God, and yet salvation is ultimately
a matter of Divine grace extended directly to the individual without an intervening mediatory role
Particularly in terms of Donne’s love of figuration in the pulpit, we might classify his style as mannerist:141
“art that reveals art” with wit, formal complexity, and often obscurity.  See James V. Mirollo, “The Mannered and the
Mannerist in Late Renaissance Literature,” in The Meaning of Mannerism, ed. Franklin W. Robinson and Stephen G.
Nichols, Jr. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1972), 7–24, 18.  See also James V. Mirollo, Mannerism
and Renaissance Poetry: Concept, Mode, Inner Design (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 68; and Frank
J. Warnke, Versions of Baroque: European Literature in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1972), 12.  To the extent that mannerism has been associated with the Counter-Reformation, this classification
could even further complicate our understanding of pulpit rhetoric in the English Reformation.  See Nikolaus Pevsner,
“The Architecture of Mannerism,” in Readings in Art History, ed. Harold Spencer (New York: Scribner’s, 1969),
2:119–48; and Wylie Sypher, Four Stages of Renaissance Style: Transformations in Art and Literature, 1400–1700
(1955) (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978), 104–105.  See also Stubbs, Reformed Soul, xxiv (“For Donne, the
Reformation was not ultimately a betrayal of the English Catholic tradition”).
Fetzer, Performances, 45.  Shami notes that Donne tended to have a tolerant attitude, one which took pains142
to avoid controversy.  “Anti-Catholicism in the Sermons of John Donne,” in Ferrell and McCullough, English Sermon
Revised, 136–66, 139, 151.  Byron Nelson studies Donne’s debut sermon at St. Paul’s and explains the “daunting set of
challenges” that Donne had to face on that occasion, all of which required him to walk some extremely fine doctrinal
lines.  “John Donne’s Pulpit Voice,” 53.  According to Stubbs, Donne’s “refuge [. . .] lay in circumspection”; he
“smudged over” issues that were deeply controversial.  Reformed Soul, 376.
Donne at Sermons, 79.143
“Logic and Paradox,” 82.144
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for the preacher.   This institutional tension was further exacerbated by deep divisions among those145
identifying themselves as Protestants, and even among fellow Conformists, about the proper use of
rhetoric in sermonic discourse, a matter that Mueller says was “debated with frequency and with
heat.”   The fact that these debates were inconclusive is illustrated by Donne’s success and acclaim146
as a preacher despite his own intensely rhetorical style and his use not only of metaphors but also
of the kinds of elaborate conceits for which his verse is justly known.   In short, Donne preaches147
during years when rhetorical and devotional theory were converging and radically transforming each
other,  and in the years after his death the movement in favor of plain style culminates in what148
Mueller calls the Royal Society’s “attack on eloquence.”149
“Since the word is heard only through preaching, then logically the preacher is necessary for salvation. 145
Yet this idea flatly contradicts the central reformed doctrine that salvation is an unmediated grace given freely and
directly to the individual’s heart.  Reduced to the lowest common denominator, the preacher is both absolutely necessary
for man’s salvation and yet utterly useless as a causally effective agent in it.”  Ibid.
We can see this conflict between fundamental Protestant doctrine and the high-Church concept of preaching
most acutely in one of Donne’s own sermons:
All the Sermon is not Gods word, but all the Sermon is Gods Ordinance, and the Text is certainely his
word.  There is no salvation but by faith, nor faith but by hearing, nor hearing but by preaching; and they
that thinke meanliest of the Keyes of the Church, and speake faintliest of the Absolution of the Church, will
yet allow, That those Keyes lock, and unlock in Preaching; That Absolution is conferred, or withheld in
Preaching, That the proposing of the promises of the Gospel in preaching, is that binding and loosing on
earth, which bindes and looses in heaven.  (S, 7:320)
John Donne: Preacher, 99.  For example, “Services in reformed churches including the Anglican were to146
be conducted in a ‘language understanded of the people’ yet—as we have heard Donne urge and practice—not without
occasional touches of specialization.”  Carrithers, Donne at Sermons, 76.
One of the editors of Donne’s sermons describes his style as “carefully wrought and artfully varied,” and147
notes that “conceits are found in Donne’s best prose as well as in his poetry.  [W]here he is most truly himself, as in the
Devotions or the greater sermons, the far-fetched images which displeased Dr. Johnson make their appearance once
more.”  Simpson, Study of the Prose Works, 257, 57.
Thomas O. Sloane, “The Crossing of Rhetoric and Poetry in the English Renaissance,” in The Rhetoric of148
Renaissance Poetry: From Wyatt to Milton, ed. Thomas O. Sloane and Raymond B. Waddington (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1974), 212–42, 214.  For more on the effects of this merger, see ibid., 230–31.
John Donne: Preacher, 101.  For a further discussion of the historical significance of Donne’s sermons149
in relationship to “the great stylistic reform linked with the Royal Society’s crusade in behalf of a simpler manner of
expression,” see Umbach, “Rhetoric of Donne’s Sermons,” 354.
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The playfully incarnational nature of Donne’s sermons therefore has the potential to enlighten
us about how the role of rhetoric in intellectual and cultural life was perceived during the English
Renaissance.   In other words, how empty a thing was rhetoric?   If Vickers is correct, then should150 151
we understand seventeenth-century rhetoric as, in his words, “a persuasive affective process,” or
were the tropes and figures we see in the texts of that period merely intended as “things of beauty
in themselves”?   Was rhetoric a way to make ideas attractive or the means for making them152
intelligible?   Or perhaps, as Mueller suggests, the age belonged to Horace, Philip Sidney, and the153
idea that “a discourse is effective in proportion to its ability to teach and delight.”154
Although Donne’s volubility in the pulpit on the subject of rhetoric may be unusual, there
is reason to believe that the substance of his comments on these questions was not entirely
See Webber, Contrary Music, 3 (“in the pulpit Donne achieved his fullest artistic expression, and came150
even closer than in his poetry to reflecting the spirit of his age”).
There is a surprising dearth of scholarly work on this question.  According to Winfried Schleiner, Donne’s
sermons were for a long time used “chiefly as a mine from which to extract passages that might serve as a commentary
to his poems.”  Imagery of John Donne’s Sermons, 3.  Although there are certainly worthwhile parallels to be drawn and
connections to be made between Donne’s prose works and his verse, the richness of his sermons is such that they should
not be overlooked either as literary or as cultural artifacts valuable in themselves.  More recently, scholars have
complained that the substance of Donne’s religious thought has dominated criticism on the sermons to the exclusion of
“his rhetorical purpose for his audience.”  Nelson, Holy Ambition, 3.  Salenius concurs.  “True Purification,” 314–15. 
Yet, even though Nelson is correct that examining a speaker’s rhetoric might be a more certain task than inquiring into
his theological position (Holy Ambition, 5), it would be unfortunate to stop there.  Rhetoric is a fundamentally social and
cultural practice, and the manner in which it is deployed in a given context can therefore tell us about much more than
an individual orator’s intentions and objectives.  See, for example, Don Bialostosky, Wordsworth, Dialogics, and the
Practice of Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 221 (suggesting that rhetorical devices may “be
understood as analogous rhetorical exploitations of [. . .] distinct sorts of expectations [. . .] which are produced socially
by historically specific institutions that regulate verbal practices”).
Edwards, remarking on complaints (both period and contemporary) that the metaphysical and heavily151
rhetorical style of preaching was hollow or “less than serious,” boldly asserts that such a view requires “an uncommon
lack of imagination” and “an extraordinary capacity to miss the point.”  History of Preaching, 377–78.
Classical Rhetoric, 86.152
Thomas O. Sloan[e], “The Rhetoric in the Poetry of John Donne,” Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900153
3, no. 1 (Winter 1963): 31–44, 31.
John Donne: Preacher, 105.154
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idiosyncratic: “The ideas expressed in Donne’s sermons [. . .] are not so much original as eclectic,”
P. G. Stanwood and Heather Ross Asals say, and they represent “seventeenth-century thought,
borrowed from the past and individually fashioned.”   Moreover, the nature of the congregations155
to and for whom Donne preached makes his sermons a useful touchstone for gauging the attitudes
toward rhetoric held by contemporary intellectual elites, those whose own discourses possessed the
most influence and power.  Brent Nelson explains that
Donne’s most frequent audiences all had in common an involvement in the world of
affairs (be it at court or in the marketplace), and it is to this aspect of his audience
that his sermons consistently speak.  Donne was a learned preacher, both in the arts
and in worldly affairs, and he used his learning to full advantage.  At court and at
Lincoln’s Inn, Donne preached to an audience that was similarly educated.  And the
same could be said for a large portion of his congregation at St. Paul’s and St.
Dunstan’s, both parishes in the heart of London which included a diversity of
people.156
This inquiry should be guided by a note on the way that Donne characterized his own pulpit
oratory: “we are not upon a Lecture, but upon a Sermon” (S, 2:320).  Donne spoke these words as
Reader of Divinity at Lincoln’s Inn, to an auditory of lawyers and law students who likely knew
Theology of Language, 9.  See also Fetzer, Performances, 45 (“[. . .] Donne had an integrative approach155
to diverse opinions”).  It is also significant that Donne’s sermons represent the fruit of Donne’s own schooling in “the
sophistical uses of the tropes and schemes of the traditional rhetoric, which had been perhaps the most important aspect
of his education.”  William Rockett, “Donne’s Libertine Rhetoric,” English Studies 52, no. 6 (December 1971): 507–18,
514.  Accordingly, a close examination of Donne’s rhetoric in the pulpit might be instructive in connection with studies
of late sixteenth-century pedagogy.
Holy Ambition, 24–25.  “Although Donne carefully tailored his sermons to the needs of his audience, his156
sermons are not easily grouped along traditional ad clerum / ad populum lines.”  Ibid., 24.  “[T]he most striking feature
of his inventio is his infusing of the message of Scripture with his audience’s common experience in the world outside
the church walls.  Much of Donne’s interpretation of Scripture, in fact, bears the marks of his and his congregation’s
cultural experience.”  Ibid., 23.
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without explanation the significance of the distinction Donne was positing.  Seven years later, as
Dean of St. Paul’s before a congregation for whom an elaboration might have been necessary, Donne
explained the difference:
a Sermon intends Exhortation principally and Edification, and a holy stirring of
religious affections, and then matters of Doctrine, and points of Divinity,
occasionally, secondarily, as the words of the text may invite them; But Lectures
intend principally Doctrinall points, and matter of Divinity; and matter of
Exhortation but occasionally, and as in a second place.  (S, 8:95)
By associating the work of the homily with the stirring of passions or affections, or pathos, Donne
invokes the Aristotelian tradition and positions the preacher as an orator, a practitioner of rhetoric.  157
Indeed, this passage suggests not merely that rhetoric was considered to be a legitimate part of the
sermon, but that preaching was inherently, or necessarily, a mode of figured speech.  Carrithers
asserts that Donne “seems to have meant by lecture what we mean by straight exposition: practical
discourse which can conform to the shape of its container,”  what Jeanne Fahnestock has referred158
to as a hypothetical “unfigured or degree-zero style.”159
Assuming that Carrithers is correct, his analysis of this passage raises serious questions about
Shuger’s claim that “Donne’s sermons often mention rhetoric, but only to disparage it,”  and about160
“The Preacher stirres and moves, and agitates the holy affections of the Congregation” (S, 8:43).157
Donne at Sermons, 3.158
Rhetorical Figures in Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 20.159
Sacred Rhetoric, 110–11.160
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the contentions of other scholars who have described Donne’s preaching style as plain or terse,  in161
sharp contrast with the often baroque rhetoric displayed in his verse and his other prose.  162
Moreover, given Donne’s prominence, this view of his sermons also casts doubt on broader claims
about pulpit discourse during the period, such as Peter Mack’s assertion that “Few of the sermons
delivered outside the court make great use of the repertory of figures of speech, though many have
short passages of amplified language at key points.”163
To the contrary, based on the readings that I have presented in this chapter, Chamberlin’s
assessment seems to be more correct: “A sermon must move the hearts of its hearers, and for that
purpose the resources of ancient rhetoric can also be utilized.”   The word rhetoric, then as now,164
possesses two senses: it is a technical term describing the formal arts of language, and it is a coded
way for the critic of a discourse to disparage it as hollow or empty.  Shuger and others seem to be
recognizing the second sense of the word in Donne’s references to rhetoric—or
Rhetorique—whereas I understand him to be using the term in its first sense, particularly in light of
For example, Umbach argues that161
Donne sought to edify, not to mystify, his hearers; hence it was necessary to speak more plainly in the
pulpit than it was his wont to write to his correspondents.  Mere cleverness, the bane of his Juvenilia, the
Paradoxes and Problems, as also of his worst poems, he had now outgrown.  For in these sermons his style
is terse, elliptical, and vivid.  His customary sentence, though seldom truly short, is brief; the favorite
device most in evidence is a combining of any number of short sentences into a cumulative paragraph.
“Rhetoric of Donne’s Sermons,” 358.  Umbach does not contend that Donne entirely dispensed with the flourishes of
rhetoric, but rather that they were “directed more strictly to religious ends [and] [b]rought into use less for display of
certain devices than for better management of the subject.”  Ibid., 355.
See, for example, Mueller, John Donne: Preacher, 114 (“From his poetry Donne carries over into his prose162
a startling and exciting metaphoric skill, and with no loss of either intensity or comprehensiveness”).
Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,163
2002), 279.
Increase and Multiply, 72.164
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the fact that Donne’s style, too long neglected in scholarly work on the sermons, is overtly, floridly,
even playfully rhetorical.
To be sure, Donne himself advocated that, at a minimum, rhetoric be used judiciously “lest
because he is able to make any thing seem probable and likely to the people, by his eloquence, he
come to infuse paradoxicall opinions, or schismaticall, or (which may be beleeved either way)
problematicall opinions, for certain and constant truths” (S, 10:148).  Indeed, citing the Divine
model, he warns preachers that “The Holy Ghost is an eloquent Author, a vehement, and an abundant
Author, but yet not luxuriant; he is far from a penurious, but as far from a superfluous style too”
(S, 5:287).  Elsewhere, Donne exhibits an outright—if ironic—skepticism about the propriety of
rhetoric: “Invention, and Disposition, and Art, and Eloquence, and Expression, and Elocution, and
reading, and writing, and printing, are secondary things, accessory things, auxiliary, subsidiary
things; men may account us [. . .] as of Orators in the pulpit, and of Authors, in the shop; but if they
account of us as of Ministers and Stewards, they give us our due” (S, 6:103–4).  In a later sermon,
Donne elaborates: “He that brings any collaterall respect to prayers looses the benefit of the prayers
of the Congregation; and he that brings that to a Sermon, looses the blessing of Gods ordinance in
that Sermon; hee heares but the Logique, or the Retorique [sic], or the Ethique, or the poetry of the
Sermon, but the Sermon of the Sermon he hears not” (S, 7:293).  The implication of this last
statement is that, while logic, rhetoric, and poetry may be parts of a sermon, they are not at its
heart—the soul of homiletic discourse lies elsewhere.165
Where, then, is the sermon of the sermon, that which prevents rhetoric from being an empty
thing?  The brand of rhetoric that Donne condemns in his sermons is “fanciful and mindless
Even though the statement provides a crucial qualification on the role of rhetoric in sermonic discourse,165
it is nonetheless remarkable evidence that rhetoric did have such a role, if not a paramount one.
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eloquence,”  and Donne denounces this “Oration of Flowres, and Figures, and Phrases without166
strength” (S, 7:329) because preaching is “a vain activity unless the hearers of the Word become also
doers of the Word.”   An interesting possibility is that Donne’s anti-rhetoric rhetoric was actually167
directed at the sermon practice of the Puritans, whom he called “Rhapsoders, and Common placers,
and Method-mongers” (S, 1:256), on account of what Chamberlin calls their “legalistic reductionism
and topical procedures.”   Donne, says Chamberlin, “was to look instead to patristic and medieval168
means of developing the scriptural text as alternatives to the arts-of-discourse methods of the Puritan
textmen.”   If this is an argument worthy of exploring in more detail, then a reevaluation of many169
scholars’ perspectives is definitely in order, if only because the Puritans themselves had a rhetoric
of their own.170
“There is an excess in [. . .] self-effusion, this pouring of a mans self out, in fair, and
promising language” (S, 8:341).  Indeed there is, and this excess can be considered as a marker of
the ludic in Donne’s language, but this final quotation from one of his sermons leaves in question
the extent to which Donne recognized and appreciated his own pulpit play.
Webber, Contrary Music, 23.166
Mueller, John Donne: Preacher, 81.167
Increase and Multiply, 91.168
Ibid.169
Even Lollardy, typically known for a radically and even heretically plain style, possessed a distinct rhetoric. 170
See Rebecca Wilson Lundin, “Rhetorical Iconoclasm: The Heresy of Lollard Plain Style,” Rhetoric Review 27, no. 2
(2008): 131–46, 132 (“For the Lollards plain discourse indicated neither an absence of figurative language nor a lack
of rhetorical nuance in meaning”).
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E.  CODA
Donne’s Play in Anamorphic Perspective
One form of play that we have encountered in Donne’s sermons is a tendency toward
equivocation—a taste for making words and phrases have two completely distinct yet simultaneous
meanings.  When Donne asks, for example, “How empty a thing is Rhetorique?” (S, 4:87), he seems
on one hand to be disparaging the art even while he undercuts his statement through a particularly
effective use of it.  To see the two meanings requires the reader to change his or her perspective, to
look directly and then to look askance, in a figurative sense.
This kind of perspective-shifting becomes literal in the next case study, in which I shall
explore, among other things, Renaissance images in the anamorphic style: distorted images that
require their viewers to see from two different angles in order to understand fully the images’
bivalent content and rhetoric.  I am not the first to make a connection between these kinds of images
on the one hand and Renaissance-era texts on the other,  but that connection is deeply relevant to171
my mission here, and it is worth explaining for transitional purposes how Donne uses what Anna
Riehl calls the “anamorphic game”  in one particular, seldom-considered piece, “Song: Sweetest172
Love I Do Not Goe”:
Sweetest love, I do not goe,
For wearinesse of thee,
Nor in hope the world can show
A fitter Love for mee,
5 But since that I
Must dye at last, ’tis best,
See, for example, Jen E. Boyle, Anamorphosis in Early Modern Literature: Mediation and Affect, Literary171
and Scientific Cultures of Early Modernity (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishers, 2010); Constance Elderhorst, “John
Donne’s First Anniversary as an Anatomical Anamorphosis,” in Explorations in the Field of Nonsense, ed. Wim Tigges,
DQR Studies in Literature (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987), 97–102; and Anna Riehl, “Eying the Thought Awry: The
Anamorphosis of John Donne’s Poetry,” English Literary Renaissance 39, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 141–62.
“Eying the Thought Awry,” 150.172
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To use my selfe in jest
Thus by fain’d deaths to dye;
Yesternight the Sunne went hence,
10 And yet is here to day,
He hath no desire nor sense,
Nor halfe so short a way:
Then feare not mee,
But beleeve that I shall make
15 Speedier journeyes, since I take
More wings and spurres then hee.
O how feeble is mans power,
That if good fortune fall,
Cannot adde another houre,
20 Nor a lost houre recall!
But come bad chance,
And wee joyne to’it our strength,
And wee teach it art and length,
It selfe o’r us to’advance.
25 When thou sigh’st, thou sigh’st not winde,
But sigh’st my soule away,
When thou weep’st, unkindly kinde,
My lifes blood doth decay.
It cannot bee
30 That thou lov’st mee, as thou say’st,
If in thine my life thou waste,
Thou art the best of mee.
Let not thy divining heart
Forethinke me any ill,
35 Destiny may take thy part,
And may thy feares fulfill,
But thinke that wee
Art but turn’d aside to sleepe;
They who one another keepe
40 Alive, ne’r parted bee.173
John Donne, “Song: Sweetest Love, I Do Not Goe,” in The Complete Poetry of John Donne, ed. John T.173
Shawcross (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), 101–102.  All further citations to the poem (“Song”) will appear
as parenthetical references to line numbers in the main text.
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Critical commentary on the poem, although sparse, is nearly unanimous in declaring its
speaker to be sincere.   Deborah Aldrich Larson has noted his “obvious respect” for the woman he174
addresses;  Wilbur Sanders has explained that the speaker “faces the woman’s grief at parting and175
searches his soul for the wholly tactful, tender, yet manly way of meeting it.”   These readings,176
however, are flawed because they are based upon a failure to account credibly for the fact that the
sentiments in the first stanza are so difficult to take seriously.  Having explained to his lady that he
is not leaving her to search for another love, the character who speaks these lines (on a literal level,
at least) claims that he goes because the experience of separation is like death and will thus inure him
to the inevitable fact of his own mortality.  If we assume that he is sincere and intends to be taken
literally to any degree, then his assertion is so histrionic that it makes him appear foolish and his
lady—if she believes him—foolishly naive.  Because neither conclusion comports with what we
expect from Donne’s verse, critics have sought interpretations that tend to preserve his sincerity
rather than to question his literalness.  For example, Patricia Garland Pinka has argued that the
speaker, in order to reassure his beloved, “comically rationalizes his departure as a feigned death,
Izaack Walton’s claim that the poem was addressed to Donne’s wife, however, does not require more than174
an aphoristic refutation: Walton was “most unreliable about many things.”  John T. Shawcross, “Some Rereadings of
John Donne’s Poems,” John Donne Journal 15 (1996): 45–62, 49.
John Donne and Twentieth-Century Criticism (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,175
1989), 138.
John Donne’s Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 89.  On the other hand, Janel176
Mueller argues that the speaker “lapses into self-regard” at the end of the first stanza.  “Women among the
Metaphysicals: A Case, Mostly, of Being Donne For,” Modern Philology 87, no. 2 (November 1989): 142–58, 147. 
N. J. C. Andreasen characterizes the poem as “an aubade of the same bawdy type as Breake of day.”  John Donne:
Conservative Revolutionary (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 223.  But neither of these critics—nor
any other that I have encountered in my research—challenges the conventional reading that the poem has received as
strenuously as I shall in this coda.
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but his jest evaporates into a bit of ghastly self-mockery.”   This reading, however, only exacerbates177
the problem: the use of such a macabre joke as consolation would be self-mockery so ghastly that
we would have to judge Donne’s representative in the poem to be a tactless oaf—a high price to pay
for sincerity.  Another response, that of Sanders and Murray Roston, has been to invent a context
within which these remarks seem more fitting or to read into the blank lines between the stanzas a
set of reactions from the beloved that makes any tonal incongruities disappear.   The problem, of178
course, is that the poem’s text does not provide evidence sufficient for these significant
interpolations to be offered on any more than a purely conjectural basis. 
Accordingly, a better approach to the problem of the first stanza is to suspend judgment on
the issue of sincerity and instead to question whether Donne intends to be taken literally at all.  If his
character is speaking figuratively, then the opening lines could be paraphrased rather like this:
“Because I must die someday, the best way would be to use up or consume my life in carnal sport
so that death finally comes as a result of the little [or feigned] death of sexual release, which is to be
preferred [or ‘fained’] over real death and over any other way I could die.”  Of course, this reading
changes the entire poem, converting it into an ode to promiscuity for a licentious beloved who
appreciates how the speaker mockingly uses the conventions of romantic verse to express a
diametrically opposed view of love.
This Dialogue of One: The “Songs and Sonnets” of John Donne (University: University of Alabama Press,177
1982), 117.
Sanders speculates that the speaker is responding to “reproachful questions the woman has asked.”  John178
Donne’s Poetry, 11.  Roston argues that the speaker begins by “posing as the gallant” but that between the second and
third stanzas “the facade suddenly collapses” when he realizes that his brave roleplaying has left his beloved
unconvinced.  The Soul of Wit: A Study of John Donne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 120.  Pierre Legouis
goes even further, suggesting that the speaker “alters his tone according to the effect produced upon her by what he has
just said,” and that “the reader must fill the logical gaps.”  Donne the Craftsman: An Essay upon the Structure of the
“Songs and Sonnets” (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 54.
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Considerably more textual evidence exists to support this reading than can be mustered for
the prevailing interpretation.   Indeed, the poem’s first word—significant for this and for the fact179
that it represents the speaker’s description of his partner—is “Sweetest” (“Song,” 1), suggesting that
she stimulates his senses rather than his mind or soul, and that his song has a strong sexual undertow
beneath its placid and conventional surface.  The fact that “sweet” and “sweat” were homophones
in Donne’s era, and that the song’s first word could therefore have been pronounced “sweatest” or
“sweatiest,” also sets the bawdy scene for this interpretation of the poem.
Continuing in the first stanza, the speaker truthfully asserts that he does not go “for
wearinesse” of his partner (“Song,” 2)—he intends to return at some point if only for the purpose of
receiving further sexual gratification—nor does he go “in hope the world can show / A fitter Love
for mee” (“Song,” 3–4).  Again, he is being truthful but not literal.  First, he does not want genuine
love, only love as a euphemism for carnal delight.  Second, he does not go in search of a partner
whose chastity would make her a more appropriate or fitting choice than his libidinous addressee and
whose virginity would provide a tighter fit in the act of coupling.  Instead, Donne’s speaker is
interested in seasoned and experienced lovers who can deliver more pleasure than can the untutored.
In the second stanza the speaker compares himself to the sun, which returns each day even
though it “hath no desire nor sense” (“Song,” 11).  Implicitly, then, he possesses both qualities:
desire (obviously) and sense (although he does not mean only to ascribe to himself the power of
cognition).  He will therefore make “speedier journeyes” than the sun (“Song,” 15)—both away from
The formal characteristics of the poem also corroborate my argument.  Donne’s unusually short trimeter179
lines possess a rhythmic regularity uncommon in his verse, evoking both the cadence of sexual intercourse and his
character’s haste to have as much of it as possible.  And this jangling, sing-songy rhythm is jarringly inconsistent with
the usual characteristics of Donne’s verse, for which Ben Jonson said Donne “deserved hanging.”  Quoted in Ben
Jonson’s Literary Criticism, ed. James D. Redwine, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 170.  Clearly,
something more is going on than what critics have thus far been willing to acknowledge.
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his lover to his next encounter and then back again for more of the same—because his cupidity gives
him “more wings and spurres” (“Song,” 16).   More tellingly, the third stanza is structured around180
the homophonic pair “houre”/“whore” and thus takes on a double meaning.  Mocking convention,
Donne rehearses the commonplace that man’s power is feeble because he cannot lengthen good
fortune when it befalls him.  But his incongruous use of the verb “fall” (“Song,” 18) to describe the
action of good fortune reveals his speaker’s punning intention to say that when death ends a man’s
pursuit of pleasure he is powerless to acquire the favors of another sportive woman or even to
“recall” or remember the pleasures “lost” (“Song,” 20) to him in his grave.
Another sexual reference couched in romantic terms begins the fourth stanza: “When thou
sigh’st, thou sigh’st not winde, / But sigh’st my soule away” (“Song,” 25–26).  Her sighs, however,
have come during the throes of passion rather than of sadness and they take the speaker’s soul away
in the figurative death of sexual ecstasy.  She would therefore be an “unkindly kinde” (“Song,”
27)—an unnatural type—were she to cry at his departure, an act that would betray the normal human
tendency toward promiscuity.  Alternatively, “weep’st” in this line can be understood as a vaginal
rather than a lacrimal reference, in which case his “lifes blood” would indeed “decay” (“Song,” 28)
if his partner were producing an unhealthy discharge symptomatic of venereal disease, potentially
fatal to him and thus unpleasant (or “unkindly”), yet a natural (and thus “kinde”) result of their
sexual profligacy.  This interpretation also resonates with the balance of the fourth stanza:
It cannot bee
That thou lov’st mee, as thou say’st,
The sun “returns each day precisely because it has no desire or sense”; as an inanimate object it cannot180
succumb to “accidents of mortality.”  Roston, Soul of Wit, 120.
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If in thine my life thou waste,
Thou art the best of mee.  (“Song,” 29–32)
If she has passed a life-wasting illness to the speaker, and particularly if she had ever claimed that
she could make love to him without doing so (a claim that under such circumstances “cannot bee
[. . .] as thou say’st”), then she has certainly gotten the best of him.181
Donne’s bawdry and mockery continue in the final stanza when the speaker asks his lover
not to “Forethinke me any ill” (“Song,” 34), which in the context of the previous lines can be
understood as a request that she not worry about his health while he is engaged in sexual sport with
other partners.  Having thus subverted the tradition of romantic verse by which the departing man
asks his lady not to fear for his safety while he is gone, Donne ridicules the related idea that the
lady’s fears may, through the power of sympathy, arouse the winds and rains to do her beloved harm:
“Destiny may take thy part, / And may thy feares fulfill” (“Song,” 35–36).  Donne’s speaker cleverly
suggests that undue concern by the addressee about his health may cause fate to claim her private
anatomy for infection, because any disease he could contract in his wanderings would ultimately be
passed along to her when he returns.  Another pun on the word “part” concludes the poem: “They
who one another keepe / Alive, ne’r parted bee” (“Song,” 39–40).  With this final gibe at chastity,
the poem’s voice asserts that lovers who keep each other alive by being constant and faithful when
separated—or by foregoing the figurative death of orgasm when together—are effectively sexless
because they neither use their own parts as nature intended nor receive the gift of each other’s parts
in the act of sexual union.
I do not suggest that the poem’s addressee is actually afflicted with disease, that she has ever given an181
assurance of her health, or that Donne’s speaker is even concerned about such matters.  Rather, my argument is that the
speaker is making a bawdy joke that would be at his lover’s expense were he not simultaneously reveling in their mutual
wantonness and mocking the conventions of courtly love by making them give voice to base and vulgar ideas.
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To look at “Song: Sweetest Love I Do Not Goe” from a second angle or perspective is to see
a key facet of Donne’s wit and playfulness, for the poem is more than it initially seems; it is a
double-sided verbal artifact that simultaneously projects two different sets of meanings, each
fundamentally at odds with the other.   This anamorphic reading of Donne’s ludic tour de force182
prepares us for the next case study, an examination of visual discourse in the Renaissance—via
contemporary popular texts—with a focus on playful and multivalent imagery that aspires to
incarnational status.
^
For Riehl, this is the essence of an anamorphic reading: “The possibility of two opposing readings, each182
readily supported by the text.”  “Eying the Thought Awry,” 152.
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Figure 7.  Cover design from Clare Gibson, The Hidden Life of Art:
Secrets and Symbols in Great Masterpieces (Glasgow: Saraband,
2006).
Jan van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait (1434) has been fragmented for the cover design
of this book in order to emphasize the status of separate objects within the image as
clues that can be deciphered and read.  Reinforcing the words hidden and secret in
the book’s title, the image fragments have been canted to reveal a black space
beyond, a space which suggests that the mysteries that lie behind the painting will
be illuminated by the text that occupies the space behind the cover.  The following
case study investigates the terrain from which that black space emerges.
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III.  A CASE STUDY OF LUDIC IMAGERY IN THE RENAISSANCE
Decoding the Legible Image:
Picture as Puzzle in Contemporary Popular Texts on Renaissance Art
God, we see, was the first, that made Images; and he was the first,
that forbad them; he forbad them in danger of adoration.  [. . .]  There
is no more danger out of a picture, then out of a history, if thou intend
no more in either, then example.1
—John Donne
Beyond his extensive commentary on the role of rhetoric in sermonic discourse, John Donne used
the pulpit to expound on other important theological issues of his day, and in this provocative
passage he turns his attention to the vexed Reformation question of images.  With the parenthetical
aside, “we see,” Donne summons a common visual metaphor in which the power of sight is likened
to the ability to understand.  To appreciate the fact that Divine precedent exists for the creation of
images is to see this fact, to envision not only a concrete and particular image but also the more
general and abstract concept of images themselves.  These two small words, therefore, encapsulate
effectively the complexities that inhere within English Reformed discourse on imagery.  Despite the
centrality of vision to our cognitive capacity as human beings, we must not descend into idolatry;
despite the fact that God has sanctioned the production of images through His own imitable example,
we must not fashion images for purposes beyond the didactic or pedagogical.
S, 9:76.1
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Figure 8.  Lucas Cranach the Elder, Hallowed Be Thy Name, 1527. 
Staatliche Kunstammlungen, Dresden.
Reproduced courtesy of © Kupferstich-Kabinett, Staatliche Kunstammlungen
Dresden, Photo: Herbert Boswank.
The discourse of preaching is itself made the subject of an image in this 1527 woodcut of a
Lutheran minister delivering a sermon on Christ crucified (Figure 8).   Although not obviously ludic,2
the image is notable for its prominent use of perspective, accentuated by the tiled floor of the
preaching space, and shows Lucas Cranach the Elder deploying without hesitation the visual
technology of his day to craft an emblem for evangelical preaching and to illustrate a segment of the
Lord’s Prayer.  The woodcut’s original gloss by Philipp Melancthon, “That is, your name should be
For a fuller discussion of this image, see Joseph Leo Koerner, The Reformation of the Image (London:2
Reaktion Books, 2004), 252–53.
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rightly known through right teaching and faith, and thereby honoured and praised,”  adds depth to3
the woodcut, explaining that the figured preacher is focused on the name or Word of God, which is 
incarnated within the picture as the crucifix toward which he gestures.  Because the crucifix itself
is an image, we might not expect to see it placed within this Reformed context; it “does not quite
belong,” Joseph Leo Koerner says, and it “casts its shadow on the ground.”   But there is a potential4
explanation for its presence in Martin Luther’s notion that the act of hearing the Word preached
imprints an image of the crucifix on the auditory’s hearts: “For whether I will or not, when I hear of
Christ, an image of a man hanging on a cross takes form in my heart, just as the reflection of my face
naturally appears in the water when I look into it.”   Cranach’s meta-image—his image of the image5
of the crucifix—is intended figuratively to visualize this other figurative process of internal image
formation.  In other words, the crucified form of Christ is not physically present in the preaching
space being depicted but rather stands as a metaphor for the image being metaphorically developed
within the hearts of the gathered congregants.  The internal or tropic image here is being literalized,
incarnated like the figured Christ Himself, for the same instructional purposes served by preaching. 
This surprisingly rich and complex use of imagery in a Reformed, evangelical context is
trumped, however, by the even more challenging depiction of Luther’s imprinting concept in the
frontispiece of Luke Milbourne’s 1697 English translation of Thomas à Kempis’ De imitatione
Ibid., 252.  The woodcut’s use of a gloss or caption is one of many examples of Protestant “reliance on3
language to contain the visual representation.”  James A. Knapp, Image Ethics in Shakespeare and Spenser (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 33.
Reformation of the Image, 253.4
Quoted in John Dillenberger, A Theology of Artistic Sensibilities: The Visual Arts and the Church (Eugene,5
OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1986), 65.  See also Siri Sande, “Conclusion: Iconoclasm in History and Present-Day
Use of Images,” in Iconoclasm from Antiquity to Modernity, ed. Kristine Kolrud and Marina Prusac (Surrey, UK:
Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 171–88, 183 (“In contrast to his colleague Karlstadt, who shared Calvin’s view that images
gave rise to idolatry, Luther argued that painted and sculpted images were not dangerous in themselves.  What counted
were the images one had in one’s heart”).
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Christi (Figure 9).  Inspired by the Word of God, represented in the frontispiece by the crucified
form of Christ, the foregrounded artist figure reproduces the crucifix within a heart shape to
symbolize Luther’s notion that the Word imprints a crucifix upon the hearer’s heart.  But this
metaphor is radically literalized in the frontispiece—the Word is again incarnated for visual purposes
by the image of the crucifix, and the imprinting process itself becomes physicalized in the act of
generating another meta-image, the artist’s creation of a crucifix embedded within a heart.  Although
a member of the high-Church party rather than a Puritan, Milbourne is demonstrating through the
use of this image an extremely subtle, and perhaps even ludic, understanding of how visuality may
be properly used in the exercise of Protestant devotion.
Figure 9.  Frontispiece from Luke Milbourne, The Christian Pattern
Paraphras’d (London: Black Boy, 1697).  Cambridge University
Library, Cambridge.
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The case study presented in this chapter is an effort to explore some of the consequences of
this nuanced thought as it emerges in Renaissance imagery, both secular and sacred, and in
contemporary popular works, particularly The Da Vinci Code, on images from the period.  More
specifically, I shall examine another metaphor that has become strikingly literalized in many forms
of contemporary discourse: the idea that Renaissance images are somehow legible, albeit deeply
encoded in the playful fashion of puzzles.  These ludic readings are revealing to the extent that they
point toward a similarly playful tendency in many instances of Renaissance visual discourse. 
However, they are deeply problematic in the sense that they consistently privilege the verbal over
the visual, treating Renaissance images as if they were texts containing letters and words that can
be non-metaphorically read.  This pervasive phenomenon, I shall ultimately argue, is one of the
legacies of iconoclasm: a scar that marks the wound of centuries, if not millennia, of iconophobia
within the Western tradition.  That iconophobic tradition, particularly as it manifests itself in the
Reformation, can therefore be more fully appreciated when we situate this contemporary discursive
phenomenon within an understanding that many types of Renaissance images are playful efforts to
imitate the Divine Incarnation.
In the first of five sections in this chapter, an overture, I shall set the stage for the analysis
to come by defining two key terms—the trope of the legible image and the decipherment model of
visual hermeneutics—that will be key to the argument of the case study as a whole; this section will
also establish that the interpretive strategies embraced by these terms are rooted in a fundamentally
ludic impulse.  The next section will endeavor to explain why these contemporary approaches to
pictures merit closer attention: first, interpretive practices of this nature, despite their occasionally
wild or exorbitantly ludic nature, are not confined merely to marginalized voices within the
conspiracy-theory branch of popular culture but rather exist within the loftier realms of art historical
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criticism and therefore deserve to be taken more seriously; second, there are many cases in which
the legible image trope and the decipherment model of visual hermeneutics parallel actual
representational practices during the Renaissance, cases in which hidden images actually
exist—playfully implanted—within canonical works of period art; finally, the playful nature of these
images can be understood as a way of physically implementing a set of incarnational strategies for
endowing images with presence, a mode of worshiping the Divine image-maker through an imitation
of His Creation and by the generation of lively images.  The third section proceeds to close readings
of popular culture texts that adopt the interpretive approaches discussed thus far in the chapter,
including but transcending and pre-dating Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code, in order to identify an
astonishingly regular pattern in these works: they literalize the metaphor of the legible image not by
teasing out meanings from components of images themselves but rather by seeking (and finding)
textuality—words and letters—within the images that they investigate.  In the fourth section, I
suggest some possible explanations for this unusual pattern; I shall focus principally on how the
Western legacy of iconoclasm and iconophobia, particularly its manifestation in the English
Reformation, becomes a kind of master trope in these texts, and I shall position those works within
a broader discursive matrix, concluding that they represent a significant strand in that matrix, one
that is important to our full comprehension of English Reformation views of images and icons. 
Finally, the fifth section will provide a brief coda and a transition to the next case study by
examining anamorphosis in a sampling of verse by George Herbert.
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A.  OVERTURE
Reading and Decoding Images
In his best-selling 2003 novel The Da Vinci Code,  Dan Brown describes his protagonist, symbol6
expert Robert Langdon, as someone who “viewed the world as a web of profoundly intertwined
histories and events.  The connections may be invisible, he often preached to his symbology classes
at Harvard, but they are always there, buried just beneath the surface.”   Judging by the success of7
The Da Vinci Code as a popular culture event—not only the novel but also the 2006 film version
directed by Ron Howard, at least a dozen basic-cable documentaries, and scores of commentaries
and similarly themed works that supported an entire segment of the publishing industry —the8
general public shares Langdon’s fascination with secret connections and occult truths hidden within
the fabric of everyday appearances.  More particularly, The Da Vinci Code and its popularity suggest
that our culture finds one notion to be irresistibly compelling: the possibility that canonical images
might contain concealed meanings that offer ways of understanding those works and the discourses
surrounding them more fully, deeply, and authentically.  This is the central phenomenon that I shall
attempt to illuminate in this chapter, and it has two distinct components.
  
Alexandra Ivanovitch refers to the novel as the “best-seller of best-sellers.”  “Dan Brown, or the Paraliterary6
as the Great Code of Literature,” in Finding the Plot: Storytelling in Popular Fictions, ed. Diana Holmes, David Platten,
Loïc Artiaga, and Jacques Migozzi (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 306–17, 307. 
Stephen J. Mexal asserts that it is the best-selling American novel of all time.  “Realism, Narrative History, and the
Production of the Bestseller: The Da Vinci Code and the Virtual Public Sphere,” Journal of Popular Culture 44, no. 5
(October 2011): 1085–1101, 1087.
Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code, Special Illustrated ed. (New York: Doubleday Books, 2004), 17.  All7
further citations to The Da Vinci Code (DVC) will appear as parenthetical references in the main text and footnotes.
For representative examples of the media coverage surrounding this phenomenon, see Bob Minzesheimer,8
“‘Code’ Deciphers What People Want to Read,” USA Today, December 11, 2003; Carol Memmott, “Similarly Themed
Books Vie for Piece of ‘Da Vinci’ Gold,” USA Today, January 17, 2006; and Carol Memmott, “‘Da Vinci’ Legacy Is
Genre’s Success,” USA Today, March 16, 2006.
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1. The Trope of the Legible Image: Reading Visuality
One manifestation of this phenomenon is the metaphor of the legible image—the idea that
visually oriented but non-linguistic artifacts can be understood and interpreted, or read, in a manner
analogous to the literal reading of verbal or textual works.  The trope of the legible image is a
common yet problematic feature of the discourse surrounding “word and image.”   As a metaphor,9
the notion of “reading images” implies a semblance that is only figuratively true, a likeness between
this and that; it therefore both reinforces the sense that “word” and “image” are distinct categories
and at the same time bridges the gap between those two concepts by suggesting a fundamental
affinity between them.
Questions about the relative value of words and images also become vexed in the workings
of this metaphor.  For example, according to Pope Gregory the Great’s seminal formulation of the
trope in 599, “what a book is to those who can read, a picture provides to even the unlearned who
look at it carefully, for in it the unlearned see what they should follow, and those who cannot read
books read it.  Hence a picture especially serves as a book to the common people.”   Although10
Gregory’s statement was hardly the first in which the interpretation of images was compared to the
reading of texts, the frequency with which it is quoted in the scholarly literature on word and image,
and its historical importance in terms of debates over the proper role of images in devotional and
“‘[W]ord and image’ designates the relation of art history to literary history, textual studies, linguistics, and9
other disciplines that deal primarily with visual expression.  Even more generally, ‘word and image’ is a kind of
shorthand name for a basic division of the human experience of representations, presentations, and symbols.”  W. J. T.
Mitchell, “Word and Image,” in Critical Terms for Art History, ed. Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 47–57, 47.
Quoted in Marguerite A. Tassi, The Scandal of Images: Iconoclasm, Eroticism, and Painting in Early10
Modern English Drama, Apple-Zimmerman Series in Early Modern Culture (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University
Press, 2005), 20.
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ecclesiastical practices, suggest that it merits a central position in the genealogy of this trope.   But11
while Gregory’s proclamation amounted to a defense of ecclesiastical images against suspicions of
latent idolatry, it also privileges words over pictures by using the text as a normative baseline in
relation to the image, the alien Other that stands in need of explanation and justification, and by
positioning the image as an inferior albeit salutary mode of pedagogical expression, suitable for those
who occupy a plebeian space of deficiency vis-à-vis the ability to understand the written word.
Even the role of this metaphor within the discipline of art history and criticism is plagued by
ambiguity, if not ambivalence: “It is a paradox,” Hubert Damisch says, “that, while making
iconography a privileged weapon in its methodological arsenal, art history has never ceased in
practice—and this quite innocently—to adhere to the logocentric model which it claimed to be
denouncing.”   Elaborating on the paradoxical nature of this dichotomy, Damisch explains that12
images can only be read iconographically to the extent that their “figures and/or signs [. . .] allow
themselves to be identified and indicated,” usually by reference to a text (in the broadest sense of that
term) external to the image itself; “a textual reference will carry the day by providing a ‘key’ which
allows the image to be interpreted,” a fact which requires “introducing into the analysis of the picture
the authority of the text from which the picture is supposed to derive its arrangement through a kind
Alain Besançon, The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm (1994), trans. Jane Marie11
Todd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 149.  As Hubert Damisch notes, “the metaphor of reading, as applied
to works of art, was introduced long before semiotics emerged as a specific discipline, implicit as it was from the
beginning in the practice of iconography.”  “Semiotics and Iconography” (1975), in The Art of Art History: A Critical
Anthology, ed. Donald Preziosi, Oxford History of Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 236–42, 237. 
According to Liselotte Dieckmann, the analogy dates back to the Renaissance, during which popular fascination with
the printed word went “so far that the term ‘reading’ was carried over into the fields of painting and music.” 
Hieroglyphics: The History of a Literary Symbol (St. Louis: Washington University Press, 1970), 66.  Of course,
Gregory’s defense of pictures as educational texts for the illiterate indicates that the metaphor was in circulation as much
as a millennium before the Renaissance.
“Semiotics and Iconography,” 236.12
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of figurative and/or symbolic application, in which each pictural element corresponds to a linguistic
term.”13
But not all critics would choose to denounce this model.   Nelson Goodman, in his aptly14
titled Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, uses the metaphor of legible images
quite unselfconsciously in discussing the essentially conventional and contingent nature of
perspective: “Pictures in perspective, like any others, have to be read; and the ability to read has to
be acquired.”   In other words, if a viewer “accustomed solely to Oriental painting does not15
immediately understand a picture in perspective,”  that is at least in part because perspective is a16
part of the rhetoric, or an idiom, of a different pictorial language.  Significantly, E. H. Gombrich—a
scholar who has sharply disagreed with Goodman’s position that visual perception is socially and
culturally conditioned—is no more averse than Goodman to invoking the trope of the legible image:
“We read a picture, as we read a printed line, by picking up letters or cues and fitting them together
till we feel that we look across the signs on the page at the meaning behind them.”17
Not surprisingly, other critics have difficulty accepting Goodman’s strictly analogical view
of the relationship between words and images.  As W. J. T. Mitchell observes, “The trope of ut
pictura poesis seems, in Goodman’s work, to have achieved its verbal apotheosis.  Pictures, like
Ibid., 237.13
See, for example, Alberto Manguel, Reading Pictures: A History of Love and Hate (New York: Random14
House, 2000).
Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Hackett15
Publishing, 1976), 14.
Ibid., 14–15.16
“Illusion and Visual Deadlock” (1961) (originally published as “How to Read a Painting”), in Meditations17
on a Hobby Horse: And Other Essays on the Theory of Art (London: Phaidon, 1963), 151–59, 155.  For an account of
some of the differences between Gombrich’s thought and that of Nelson Goodman, see Norman Bryson, “Semiology and
Visual Interpretation,” in Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation, ed. Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly, and Keith
Moxey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 61–73.
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paragraphs, have to be read as an arbitrary code.”   Yet even Mitchell finds himself unable to18
dispense altogether with some version of the trope: “a picture is normally ‘read’ in something like
the way we read an ungraduated thermometer.  Every mark, every modification, every curve or
welling of a line, every modification of texture or color is loaded with semantic potential.”   And19
art historians who are suspicious of the accuracy of the cognitive model that is implied by this trope,
like James Elkins, are constrained to concede that the ideal “of a perfect ‘notational system’—an
image that functions in a reasonable, rational way in its dealing with symbols and the world—is
behind the informal approaches we all take to works of visual art.”   According to Göran20
Hermerén’s succinct account, “there is good reason to be sceptical about analogies between art and
language.  But it is difficult to deny that there are certain general similarities.”   Indeed, Mitchell21
goes so far as to assert that the trope represents a “commonplace of modern studies of images,” an
assumption that pictures “must be understood as a kind of language.”22
The persistence and pervasiveness which characterize the metaphor of the legible image are
remarkable at least in part because the kinds of conceptual slippage that I have been discussing seem
to arise unbidden whenever the trope is marshaled as part of a discourse on the relationship between
Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 65.18
Ibid., 67.19
“What Really Happens in Pictures? Misreading with Nelson Goodman,” Word and Image 9, no. 4 (1993):20
349–62, 349.  Elkins has expressed his skepticism about the legibility of pictures elsewhere: “[. . .] I am concerned with
those places in pictures where the inevitable linguistic or semiotic model stops making sense, becomes counterintuitive,
or begins to contradict what is actually happening.”  On Pictures and the Words That Fail Them (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), xi.
Representation and Meaning in the Visual Arts: A Study in the Methodology of Iconography and21
Iconology, Lund Studies in Philosophy (Lund, Sweden: Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1969), 14.
Iconology, 8.22
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words and pictures.   Most prominent, however, is the simple fact that comparing the act of23
apprehending a visual image to the act of reading a verbal text tells us surprisingly little about how
we actually understand pictures.  “Pictures,” as Elkins explains in Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles?
On the Modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity, a central text for this chapter, “have no words, and
therefore they do not ‘say’ anything.”   Even if they can be imagined as constituting or containing24
symbols, those signs “don’t spell anything” and are therefore “fundamentally meaningless,” at least
in the limited sense that only languages can really convey meaning: “if they were not, they would
not be pictures—they would be texts” (WAOPP, 256).  Yet the idea of image as text has lost none
of its potency or currency; despite its obvious shortcomings, the metaphor remains sufficiently
compelling to support its continual use.
2. The Decipherment Model of Visual Hermeneutics: Decoding the Language of Images
If this fact resists explanation, the trope’s persistence may itself account for the prevalence
of another metaphor, an extension of the idea that pictures are legible: images must be translated,
even decoded, before they can yield up the secondary meanings or messages that lie hidden within
them.
The highly equivocal nature of the trope is likely associated with the some of difficulties which Mitchell23
has found to be implicit in the idea of a word/image binary, which “is not likely to be definitively stabilized by any single
pair of defining terms or any static binary oppositions.  ‘Word and image’ seems to be better understood as a dialectical
trope.  [. . .]  [I]t resists stabilization as a binary opposition, shifting and transforming itself from one conceptual level
to another, and shuttles between relations of contrariety and identity, difference and sameness.”  “Word and Image,” 53.
Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity (New York: Routledge,24
1999), 255.  All further citations to Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? (WAOPP) will appear as parenthetical references
in the main text and footnotes.
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Figure 10.  Leonardo da Vinci, The Adoration of the Magi
(unfinished), 1481.  La Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence.
Reproduced by permission of the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Cultural
Activities, and Tourism.  Duplication of this image without consent is prohibited.
As an example of the type of interpretation that I mean when I refer to this phenomenon, the
decipherment model of visual hermeneutics, consider the unfinished Adoration of the Magi (Figure
10), which has been explained by Lynn Pickett and Clive Prince as an instance of “the secret code
of Leonardo da Vinci.”   According to this view, the painting is only putatively—on the surface—a25
visual rendering of Matthew 2:1–11, a standard image from Christian iconography depicting the
The Templar Revelation: Secret Guardians of the True Identity of Christ (New York: Simon and Schuster,25
Touchstone, 1997), 23.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main text.
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arrival of gift-bearing eastern kings before the newborn Christ.  The first clue to the latent meaning
of the work is the upward-gesturing figure to the right of the Madonna, standing beneath what these
writers claim is a carob tree.  In Leonardo’s works, the painting’s interpreters assert, this gesture is
always associated with John the Baptist (27).  The second clue is the carob tree itself, which they
also take to be an attribute of John (28).  Finally, the group of worshipers behind the Madonna is
significant: “These are much healthier and more normal-looking [than those in the foreground]—but
if one follows their eyelines it is obvious that they are not looking at the Virgin and child at all, but
seem instead to be revering the roots of the carob tree” (27).  The authors take these features of the
painting to be evidence that Leonardo adhered to a heretical belief in the superiority of John the
Baptist to Christ.
Although this notion of images converts pictures into “a freakish kind of writing,” as G. E.
Lessing characterized allegorical painting,  there is a sense in which it is an inevitable consequence26
of the way we perceive artworks as objects of attention and study.  According to Richard Wollheim,
to perceive an image that is part of a differentiated surface—such as a painting on a canvas, a fresco
on a wall, or a photograph on a piece of glossy paper—is already to experience a form of double
vision which he calls “seeing-in”: “I am visually aware of the surface I look at, and I discern
something standing out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else.”  27
Moreover, seeing-in “appears to be biologically grounded” (114) and “precedes representation: it is
prior to it, logically and historically” (106).  However, it is important to note that Wollheim would
Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766), trans. William A. Steel (London: Dent,26
1930), 4.
“What the Spectator Sees,” in Bryson, Holly, and Moxey, Visual Theory, 101–50, 105.  Subsequent27
citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main text.  See also Mitchell, Iconology, 17 (“an
image cannot be seen as such without a paradoxical trick of consciousness, an ability to see something as ‘there’ and ‘not
there’ at the same time”).
163
probably not concede that the concept of seeing-in explains the decipherment model of visual
hermeneutics:
any information of which the spectator has need must be information that affects
what he sees when he looks at the picture: because it is only through what can be
seen when the picture is looked at that the picture carries meaning.  What is
invariably irrelevant is some rule or convention that takes us from what is perceptible
to some hidden meaning: in the way in which, say, a rule of language would. 
(144–45)
Of similar import is Erwin Panofsky’s argument that the notion of a work of art as a “man-
made object demanding to be experienced aesthetically” creates a distinction between the humanities
and the natural sciences.  Whereas the scientist “can at once proceed to analyze” a natural
phenomenon or an artifact, the humanist 
has to engage in a mental process of a synthetic and subjective character: he has
mentally to re-enact the actions and to re-create the creations.  [. . .]  For it is obvious
that historians of philosophy or sculpture are concerned with books and statues not
in so far as these books and statues exist materially, but in so far as they have a
meaning.  And it is equally obvious that this meaning can only be apprehended by re-
producing, and thereby, quite literally, “realizing,” the thoughts that are expressed in
the books and the artistic conceptions that manifest themselves in the statues.28
“Introduction: The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline” (1940), in Meaning in the Visual Arts:28
Papers in and on Art History (New York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1955), 1–25, 14.
164
In other words, because the work of art is the product of a human mind, it must be associated with
a human intentionality, if not an actual message.   And if the intent or meaning of the work is not29
immediately apparent on the work’s surface, then it must somehow be buried or even concealed
beneath that surface.  The viewer, therefore, is required to ascertain the latent semantic content of
the work by examining its patent surface features; that is, to decipher it.
A more eloquent statement of this idea comes from an unlikely source, Winston Churchill:
The canvas receives a message dispatched usually a few seconds before from the
natural object.  But it has come through a post office en route.  It has been
transmitted in code.  It has been turned from light into paint.  It reaches the canvas
a cryptogram.  Not until it has been placed in its correct relation to everything else
that is on the canvas can it be deciphered, is its meaning apparent, is it translated
once again from mere pigment into light.  And the light this time is not of Nature but
of Art.30
If we are delightedly taken aback to hear a figure like Churchill expound this theory, then is not
surprising at all that this view of art should be articulated by Panofsky, usually credited as an early
Of course, not all scholars would concur.  “It is a truism that many works of art are created in order to29
achieve something, and that they usually have effects on the beholders.  But this does not mean that the meaning of works
of art or of motifs in works of art can be defined (merely) in terms of intentions and effects.”  Hermerén, Representation
and Meaning, 18.
Quoted in E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (1960),30
Millennium ed., Bollingen Series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 39.  Gombrich himself uses both
the decoding metaphor and the metaphor of the legible image when he says, “I am not sure we are ever quite sufficiently
surprised at our capacity to read images, that is, to decipher the cryptograms of art.”  Ibid.
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leader in the modern study of iconology.   As Damisch characterizes both Panofsky’s practice and31
Cesare Ripa’s 1593 text Iconologia, they both insist “on dealing solely, to the exclusion of all others,
with such images as were meant to signify something different from what they offered to view,”32
which is simply another way of saying that iconology focuses on hidden meanings that must be
decoded.33
Like the idea that images are legible, the notion that artworks contain hidden meanings that
can or must be deciphered is far from being an isolated sentiment peculiar to iconologists.  It is
already nascent in Gregory’s claim that a picture can be a book for those who take the time to look
at the image carefully.  A casual viewing, he implies, is not sufficient; the text conveyed by (or
contained within) the image is not immediately manifest, but becomes apparent only with effort and
attention.
Moreover, this notion has long been a component of the popular imagination, and it can be
considered to be an example of a ludic impulse.   For example, Salvatore Settis uses a firsthand34
account of reactions to Guiliano de’ Medici’s banner for a 1475 jousting tournament in order to
illustrate the “taste for cryptic images” that was common during the Renaissance.  The observer
Panofsky defines “iconography” as “that branch of the history of art which concerns itself with the subject31
matter or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form.”  “Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study
of Renaissance Art” (1939), in Meaning in the Visual Arts, 26–54, 26.  “Iconology,” on the other hand, is concerned
“with the work of art as a symptom of something else [. . .] and we interpret its compositional and iconographical features
as more particularized evidence of this ‘something else.’  The discovery and interpretation of these ‘symbolical’ values
[. . .] is the object of what we may call ‘iconology’ as opposed to ‘iconography.’”  Ibid., 31.
“Semiotics and Iconography,” 239.32
According to Göran Hermerén, works like Ripa’s Iconologia “are a kind of code system with signs and33
labels for different ideas.”  Representation and Meaning, 15.
Of course, there is an argument that the desire to discern and to make concrete an image’s latent or hidden34
content is actually anti-ludic: it is, in those terms, an impulse against a playful multivalence or even a “free play” of
meaning.  I would beg to disagree with that argument, simply because a latent or hidden meaning is always already an
example of multivalence—the effort, in other words, is not necessarily to fix a single interpretation over against another
but rather to find a surplus of signification residing beyond a single surface meaning.
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“emphasized that his pleasure in admiring it was largely due to guessing its secret meaning,” and that
it became the subject of a lively and ludic discussion “more delightful than the pictures
themselves.”   The Renaissance image, according to Settis, is more than an object of aesthetic35
enjoyment: “it is also a stimulus to discussion of the very image it presents, which passes from the
picture to the eyes of the observer, to their various learned and ingenious interpretations, to the
hidden intentions devised by artist and patron, like an image in an elegant game of mirrors.”36
In the twentieth century, we can see this playful mind-set again in connection with the 1911
theft of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa from the Louvre.  Darian Leader’s account of the incident notes that
hundreds of letters to a Parisian newspaper offering opinions about the location of the stolen painting
gave essentially the same explanation: “the Mona Lisa had never left the Louvre but must have been
hidden behind some other painting in the collection.”   The popularity of this theory strikingly37
bespeaks the ludic power of the decipherment model of visual hermeneutics: if Leonardo’s
masterpiece—the archetype of canonical images—was stolen, then the crime could only have been
a prank or a TRICK involving concealment and disguise.
Noting the enthusiastic reception that greeted The Da Vinci Code’s release in 2003, Michael
Hall has boldly speculated that “this sort of search for meaning in an image draws on a natural,
Giorgione’s Tempest: Interpreting the Hidden Subject (1978), trans. Ellen Bianchini (Chicago: University35
of Chicago Press, 1990), 127.
Ibid.36
Stealing the Mona Lisa: What Art Stops Us from Seeing (London: Faber and Faber, 2002), 81.  According37
to Leader, “This strange congruence of voices demonstrates less a shared rationality than a belief that there must be
something ‘beyond’ the painted surface of a work of art.  In Freud’s terms, if the object we search for does not exist, we’ll
keep looking, and if a painting or a work of art can evoke for us the idea of something hidden, we will be even more
interested.”  Ibid.
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universal way of looking at pictures that art historians often underestimate or downplay.”   But if38
scholars dismiss this mode of understanding images when it is presented in popular literature, then
one can nonetheless fairly say that they practice a similar, and similarly ludic, method of visual
hermeneutics within the pages of their own books and journals.   Indeed, Elkins’ Why Are Our39
Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origins of Pictorial Complexity is probably the seminal (if not the
only sustained) examination of the widespread tendency by contemporary art historians and critics
to view images as complex semantic structures with meanings that must be teased out through an
intricate process of reasoning that resembles playful decryption or PUZZLE-solving.
Given the centrality of Elkins’ work to this case study, it is important to pause for a moment
in order to establish its connections to the realm of ludic theory in which this dissertation is itself
grounded.  Three elements of Elkins’ work lend themselves to being understood through the lens of
play.  First, Elkins defines his inquiry into the decipherment model of visual hermeneutics by
reference to the concept of excess (WAOPP, 1).  Readings of images in the disciplines of art history
and criticism tend to exhibit both “extensive and intensive writing,” the first characterized by the
length of critiques as well as their sheer mounting numbers, and the second by the minute levels of
“So Where Is the Holy Grail?,” Apollo 163, no. 531 (May 2006): 13.  See also Jerry Cullum, “Secrets of38
the Code: Do Dan Brown’s Readers Learn Something Real about Art?,” Art Papers 29, no. 3 (May–June 2005): 35 (The
Da Vinci Code “suggests that already existing buildings and works of art, some of them famous, are codes conveying
a specific message.  Once again, the public longs for implications deeper than those borne out by the text.”).  This zeal
for hidden meanings, as Cullum implies, is not limited to those which may reside in images: “believers in the Gospel of
the Hidden Meaning [. . .] have plenty of company.  The world is full, it sometimes seems, of people who think that what
writers do is encode secret messages, and what readers, therefore, should do is decipher them.”  Alan Jacobs, “The Code
Breakers,” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, no. 165 (August–September 2006): 14–17, 14. 
And, as anyone who has ever taught an introductory-level literature class knows all too well, this model of reading is so
resilient that one can easily despair of ever disabusing one’s undergraduates of the belief in the ubiquity of “hidden
meanings.”
Of course, some works of art either lend themselves to or tend to stimulate this method of interpretation39
more than others.  “A superficial acquaintance with the scholarly literature reveals that although [Hieronymus] Bosch’s
work has almost universally been acknowledged to be enigmatic, one author after another has approached it as if it were
a puzzle that needed solving or a code that should be broken.”  Keith Moxey, The Practice of Theory: Poststructuralism,
Cultural Politics, and Art History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 110.
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detail which scholars see in visual artifacts and the lengths to which they are willing to go in order
to explain those features of images (WAOPP, 27).  Elkins highlights such terms as complexity,
wildness, and intricacy as part of his argument that writing in his field often “attracts attention” to
itself (WAOPP, 46).  These dimensions of much scholarly work on imagery signal that the field is
operating in the hyperabundant mode associated with ludic minds in action.
Second, Elkins often frames his own investigation in the language of play, reflecting a
consciousness that the phenomenon that he describes is inextricably linked to ludology.  Asking, for
instance, “Why are our accounts of pictures intellectual games [. . .]?” (WAOPP, 50), he likens the
interpretation of visual images to puzzle-solving through a detailed examination of, among other
ludic items, double-sided jigsaw puzzles (WAOPP, 80–81).  Viewing, understanding, and writing
about an image, Elkins implies, is similar to the process of assembling arbitrarily distinct picture
components for the exclusive purposes of recreation.
Finally, in making the claim that “Virtually all contemporary art history [. . .] treats images
as if they were puzzles of some sort,” Elkins also speculates that there might be a fundamental
human “desire that drives us to willfully hallucinate the trappings of puzzles where there are none”
(WAOPP, 248).  This assertion is consistent with the work of ludologist Marcel Danesi, who posits
the existence of a puzzle instinct within human nature, an inborn tendency to look for or even crave
that which is mysterious or enigmatic.   If this claim is accurate, then this inherent human drive40
might be linked to the biologically grounded practice of  “seeing-in” that Wollheim describes.  41
The Puzzle Instinct: The Meaning of Puzzles in Human Life (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,40
2002).
“What the Spectator Sees,” 114.  See also Hall, “So Where Is the Holy Grail?,” 13.41
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As I explain in the next section, the questions that Elkins pursues in his book—“What makes
us behave this way?  Since a picture is an object that is manifestly whole and complete, why would
we want to experience it as if it were hiding something?” (WAOPP, 248)—are worth asking.
B.  SALIENCE
Studying Ludic Modes of Visual Interpretation in Popular Culture
Materials that might support an examination of these questions as they relate to popular culture—a
counterpart or companion to Elkins’ undertaking with regard to academic and scholarly
contexts—are so abundant that the absence of such a project is a striking feature of existing
scholarship.  Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code is only one example of the kinds of popular texts that
could be seriously examined in a study like Elkins’, a study that is long overdue.
Following in the wake of The Da Vinci Code, of course, are texts that directly or indirectly
seek to capitalize upon the commercial success of Brown’s novel.  As of June 2004, little more than
a year after its publication, The Da Vinci Code had already spawned more than twelve responsive
texts in the non-fiction category, and the shelves and tables of booksellers testify to the fact that
publishers did not stop there.   Some of these books (like The Da Vinci Hoax: Exposing the Errors42
in The Da Vinci Code ) offer to expose the errors or exaggerations in Brown’s best-seller;  others43 44
Darrell L. Bock, “Fact, Fiction, and The Da Vinci Code,” Human Events, June 7, 2004, 22.42
Carl E. Olson and Sandra Miesel, The Da Vinci Hoax: Exposing the Errors in The Da Vinci Code (San43
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004).
According to one author’s count, nearly sixty refutative works on The Da Vinci Code were published within44
three years of the novel’s initial release.  Eric Plumer, The Catholic Church and American Culture: Why the Claims of
Dan Brown Strike a Chord (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2009), viii.
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(like Secrets of the Code: The Unauthorized Guide to the Mysteries behind The Da Vinci Code )45
take a more sympathetic attitude toward their subject and attempt to support or supplement Brown’s
most marginal positions.   Less explicitly founded upon the success of The Da Vinci Code are46
dozens of fiction knockoffs, including Raymond Khoury’s The Last Templar, Neil Olson’s The Icon,
Steve Berry’s The Templar Legacy, Jim Hougan’s The Magdalen Cipher, and Gregg Loomis’ The
Pegasus Secret, all of which to a greater or lesser extent involve the interpretation of arcane symbols
in objects of art or religious artifacts.   Finally, at least two popular art guides, so-called “coffee-47
table books,” have been marketed specifically in order to appeal to readers who enjoy The Da Vinci
Code and similar works.  Book-jacket copy for one of these works explains that “a knowledge of the
meaning of symbols was indeed often truly perilous in times past, for the visual codes that made up
the vocabulary of sacred or esoteric languages were born of desperate necessity, being developed as
a way of communicating covertly with fellow persecuted initiates.”   An exhortation to prospective48
readers—“Discover how to spot, and then decipher, all manner of hidden clues” —invites them into49
this dangerous but exciting world by appealing to their understanding of the same model of visual
Dan Burstein, ed., Secrets of the Code: The Unauthorized Guide to the Mysteries behind The Da Vinci45
Code (Durham, NC: CDS Books, 2004)
For a comprehensive summary, classification, and analysis of these responsive texts, see Rachel Wagner,46
“The ‘Scholar’s Code’: Biblical Interpretation, Postmodernism, and The Da Vinci Code,” in The Da Vinci Code in the
Academy, ed. Bradley Bowers (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 31–47. 
Raymond Khoury, The Last Templar (New York: Signet Books, 2006); Neil Olson, The Icon (New York:47
HarperCollins Publishers, 2005); Steve Berry, The Templar Legacy (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007); Jim Hougan,
The Magdalen Cipher (New York: Avon Books / HarperCollins Publishers, 2006); and Gregg Loomis, The Pegasus
Secret (New York: Leisure Books, 2005).
Clare Gibson, The Hidden Life of Art: Secrets and Symbols in Great Masterpieces (Glasgow: Saraband,48
2006), inside front dust jacket.  See also Figure 7.
Ibid.49
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hermeneutics on which The Da Vinci Code is based.  A similar work uses the same marketing
strategy: 
We may never know what the Mona Lisa is smiling about, but we do know
that there’s more to the masterpieces of Renaissance art than the beauty that meets
the eye.  There are layers of significance below the surface [. . .] a store of secrets
even more fascinating than fiction.  This magnificently illustrated guide by an expert
art historian gives you the key to unlock those secrets for yourself.50
Although The Da Vinci Code is never explicitly mentioned, this dust-jacket copy is clearly calculated
to appeal to the novel’s fans and readers.
But The Da Vinci Code itself is only an entry in a pre-existing subgenre of detective fiction
in which works of art, real or invented, serve as clues to a mystery or as sources of concealed
information.  Examples of such texts include Peter Ackroyd’s Chatterton; Peter Watson’s Landscape
of Lies; Arturo Pérez-Reverte’s The Flanders Panel; Lewis Purdue’s The Da Vinci Legacy and
Daughter of God; and a series of seven interrelated novels by Iain Pears: The Rafael Affair, The
Titian Committee, The Bernini Bust, The Last Judgement, Giotto’s Hand, Death and Restoration,
Richard Stemp, The Secret Language of the Renaissance: Decoding the Hidden Symbolism of Italian Art50
(London: Duncan Baird Publishers, 2006), inside front dust jacket.  I have been unable to confirm the claim that Richard
Stemp is “an expert art historian”; his only published contribution to the discipline seems to be this very book.  Patrick
de Rynck, on the other hand, has a more substantial record in the field, and his contribution to the popular art guide genre
contains some similarities to those by Gibson and Stemp.  In a discussion of Jan van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait, de Rynck
explains that, “In spite of their naturalism and exceptional detail, Van Eyck’s works also contain numerous symbols and
clues as to how they should be interpreted on a deeper level.”  How to Read a Painting: Lessons from the Old Masters,
trans. Ted Alkins and Elise Reynolds (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2004), 28.  Yet despite this rhetoric of cryptography,
de Rynck’s treatment of Andrea Mantegna’s The Martyrdom of St. Sebastian makes no mention of the horse and rider
concealed in a cloud in the upper-left corner of the painting.  de Rynck, How to Read a Painting, 64–65.  See also Figure
22.
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and The Immaculate Deception.   The wide variety of texts in this list is significant.  Peter Ackroyd,51
for example, is an author whose works are routinely discussed in academic journals and assigned in
upper-level college literature courses without controversy.  Lewis Purdue is not.  The relative quality
of the prose and the apparent depth of thought in their respective novels provide a ready explanation
for this difference.  Iain Pears is an art historian as well as a popular novelist; Arturo Pérez-Reverte
has, as far as I am aware, no specialized knowledge or training in art history or criticism.  One would
naturally expect the two writers to take rather different approaches to the works of art that they treat
in their novels, and one would be correct to do so: Pears’ novels have a sophistication with regard
to this subject matter that Pérez-Reverte’s The Flanders Panel (although carefully researched and
finely written) does not.  The point is that these works register at a wide range of different points on
the hypothetical continuum between high culture’s literature and serious scholarship on one end and
popular culture’s pulp novels and pseudo-scholarly,  sensationalist non-fiction on the other.  At least
for the purposes of understanding the dynamics of the decoding trope in the popular imagination, the
latter can be taken just as seriously as the former even though its substantive and stylistic value may
be a matter of question.
Peter Ackroyd, Chatterton (New York: Grove Press, 1987); Peter Watson, Landscape of Lies (New York:51
Atheneum, 1989); Arturo Pérez-Reverte, The Flanders Panel, trans. Margaret Jull Costa (New York: Harcourt Brace,
1990); Lewis Purdue, The Da Vinci Legacy (1983) (New York: Tor Books, 2004); Lewis Purdue, Daughter of God (New
York: Forge, 2000); Iain Pears, The Rafael Affair (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990); Iain Pears, The Titian
Committee (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991); Iain Pears, The Bernini Bust (New York: Harcourt Brace,
1992); Iain Pears, The Last Judgement (London: Victor Gallancz, 1993); Iain Pears, Giotto’s Hand (New York: G. K.
Hall, 1994); Iain Pears, Death and Restoration (New York: Scribner, 1996); and Iain Pears, The Immaculate Deception
(New York: Scribner, 2000).
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In addition to novels, several works of popular non-fiction, such as Holy Blood, Holy Grail
and Key to the Sacred Pattern: The Untold Story of Rennes-le-Château,  include analyses of52
artworks that operate according to the same decoding metaphor on which Brown relied in The Da
Vinci Code.  Of course, this is no coincidence, for Brown has recognized these texts as important
sources for his own work.  In fact, two of the three authors of Holy Blood, Holy Grail, Michael
Baigent and Richard Leigh, sued Brown for damages under the theory that The Da Vinci Code was
merely a novelized version of their own work.  They were unsuccessful at least in part because their
book’s claim to be non-fiction (i.e., historical fact) rendered its subject matter fair game for
novelization—history is not subject to private ownership via copyright.   Lewis Purdue sued Brown53
for copyright infringement based on the claim that The Da Vinci Code reworked themes, stories, and
characters originally presented in Daughter of God and The Da Vinci Legacy.  His suit also ended
in a victory for Brown.54
Rounding out the list of popular non-fiction that relied on the legible image trope and the
decipherment model of visual hermeneutics before Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code is a sequence
of books by Wilson Bryan Key—Subliminal Seduction: Ad Media’s Manipulation of a Not So
Innocent America, Media Sexploitation, and The Clam-Plate Orgy: And Other Subliminals the
Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh, and Henry Lincoln, Holy Blood, Holy Grail (New York: Delacorte Press,52
1982); and Henry Lincoln, Key to the Sacred Pattern: The Untold Story of Rennes-le-Château (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998).
See generally Victoria Nelson, “Faux Catholic: A Gothic Subgenre from Monk Lewis to Dan Brown,”53
boundary 2 34, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 87–107, 96, 99.  For more commentary on the connections between the two works,
see Thomas Regnier, “The Last Supper and the ‘da Vinci Code’ Frenzy,” Queen’s Quarterly 113, no. 2 (Summer 2006):
178–79.
See Seth Mnookin, “The Da Vinci Clone?,” Vanity Fair, July 2006, 100–102.  Victoria Nelson notes archly54
that the authors of Holy Blood, Holy Grail never sued Purdue, implying that the reason was the relative lack of
commercial success for Daughter of God.  “Faux Catholic,” 96.
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Media Use to Manipulate Your Behavior —that finds words and images concealed in television and55
print advertisements as well as in consumer products themselves.  As is often the case in the works
that I have been describing, Key presents these hidden images and words as nefariously threatening;
they mark traces of conspiracy, and they are tools through which the corporate and political domains
attempt to manipulate or control the general public’s actions.
Methodologically these pre-Brown texts are more interesting than those released after The
Da Vinci Code, texts which may well have more to do with that novel’s commercial success than
with the persistence of the trope of the legible image and the decipherment model of visual
hermeneutics themselves.  The Da Vinci Code itself is less significant than the approach to artistic
imagery that it is part of its premise.
The absence of any sustained and serious treatment of the decoding metaphor in popular
culture is therefore not attributable to a shortage of sources to examine.  Rather, it may be due to the
tendency of most authorities either to ridicule these works or to dismiss them altogether.   The Da56
Vinci Code has drawn the exasperated ire of art critics and museum curators,  not to mention the57
Roman Catholic Church and other religious organizations,  and Holy Blood, Holy Grail has been58
Subliminal Seduction: Ad Media’s Manipulation of a Not So Innocent America (New York: Signet, 1974);55
Media Sexploitation (New York: Signet, 1977); and The Clam-Plate Orgy: And Other Subliminals the Media Use to
Manipulate Your Behavior (New York: Signet, 1981).  Notice that the titles of these texts become progressively more
outré and provocative as Key’s career progresses; the tone of the books evolves in this direction as well, with Key
sounding ever more hysterical in his quest to be believed.
According to Ivanovitch, studies of The Da Vinci Code have in common the position that the novel56
“contains unforgivable errors, of technique as well as fact, and whatever the paradigm adopted, all commentaries come
to resemble lists of howlers.”  “Dan Brown,” 308.
See Hall, “So Where Is the Holy Grail?,” 13.57
See Gregory Alan Thornbury, “The Da Vinci Code Distraction,” American Spectator 39, no. 658
(July–August 2006): 20–25.
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characterized by Eileen Harris as “a best-selling masterpiece of mumbo-jumbo.”   Jerry Cullum,59
who refers to Brown’s “interpretive illiteracy,” is actually among the more measured and judicious
of the novel’s critics, because he at least acknowledges that The Da Vinci Code’s perceived
shortcomings warrant “more than passing interest.”   However, referencing Elkins’ 2004 book, On60
the Strange Place of Religion in Contemporary Art, even Cullum sees Brown as an important figure
only insofar as Elkins demonstrates that “emerging American artists are equally uncomprehending
of the many functions of religious symbols” (37).  With palpable disappointment, he notes that “Dan
Brown represents the presuppositions of most Americans” and sees the fact of renewed public
interest in art arising from the success of The Da Vinci Code as an opportunity to educate (or reform)
its readers (36).
What Cullum gets right, however, is sufficient to demonstrate why the balance of his
presentation is wrong.  The popularity of The Da Vinci Code and similar works does indeed provide
insight about the public’s values, beliefs, and assumptions vis-à-vis artworks, images more generally,
and the manner in which images can or should be interpreted.  And the evidence suggests that the
public’s understanding of images has been remarkably consistent for several centuries, at least, with
regard to the expectation not only that images are legible but also that this legibility must attend an
act of decipherment.  Entirely apart from the normative question of whether these values and beliefs
are correct or incorrect, sophisticated or naive, the fact that those values and beliefs govern most of
our responses to and interactions with images is of independent relevance.
“The Key to the Shepherd’s Monument at Shugborough: Cracking the Poussin Code,” Apollo 163, no. 53159
(May 2006): 26–31, 26.
Cullum, “Secrets of the Code,” 37.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical60
references in the main text.
176
Because both words and images are human constructions, the relationship between the two
is a contingent rather than an intrinsic one.  That is to say, word and image as products of the human
imagination can only be said to have a relationship to the extent that such a relationship is itself
created and perceived within the lived experience of those who encounter or create verbal and visual
texts.  Although a metaphysics of word and image is conceivable, a genuine understanding of word
and image that does not somehow account for popular tastes and practices is not.  Moreover, the
growing significance of images in public discourse in our media-saturated, globalized culture makes
an empirically accurate foundation for the study of discourse an essential precondition to any
normative or prescriptive critique of discourse.  Mitchell says that “instead of providing a transparent
window on the world, images are now regarded [in academic circles] as the sort of sign that presents
a deceptive appearance of naturalness and transparence concealing an opaque, distorting, arbitrary
mechanism of representation, a process of ideological mystification.”   If, as Goodman declares,61
“Nothing is seen nakedly or naked,”  then an account of how we see must precede an analysis of62
what we see.
These arguments for a serious examination of popular culture texts in which the decoding
trope is operative assume the validity of objections to those texts based upon their perceived lack of
merit from art historical or literary critical perspectives.  However, we need not concede this field
because these texts have more in common with orthodox scholarship than they have usually been
given credit for.  This is the first of three reasons why a detailed study of contemporary popular
approaches to image analysis might be valuable.
Iconology, 8.61
Languages of Art, 8.62
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1. “Paranoiac-Critical Interpretation”: Not Just Marginalized Voices
Wild, exorbitant interpretations of visual discourses are not the sole province of conspiracy
theorists, as authors who decode works of art in popular non-fiction are sometimes characterized. 
Three examples involving Nicolas Poussin’s The Arcadian Shepherds (Figure 11) will demonstrate
that the boundaries between popular-culture crackpot and serious scholar, between paranoid attention
to minutiae and sophisticated attention to detail, can be difficult to define.
Figure 11.  Nicolas Poussin, The Arcadian Shepherds, 1637.  The
Louvre, Paris.
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Poussin himself adopts the trope of the legible image when encouraging a patron to “Read
the story and the painting in order to see how each thing is proper to its subject.”   And art historians63
have taken Poussin up on that invitation by writing profusely about The Arcadian Shepherds, one
of the most commonly analyzed works in the canon of French Renaissance images.   Mainstream64
art critics who consider the painting typically concern themselves with such issues as the relationship
between the foregrounded figures and the pastoral landscape beyond; the significance of the
inscription on the tomb and whether it renders the image into a kind of memento mori, a reminder
that death dwells even in paradise; and more abstruse and perhaps unanswerable questions like the
identity of the entombed person, the nature of the shepherds’ activities before they discovered the
tomb with its inscription, and whether the painting depicts a scene at dusk or at dawn.  Other
commentators, however, go much further in their inquiries.
Quoted in Rachel Cohen, “Looking at Poussin,” review of Poussin and Nature: Arcadian Visions, an63
exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, Threepenny Review, no. 114 (Summer 2008): 30–31, 30.
For the early critical history of the piece, see Richard Verdi, “On the Critical Fortunes—and64
Misfortunes—of Poussin’s ‘Arcadia,’” Burlington Magazine 121, no. 911 (February 1979): 94–107.  For brief accounts
of more recent interpretations, see David Carrier, Poussin’s Paintings: A Study in Art-Historical Methodology
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 168–74; and T. J. Clark, The Sight of Death: An
Experiment in Art Writing (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 93–97.
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Figure 12.  Figure from
Richard Andrews and Paul
Schellenberger, The Tomb of
God: The Body of Jesus and
the Solution to a 2,000-Year-
Old Mystery (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1996), 194.
Figure 13.  Figure from
Richard Andrews and Paul
Schellenberger, The Tomb of
God: The Body of Jesus and
the Solution to a 2,000-Year-
Old Mystery (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1996), 145.
At one extreme, we have something like a case of what Salvador Dalí called “paranoiac-
critical interpretation” (WAOPP, 223).  Richard Andrews and Paul Schellenberger look so closely
for signs of sacred geometry within Poussin’s painting—signs that they characterize as “quite
clear” —that the work itself is effaced by arbitrary shapes and lines that intersect at apparently65
insignificant angles (Figure 12).  The fact that shapes like squares are canted rather than parallel with
the outlines of the work is not taken as evidence that those shapes are fabulations but rather that the
The Tomb of God: The Body of Jesus and the Solution to a 2,000-Year-Old Mystery (Boston: Little, Brown,65
1996), 111.
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angles of deviation themselves possess special significance.  And in their approach to another
Poussin work on the same theme, shapes that are not even geometrically regular supply Andrews and
Schellenberger with a 1½° angle that they contend is an intentional deviation from rectilinearity
crucial for identifying the precise location where the remains of Jesus Christ have been secretly
deposited and preserved (Figure 13).
Henry Lincoln, a co-author of Holy Blood, Holy Grail, has written an account of the
investigation and research that preceded and ultimately culminated in that 1982 best-seller.  While
examining an x-ray of Poussin’s The Arcadian Shepherds, Lincoln noticed that “the staff held by the
right-hand shepherd is overpainted by the roof of the tomb,” a fact which implied to him “that the
staff was painted first.  Poussin appears to have worked backward from the foreground
details—which seems an odd procedure.  He has apparently fixed the placing of the staff before
completing the painting of the tomb and the shepherd’s head.”   “Time and time again,” Lincoln66
says, “I have returned unavailing to this problem.  But I am learning ‘not only to look, but to see’”
(108).  By attempting to make the simplest statement he can about the shepherd’s staff—“If one sets
out on a hunt for complexities, then those very complexities may obscure a simplicity which is
crying out for attention” (108)—he notices that the staff is cut precisely in half by the shepherd’s
arm, a discovery that sends him searching for other potentially significant geometrical anomalies or
mathematical ratios in the painting.  Working with Christopher Cornford, later the Dean of the Royal
College of Art, Lincoln obtained a detailed analysis of the painting’s geometry (Figure 14). 
According to Cornford, Renaissance artists like Poussin often constructed their works on the basis
of number systems that were considered “a kind of invocation of the divine, inasmuch as the building
Key to the Sacred Pattern: The Untold Story of Rennes-le-Château (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998),66
70.  Subsequent citations in this paragraph appear as parenthetical references in the main text.
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or painting became a microcosmic rehearsal of the primal act of creation” (109–10).  Although not
drawing more specific conclusions, Cornford determined that Poussin’s The Arcadian Shepherds
was clearly constructed around a pentagonal geometry, based on the painting’s format: “The
dimensions are [. . .] 120cm x 87cm = 1:1.3793—a discrepancy of only .0033% [. . .] from the
rectangle 1:1.376, which has a very particular and strong relationship with the regular pentagon”
(110).  Based in part on Cornford’s analysis, Lincoln advances the hypothesis that the units of
English length measurement (like the foot, yard, rod, and mile) might have originally been derived
from the geometry of locations considered to be sacred by ancient Europeans, including the site near
Rennes-le-Château that Lincoln believes is memorialized in Poussin’s painting.  Even though this
theory could fairly be considered just as speculative, and likely as false, as that advanced in Andrews
and Schellenberger’s The Tomb of God, the two main differences are that Lincoln never characterizes
his conclusions as historically demonstrable fact and that some of the evidence for those conclusions
bears the imprimatur of a member of the art historical and critical establishment.  The basic strategy
behind the two works—an effort to decode The Arcadian Shepherds by ascertaining the painting’s
latent geometrical structure—is the same.67
One art historian and critic, in the course of providing an analysis based on just such a set of geometrical67
structures within a painting, bemoans the fact that “geometrical lines are anathema” to most scholars in the discipline. 
John North, The Ambassadors’ Secret: Holbein and the World of the Renaissance (London: Hambledon and London,
2002), 73.  For a detailed defense of this methodology and some of the more prominent objections to it, see ibid., 73–78.
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Figure 14.  Figure from Henry Lincoln, Key to the Sacred Pattern:
The Untold Story of Rennes-le-Château (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998), 111.
Reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.  This material may not be
copied or reproduced without permission from Palgrave Macmillan.
A third reading of the painting appears in some respects to share more in common with
Andrews and Schellenberger’s than Lincoln’s.  According to this interpretation, it is significant that
the kneeling shepherd points to the letter R in the inscription ET IN ARCADIA EGO because Cardinal
Guilio Rospigliosi was the patron who commissioned The Arcadian Shepherds and also the inventor
of the phrase used in the inscription.  Similarly, the standing shepherd directs the viewer’s eye not
only to the word EGO but also to a crack in the face of the tomb which splits the word in two.
That “pun,” right in the center of the painting, indicates what is at stake in it: a gap
between two gestures, between the initial of the name of the Father (of the motto and
the painting) and the splitting of the writing-painting Ego, the ego of the
representation of Death in Arcadia; a scission of the absent name of the painter, who
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nevertheless has made the painting and who signifies that he too is in Arcadia, but
as one absent from that blissful place which is nothing else than the painting itself.
One could argue that, although at least one respected scholar agrees that the phrase “Et in
Arcadia ego” can be appropriately ascribed to Rospigliosi, the ancient and extensive elegiac tradition
from which both the painting and the phrase emerge renders that question too far from being settled
to support this particular reading of the painting.   Moreover, it is possible to claim that this reading68
places far too much weight on the exact positions of the shepherds’ fingers to be credible; given the
fact that the painting depicts an inscription which is being indicated by the two figures, their fingers
will inevitably intersect with some portion of that text, and an arcane significance could be attributed
any part of the inscription that happened to line up with the pointing gestures.
One could advance these claims—and one would probably do so if this interpretation were
part of the argument in The Tomb of God or in Key to the Sacred Pattern—but because this is Louis
Marin’s reading of The Arcadian Shepherds from a seminal essay on that painting,  we choose69
rather to admire his ingenuity.  Of course, Marin’s own rhetoric facilitates our reaction in this regard:
he concedes that he does not offer his reading as a “conclusive explanation; it will be only a step
further into the indeterminable area which is ultimately the contemplative reading of a painting—that
area between proving and dreaming, vision and fantasy, analysis and projection, that Poussin calls
delectation.”   But if this serves to distinguish Marin’s interpretation from that of Andrews and70
Schellenberger, it only makes more problematic the relationship between Marin and Lincoln, who
See Erwin Panofsky, “Et in Arcadia Ego: Poussin and the Elegiac Tradition” (1936), in Meaning in the68
Visual Arts, 295–320.
“Toward a Theory of Reading in the Visual Arts: Poussin’s The Arcadian Shepherds,” (1980), in The69
Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience Interpretation, ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1980), 293–324.  For the block quotation in the previous paragraph, see ibid., 323.
Ibid.70
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also takes pains to characterize his findings as hypothetical rather than conclusive and whose theory
is, frankly, more credible and better supported than Marin’s.  In fact, Elkins asserts that Marin’s To
Destroy Painting, in which his essay on Poussin’s painting was originally published, “has a
Doppelgänger, a wild shadow-text that mocks it even without knowing of its existence: [. . .] Holy
Blood, Holy Grail” (WAOPP, 231).  “In both,” Elkins explains, “there is an insistent—at times,
overwhelming—sense that the painting must be legible, and in both the kind of legibility turns out
to be extremely dense, infolded with half-revealed meanings [. . .].  The desire to understand, and
the magnetic pull of complexity, are identical in both works” (WAOPP, 232).71
These similarities are not isolated occurrences.  Salvatore Settis, who has offered a
decipherment and reading of Giorgione’s The Tempest (c. 1507), has coined the term indulgent
iconography to describe exorbitant interpretations by established art historians and critics.   Carlo72
Ginzburg, a scholar whose work has led one observer to describe him as a detective,  complains that73
“any odd conjecture may be permissible” in contemporary art historical writing, and cautions against
approaches in which “The work itself ends up [. . .] by becoming a pretext for a series of free
associations.”   And, of course, the supply of bizarre readings of artworks by scholars and academics74
Elkins’ of-the-cuff suggestion that Holy Blood, Holy Grail unknowingly mocks To Destroy Painting has71
a more serious echo in at least one response to Brown’s The Da Vinci Code: “Perhaps the irritation that the book
provokes in so many scholars is partly a recognition that there is a joke there somewhere, and that it strikes
uncomfortably close to home?”  Hall, “So Where Is the Holy Grail?,” 13.
Giorgione’s Tempest, 55.72
Peter Burke, “Introduction: Carlo Ginzburg, Detective,” in The Enigma of Piero: Piero della Francesca,73
by Carlo Ginzburg (1994), trans. Martin Ryle and Kate Soper (London: Verso, 2000), xii–xviii.
Ginzburg, preface to The Enigma of Piero, xxv.74
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is sufficiently large to support Elkins’ book-length treatment of the subject.   As a consequence, the75
works of more marginalized voices outside the community of scholars and critics merit serious study
and reflection.
2. Hidden Images: Renaissance Anamorphoses and Other Playful Paintings
A second reason for according serious and respectful treatment to these voices is that their
approach of looking for hidden meanings in images is not self-evidently suspect in light of the
existence of artworks that contain concealed information.  Elkins considers three major ways in
which contemporary art historians respond to pictures: seeing images as puzzles (Settis’ reading of
Giorgione’s The Tempest falls into this category), searching for ambiguities within pictures (the
proliferating interpretations of Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel ceiling [1508–12] are his paradigm
case), and what he designates as the “wildest” of the three, “the purposive and sometimes
uncontrolled use of what used to be known as fantasia and is now generally called hallucination,”
including the search for hidden objects within images (WAOPP, 13).  Because encryption is
etymologically a process of hiding or concealing, this response to images is particularly relevant to
the decipherment model of visual hermeneutics.  The act of searching for hidden images in a picture,
however, need not be considered fantastic or paranoid.  It can instead be explained as a rational
Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? contains abundant descriptions of interpretative frenzy on the part of art75
historians and critics.  Of particular relevance here is Elkins’ detailed analysis of Birger Carlström’s Hide-and-Seek
(1989).  Carlström identifies hidden words and symbols in works by Renoir and argues that they encode the artist’s
political positions regarding the Suez and Panama Canals (WAOPP, 1–11).  Yet Elkins is able to conclude—with utter
sincerity—that Carlström “fits right in” with trends of art historical scholarship in the late-twentieth century (WAOPP,
9).
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response to the fact that many pictures, particularly those produced during the Renaissance, actually
do contain hidden images; they are works that affirmatively require acts of decipherment.76
With La practica della perspettiva (1559), Daniele Barbaro gave Renaissance artists a guide
for creating a particular kind of hidden image, an anamorphic projection in which the technique of
linear perspective is used to create a picture that is only comprehensible from a single viewing
position, typically requiring the viewer’s line of sight to approach the work from an oblique angle
very close to the image, or a picture that manifests two distinct images, one being apparent from one
angle and another emerging when the viewer’s line of sight changes.  These images can be typed as
PUZZLES.   There is, of course, a sense in which any work of visual art may be considered ludic or77
playful,  but anamorphoses seem to fall especially clearly into that category.  Mid-seventeenth-78
century publishers, for instance, produced dozens of popular recreational guides that nearly always
included anamorphic images.   Consider as an example Jean Leurechon’s 1624 French treatise of79
mathematical games that later crossed the Channel to be translated into English.   Leurechon80
provides detailed instructions for how to construct a kind of camera obscura that could be used to
generate distorted images, presumably because the exercise of tracing those images might be
See, for example, Dieter Jung, “Holographic Space: A Historical View and Some Personal Experiences,”76
in “Holography as an Art Medium,” ed. Louis M. Brill, special double issue, Leonardo 22, no. 3–4 (1989): 331–36, 332
(anamorphoses “can only be decoded by the viewer at a certain viewing angle”).
See Danesi, Puzzle Instinct, 73–74; and Frances Terpak, “Anamorphosis,” in Devices of Wonder: From77
the World in a Box to Images on a Screen, by Barbara Maria Stafford and Frances Terpak (Los Angeles: Getty Research
Institute, 2001), 235–48, 235 (calling anamorphic images “visual puzzles”).
See Leon Rosenstein, “The Ontological Integrity of the Art Object from the Ludic Viewpoint,” Journal78
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34, no. 3 (Spring 1976): 323–36.
Jen E. Boyle, Anamorphosis in Early Modern Literature: Mediation and Affect, Literary and Scientific79
Cultures of Early Modernity (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 15.
Jean Leurechon, Mathematicall Recreations (London: William Leake, 1653).  On this text and others like80
it, see generally Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Cultures (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 104–105.
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intrinsically fun or entertaining for readers.   Manuals such as his thus featured “virtual play” and81
were sometimes described as games of cunning.82
Figure 15.  Emmanuel Maignan, Untitled Anamorphic Fresco of St.
Francis di Paola, 1642 (frontal view).  Santa Trinità dei Monti, Rome.
Photograph copyright © Mauro Coen.  Used by kind permission.
Barbaro’s second type of anamorphic projection is best illustrated by Emmanuel Maignan’s
1642 fresco in a corridor of the Santa Trinità dei Monti monastery in Rome (Figure 15), the largest
documented anamorphosis in existence.   When the viewer stands facing the fresco, it assumes the83
character of a landscape with a low grassy field in the foreground, a placid bay on which ships are
sailing in the middle, and a threatening swirl of turbulent clouds in the background.  But when seen
at an oblique angle from the entrance to the corridor, the clouds collapse into the face and arms of
St. Francis di Paola at prayer, and the bay and field coalesce into his robes (Figure 16).  To be sure,
this kind of image-making is less concerned with maintaining concealment than it is with revealing
See Leurechon, Mathematicall Recreations, 141–46.81
Boyle, Anamorphosis, 22–23.82
Brigitte Burgmer, “Studies on Holographic Anamorphoses: 500 Years Later,” in Brill, “Holography as an83
Art Medium,” 379–82, 379.
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its own secret; the point of the fresco is for both of its constituent images to be seen and
appreciated.   Yet the idea of mystery is still very much in play.  Maignan himself—a Minim monk,84
professor of mathematics, and noted theologian —compared the visual deception that takes place85
in ordinary perspective painting “to the way our senses are ‘deceived’ in the mystery of
transubstantiation . . . ,”  and Barbaro’s philosophy of anamorphosis stressed the technique’s status86
as a “beautiful and ‘secret’ part of perspective.”   These remarks point to a way in which87
anamorphic images were profoundly relevant to matters of faith.   Particularly for Roman Catholic88
believers, the instance of this kind of anamorphic image, in which two pictures subsist as one, might
well have evoked the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the physical materials of the Eucharist
were co-present with Christ’s body.   For Christians more broadly, anamorphoses like Maignan’s89
could have served as reminders of Christ’s paradoxically dual and therefore anamorphic nature: He
was at once fully human yet fully Divine.
On the similar subject of trompe l’oeil paintings, Michael Leja notes that the images “cannot conceal their84
status as painted illusions, nor do they try.”  “Trompe l’oeil Painting and the Deceived Viewer,” in Presence: The
Inherence of the Prototype within Images and Other Objects, ed. Robert Maniura and Rupert Shepherd, Histories of
Vision (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 173–90, 176.  Instead, “the paintings introduce themselves as good-
natured efforts to deceive, all the while acknowledging that they cannot trick a reasonably sober spectator with binocular
vision.”  Ibid., 177.  This dynamic registers at high points on both the methexis and telos axes, suggesting that it could
form the basis of a GAME/PUZZLE hybrid typology for anamorphic images.
See Terpak, “Anamorphosis,” 237–39.85
Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Anamorphic Art (1969), trans. W. J. Strachan (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1977),86
69.
Ibid., 30.87
Terpak, “Anamorphosis,” 237 (“Anamorphosis carried spiritual and symbolic overtones for other makers88
and audiences as well”).
See ibid., 239 (Maignan’s anamorphosis “would have accorded well with the tenets of the Catholic Church. 89
Faith is hedged in by mystery, doubleness, and fleeting glimpses of the truth”).
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Figure 16.  Emmanuel Maignan, Untitled Anamorphic Fresco of St.
Francis di Paola, 1642 (lateral view).  Santa Trinità dei Monti, Rome.
Photograph copyright © Mauro Coen.  Used by kind permission.
In the English tradition of anamorphosis, Hans Holbein the Younger’s 1533 painting The
French Ambassadors (Figure 17) is the most familiar example of the type of anamorphic projection
that conceals an image by making it visible only from a single point of view.  Although the blurry
foreground object is not itself hidden, it only becomes visible as a human skull—a memento mori
to complement the symbols of worldly success arrayed between the central figures—when viewed
from an extremely oblique angle.  Less familiar, however, is the hidden crucifix which is barely
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visible in the upper-left corner of the piece, behind the parted curtain which serves as the painting’s
backdrop.90
Figure 17.  Hans Holbein the Younger, The French Ambassadors,
1533.  The National Gallery, London.
Photograph copyright © The National Gallery, London.
The image is therefore at a deep and fundamental level about the problems associated with
seeing and visibility, which is precisely why it might have attracted so much commentary.  Two
Leader interprets the crucifix as a dialectical companion to the anamorphic skull, the latter suggesting death90
and the former signifying salvation and eternal life, and also suggests that it “indicates the function of the painting itself:
the relation of the curtain to the crucifix is parallel to that of the painted surface and what lies beyond.  Holbein’s picture
thus emphasizes the screen-like quality of the visual image.”  Stealing the Mona Lisa, 136–37.
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especially provocative readings of The French Ambassadors warrant mention, for both fall within
the class of interpretations that Elkins explores in such detail in Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? 
Hagi Kenaan starts from the proposition that The French Ambassadors is a work that seems to cry
out for a figurative interpretation, its enigmatic features and character leaving us unsatisfied with an
explanation of the painting that remains at the literal level.   Because it “is a painting that hides by91
showing” (68), Kenaan explores the potential secrets that lie within plain sight in the image,
concluding that the relationship between the two pictured ambassadors was an “intimate” one “of
a kind that could not be openly expressed” (71).  More extravagant is John North’s book-length
treatment of the painting, The Ambassadors’ Secret.  As Andrews and Schellenberger and as Lincoln
do with Poussin’s The Arcadian Shepherds, North attempts to deduce The French Ambassadors’
latent geometric structure, and he credibly discovers many hexagonal patterns, including a Star of
David, in the image.  But North’s reading is simultaneously more sustained and more intense,
including a close analysis of every object depicted in the work, some of which prove to disclose
surprising levels of detail and fodder for interpretation, and an explanation of the painting’s allusions
to figures as diverse as Geoffrey Chaucer, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Hrabanus Maurus.  Yet,
despite the fact that North adopts an interpretive strategy that can fairly be considered ludic, despite
his acknowledgment that the skull can be understood as a punning artist’s signature (“hohles Bein”
in German means “hollow bone”),  and despite his conclusion that the accoutrements of92
Renaissance humanism featured in the painting are “introduced in ways that were highly
“The ‘Unusual Character’ of Holbein’s Ambassadors,” Artibus et Historiae 23, no. 46 (2002): 61–75, 61. 91
Indeed, surveying the history of critical commentary on the image, Kenaan concludes that it “unavoidably inflames one’s
desire to understand it.”  Ibid., 63.  This is a striking reminder of the principle that there might be an innate human desire
to understand and decipher puzzles.  Danesi, Puzzle Instinct, 2.  Subsequent citations to Kenaan’s article in this paragraph
appear as parenthetical references in the main text.
Ambassadors’ Secret, 7.  See also David Topper, “On Anamorphosis: Setting Some Things Straight,”92
Leonardo 33, no. 2 (2000): 115–24, 115.
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contrived,”  he declares that the placement of the anamorphic skull in the painting “can hardly be93
described as a playful gesture” on Holbein’s part.   Nonetheless, North wisely notes that seemingly94
excessive interpretations like his bear a direct relationship to early modern visual practices: “It is as
well to remember how extremely sophisticated medieval and Renaissance theories of artistic and
literary purpose and exegesis were.”95
Figure 18.  William Scrots, King Edward VI, 1546 (frontal view). 
National Portrait Gallery, London.
Photograph copyright © National Portrait Gallery, London.
Another anamorphic image associated with the English Reformation is William Scrots’
mistitled King Edward VI (Figure 18), which depicts the young prince during the reign of his father,
Henry VIII.   We know very little about Scrots, or Guillim Stretes as he was sometimes called, aside96
from the facts that he was the best-paid painter during the reign of Edward VI (suggesting that his
distinct style was a popular one); that he, like Holbein, was a Dutchman; and that he likely held a
Ambassadors’ Secret, 72.  Contrivance is, of course, a marker of the ludic.  See, for example, MPaG, 31.93
Ambassadors’ Secret, 7.  Kenaan sees a ludic element in Holbein’s use of the skull but understands its role94
in the painting as transcending mere play; the anamorphosis is “daring” but is transformed “into a serious and
meaningful artistic device.”  “‘Unusual Character,’” 65.
Ambassadors’ Secret, 188–89.95
See, for example, ibid., 126.96
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position as an artist at court, probably fleeing England at about the time of Mary’s ascension to the
throne.   While scholarship on the image is exceptionally sparse, it is an easy picture to describe. 97
It consists of two paired elements, a background landscape in normal perspective patriotically
evoking the rolling, green hills of England and a foregrounded anamorphic oval in the form of a seal
containing the date, Edward’s age (ætatis suæ 9), and his distorted likeness surrounded by the initials
E P for Edouardus princeps.  When viewed through a notch in the right-hand side of the image’s
frame, the oval resolves itself into a circle and Edward himself comes into perfect focus (Figure 19).
Figure 19.  William Scrots, King Edward VI, 1546 (lateral view). 
National Portrait Gallery, London.
Photograph copyright © National Portrait Gallery, London.
The playful technique of anamorphosis would surely have delighted the young prince, but
it is fitting in another sense as well.   Through the anamorphic image, the piece plays upon period
views of childhood, emphasizing that Edward was as yet unformed and incomplete but insisting that,
Erna Auerbach, “Holbein’s Followers in England,” Burlington Magazine 93, no. 575 (February 1951):97
44–51, 45–46.
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as Michael Witmore says, “With the addition of time and motion,”  the young boy would mature98
into a man fit to be king and to reign over the land which his corrected perspective skews and
therefore comes to dominate.  Apart from the fact that Edward never had that opportunity to mature
fully, the central irony of the painting is that its subject became the greatest of the Tudor iconoclasts,
a Reformed king in whose name images were made suspect and often destroyed because of precisely
the same power that we see exhibited in Scrots’ anamorphic portrait.  If, in other words, the distorted
fresco of St. Francis di Paola lends itself well to the Roman Catholic audience for which it was
designed, the anamorphic image of Edward is not at all what we might ordinarily expect to see in
a Protestant context.
More common in England than the anamorphoses inspired by Daniele Barbaro, the “turning
picture” was a painting rendered on a pleated or corrugated panel so that it would display one image
from the right and another from the left.   Few of these objects survive outside of frequent literary99
references to them, particularly in the works of Shakespeare,  but one example is strikingly100
reminiscent of Holbein’s The French Ambassadors.  From the left, it presents the image of a woman,
once thought to be Mary, Queen of Scots (Figure 20);  from the right, the image appears as a101
death’s head, a memento mori and a reminder of the transience of physical beauty (Figure 21).  The
Pretty Creatures: Children and Fiction in the English Renaissance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,98
2007), 1.
See Alan Shickman, “‘Turning Pictures’ in Shakespeare’s England,” Art Bulletin 59, no. 1 (March 1977):99
67–70.  Shickman borrows his term for this kind of work from Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy, which at
one point describes a piece that presents a beautiful woman from one angle and an ape from the other.  Ned Lukacher,
Time-Fetishes: The Secret History of Eternal Recurrence, Post-Contemporary Interventions (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1998), 75.
See Tarnya Cooper, Searching for Shakespeare (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 18–29100
(Richard II); Shickman, “‘Turning Pictures,’” 67, 69 (Richard II and Antony and Cleopatra); and Alan Shickman, “A
Turning Picture in Shakespeare’s Othello?,” Notes and Queries, no. 223 (April 1978): 145–46.
See Shickman, “‘Turning Pictures,’” 68; and Imtiaz Habib, Shakespeare’s Pluralistic Concepts of101
Character: A Study in Dramatic Anamorphism (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1993), 24.
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ingenuity of the device can be understood as a very early effort in the direction that modernists like
Pablo Picasso only achieved several hundred years later, an attempt to capture the dimension of
duration in a fixed image.  Giving us a God’s-eye view of the pictured woman—we see her as she
is now and as she is destined to be after her death—the anonymous artist has used the visual
technology of his age to accomplish a serious purpose in a playful manner.102
Figure 20.  Anonymous
Corrugated Anamorphosis of
Woman and Skull, c. 1590
(view from the left).  Scottish
National Portrait Gallery, 
Edinburgh.
Figure 21.  Anonymous
Corrugated Anamorphosis of
Woman and Skull, c. 1590
(view from the right).  Scottish
National Portrait Gallery,
Edinburgh.
Cooper, Searching for Shakespeare, 40 (referring to Scrots’ image as “a playful perspective device”).  See102
also Boyle, Anamorphosis, 12 (“image technologies that incur new openings and possibilities for perceptual and sensorial
experience become crucial sites for investigating how the ‘idea of God’ becomes incorporated in new ways”).
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Figure 22.  Andrea Mantegna, The Martyrdom of St. Sebastian,
1457–58.  Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien.
As a final example, consider a non-anamorphic work which nonetheless contains a hidden
image, Andrea Mantegna’s The Martyrdom of St. Sebastian, which features a horse and rider
concealed in the cloud at the upper-right corner of the painting (Figure 22).  “Though the horseman,”
like Holbein’s crucifix, “was certainly not meant to be seen by everyone, it is not easy to say how
thoroughly hidden Mantegna intended it to be” (WAOPP, 184).  Wollheim interprets the hidden
image as an example of Renaissance artists’ attempts to represent the act of seeing-in “directed on
to natural phenomena.  [I]n order to represent this activity, they had to represent that which, on their
account of the matter, this activity presupposes: they had to display nature as an album of well-
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contrived but also well-concealed representations.”   Of course, the notion of God’s creation as a103
legible book of symbols was an important trope (or, indeed, a belief) during the Renaissance.   And104
the hidden image is also a commentary on the Divine image-maker.  Keith Christiansen refers to
Mantegna’s interest in “Nature” as a creator of images,  but given that this is a painting about the105
ultimate triumph of a peculiarly Christian vision over paganism, we must necessarily see Mantegna’s
horse and rider as a creation of the Divine, the first maker of images.  If, as Christiansen contends,
Mantegna was interested in achieving a perfect imitation of nature,  then what better model was106
there for him to follow than God Himself?
What these examples establish is that there is ample precedent and justification—particularly
in the case of Renaissance-era images—for the decipherment model of visual hermeneutics, for the
practice of analyzing pictures as if they contained hidden or encoded information.  In the next
subsection, I shall turn to a third reason why this model of interpretation ought to be taken more
seriously.  Artists, like Mantegna, who conceal images within their works are engaged in an attempt
to imitate, and thereby to worship, God.
“What the Spectator Sees,” 115.103
Dieckmann, Hieroglyphics, 66.  Michael Bath links this world-view to the popularity of the emblem book,104
“an art which used inherent meanings already inscribed in the Book of Nature by the finger of God.”  Speaking Pictures:
English Emblem Books and Renaissance Culture, Longman Medieval and Renaissance Library (London: Longman,
1994), 3.  See also E. H. Gombrich, “Icones Symbolicae: The Visual Image in Neo-Platonic Thought,” Journal of the
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 11 (1948): 163–92, 168 (“apart from the revelation as embodied in the words of the
Scriptures and the teachings of the Church the whole of nature is, as it were, a hieroglyph of revealed truth”).
The Genius of Andrea Mantegna (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 46 (“In the upper left105
Mantegna drew an intentional comparison between his creative skills and those images that Nature makes on occasion
in passing clouds: images made by chance”).
Ibid.106
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3. Incarnation and Presence: The Lively Ludic Image
Marginalized voices outside the academy that posit images as puzzles to be deciphered and
then read are also worthy of investigation for a third reason, one that is especially germane to this
particular study and one that pertains to a quality of the images that were considered in the previous
subsection, images that through anamorphosis or other kindred techniques encode hidden
information within them.  I argue that these ludic pictures are incarnational in design; they seek to
emulate Divine images by producing representations that possess life and presence.
Christ’s Incarnation is central to early image theory in the West.   God’s second107
commandment in the Old Testament book of Exodus explicitly forbade the making of images of the
Divine: “Thou shalt not make vnto thee any grauen Image, or any likenesse of anything that is in
heauen aboue.”   We see in this Hebraic prohibition both a suspicion of human artifice and, more108
important, the idea that God as a non-physical and atemporal being is incapable of being represented. 
But when Word becomes Flesh in the New Testament—when Christ assumes humble, human form
on behalf of His Creation yet retains His fully Divine nature—the possibilities for image-making
suddenly and dramatically change.  Whereas God cannot be represented by human artifice, a man
can be, Marie-José Mondzain notes, so “from now on, God, who had lent his invisible image to his
human creation, will in turn receive his own visibility thanks to that creation.”   Hans Belting says109
that, while it remained “to postulate the indivisible unity of the invisible God and the visible human
See generally John Phillips, The Reformation of Images: Destruction of Art in England, 1535–1660107
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 11–14.
Ex 20:4 (AV 1611).  See Michael O’Connell, The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early108
Modern England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9.
“What Does Seeing an Image Mean?,” Journal of Visual Culture 9, no. 3 (December 2010): 307–15, 310.109
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being seen in a single person,”  “The reality of Christ’s incarnation [. . .] thus was linked to the110
possibility of Christ’s representation, and the image was thereby promoted to a criterion of
orthodoxy.”   Further support for rendering images of Christ came from the text of the New111
Testament itself, which declared Christ to be “the image of the inuisible God.”   Early Church112
theologians, therefore, had ample basis for justifying the creation of images of Christ, the ultimate
sanction for creating an image of the Divine, and according to Michael O’Connell, “The effect of
this renewed emphasis on the humanity of Christ is what may be called an incarnational sense of
religious experience, [. . .] an aesthetic in which the spiritual is incarnated in forms immediately
accessible to human senses and emotions.”113
This “incarnational aesthetic,” as Jennifer Waldron calls it,  takes on greater importance114
during the Reformation, with its emphasis on word (and Word) over image and with its distinct
strain of iconoclasm.  As John Twyning has explained, certain images seemed to be exempt from
the iconoclastic zeal of radical Reformers, particularly in England.  For example, the elegant stained-
glass windows depicting the story of Christ at St. Mary’s Church in Fairford were not destroyed
during the waves of image-breaking fury that swept England during the Reformation, most likely
because the images in those windows possessed a “quickness,” life, and vividness that transcended
Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art (1990), trans. Edmund Jephcott110
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 7.
Ibid., 152.  But see Koerner, Reformation of the Image, 13 (“Christ’s incarnation was iconoclastic: the111
pagan idols crumbled before the infant Jesus; Christ’s humble birth and humiliating death overturned the equation, made
concrete in classical art, of the beautiful with the true and the good; his disciples martyred themselves rather than honour
the emperor’s portrait; his suffering mortified vision itself”).
Col 1:20 (AV 1611).  See O’Connell, Idolatrous Eye, 10 (“The words ‘icon’ and ‘likeness’ are used in the112
Bible to explain the relationships between God and his Son and between the believer and Christ”).
Idolatrous Eye, 47.113
Reformations of the Body: Idolatry, Sacrifice, and Early Modern Theater, Early Modern Cultural Studies114
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3. 
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the flatness of dead iconicity.   Instead, we see in those images “a Christ who inspires worldly115
compassion, one whose body has heft and presence [. . .].  Christ is not made into a monument, not
cast as a graven image or idol, nor depicted as an abstract or superstitious icon”; the figure of the
Savior possesses “somatic vitality and materiality.”  116
In short, these images of Christ possessed a quality known in image theory as quickness or
sometimes presence, which Marina Prusac describes as follows:
The metaphysical aspect of images is usually referred to as presence, or prototype,
and happens when images are perceived as matter animated by spirit; when images
or idols are believed to inhibit a prolonged existence of the individual they represent. 
The presence is sometimes explained as a symbolic representation or even as
something magical, which cannot be translated as spirit or soul, which are Christian
terms, and terms such as force or power express something physical and would be
misleading.  It can perhaps be understood as a phenomenological quality which was
believed to connect the portrait or image to the represented individual or deity in a
way which demanded respect.117
If this notion sounds vaguely superstitious, then it is well to remember that, as Andrew Harrison
notes, “All sorts of attitudes and beliefs that fail to pass our own intellectual censors have played a
Forms of English History in Literature, Landscape, and Architecture, Language, Discourse, Society115
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 37–53.
Ibid., 52.116
“Presence and the Image Controversies in the Third and Fourth Centuries AD,” in Kolrud and Prusac,117
Iconoclasm, 42–56, 42.  In the seminal work on this idea in the West, Hans Belting defines the notion more briefly as
follows: “Authentic images seemed capable of action, seemed to possess dynamis, or supernatural power.  God and the
saints also took up their abode in them, as was expected, and spoke through them.”  Likeness and Presence, 6.
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part within the history of other cultures.”   Moreover, it is not strictly necessary to define presence118
by reference to the mystical idea that the person depicted in an image actually somehow exists within
it; rather, presence is a form of response to an image as well.  Harrison continues: “a sense of
‘presence’ in response to representational works of art, pictures or sculpture, is the feeling that what
they represent, or aspects of it, do not just appear to be present to the beholder but are present to the
beholder ‘in’ the picture or sculpture itself.”   The concept also describes an artistic technique, one119
first theorized by Michael Psellus in the eleventh century—another iconoclastic age—as “living
painting” (empsychos graphē).  In Belting’s account of that term, it
first serves to defend painting against the old charge of being dead matter that in vain
pretends to provide the illusion of life.  In addition, the term equates painting, which
is not mute but capable of speech, with poetry, which touches the feelings by
arousing persons and events to life.  That which has a soul can speak to the soul.  A
“live” quality of expression, the goal of poetry, was now expected of the icon as
well.120
In order to see how the images that I explored in the previous subsection possess this quality
of quickness or presence, it might be helpful first to examine a “dead” image, one that lacks this
added incarnational dimension of depth or soulfulness.  A primary example of such a painting within
“What Is ‘Presence’?,” in Maniura and Shepherd, Presence, 161–72, 162.118
Ibid., 161.119
Likeness and Presence, 261.  The concept of liveliness or quickness is also central to Jennifer Waldron’s120
account of embodiment and English theatrical practices during the Reformation: “the human body is one of the most
effective material forms through which to assert various kinds of ‘real presence,’ or nonarbitrary relationships between
sign and thing.”  Reformations of the Body, 39.  “‘[D]ead’ idols [. . .] have no necessary link to the divine image that they
falsely claim to represent.”  Ibid., 40.  For more on “quick” images in the theater, see Theodore K. Lerud, “Quick Images:
Memory and the English Corpus Christi Drama,” in Moving Subjects: Processional Performance in the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance, ed. Kathleen Ashley and Wim Hüsken, Ludus: Medieval and Early Renaissance Theatre and Drama
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), 213–37.
202
the English tradition is Nicholas Hilliard’s The Pelican Portrait of Queen Elizabeth (Figure 23).  121
The most striking feature of the portrait is its flatness.  The monarch’s face lacks any real trace of
modeling or mass; her nose and brow are created by the faintest of lines, and neither the cheekbones
nor the chin bears any sign of curvature or depth.   The effect is one of seeing a mask.  Moreover,122
the foreground of the piece is nearly without shadow, except for the wispy suggestion of one cast by
Elizabeth’s poised left hand on her bodice and a somewhat more substantial one cast by the pearl that
lies upon her breast.  To be sure, her figure casts a shadow on the curiously abstracted black and gray
background behind it, but this fact contrasts sharply with the crowned rose and fleur-de-lis emblems
framing her face; they cast no shadows at all, implying that they exist beyond the space of the
painting and that they are merely superimposed upon the canvas.  Elizabeth’s red curls are, upon
close inspection, drawn on top of one another in identical, repeated patterns rather than depicted as
receding from her brow in perspective, and the ruff of her collar is rendered in the same manner,
having the same thickness where it curves around the back of her neck as it does at her throat.  The
angle of the bodice as it approaches her waist is curiously straight and exaggerated, and the waistline
itself is unrealistically narrow, idealized even given the fashions of the period.
What we have in The Pelican Portrait, in other words, is a secular icon, but to characterize
the image in this way is not to diminish it—that is clearly its chief purpose, for it is part of a
discourse of royal power, the monarch linked through the manner of her depiction to the religious
For a close analysis of this image that has keenly influenced my own perception of the piece, see Virginia121
Chieffo Raguin, “You Are What You Wear (and Use, and See): The Form of the Reform in England,” in Art, Piety and
Destruction in the Christian West, 1500–1700, ed. Virginia Chieffo Raguin, Visual Culture in Early Modernity (Surrey,
UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 65–89, 75–76.
Portrayals of Elizabeth, like Hilliard’s, often depict her in heavy, white make-up, and this is surely one122
reason for the features that I have noticed.  However, other portraits that I have examined do not exhibit the same degree
of flatness that I have mentioned here.
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iconography that represents the ultimate source of her authority to rule England.  Hilliard’s portrait
is justly praised, but it is not an image with life, quickness, or presence.123
Figure 23.  Nicholas Hilliard, The Pelican Portrait, c. 1574.  Walker
Art Gallery, National Museums, Liverpool.
Courtesy National Museums Liverpool.
There are references to a lost anamorphic work by Nicholas Hilliard.  See Shickman, “‘Turning Pictures,’”123
70.  To be able to contrast it with The Pelican Portrait would be a fascinating exercise.
204
At this juncture, with my reference to Hilliard’s piece as a “secular icon,” I must
parenthetically acknowledge that I am treating works of secular art by the same criteria and in the
same fashion as one might treat religious imagery and vice versa.  The line between the two,
however, is exceptionally fine, for the category of “art” is ultimately one that is generated in the
iconoclastic pressures of the age—“Calling church pictures ‘art’ often saved them from destruction,”
Koerner says.    Moreover, Kristine Kolrud and Marina Prusac remind us that “The idea that124
idolatry or iconolatry may be related also to non-religious imagery, especially portraits of emperors
or kings, is not new.”   “[I]conoclasm may pertain to art of almost any kind,” Thomas F. X. Noble125
says, “and may have many motivations whereas iconodulia pertains only to sacred art and is
characterised by particularly intense habits of worship.”   And finally, Hilliard’s iconic portrait of126
Elizabeth was of a sort that was beginning to replace images of Christ and the saints in Reformed
churches throughout England during her reign: the spaces cleared by the iconoclastic impulse were
often reassigned to such purposes,  so it is not surprising that his piece would present distinctly127
iconic qualities.
By contrast, consider again William Scrots’ anamorphic portrait of Prince Edward (Figures
18 and 19).  Michael Witmore describes the effect of the image well:
Reformation of the Image, 59.  See also James Simpson, Under the Hammer: Iconoclasm in the Anglo-124
American Tradition, Clarendon Lectures in English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 10 (“the Enlightenment
produced the museum and the category of Art in defensive response to early modern iconoclasm”).
“Introduction—Whose Iconoclasm?,” in Kolrud and Prusac, Iconoclasm, 1–13, 5.125
“Neither Iconoclasm Nor Iconodulia: The Carolingian Via Media,” in Kolrud and Prusac, Iconoclasm,126
95–105, 95.
Raguin, “You Are What You Wear,” 76.127
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That act of resolving the anamorphic projection is one of vivification, a motive form
of enargeia [. . .].  What viewers marvel at in such an image is its apparent
agency—its ability to bring to life that which, strictly speaking, is inert.  [. . .] 
[T]here is something in the portrait’s power to animate and vivify its child subject
that confirms the Tudor iconoclasts’ worst anxieties about the seductive power of
images.128
Scrots and other anamorphic artists of the Renaissance force their images to do the work of
embodiment and Incarnation by compelling their viewers to move and to experience the works
actively and physically; the images are in a very real sense painted upon the body itself.   An129
anamorphic image is what Koerner has described in a somewhat different context as a
“corporealization of the communicative act.”   And if the quick image is, as Thomas Aquinas130
posited, a vital link between visual sensibilia and the believer’s understanding,  then an image that 131
includes components not immediately, or at least not in a typical fashion, subject to apprehension
by the senses might be said metaphorically to possess a soul, an element of the Divine invisibilia that
dwells within us all as a marker of our status as images of God.
Pretty Creatures, 3–4.  Witmore’s concluding remark is, of course, profoundly ironic given Edward’s own128
status as a Tudor iconoclast.
See Boyle, Anamorphosis, 1 (“A crucial aspect of the anamorphic experience, then, is the way in which129
it requires that the experience be written on the body, that the body carry with it the cognitive and autonomic traces of
having been unmoored from perceptual anchors and pushed into a mode of spectatorship caught up in affective intensity
and perceptual uncertainty”).
Reformation of the Image, 256.130
See Lerud, “Quick Images,” 214–15.131
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Having established that playful interpretive strategies are salient to our understanding of
images during the Renaissance and Reformation, it remains to embark on a prolegomenon to the
kind of study that these readings merit.  A full study devoted exclusively to such interpretations is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but in the next section I suggest that keen attention to
contemporary popular works of image interpretation can reveal an enticing pattern, one that can add
to our understanding of visual discourses during the English Reformation.
C.  CLOSE READINGS
The Legible Image Trope in The Da Vinci Code and Other Popular Texts
In light of the images and the readings of images that we have encountered thus far, one would
expect that an examination of popular texts about Renaissance images would simply reveal more of
what we have already seen—measurements of lines and angles to identify a painting’s underlying
geometrical design, searches for images that have been concealed or disguised within a painting, or
investigations into a painting’s symbolism or iconography.   To a certain extent, one would not be132
disappointed in these expectations; all of these fairly obvious themes are indeed woven into both the
fictional and the non-fictional texts that I have examined.  However, among the patterns that I have
Iain Pears’ The Titian Committee (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1991) provides an example of the type of132
plot one might expect to find in a novel of this sort, and it is a useful contrast to what might be considered unsophisticated
treatments of imagery in other works.  The story revolves around the murder of a Titian scholar in the greenhouse of a
Venice garden.  She is found clutching in one hand a crucifix that she has apparently ripped from a gold chain around
her neck and in the other a bunch of lilies from a nearby planter.  It appears that she was killed because she discovered
and threatened to go public with a scheme by two other members of the committee of Titian experts: they would convince
other members of the panel to deny a Titian attribution to a painting and then supply an attribution based on their own
authority in exchange for a large percentage of the resulting inflated sale price.  In reality, however, the discovery she
was on the eve of announcing was “the fact that she’d deciphered an intricate and personal account of a long-hidden
scandal that excited her” (187): Titian had used a series of panels depicting events in the life of St. Anthony to tell the
story of how he had poisoned Pietro Luzzi as revenge for murdering Giorgione’s mistress and causing Giorgione himself
to die from a broken heart.  Although the crucifix and the lilies found clutched in the victim’s hands represent attributes
of St. Anthony, they were her attempt to identify her killer, an annoyingly pious member of the committee nicknamed
“St. Anthony” who murdered her based on the false assumption that she knew about his role in the attribution scheme.
207
been able to identify in these works, the most unexpected and even striking thing that many of them
have in common is the fact that they do not proceed according to this model.  To the contrary, the
pictures that are read or deciphered in these works often become legible only by virtue of the fact that
they contain words; the purely visual aspects of the image play little or no role at all.
As the focal point of contemporary popular discourses on the legibility of images, The Da
Vinci Code is a sensible place to begin examining this pattern.  The novel revolves around the
adventures of Harvard symbologist Robert Langdon, who is enlisted by Paris police to assist in the
investigation of the brutal murder of the Louvre’s curator, Jacques Saunière, who succeeded before
his ultimate death in leaving cryptic clues to his murder scattered throughout the museum. 
Implicated in the murder, Langdon and Saunière’s granddaughter, Sophie Neveu, take flight from
police as they pursue in turn Saunière’s clues, which prove to lead to a secret of even greater
magnitude than the true killer’s identity: Saunière, as grandmaster of the secret society, the Priory
of Sion, guarded the millennia-old secret that Christ was a mortal man who married Mary Magdalene
and left behind a string of descendants, the Merovingian founding dynasty of France, which survives
to this day.  Representatives of a Roman Catholic extremist group, Opus Dei, have committed the
murder, have framed Langdon and Neveu, and are attempting to assassinate the pair as part of an
effort to continue oppressing this secret of the sacred feminine.  Neveu is ultimately revealed to be
a direct descendant of Christ, and Langdon decides to maintain the Priory’s secret knowledge. 
Early in the novel, Brown takes pains to mark his protagonist as a master of decoding images. 
Langdon, in fact, is in Paris in order to deliver a lecture on “pagan symbolism hidden in the stones
of Chartres Cathedral” (DVC, 7).  When police discover the nude corpse of Saunière—the author of
“books on the secret codes hidden in the paintings of Poussin and Teniers” (DVC, 16)—laid out on
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a gallery floor in the shape of the figure in Leonardo’s famous sketch, Vitruvian Man, they summon
Langdon to the museum.  Although this provides an opportunity for exposition describing Leonardo
as “a prankster” who amused himself by incorporating “in many of his Christian paintings hidden
symbolism that was anything but Christian” (DVC, 50), Brown does not provide specific examples,
and the bizarre position of the murder victim does not result in any analysis or discussion of hidden
symbolism.  Instead, the most salient feature of the crime scene is a series of inscriptions apparently
scrawled by Saunière in his own blood on the floor of the gallery:
13-3-2-21-1-1-8-5
O, Draconian devil!
Oh, lame saint!  (DVC, 48)
Neveu, a police cryptographer and Saunière’s estranged granddaughter, arrives on the scene
in order to assist Langdon, whom she has learned is being wrongly targeted as a prime suspect by
police investigators.  Although she identifies the numbers in the inscription as scrambled members
of the Fibonacci sequence, it is ultimately Langdon who realizes that the rearranged numbers are a
sign that the letters in the rest of the inscription must also be reordered; they are an anagram for
“Leonardo da Vinci!  The Mona Lisa!” (DVC, 103).  Faking Langdon’s escape from the Louvre in
order to give themselves an opportunity to investigate the mystery themselves, he and Neveu
discover that this coded message leads to an inscription written on the Mona Lisa in invisible ink:
“So dark the con of man” (DVC, 131).  Of course, this is another anagram and it leads the pair to
Leonardo’s Madonna of the Rocks, behind which they find a key (DVC, 141–42).  Up to this point,
Brown has used the paintings in his novel only as stations on a kind of scavenger hunt, sites on
which words foreign to the images themselves have been inscribed.  The pictures, their iconography,
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the codes which we as readers have been led to expect the characters to find within them—none of
these has proven important to the protagonists’ discovery of the key.  In fact, the only real analysis
of these paintings is offered in exposition, and even then it is not relevant to the main line of the plot. 
Brown has Langdon articulate the recent view that the Mona Lisa’s enigmatic smile hints that the
painting, a self-portrait, is Leonardo’s inside joke, and in further exposition he explains the title of
the work as yet another anagram: “Amon L’Isa,” the names of the Egyptian male and female fertility
deities (DVC, 126–28).
The key leads Langdon and Neveu to a Swiss bank and a safety deposit box which contains
a cryptex, a cylinder of marble and bronze around which are five wheels, each bearing the letters of
the alphabet.  The device, allegedly designed by Leonardo, protects a written message inside and can
only be opened without destroying the message if the wheels are arranged to spell the correct
password (DVC 203–209)—again, word trumps image.  Fleeing from the police, the protagonists
take refuge at the estate of Leigh Teabing, an English expert on the mythology surrounding the Holy
Grail, or San Greal, who has emigrated to France in order to facilitate his search for the Grail itself. 
Teabing and Langdon explain to Neveu and to the reader that the identity of the Grail is encoded
within Leonardo’s Last Supper.  They allege that the figure to Christ’s right is Mary Magdalene and
that she was His wife and the mother of His child; the Holy Grail, the cup said to have contained the
blood of Christ, is actually her womb, and San Greal should actually be read (in another anagram
of sorts) as Sang Real—royal blood (DVC, 249–61).  Despite the fact that this scene provides some
opportunity for a discussion of the Last Supper, including the claim that the ancient symbols for male
and female are hidden within its structure, even here Brown foregrounds the notion of text concealed
inside the painting.  The shape of “Mary Magdalene” and Christ, Teabing claims, forms the letter
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M—“Conspiracy theorists,” he explains, “will tell you that it stands for Matrimonio or Mary
Magdalene.  To be honest, nobody is certain.  The only certainty is that the hidden M is no mistake”
(DVC, 254).
With Teabing joining the pair of fugitives, they discover an inscription hidden inside the box
that contains the cryptex.  It is a riddle in the form of two verse couplets whose answer will unlock
the device and reveal the message within:
An ancient word of wisdom frees this scroll.
And helps us keep her scatter’d family whole.
A headstone praised by Templars is the key.
And Atbash will reveal the truth to thee.  (DVC, 311)
Atbash is identified as a simple substitution code using the vowelless Hebrew alphabet (DVC, 312);
the “key” is Baphomet (or B-P-V-M-Th in Hebrew), whose image the Templars were accused of
worshiping (DVC, 323–25); and when decoded using Atbash, B-P-V-M-Th becomes Sh-V-P-Y-A,
or “Sofia,” an ancient word meaning “wisdom” and, of course, Neveu’s own first name (DVC, 327). 
Although this word opens the cryptex, they discover inside a smaller cryptex accompanied by yet
another textual riddle:
In London lies a knight a Pope interred.
His labor’s fruit a Holy wrath incurred.
You seek the orb that ought be on his tomb.
It speaks of Rosy flesh and seeded womb.  (DVC, 342)
Ultimately, a textual pun in the riddle proves to be the key to its decipherment: “a Pope” must be
read as “A. Pope” or “Alexander Pope,” who wrote Sir Isaac Newton’s epitaph and presided over
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his interment at Westminster Abbey (DVC, 393–94).  Brown’s final opportunity to use an image as
a substantive clue in the mystery goes unexploited.  Although Neveu and Langdon must examine the
tomb, they are searching for an orb that the image does not represent.  The tomb is not legible or
subject to decipherment because the key to unlocking the cryptex is the word for that which is
invisible, not by virtue of being hidden within an image but rather by virtue of being excluded from
it: the word apple opens the second cryptex and leads to the solution of mystery (DVC, 425).
Although The Da Vinci Code provides the best and most extensive set of examples of the
privileging of word over image in popular texts of its ilk, several other works demonstrate that
Brown’s reliance on anagrams in particular is a common technique throughout the genre.
With respect to works of art, Holy Blood, Holy Grail is centrally concerned with Poussin’s
The Arcadian Shepherds.  The actual image is important to the authors to the extent that the
landscape depicted in the background is alleged to resemble the vista around the site of a similar
tomb near Rennes-le-Château,  but the only other attention given to Poussin’s painting is133
speculation that the inscription ET IN ARCADIA EGO could be an anagram for a Latin phrase meaning
“BEGONE!  I CONCEAL THE SECRETS OF GOD.”134
The mystery in The Pegasus Secret surrounds a copy of Poussin’s painting in which the
inscription reads “ET IN ARCADIA EGO SUM,” an anagram for Arcam Dei Jesu Tango, “I touch the
Baigent, Leigh, and Lincoln, Holy Blood, Holy Grail, 18.  It is worth noting at this juncture that Brown’s133
evident fascination with anagrams extends even to his characters’ names.  “Leigh Teabing” is an homage to Richard
Leigh and Michael Baigent, whose surname is an anagram for “Teabing.”  Mnookin, “The Da Vinci Clone?,” 103.  The
name “Jacques Saunière” is an allusion to Bérenger Saunière, a priest from Rennes-le-Château whose discovery of coded
parchments in his church is pivotal to the argument of Holy Blood, Holy Grail.  Ibid.
Baigent, Leigh, and Lincoln, Holy Blood, Holy Grail, 19.134
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tomb of God, Jesus.”   The painting’s geometry plays only a minimal role in the novel; a monk135
explains that because the shepherds’ staffs are held at angles that create an equilateral triangle, and
because the third leg of that figure would have the tomb at its center, “That means that the painting
[. . .] directs the observer to the tomb itself.”136
The Flanders Panel  concerns a 1471 painting by the fictional artist Pieter van Huys, who137
“was always interested in symbolism, and [whose] paintings are packed with parallel readings.”  138
Entitled The Game of Chess, the painting depicts two figures in the foreground at a chessboard
whose pieces are rendered with the careful detail and realism typical of Netherlandish artists from
the Renaissance.  In the background sits a female figure dressed in black, who is identified by
inscriptions on the painting as Beatrice, the wife of one of the players, the fictional Duke Ferdinand
of Ostenburg (FP, 2–7).  The other player is Roger de Arras, a knight in the Duke’s service who had
been assassinated two years before the painting’s completion (FP, 21–22).  Significantly, his name
connotes a wall hanging decorated with an image and behind which characters in Renaissance
dramas, most famously Polonius in Hamlet, often conceal themselves.   Both the mystery and the139
On an unnumbered acknowledgments page, Loomis thanks Richard Andrews and Paul Schellenberger for135
“the suggested translation of the Latin puzzle in Poussin’s painting.”  He does not, however, express gratitude to Dan
Brown for the name of his protagonist, “Langford Reilly,” which evokes the name “Robert Langdon” too strongly to be
a mere coincidence.  Perhaps it is Dan Brown’s turn to sit in the plaintiff’s chair in a copyright infringement suit.
Loomis, Pegasus Secret, 124.136
Victoria Nelson has also noticed connections between The Flanders Panel and The Da Vinci Code.  “Faux137
Catholic,” 98.
Pérez-Reverte, Flanders Panel, 27.  All further citations to The Flanders Panel (FP) will appear as138
parenthetical references in the main text.  
Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., s.v. “arras.”  Although The Flanders Panel was originally139
written in Spanish, the word “arras” derives from the name of a Flemish town in which the fabric often used for arrases
was manufactured.  Given the centrality of Flanders to the novel, the character’s name is probably not a coincidence
peculiar to the English translation of the text.
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novel begin in the present day when an art restorationist who is working on the painting discovers
through radiography an inscription that has been painted over: “QUIS NECAVIT EQUITEM” or
“Who killed the knight?” (FP, 2).  It is only by virtue of this text that the main character discovers
the painting’s status as a puzzle to be solved.  Despite the importance of verbal text to the novel’s
plot, its author hints that images themselves will need to be deciphered in order for the picture to be
read and understood—the name “Roger de Arras” and the description of Pieter van Huys’ symbolic
and multi-layered artworks both serve as tantalizing hints in this regard.
Although the heroine notices that Arras’ head is “placed exactly at the intersection of lines
known in painting as the golden section” (FP, 26), which leads her to conclude that he is the subject
not only of the painting but also of the hidden inscription, this only confirms knowledge that the
character already had by virtue of the painting’s textually explicit identification of this figure as a
knight (FP, 19).  The book that the Duchess is reading in the image, an anonymous love poem
attributed to Roger de Arras, allows the characters to surmise correctly that he had been having an
illicit affair with her and thus to suspect that the Duke had him killed as revenge.  But this particular
detail proves to be nothing more than a red herring.  The solution to the mystery lies in the chess
game being played in the foreground—one white knight has been captured, or “killed,” and the
characters must deduce from the configuration of the board which piece made the fatal move.  In this
sense, the painting is less a puzzle than the depiction of one, and the image does not need to be read;
rather, the chess game which it contains must be played.  And this mystery is solved halfway through
the novel; the second half relates to murders in the present day to which the contents of the painting
itself are irrelevant.  In fact, the role of the painting in the story is accurately paralleled by the
sentiments of the protagonists’ cynical employer: “A picture is just canvas, wood, paint and varnish. 
214
What matters is how much it leaves in your pocket when it changes hands.  [. . .]  The rest is just
fairy tales” (FP, 13).140
My final example is Javier Sierra’s The Secret Supper, a novel set in 1497 during Leonardo’s
work on The Last Supper at Santa Maria della Grazie in Milan.  Having heard rumors that Leonardo
is encoding heretical messages into the mural, Church officials send a Dominican priest to
investigate.  Although both The Last Supper and Leonardo’s Maestà are subjected to symbolic and
iconographical analysis during the course of the novel, it is ultimately the written word, Jacobus de
Voragine’s The Golden Legend, which allows the question of Leonardo’s rumored heresies to be
solved and which reveals that The Last Supper is itself legible as a text.  In The Golden Legend each
of Christ’s disciples is given a descriptive attribute.  Bartholomew, for example, is designated
Mirabilis or “He Who Is Miraculous,” and Peter is Exosus or “He Who Hates.”   When the initial141
of each disciple’s Latin attribute is positioned relative to his placement in The Last Supper, and
Christ designated by the letter A based on his shape in the image, the painting spells out “MUT NEM
A LOS NOC” (Figure 24).  This phrase means nothing until the protagonist recalls Leonardo’s
unusual habit of writing backwards, so that The Last Supper spells out the word
“CONSOLAMENTUM,” the name of the sacrament practiced by the heretical Cathars, and which
the image of Christ symbolically extends to all those who pass through the door beneath it.
One critic would likely disagree with my assessment, seeing The Flanders Panel as a complex meditation140
on the nature of representation.  Pedro García-Caro, “Behind the Canvas: The Role of Paintings in Peter Ackroyd’s
Chatterton and Arturo Pérez-Reverte’s The Flanders Panel,” in Crime Scenes: Detective Narratives in European Culture
since 1945, ed. Anne Mullen and Emer O’Beirne, Internationale Forschungen zur allgemeinen und vergiechenden
Literaturwissenschaft (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 160–70.
Javier Sierra, The Secret Supper (2004), trans. Alberto Manguel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006),141
154.  Significantly, the novel asserts that Leonardo used his own likeness in painting Judas Thaddeus, Occulator or “He
Who Conceals.”  Ibid., 115.
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Figure 24.  Illustration from Javier Sierra, The Secret Supper (2004),
trans. Alberto Manguel (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 252.
Reprinted with the permission of Atria Publishing Group, a Division of Simon &
Schuster, Inc. from the Washington Square Press edition of THE SECRET
SUPPER by Javier Sierra, translated by Alberto Manguel.  Copyright © 2004 Javier
Sierra.  Copyright © 2004 Random House Mondadori, S.A.  English translation
copyright © Simon & Schuster, Inc.
As these examples demonstrate, popular texts which operate according to the trope of the
legible image or the decipherment model of visual hermeneutics frequently devalue the purely visual
and non-linguistic dimensions of images in favor of an approach that presents the image as a
repository for a latent or concealed text, by virtue of which the image acquires its ability to be read. 
We could perhaps attribute this pattern to nothing more than a familiar privileging of the verbal over
the visual, what Mitchell refers to as “a tacit assumption of the superiority of words to visual
images.”   But this explanation seems not only too facile to account for the unusual frequency with142
which this phenomenon emerges in popular texts but also too little like an explanation at all: in the
manner of a tautology, it merely affixes a shorthand term to the pattern, dismissing it by naming it
rather than determining its fundamental causes.  We could also interpret these examples as merely
evidence of a failure of the imagination on the part of writers who, being much more familiar and
“Word and Image,” 55.142
216
comfortable with words than with images, have taken the legible image metaphor too literally and
too far—if images can be read, these texts seem to say, then they must be legible in the same sense
that texts are.   This account would certainly be consistent with the fact that Iain Pears, for example,143
does not do this sort of thing in his novels whereas writers without training in art history and
criticism do.  But it fails to explain the intersection between this phenomenon in popular texts and
a similar move that has become common in contemporary scholarship: “pictures provoke art
historians merely because they are less familiar than texts.  All art historians write, but relatively few
draw with any relevant degree of facility” (WAOPP, 15).144
Two other patterns in the texts that I have examined point toward a better explanation, or at
least toward the beginnings of one.  First, the overwhelming majority of popular works within this
genre focus on Renaissance images.  With the exception of Lewis Purdue’s Daughter of God, in fact,
every text that I have examined for the purposes of this study has had one or more Renaissance
artworks at its center.  Out of the works that I have identified as part of the genre but not studied,
only Peter Ackroyd’s Chatterton and Wilson Bryan Key’s works on advertising seem to deal with
“[I]t is much easier to read, or to tell stories, than to stare at the peculiarities of a stubbornly silent and143
senselessly wordless object.”  Elkins, On Pictures, 267.  Alan Jacobs adopts a similar explanation for the popular idea
of hidden meanings in a more general sense that includes the interpretation of literary texts as well: “these fanciful tales
appeal to what I can only call our plain laziness.  The interpretation of literary texts is actually hard work.  [. . .]  But the
code breakers offer a much more consoling message.  They tell us that we don’t need to read carefully or think hard or
labor for years on end.  All the work that needs to be done they have already done.  Understanding is nothing more than
putting the right key in the right lock.”  “The Code Breakers,” 16–17.  Albeit in the same vein, a more charitable
explanation might be supplied by James A. W. Heffernan’s claim that ekphrasis or language itself “releases a narrative
impulse which graphic art restricts.”  “Ekphrasis and Representation,” New Literary History 22, no. 2 (Spring 1991):
297–316, 302.
Mitchell sees the same trend, but does not make the connection as explicitly as Elkins does.  On one hand,144
Mitchell asks, “What is art history, after all, if not an attempt to find the right words to interpret, explain, describe, and
evaluate visual images?”  “Word and Image,” 48.  But he also says that “One of the more depressing sights in
contemporary art history is the rush to fix on some master term (discourse, textuality, semiosis, and culture come to mind)
that will solve the mystery of visual experience and representation and dissolve the difference between word and image.” 
Ibid., 49.
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post-Renaissance images.  This pattern might be independently explicable by virtue of the fact that
“In many respects the Renaissance is the origin of our ways of writing about art: it is the period in
which pictures first became the objects of intensive intellection, and were first able to bear the
weight of philosophic and critical concepts” (WAOPP, 22).  Moreover, what Panofsky calls the
emblematic spirit of the age  led to a sort of fusion of word and image as “Renaissance art,”145
according to Liselotte Dieckmann, “became flooded with hieroglyphics”  and cryptomorphic and146
anamorphic images acquired what Leader describes as a “curious vogue.”   Marguerite A. Tassi,147
focusing specifically on images from the English Renaissance, offers a more extended explanation:
It seems logical to conclude that Elizabethan pictorial artists adopted anti-illusionist
painting techniques in response to reformed views of images.  They often inscribed
paintings with texts, names, and dates, and depicted their sitters as pallid,
unexpressive figures set in flat, linear spatial arrangements.  Their pictures appear to
have been designed as texts for reading; indeed, many portraits, with their allegorical
features and inscriptions, must have struck viewers forcefully as representations or
symbols conveying specific information and ideas, rather than as aesthetically
pleasing likenesses.148
“Titian’s Allegory of Prudence: A Postscript,” in Meaning in the Visual Arts, 146–68, 159.145
Hieroglyphics, 44.146
Stealing the Mona Lisa, 135.147
Scandal of Images, 52–53.148
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In any case, the period’s belief that hidden truths can be read out of both images and texts, according
to Gombrich,  “still lingers as an undercurrent of European thought”  and serves as a foundation149
for the iconographical approach to images, which Damisch says “is theoretically founded on the
postulate that the artistic image (and indeed any relevant image) achieves a signifying articulation
only within and because of the textual reference which passes through and eventually imprints itself
in it.”150
The second pattern is a recurrent religious subtext coalescing around the theme of heresy.  151
Almost without exception these works and their characters revisit the historical origins of
Christianity and encounter narratives that tend to contradict orthodox belief.  Christ was married and
fathered a child by Mary Magdalene.  Christ’s death at the Crucifixion was a hoax perpetrated to
allow Him and Mary to escape from charges of anti-Judaic heresy in the Holy Land, and the
Resurrection is therefore merely a myth.  The notion of Christ’s divinity originated in a rigged vote
at the First Council of Nicea, orchestrated by the emperor Constantine.  Christ was Divine, but
subordinate in importance to John the Baptist.  Christ was Divine, but so were other messiahs who
came after Him, including women.  All of these heretical narratives, and others, play central roles
in the plots of most of these works.
“Icones Symbolicae,” 169.149
“Semiotics and Iconography,” 237.150
See Nelson, “Faux Catholic,” 106 (“the populace has a strong appetite for heresy that The Da Vinci Code151
and other works of popular fiction help to feed”).
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These two patterns, the themes of the Renaissance and of heresy, point us singularly toward
the Reformation, with its “insistence,” O’Connell says, “on scriptura, on what is written—and only
what is written.”152
D.  IMPLICATIONS
Iconophilia in the English Reformation and Iconophobia Today
During the Reformation, the image becomes associated with the ritual and spectacle of the Roman
Catholic Mass, in which the spiritual Word is reduced to mere matter not by an act of Divine will
but by the priest in the non-scriptural and sacrilegious act of transubstantiation.   Just as Roman153
Catholics came to be seen as idolaters, many Protestants adopted a position that O’Connell has
dubbed logolatry: “a heterodox identification of the Logos with the word of scripture, rather than
with the preexistent Christ.”   And this “crisis in the relation of image and word”  culminates in154 155
iconoclasm, the destruction of images that threaten to consume the text, the word, and the Word.
Indeed, the actual destruction of an image is a key plot point in Daughter of God, in which
the mystery’s answer is literally “behind the image”; the physical layers of paint conceal a gold ingot,
and uncovering this secret requires that the image be effaced, a task which is unceremoniously
completed in a brief operation involving a rag and a bottle of turpentine.   Peter Watson’s156
Landscape of Lies focuses more explicitly on the Reformation and the Protestant aversion to images. 
Michael O’Connell, “The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm, Anti-Theatricalism, and the Image of the Elizabethan152
Theater,” ELH 52, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 279–310, 286.
See Tassi, Scandal of Images, 36–37.153
“Idolatrous Eye,” 287.154
Ibid.155
Purdue, Daughter of God, 238.156
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The premise of the novel is that a Roman Catholic monastery during the reign of Henry VIII
managed to hide its valuable assets—including a silver reliquary, a jewel-encrusted map of the True
Cross, an ivory crosier, and a silver communion chalice—before they could be seized by authorities
charged with the task of dissolving Roman Catholic institutions in England.  In order to preserve the
memory of the location where these objects were hidden, the monks created a painting that could be
iconographically read like a treasure map.  It was one of the only items left in the monastery when
Henry’s Visitor arrived, and one of his descendants enlists the aid of an art dealer to help her
decipher the painting.  Significantly, the clues to the monks’ hiding place simulate a descent through
hell, an added layer of symbolic detail designed to deter the unworthy from pursuing the search.
If, as Mitchell suggests, “Texts present, in general, a greater threat to concepts of the
‘integrity’ or ‘purity’ of images than vice versa,”  then the contemporary works of popular literature157
that I have been examining in this case study—works that imprint words upon images, reducing them
to texts that are literally legible—can be said both to represent and to reenact the iconoclastic
movement of the Reformation.  This section, therefore, has two phenomena to explain.  First, in
reenacting Reformation iconoclasm, how do these works speak more broadly about the effects of
Renaissance-era discourses on contemporary life?  Second, in representing the iconoclasm of the
Reformation, and of the Reformation in England more particularly, what do these contemporary
Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (1994) (Chicago: University of Chicago157
Press, 1995), 209. 
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ludic interpretations of images—if we can somehow read backward in time —tell us about158
discourses of word and image during that period?
My answers to these questions focus upon the twinned concepts of iconophobia (or a fear of
images) and iconophilia (or an attraction to images).   I suggest that the two sentiments were deeply159
entwined with one another during the English Reformation, and that they remain so today, with the
result that a strict binary is of only limited utility in describing a culture’s reactions to images.  The
site at which the ludic and incarnational image is positioned is also a point of intersection between
iconophobic and iconophilic reactions; these images simultaneously repel and attract us, for their
complexity and richness are, on one hand, visually appealing and even fun while, on the other hand,
they are reminders of the frightening power that images can hold over us.  In Why Are Our Pictures
Puzzles? Elkins offers nine possible explanations for the widespread attitude among art historians
and critics that pictures are densely complex and therefore need to be solved.  What I am suggesting
here is a tenth hypothesis, one that Elkins has not explored.
[W]hat happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the158
works of art which preceded it.  The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is
modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them.  The existing order is
complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole
existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work
of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new.  Whoever has
approved this idea of order, of the form of European, of English literature, will not find it preposterous that
the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past.
T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919), in The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism (1928)
(London: Methuen, 1969), 47–59, 49–50.
Thomas F. X. Noble places iconophobia and iconophilia on a hypothetical continuum between the extremes159
of iconoclasm (the destruction of images) and iconodulia (the worship of images).  “Neither Iconoclasm Nor Iconodulia,”
95.  James A. Knapp adopts a binary in which iconophobia is associated with the Reformation and iconophilia is
associated with Roman Catholicism.  Image Ethics, 4. 
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1. Iconophilia in the English Reformation
As I have been arguing, contemporary, ludic interpretations of Renaissance-era images bear
traces of early modern interpretive and representational practices.  It is where those interpretations
may seem least credible and most torturous that they point most directly to a similarly playful and
extravagant facet of a certain class of pictures created during the English Reformation: Holbein’s The
French Ambassadors (Figure 17), Scrots’ King Edward VI (Figures 18 and 19), and the anonymous
corrugated anamorphosis of a woman and a skull (Figures 20 and 21).
These images, however, are not at all what we might expect to see during the English
Reformation.   First, like Maignan’s anamorphic fresco of St. Francis di Paola (Figures 15 and 16),160
these works seem to be more acceptable to a Roman Catholic sensibility than to a Reformed one. 
Not merely incarnational, they also tend to evoke the doctrine of transubstantiation in the way that
they present one thing as almost magically consisting of two essences.  Scrots’ anamorphic portrait
of Prince Edward is similarly out of place given its sitter’s deep distrust of images and the fact that
images were vigorously broken in his name as part of the English Reformation’s most determined
phase of iconoclasm.  The sheer novelty of the corrugated anamorphic memento mori positions that
Except where I have cited to other sources, my account of the history of images in the English Reformation160
is indebted to John Phillips’ Reformation of Images.  Throughout this account, the reader should remain sensitive to
Phillips’ wise cautionary note: “iconoclasm itself is too complex a phenomenon to be identified simply with a type of
religious thinking.”  Ibid., 7.  Waldron also observes the complexities inherent in attempts to generalize briefly about
the theology of images during the period: “the differences among ‘Anglicans,’ ‘puritans,’ and others during this period
were often those of emphasis and degree rather than kind—a sliding scale of temperature within the same current of
Protestant culture.”  Reformations of the Body, 11.
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piece as mannerist in execution and design,  therefore associating it more closely with Counter-161
Reformation tendencies than with those of the Reformation.162
Moreover, these works are strikingly inconsistent with even the fairly liberal and tolerant
views of Martin Luther toward images; although images were acceptable for use in teaching,
“Luther’s mandate hardly changed images for the better,” Koerner says.  “Didacticism required that
the image become less rather than more: less visually seductive, less emotionally charged, less
semantically rich.”   Little commentary is required to demonstrate that the images examined above163
do not fit this description.
If these images from the English Reformation do not square with Lutheran sentiments about
images, then they are certainly well beyond what English Calvinists might have been expected to
tolerate.  Calvinists’ views on images were much more radical than Luther’s,  and they were much164
more influential on the iconoclastic movement in Reformed English thought.  What James Simpson
calls “legislated iconoclasm” was official state policy in England for over a century, from 1538 to
1643, “despite periods of respite and image-making within those years,”  and this state-sanctioned165
See James V. Mirollo, Mannerism and Renaissance Poetry: Concept, Mode, Inner Design (New Haven,161
CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
See Nikolaus Pevsner, “The Architecture of Mannerism,” in Readings in Art History, ed. Harold Spencer162
(New York: Scribner’s, 1969), 2:119–48.
Reformation of the Image, 28.  Koerner also describes the “formal blandness” and “semantic transparency”163
of Lutheran images.  Ibid., 36.
See ibid., 58.164
Under the Hammer, 5.165
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destruction of images principally drew from Calvinist doctrine,  although images were broken first166
in the name of Lollardy and later in that of Puritanism.  Although it is important to note that Calvin
distinguished between quick and dead images, so that “Liveliness” became what Waldron calls “the
defining attribute for lawful channels of communication with the divine,”  Calvin’s emphasis on167
Christ as the “true ‘lively image’ of God” renders human bodies, rather than painted images, the
cardinal lawful means for expressing devotion.168
Quite typically, Elizabeth was more moderate in her position on images, although she did
acquiesce at one point in her reign to the destruction of the remaining crucifixes in English Reformed
churches.   The doctrine of the Elizabethan settlement was primarily a functional one, focusing less169
on the content and style of an image than on how it was used, yet it almost insistently refused to
define with precision what constituted proper and improper use.   We know, however, that170
Elizabeth came to replace forbidden icons with images of royal power, like her portrait or coat of
arms, and the result of this move was often a rather flat rendering of the monarch—in an iconic
style—more similar to what we saw in Hilliard’s The Pelican Portrait (Figure 23) than in the other
images that I have analyzed in this case study.
Indeed, it is only with the advent of the Stuart dynasty and later of William Laud’s
archepiscopacy—well after the composition dates of the images in question here—that we begin to
According to Hans Belting, Karlstadt’s views about images were similar—removing them was “an166
opportunity for activism.”  Likeness and Presence, 459.  Zwingli advocated “a middle position” of removing images in
an orderly manner.  Ibid., 460.  
Reformations of the Body, 29.167
Ibid., 48.168
Raguin, “You Are What You Wear,” 79–80.169
See generally Phillips, Reformation of Images, 114–15.170
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see a shift in attitudes that might comport with the style of those images.   James continued the171
ambiguous terms of the Elizabethan Settlement in public statements, but in actual practice he
relished the comeliness that accompanied his adornment of royal chapels with, in John Phillips’
account, “gilded figures of apostles and patriarchs.”   Laud advocated a liturgy that appealed to all172
of the senses, not excluding the visual, and Charles advanced his program in that regard, perhaps
even more aggressively than Laud himself would have desired.  Sympathetic preachers included John
Donne and Lancelot Andrewes.  For Donne, the identification of a practice with Roman Catholicism,
such as the use of images to decorate a service, did not render that practice inherently illegitimate
in a Reformed context: “It is a perverse way, rather to abolish Things and Names [. . .] because they
have been abused, then to reduce them to their right use.”   McCullough has compared Andrewes’173
vision to Luther’s in its “composite logo-iconophilia.”   But the fact remains: Holbein, Scrots, and174
the anonymous painter of the corrugated anamorphosis were, in at least this sense, ahead of their
time.
A logical counter-argument—that those images are secular rather than religious in purpose
and design—is not quite tenable.  First, granting the objection that Scrots’ anamorphic portrait of
young prince Edward is principally secular in nature, Holbein and the anonymous creator of the
corrugated anamorphosis are quite evidently communicating religious content in their works. 
Holbein’s half-concealed cross converts his image of two state officials into a meditation on the
Although Richard Hooker did not explicitly mention images in his works of Reformed theology, “he sets171
the stage for their acceptance and re-entry into churches.”  Ibid., 137.
Ibid., 141.172
S, 7:325.173
“Lancelot Andrewes’ Transforming Passions,” Huntington Library Quarterly 71, no. 4 (December 2008):174
573–89, 583.
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hiddenness of God, and the corrugated anamorphosis (perhaps even more so than Holbein’s similarly
themed painting) seems intended as a private devotional reminder of the sitter’s mortality, a memento
mori that prompts the sitter and other viewers to recall the centrality of non-earthly concerns to their
lives.  Second, the images with which I opened this case study cannot be considered flat or
impoverished when they are considered carefully: Cranach’s Hallowed Be Thy Name (Figure 8) and
the anonymous frontispiece to Milbourne’s The Christian Pattern Paraphras’d (Figure 9), although
didactic and religious in nature, are notably rich in design despite the fact that they are neither
anamorphic nor designed to contain concealed images. 
As a consequence, there must be a thread of iconophilia woven into the iconophobic tapestry
that constitutes iconoclastic thought during the English Reformation.   Indeed, Simpson has noted175
just that such a phenomenon is nearly inevitable: “Even as evangelicals insisted on the utter
lifelessness of the image, their attack evokes the spectral presence of the image.”   Such a theory176
might explain the popularity of two other genres of discourse during the period: rebuses, what
Koerner calls “verbal-visual picture puzzles” in which “evangelical polemic and pedagogy [were]
often couched,”  and emblems, which married word and image into a single, fused unit.  In other177
words, the superimposition of the verbal upon the visual that we saw in contemporary popular texts
Knapp approaches this theory in advancing his thesis that, although “early modern English culture was175
predominantly antivisual,” “the period’s literature reveals an obsession with visual experience.”  Image Ethics, 1–2.
Under the Hammer, 70.176
Reformation of the Image, 285.177
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about Renaissance images is not a new phenomenon at all; it merely continues a Reformation-era
strategy for managing anxieties about purely visual discourses.178
2. Iconophobia Today
Reformation iconoclasm was simply one manifestation of the West’s long tradition of
iconophobia, “a fear of imagery,” as Mitchell puts it, traceable to the ancient Greeks and Hebrews
and still very much a part of contemporary consciousness.   “Everyone knows,” he says, “that179
television is bad for you and that its badness has something to do with the passivity and fixation of
the spectator.  But then people have always known, at least since Moses denounced the Golden Calf,
that images were dangerous.”   Fear of the image expresses itself in the Platonic and Christian idea180
of the uncertainty of appearances and what Jurgis Baltrušaitis calls “the inconstancy and vanity of
the world.”   It parallels the association of the self with a speaking and thinking subject and of the181
Koerner, for instance, discusses the unusual emergence of altarpieces that consisted not of images but of178
framed words, in which language was “Materialized for display.”  Ibid., 289.  As Koerner explains, “where one expects
to find a subordination of all external codes—images, writing, ritual, etc.—to the signified, to inner sense, to the message
in the heart, one instead discovers language.”  Ibid. 
 
I am indebted to James A. Knapp for the idea that early modern English culture exhibited “an anxiety over the
use of images.”  Image Ethics, 32.  As he explains, the common “interjection of words into visual images” was a way
to “contain visual excess.”  Ibid., 35.  But see also Huston Diehl’s study of Reformation-era English theater, in which
he argues that language, for the Calvinist mind, sanctified the naked visuality of the Roman Catholic sacraments.  Staging
Reform, Reforming the Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theater in Early Modern England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1997), 103–105.
Iconology, 157–58.  For the Platonic roots of iconophobia, see Besançon, The Forbidden Image, 36. 179
According to Jean Baudrillard, “the millenial quarrel” of the iconoclasts “is still with us today.”  Simulations, trans. Paul
Foss and Paul Patton (New York: Semiotext[e], 1983), 8.  See also Mitchell, Iconology, 112 (“iconophobic and
iconoclastic rhetoric [. . .] pervades the discourse we call ‘criticism’ in Western culture”).  For accounts of contemporary
image destruction in the West, manifesting a continuing kind of iconophobia, see Graham Howes, “Art under Attack:
Histories of British Iconoclasm,” Art & Christianity, no. 76 (Winter 2013): 6–7; and Sande, “Iconoclasm in History.”
Picture Theory, 2.180
Anamorphic Art, 70.  See also Tassi, Scandal of Images, 38 (“The plentiful tirades against spectacle and181
spectatorship [during the English Renaissance] reflect a Platonic distrust of the world of appearances, which is
apprehended primarily through the eyes”).
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Other with, as Mitchell puts it, “a silent, observable object, a visual image.”   And it resonates with182
another “longstanding binary opposition” that Tassi has noted: the privileged realm of mentation and
reason versus the inferiority of sensual, bodily, erotic existence.183
I suspect that iconophobia is also a force in the texts that I have analyzed in this study, and
particularly in those which seem to make images legible by transforming them into words.  The kinds
of paintings which these works typically feature are not merely images but objects of monetary and
cultural value.  They are things that the wealthy buy and sell, display in their homes, or donate to
museums; they are things that the educated study, visit, and understand; they are artifacts of a history
that is rarely taught and that therefore seems distant, alien, and intimidating, whose language we can
neither speak nor understand.  They are associated, in other words, with status.  Contemporary
popular texts simultaneously appeal to, or perhaps exploit, our fear that we are outsiders (i.e., that
we do not understand these images) and our desire to be considered insiders (i.e., that we do
understand them).184
This conclusion resonates with the existence of an elitist aura that has long been associated
with objects of art; the greatest Renaissance paintings, as Edgar Wind says, “were designed for
“Word and Image,” 55.  Mitchell has also argued that an idol can be considered as “an image overvalued182
(in our opinion) by an other: by pagans and primitives; by children or foolish women; by Papists and ideologues.” 
Iconology, 112.
Scandal of Images, 22 (“painting belongs to the realm of the senses, the eyes, the body; poetry belongs to183
the realm of the mind, reason, understanding”).
Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code “gives the reader the misleading impression of being fully initiated into184
the history of ‘high’ art and literature, of being an Übermensch of literary and artistic culture.”  Ivanovitch, “Dan
Brown,” 315.  Mexal argues that “it reveals a deep longing, in a global, transnational public, for a coherent master
historical narrative.”  “Realism,” 1091–92.
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initiates; hence they require an initiation.”   Keith Moxey argues that the hermetic quality of185
Hieronymus Bosch’s work, for example, has been “interpreted as a device by which meaning could
be hidden from those who were regarded as socially (and morally) inferior.”   The vogue for186
hieroglyphics and emblems, according to Panofsky, was fueled in part by the appeal of “an
ideographic vocabulary independent of linguistic differences, expansible ad libitum and intelligible
only to an international elite.”   There existed during the Renaissance what Settis has described as187
an “elitist delight in the inexplicit which only the ‘initiated’ few could understand.”   Art “strove188
for a code of iconographic ambiguity, and served the private learning of the few people who could
understand it.”   This constellation of ideas has roots in the Western tradition going back at least189
as far as Christian Rome and On Christian Doctrine, in which St. Augustine wrote that the Holy
Spirit contrived ambiguities within Scripture in order “to conquer pride by work and to combat
disdain in our minds, to which those things which are easily discovered seem frequently to become
worthless.”  190
Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (1958), new and enlarged ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967),185
15.
Practice of Theory, 113.186
“Titian’s Allegory of Prudence,” 159.187
Giorgione’s Tempest, 127.188
Ibid., 137.189
On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 37 (2.6.7).  Significantly190
for the present study, St. Augustine also identifies a ludic dimension to scriptural obscurity: “in a strange way, I
contemplate the saints more pleasantly when I envisage them as the teeth of the Church cutting off men from their errors
and transferring them to her body after their hardness has been softened as if by being bitten and chewed.”  Ibid.  St.
Augustine does not venture an explanation for the pleasures of obscurity, instead describing them as “a problem for
another discussion.”  Ibid., 38 (2.6.8).
230
My tentative conclusion is also consistent with an “anxiety to interpret” postulated by Alberto
Manguel—“even the absence of language becomes language in the eye of the beholder.”   Elkins,191
in particular, suggests that even art historians and critics
write so much because we fear not writing, where “not writing” is understood in
absolute terms as not speaking, not teaching, not knowing what to say, and
ultimately, not understanding.  Art history and criticism would then be driven by an
inverse perversity, speaking continuously in order not to spend time thinking about
the fact that visual objects have nothing obviously or simply to do with speaking. 
The incessant claims to knowledge would be the symptoms of a low-level
ineradicable anxiety about understanding artworks.  (WAOPP, 249)
“Art history as a whole,” Elkins continues, “may be a collection of ways of coping with a feeling of
helpless bewilderment—a feeling that grows whenever we take the time to attend to the persistent,
senseless silence of images”  (WAOPP, 249).  Jean Baudrillard offers a similar explanation for
Renaissance iconoclasm.  The iconoclasts’ “metaphysical despair” resulted from “the overwhelming,
destructive truth” that icons suggest:
that ultimately there has never been any God, that only the simulacrum exists, indeed
that God himself has only ever been his own simulacrum, [. . .] the idea that the
images concealed nothing at all, and that in fact they were not images [. . .] but
actually perfect simulacra forever radiant with their own fascination.  But this death
of the divine referential has to be exorcised at all cost.192
Reading Pictures, 29 (quoting Giovanna Franci, L’anzia dell’interpretazione [Modena: Mucchi, 1989]).191
Simulations, 8–9.192
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If iconophobia is a product of our recognition that mute and powerless images, in Mitchell’s words,
“may be in the process of taking power, appropriating a voice,”  then contemporary popular texts193
suggest that it also results from our recognition of the possibility that we may lack power ourselves.
Yet the instability of the word/image dialectic means that iconophobia never exists without
a dimension of iconophilia, and vice versa.  According to Moshe Barasch:  
Even the most enthusiastic champion of pictures acknowledges, by the very fact that
he or she has to defend the image’s validity, that the object of his or her veneration
is problematic.  On the other hand, the student also knows that the philosophers,
religious or political leaders, or simply fanatical believers who rejected sacred images
as lies, as appearances lacking in substance, rarely merely neglected or ignored them,
as one would perhaps expect if something is believed to be devoid of truth and
vigor.194
God forbade the Jews from making idols, but then directed them to make an ark topped by images
of cherubs.  If Plato’s suspicion of the sensory world makes him “the father of iconoclasm,” as Alain
Besançon calls him, he is also “the father of iconophilia, since he completely justifies man’s desire
to contemplate divine beauty.”   And one of the principal arguments against idolatry—the non-195
physical and therefore unrepresentable nature of the Divine—leads to the conclusion that when the
Scriptures say that God made humanity “in His image” what they mean is that the human mind and
Iconology, 151.193
Icon: Studies in the History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 1–2.  Similarly,194
Baudrillard says that “the iconoclasts, who are often accused of despising and denying images, were in fact the ones who
accorded them their actual worth, unlike the iconolaters, who saw in them only reflections and were content to venerate
God at one remove.”  Simulations, 9.  
Forbidden Image, 36.195
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soul, traditionally more highly valued in the West than the body, are themselves images, created in
the likeness of the Divine essence, the Logos, the Word.196
This ambivalence toward the image, a simultaneous repulsion and attraction, is as much a
part of the Western tradition as either iconophobia or iconophilia alone, and it can also be seen in
the texts that this chapter has explored.  Although heresy is a consistent theme in these works, they
position Church orthodoxy as the true province of the heretic, and the heroes of those texts tend to
be engaged in a struggle to reveal a truth that the Church would suppress as heretical; even the priest
sent to investigate Leonardo’s heresy in The Secret Supper becomes a Cathar.  Although the image
is presented as a site of danger—to possess it or to know its secret is to become a target for
murder—the denouement inevitably presents the image as a source of truth and virtue; the act of
deciphering and reading it yields a victory over evil and a return to normalcy.
The idea that images possess hidden meanings which can be deciphered and read in textual
terms might therefore be a strange way of ascribing value to those images, of appropriating them,
or of inscribing the value of the written word upon them.  Even assuming that this approach
represents an imperfect or unsophisticated understanding of how images function (an assumption,
of course, which is not to be cavalierly made), it nevertheless constitutes an attempt at
comprehension, a gesture in the direction of finding within the inaccessible Otherness of images
something that can be appreciated and known.  As a result, to understand the image as a vessel of
verbal or textual meaning is not necessarily to privilege the latter over the former.  The image is a
Ibid., 93.  See also Barasch, Icon, 134–35.196
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code which conceals, and in this sense its virtue is to be mysterious, as well as a code which
communicates, and in this sense its virtue is to be clear.197
According to Martin Jay, “we may well be entering a new period of distrusting vision, an era
reminiscent of the other great iconoclastic moments in Western culture.”   Mitchell, on the other198
hand, interprets this anxiety about the visual as “a sure sign that a pictorial turn is taking place.”  199
Regardless of which view is ultimately correct, popular texts like The Da Vinci Code are critical
evidence of our culture’s attitude toward both words and images.  O’Connell says that “Iconoclasm
was an important social aspect of the Reformation in Europe, far-reaching in its impact on the
national cultures it touched.”   I contend that iconoclasm and the fear of images that animated it200
were such powerful forces during the period that their echoes are still audible today.201
Gombrich, “Icones Symbolicae,” 167.197
“The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism,” Poetics Today 9, no. 2 (1988): 307–26, 313. 198
See also O’Connell, Idolatrous Eye, 4 (“It is a striking fact that over the past two decades our own suspicions and
anxieties about the image have surfaced, apprehensions that, if not iconoclastic in their result, are pervasive in the
culture”).
Picture Theory, 13.199
Idolatrous Eye, 4.200
For a book-length treatment of a similar argument, see James Simpson’s Under the Hammer: Iconoclasm201
in the Anglo-American Tradition.  Simpson contends that “iconoclasm is not ‘somewhere else.’  Instead, it lies buried
deep within Western modernity, and especially deep within the Anglo-American tradition.”  Ibid., 11–12.  “The effects
of the century long, ferocious repression of the pre-Reformation visual regime by early modern evangelical English and
Scottish clerics are profound.  They continue to ripple through Anglo-American culture.”  Ibid., 15.
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E.  CODA
Herbert’s Play in Anamorphic Perspective
Like John Donne, George Herbert, whose insistently visual poem “The Altar” is the subject
of the next case study, plays in a mode that might be productively linked to anamorphosis.   Given202
Herbert’s penchant for experimenting with the relationships between words and images —not only203
in “The Altar” but also in “Easter-Wings,” “Coloss. 3.3,” and “Paradise”—it should not come as a
surprise that he would incorporate such a popular visual technique into his verse.  I shall consider
in this coda, which serves as a transition to the next chapter, three short lyrics in which Herbert plays
anamorphically. 
The bivalence of anamorphosis is a key element of “Redemption,” a central dimension of
how the poem operates upon its reader by forcing him or her, along with the poem’s speaker,
constantly to shift perspectives:
Having been tenant long to a rich Lord,
Not thriving, I resolved to be bold,
And make a suit unto him, to afford
A new small-rented lease, and cancell th’ old.
5 In heaven at his manour I him sought:
They told me there, that he was lately gone
About some land, which he had dearly bought
Long since on earth, to take possession.
I straight return’d, and knowing his great birth,
10 Sought him accordingly in great resorts;
In cities, theatres, gardens, parks, and courts:
At length I heard a ragged noise and mirth
See Eric B. Song, “Anamorphosis and the Religious Subject of George Herbert’s ‘Coloss. 3.3,’” Studies202
in English Literature, 1500–1900 47, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 107–21.  Song describes “Coloss. 3.3" as a “visual puzzle”
(ibid., 108), and asserts that “the incarnation lies at the heart of the poem” (ibid., 116).
Ibid., 107 (“George Herbert experiments in clever and often profound ways with the interplay between203
visual and literary traditions”).
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Of theeves and murderers: there I him espied,
Who straight, Your suit is granted, said, & died.204
The reader’s experience of perspective-shifting begins in the poem’s title and its first line.  Given
the obvious Christian theme of The Temple, we expect when we encounter “Redemption” to be
reading a poem about redemption in the religious sense, but the speaker’s immediate reference to
himself as a “tenant” (“R,” 1) suggests redemption in a legal sense, the “buying back of something
offered as security, [especially] mortgaged property or a pawned item” or “The action or fact of
discharging or paying off a debt, obligation, or charge.”   Later references in the poem confirm that205
the title is anamorphic in its bivalence.  “Lord” (“R,” 1) can reference Christ or allude to a feudal
land-owner; the “new small-rented lease” that the speaker seeks as a replacement or substitute for
“th’ old” (“R,” 4) is simultaneously another reference to a redemption transaction at law and an
allusion to a different kind of contract, the Old Testament covenant of law that is transcended and
fulfilled in Christ’s New Testament covenant of grace; and the speaker’s reference to the Lord being
“lately gone / About some land, which he had dearly bought / [. . .] to take possession” (“R,” 6–8)
captures both a literal, legal sense of redemption as well as the term’s Christian context, in which
Christ through the Incarnation reclaims the Creation generated by His spoken name.206
George Herbert, The English Poems of George Herbert, ed. C. A. Patrides (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and204
Littlefield, 1974), 60. All further citations to “Redemption” (“R”) will appear as parenthetical references to line numbers
in the main text.
Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., s.v. “redemption.”205
For Robert Kilgore, it is this final set of bivalences in the lyric’s second stanza that instantiate a transition206
from an understanding of the legal terms in a literal sense to one in the figurative and scriptural sense.  “Rereading
Ourselves in ‘Redemption,’” George Herbert Journal 26, no. 1–2 (Fall 2002–Spring 2003): 1–14, 7.  Richard Strier
concurs.  Love Known: Theology and Experience in George Herbert’s Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1983), 56.
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Not just a whimsical set of quibbling puns, the use of a bivalent legal term as the poem’s
principal structuring device is essential to the work that “Redemption” performs.   “Redemption”207
in its final moment is ultimately about Christ’s replacement of the covenant of law with the covenant
of grace.  To have the poem pivot on the two senses of its cardinal legal term is to enact within the
body of “Redemption” the process by which God rejects the legalistic order that had prevailed under
the Old Testament.  The fact that the reader must move back and forth between a legal and a
Christian sense of the word redemption provides him or her with a devotional reminder of the similar
shift in God’s relationship with His Creation.  “Redemption,” therefore, does not quite consume
itself in its closing line, as Stanley Fish might argue,  but instead stands as rather concrete and self-208
subsistent memento of the powerful effect of the Incarnation.
It is not only the reader who must change perspectives in order to perceive aright but rather
the speaker as well.  Critical commentary on “Redemption” has emphasized the speaker’s muddled
understanding of his proper relationship to Christ,  and Esther Gilman Richey has even gone so far209
According to Esther Gilman Richey, the poem’s reliance specifically on terms from the law of property is207
the key to understanding “Redemption.”  “The Property of God: Luther, Calvin, and Herbert’s Sacrifice Sequence,”
English Literary History 78, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 287–314.
Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth Century Literature, Medieval and Renaissance208
Literary Studies (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1994).  Fish does not consider “Redemption” in his masterful
analysis of poems from The Temple.  I would grant that there is a sense in which the poem fulfills itself in the final
line—in much the same way that Christ’s Sacrifice fulfills the harsh demands of Old Testament law—but I resist the
notion that Herbert’s concluding gesture in this regard is one of self-consumption.
See, for example, Chana Bloch, Spelling the Word: George Herbert and the Bible (Berkeley: University209
of California Press, 1985), 151; Julia Carolyn Guernsey, The Pulse of Praise: Form as a Second Self in the Poetry of
George Herbert (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1999), 184; Arnold Stein, George Herbert’s Lyrics (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 123; and Kathleen J. Weatherford, “Silence and the Triumph of Poetry: Closure
in Three Poems by George Herbert,” Orbis Litterarum 48, no. 2 (July 1993): 194–211, 198.
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as to claim that he “walks through heaven blind.”   He fundamentally misconceives the nature of210
Christ when he goes in search of the Savior “In heaven at his manour” (“R,” 5) and “in great resorts;
/ In cities, theatres, gardens, parks, and courts” (“R,” 10–11), instead finding, “At length” (“R,” 12),
his Lord suffering on the Cross in the wretched company “Of theeves and murderers” (“R,” 13).  The
jarring shift in perspective required by the speaker’s realization that, in the Incarnation, the Son of
God becomes fully and abjectly human is emphasized by the enjambment between stanzas three and
four: “At length I heard a ragged noise and mirth // Of theeves and murderers: there I him espied,
/ Who straight, Your suit is granted, said, & died” (“R.” 12–14).  It is the “theeves and murderers”
from whom we expect to hear “ragged noise,” and it is from Divine that we expect the sound of
“mirth”—instead, we are suddenly prompted to hear, with the completion of the final sentence, the
harsh sounds of misery associated with the Crucifixion and an allusion to the sounds of mirth from
those who mock the Savior’s suffering on the Cross.  Again, the divergent Old Testament and New
Testament perspectives come into conflict here, “Redemption” mediating between them while the
poem’s speaker, with the reader, undergoes “trials of interpretation” until the anamorphic bivalence
of the poem resolves itself, through the perfect power of Christ’s intervening Divine language, into
a complete picture.211
Herbert’s anamorphic art works differently in “Jesu” and “Heaven,” in which the focus is less
on the readers’ or speakers’ perceptions than on the bivalences that become evident in the
“‘Small Rent’: Seventeenth-Century Parable and the Politics of Redemption,” Studies in Philology 92, no.210
1 (Winter 1995): 102–17, 110.  She has come, however, to reject or at least to qualify that assertion: “He is not a dolt,
[. . .] or naïve, or a fool.”  “Property of God,” 302.
Kilgore, “Rereading Ourselves,” 3.211
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interactions between Divine and human language.  In “Jesu,” the Christian speaker undergoes a
conversion experience when he realizes that Christ’s name bears hidden significance:
J E S U is in my heart, his sacred name
Is deeply carved there: but th’other week
A great affliction broke the little frame,
Ev’n all to pieces: which I went to seek:
5 And first I found the corner, where was J,
After, where E S, and next where U was graved.
When I had got these parcels, instantly
I sat me down to spell them, and perceived
That to my broken heart he was I ease you,
10 And to my whole is J E S U.212
As we have already seen, this nearly cabalistic attribution of obscure meanings to etymologies and
to the letters within words is a fairly common source of Renaissance-era linguistic play.  In this
particular instance, Herbert reflects on the fact that Christ’s name—quite literally the Word of
God—incarnates that which Christ does,  providing “ease” (“J,” 9) or comfort to the weary who213
suffer “great affliction” (“J,” 3), when seen from a different metaphorical angle or perspective, one
that requires us to perceive the name “Jesu” as a set of distinct and discrete letters.  Significantly,
a fact that as far as I have been able to ascertain has gone unnoticed in the relatively sparse scholarly
work on “Jesu,” the double meaning that the poem’s speaker finds within Christ’s name only
manifests itself when that name is rendered in its Latin vocative case.  In other words, only when one
calls upon Christ is the inherent redemptive power within His name actualized.
Herbert, English Poems, 125.  All further citations to “Jesu” (“J”) will appear as parenthetical references212
to line numbers in the main text.
See Patricia Canning, “‘The bodie and the letters both’: ‘Blending’ the Rules of Early Modern Religion,”213
Language and Literature 17, no. 3 (2008): 187–203, 189 (the poem “draws the readers’ attention to the textual
incarnation of Christ as the ‘Word’ by invoking a chain of conceptual metaphors that interact with grammatical and
phonological puns, all of which operate on the name ‘JESU’”).  See also John Reid, “Observing the Law of the Letter:
Order in George Herbert’s Hieroglyphs,” Idéologies  dans le monde Anglo-Saxon 8 (1995): 147–58, 153 (the poem has
“enacted the eucharistic ritual of the breaking of the body of Christ, thus bestowing on the text a sacramental quality”).
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“Heaven” works similarly by finding hidden significances in the sounds of words when they
are “viewed” or understood from a different perspective, as instances of speech:
O who will show me those delights on high?
Echo. I.
Thou Echo, thou art mortall, all men know.
Echo. No.
5 Wert thou not born among the trees and leaves?
Echo. Leaves.
And are there any leaves, that still abide?
Echo. Bide.
What leaves are they? impart the matter wholly.
10 Echo. Holy.
Are holy leaves the Echo then of blisse?
Echo. Yes.
Then tell me, what is that supreme delight?
Echo. Light.
15 Light to the minde: what shall the will enjoy?
Echo. Joy.
But are there cares and businesse with the pleasure?
Echo. Leisure.
Light, joy, and leisure; but shall they persever?
20 Echo. Ever.214
On one level, the poem represents the questioning and solitary speaker reflecting on his relationship
with Christ, yet the sounds that he hears in his own words possess an independent significance,
transforming “Heaven” when viewed from this perspective into something like a catechistic exercise,
with God Himself as the instructor.   What the speaker hears is not the echo of his own voice, but215
Herbert, English Poems, 191.  All further citations to “Heaven” (“H”) will appear as parenthetical214
references to line numbers in the main text.
Like Stanley Fish, The Living Temple: George Herbert and Catechizing (Berkeley: University of California215
Press, 1978), Glenn Klopfenstein sees “Heaven” as a poem whose central conceit is the idea that God Himself catechizes
or instructs the properly attentive Christian.  “Herbert’s ‘Heaven,’” Explicator 51, no. 1 (Fall 1992): 10–12.  See also
Janis Lull, The Poem in Time: Reading George Herbert’s Revisions of The Church (Newark: University of Delaware
Press, 1990), 133–36.  Inge Leimberg disagrees.  “Echo Restored: A Reading of George Herbert’s ‘Heaven,’”
Connotations 16, no. 1–3 (2006–2007): 11–25, 13–14.
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the indwelling Christ speaking directly to him.   Divine discourse, when viewed from this oblique216
perspective, is revealed to be so potent that it even reveals itself in the language of human beings,
hidden like God Himself but accessible to the listener who attends closely to that still voice.  From
the standpoint of ludics, it is important to note that the “pleasure”/“Leisure” pairing (“H,” 17–18)
emphasizes the central relationship in Herbert’s The Temple between devotion and play; the pleasure
that accrues to the devout Christian as his heavenly reward includes a form of recreation or the
opportunity to re-create himself—or to have God re-create him.
Understanding George Herbert’s use of anamorphic techniques in his verse prepares us to
consider more closely “The Altar,” a shaped poem that itself embodies not one but two images, in
the next case study.
^
P. S. Weibly has emphasized the fact that the speaker of the poem is hearing God’s voice echoed back to216
him in his own words.  “George Herbert’s ‘Heaven’: The Eloquence of Silence,” George Herbert Journal 4, no. 2
(Spring 1981): 1–9.  As Leimberg puts it, “Echo reminds him of what he already knows.” “Echo Restored,” 19.
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Figure 25.  George Herbert, “The Altar,” from the Bodleian
Manuscript of The Temple (MS. Tanner 307 fol. 15v), 1633. 
Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University, Oxford.1
The image of George Herbert’s shaped poem, “The Altar,” appears simple and
unitary, like the poem itself, but the shape is actually multistable, betraying upon
closer examination not just one but two images within it.  This sub-surface
complexity will emerge in the following case study as an important component of
Herbert’s poetic strategy in “The Altar.”
See also The Temple: A Diplomatic Edition of the Bodleian Manuscript (Tanner 307), ed. Mario A. Di1
Cesare (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1995), 39.  All further citations to “The Altar”
(“A”) will appear as parenthetical references to line numbers in the main text and footnotes.
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IV.  A CASE STUDY OF LUDIC POETRY IN THE RENAISSANCE
Recreation and Re-Creation in “The Altar”:
The History of a Form and the Reform of Meaning
Sir, I pray deliver this little Book to my dear brother Ferrer, and tell
him, he shall find in it a picture of the many spiritual Conflicts that
have past betwixt God and my Soul, before I could subject mine to
the will of Jesus my Master, in whose service I have now found
perfect freedom; desire him to read it, and then if he can think it may
turn to the advantage of any dejected poor Soul, let it be made
publick; if not, let him burn it, for I and it, are less than the least of
Gods mercies.2
—George Herbert
According to Jean-Christophe Van Thienen, this passage from Izaack Walton, embodying George
Herbert’s apocryphal last words, “reveals Herbert’s will to turn The Temple into ‘a picture,’ i.e. an
‘imago’ of a new sort, the emblem of Anglican salvation, and to replace the Bible of the Illiterate
with his own set of mental pictures so as to reconcile man to God.”   In thus approaching The Temple3
as a work of “verbal iconoclasm,”  in which Herbert sought to convert and appropriate to the Church4
of England a long-established set of visual and textual discourses, Van Thienen situates Herbert’s
poetic project in The Temple within the array of debates that I explored in the previous case study. 
Herbert, for Van Thienen, is an iconoclast, one who shatters the images of previous generations in
Izaack Walton, The Life of Mr. George Herbert (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1670), 109.2
“George Herbert’s Anglican Recycling,” in The Déjà-vu and the Authentic: Reprise, Recycling,3
Recuperating in Anglophone Literature and Culture, ed. Jean-Jacques Chardin (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing, 2012), 195–210, 209.
Ibid.4
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favor of a new way of seeing, but he is also an image-maker in the Gregorian tradition, creating a
didactic picture from which even the unlettered can learn the lessons of salvation.  There thus reside
in The Temple—as described by Walton and as inflected by Van Thienen’s observations—strains
both of the iconophobic and of the iconophilic traditions within Western discourse.  This much
should be unsurprising.  Given my argument that iconophobia and iconophilia are thoroughly
intertwined during the English Reformation, and given Herbert’s fusion of word and image in pattern
poems like “The Altar” and “Easter-Wings,” one would expect to see this type of tension emerge
from a close examination of The Temple.
What is more unexpected in Van Thienen’s analysis, and what is more pertinent for the
purposes of this final case study, is the fact that Herbert is engaged in a re-creative project in The
Temple.  As the inheritor of a tradition of words and images that included Hebraic, pagan, and
Roman Catholic influences, Herbert faced the challenge of converting—to use Van Thienen’s
term—the pagan and Hebraic elements of that tradition to a Christian use, the Roman Catholic
components of that tradition to a Protestant use, and both elements of the tradition to a context
specific to the Protestantism of the Church of England.   Given the close connections between the
concepts of re-creation and recreation in Renaissance England, the re-creative nature of Herbert’s
work in The Temple becomes associated with a form of recreation that is not what we would
anticipate from a figure more commonly associated with sincere gravity than with play.5
Moreover, we see in Walton’s description of Herbert’s final words hints of another important
feature of Herbert’s mission in The Temple.  The picture that, according to Walton, Herbert wished
to draw was of a highly abstract and intangible notion: “the many spiritual Conflicts that have past
But see Frank J. Warnke, Versions of Baroque: European Literature in the Seventeenth Century (New5
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), 94 (an “extreme element of the play-spirit hovers constantly over the Temple”).
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betwixt God and my Soul.”  Of course, the problem of how (and, indeed, whether) to depict an
immaterial God is part and parcel of the tensions within Western discourses between iconophobia
and iconophilia.  But how does one figure the immortal soul, much less a spiritual conflict passing
between the soul and the God to which it aspires?  To materialize, to embody in a fashion that can
be rendered in words or images, this notion is to epitomize the poet’s strange and ultimately fanciful
undertaking: to “give[] to airy nothing / A local habitation and a name.”6
The following case study explores one site within George Herbert’s The Temple at which
these strands of thought unite: “The Altar,” an anamorphic poem that re-creatively and recreatively
materializes, embodies, and incarnates language—indeed, an entire tradition of word/image
discourses—into a concrete image in meditative imitation of the Word that was made Flesh.   Within7
The Temple, Herbert plays perhaps most conspicuously in “The Altar,” a poem that incarnates and
materializes language by rendering words into the image of an object.  
Not coincidentally, it is among Herbert’s best-known pieces, an apparent novelty that can
produce a flash of recognition even outside the community of Renaissance scholars.  Something
about this impression of novelty, however, seems to cheapen the poem, reducing it to a mere
gimmick.  Indeed, in a recent literary biography of George Herbert, John Drury barely mentions “The
Altar” at all—it seems in his eyes to be a trifle, hefty on the page but not entitled to the same serious
consideration as Herbert’s other verse.  Where Drury chooses to reference it, moreover, he seems
William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream 5.1.16–17, in The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the6
Oxford Edition, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, and Katharine Eisaman Maus (New
York: Norton, 2008), 839–96.
I am not the first to posit a connection between patterned verse and incarnationalism.  See, for example,7
chap. 1, “The Word Made Flesh,” in Willard Bohn, Reading Visual Poetry (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press, 2011).  Bohn, however, never develops the idea encapsulated in his chapter title into a fully formed argument,
relying instead on the evocative notion to introduce his text, a history of shaped verse in the twentieth century. 
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to damn it with faint praise, describing it and other instances of patterned verse in The Temple as
“heartfelt,” as if Herbert’s notoriously sincere tone were the best index of meaning.   Likewise, many8
critics of Herbert’s patterned verse tend to dismiss it as a curiosity.  Joan Bennett, for example,
attributes Herbert’s interest in the genre to “a child-like quality of mind” (“he liked word games”)
and describes pattern poetry as “a naïve device” but one that suffices for “the simple mood” of “The
Altar.”   This assessment is by no means a new phenomenon; although pattern poems attracted some9
notable defenders like George Puttenham,  the chorus of detractors was both louder and more10
eloquent.   Ben Jonson, for example, lambasted pattern poems as “A paire of sizers and a Combe11
in verse,” and Gabriel Harvey complained that there was “Nothinge so absurde and fruteles, but
beinge once taken upp shall have sume imitatoures.”   Yet “The Altar” ranks among the richest and12
most complex pieces in The Temple.  Belying its visual unity and simplicity, its almost monolithic
Music at Midnight: The Life and Poetry of George Herbert (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014),8
314.  Although Drury disagrees with John Dryden’s famous condemnation of shaped verse, arguing that “the insinuation
that the writing of figure poems could only be a kind of quaint fiddling about falls and fails with Herbert,” Drury
diminishes the tradition’s importance in understanding these poems (and particularly “The Altar”) by claiming that they
are “not at all distorted by their appearance or dependent on it (they work aurally as well as visually) for their effect.” 
Ibid.
Five Metaphysical Poets, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 63–64.  Bennett9
concludes that Herbert’s verse “leaves the impression of an unsophisticated mind.”  Ibid., 63.  In a similar vein, Louis
Untermeyer calls Herbert’s pattern poems “shaped whimsies” and observes that “Herbert’s sense of play is so free as to
be freakish.”  Play in Poetry: The Henry Ward Beecher Lectures Delivered at Amherst College; October, 1937 (New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1938), 28.
“[T]hose trifles are come from many former siecles unto our times, vncontrolled or condemned or supprest10
by any Pope or Patriarch or other seuere censor of the ciuill maners of men, but haue bene in all ages permitted as the
conuenient solaces and recreations of mans wit.”  The Arte of English Poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), 85.
See Dick Higgins, Pattern Poetry: Guide to an Unknown Literature (Albany: State University of New York11
Press, 1987), 14–15.  Joseph H. Summers notes that “Both before and after 1633 the literary quality of most of these
poems was notoriously low,” and offers a set of explanations for the frequent critical condemnation of pattern poems
during the Renaissance.  George Herbert: His Religion and Art (1954) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1968), 140.
Ben Jonson, Execration against Vvlcan (London: J. Okes, 1640), 2, line 38; Gabriel Harvey, Letter-book12
of Gabriel Harvey, A.D. 1573–1580, vol. 33 of Publications of the Royal Historical Society, ed. Edward John Long Scott
(Westminster, UK: Camden Society, 1884), 100.
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appearance on the page, this poem embeds within itself an intricate array of structures, allusions, and
subtexts.  These manifold complexities suggest a concerted strategy to imitate the Creation, the13
Incarnation, and the re-creative power of Christ’s Sacrifice by means of linguistic play.14
In the first section of this chapter, an overture, I shall introduce the raw materials with which
Herbert worked in crafting the remarkably complex poem, “The Altar,” by tracing the history of the
patterned verse tradition back to its pagan origins so that it will become possible to reveal the ways
in which Herbert consecrates that tradition within the text/image matrix of the poem.  Section two
will offer a close reading of “The Altar” designed to tease out some of this unexpected complexity
and to disclose more of the poem’s heretofore hidden ludic dimension.  In section three, I shall
address the implications of this analysis by discussing what it might mean for Herbert to erect an
altar of words at the same time that altars of stone were being re-installed in churches throughout
England.  Finally, in a coda based upon Herbert’s prose work, A Priest to the Temple or, The
Countrey Parson His Character, and Rule of Holy Life, I shall attempt to bring my three case studies
full circle by reflecting upon the subject of Chapter II—the role of preaching within the Reformed
Church of England.
“[I]n both poems the relationship between material form and spiritual significance is neither simple nor13
straightforward.”  Martin Elsky, “George Herbert’s Pattern Poems and the Materiality of Language: A New Approach
to Renaissance Hieroglyphics,” ELH 50, no. 2 (Summer 1983): 245–60, 256.  The same is true of patterned verse in
general: “This poetry is characterized by a simplicity of image, an extreme unobtrusiveness, and a concentration of
meaning in which the complexity becomes only gradually apparent.”  Rosemary Freeman, “George Herbert and the
Emblem Books,” Review of English Studies 17, no. 66 (April 1941): 150–65, 157.
For a view on Herbert and the question of labor, see Robert Kilgore, “From ‘Employment’ (I) to ‘Grace’:14
George Herbert’s Restructuring of Work,” George Herbert Journal 35, no. 1–2 (Fall 2001–Spring 2012): 72–81; and
Amanda Taylor, “‘Use alone’: Usefulness and Revision in George Herbert’s The Temple,” George Herbert Journal 34,
no. 1–2 (Fall 2010–Spring 2011): 78–101, 91–96.
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A.  OVERTURE
Herbert’s Consecration of the Shaped-Verse Tradition
As a shaped poem, “The Altar” is implicated in a rich historical context, and an important dimension
of Herbert’s re-creative agenda in this piece is his deliberate and studied intervention in the tradition
of pattern poetry.   Therefore, to consider it “in isolation as [a] fluke[] of some kind,” as Dick15
Higgins says, is to miss its significance both as a poem and as a “cultural frame of reference.”   I16
suggest that Herbert’s medium becomes part of his message; his remaking of the shaped-verse
tradition enables him to physicalize the process of conversion in an imitation of the Divine Word that
became Flesh.
My account of the history of shaped verse draws principally upon the following sources, each of which15
supplies a much more complete treatment of the subject: Jeremy Adler, “Technopaigneia, carmina figurata, and Bilder-
Reime: Seventeenth-Century Figured Poetry in Historical Perspective,” Comparative Criticism 4 (1982): 107–47;
Margaret Church, “The First English Pattern Poems,” PMLA 61, no. 3 (September 1946): 636–50; Higgins, Pattern
Poetry; Kenneth B. Newell, Pattern Poetry: A Historical Critique from the Alexandrian Greeks to Dylan Thomas
(Boston: Marlborough House, 1976); and Bart Westerweel, Patterns and Patterning: A Study of Four Poems by George
Herbert, Costerus Series (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984).
George Herbert’s Pattern Poems: In Their Tradition (West Glover, VT: Unpublished Editions, 1977), 20. 16
Rosemond Tuve, of course, has stressed the importance of understanding the conventions and traditions that George
Herbert inherited; she therefore disapproves of the fact that “Partly because of the picture poems, ‘The Altar’ and ‘Easter-
wings’, he is often thought of as a writer who liked to perform stunts or toy with oddities.”  A Reading of George Herbert
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 138.  As Summers remarks, “Herbert, of course, no more invented the
pattern poem than he invented ‘emblematic poetry’ or the religious lyric: his originality lies in his achievement with
traditional materials.  ‘The Altar’ and ‘Easter-wings,’ his two most famous pattern poems, are not exotic or frivolous
oddities.”  George Herbert, 123.
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The earliest pattern poems in the Western tradition are the ancient Greek technopaigneia, a
term which translates as “games of skill.”    Six of these poems—most famously the axe, wings, and17
egg of Simmias of Rhodes but also including two later altar-shaped poems—survived the Middle
Ages to be published in the 1555 Greek Anthology, a text with which Herbert was almost certainly
familiar.18
Although the tradition of shaped verse displays obvious spiritual components, not to mention
bold markers of the ludic, Herbert’s relationship to this tradition is not necessarily uncomplicated. 
For example, although the Greek Anthology’s two altar poems have religious themes, one by
Dosiadas (Figure 26), according to Higgins, describes “a shamanistic sexual transformation of some
kind,”  and Simmias’ wing-shaped poems (see Figure 27) are tributes to the god Eros.  Given that19
Herbert directly imitated these poems in “The Altar” and “Easter-wings,”  one may justly consider20
their distinctly pagan origins to be deeply troubling.  As C. C. Brown and W. P. Ingoldsby write:
“Commentators seem to agree that all six poems were primarily exercises in wit, jeux d’esprit.” Adler,17
“Technopaigneia,” 109.  Adler also notes that the poems tended to “invite a playful, yet also concentrated, manner of
reading” in which “reading becomes a game.”  Ibid., 110.  Westerweel describes the two altar-shaped poems as “puzzle
poems” that encode the names, and test the reader’s knowledge, of the gods.  Patterns and Patterning, 68.  It is therefore
not surprising that “The Altar” and “Easter-wings,” as descendants of these poems, have been described in similarly ludic
terms.  See, for example, Leah S. Marcus, Childhood and Cultural Despair: A Theme and Variations in Seventeenth-
Century Literature (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), 110 (“the visual punning of ‘The Altar’ and
‘Easter-wings’ [. . .] display[s] the poet at play, building words into a sacred game for the glory of his heavenly Father”);
and Frank J. Warnke, “Sacred Play: Baroque Poetic Style,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 22, no. 4 (Summer
1964): 455–64, 456 (describing the poems as forms of “intellectual play”).
See C. C. Brown and W. P. Ingoldsby, “George Herbert’s ‘Easter-Wings,’” Huntington Library Quarterly18
35, no. 2 (February 1972): 131–42, 132; and Jeffrey S. Johnson, “Recreating the Word: Typology in Herbert’s ‘The
Altar,’” Christianity and Literature 37, no. 1 (Autumn 1987): 57–58.
Pattern Poetry, 19.19
For more on the influence of the Greek technopaigneia on Herbert’s patterned verse and on English pattern20
poems in general, see Johnson, “Recreating the Word,” 57–58.  See also Adler, “Technopaigneia,” 118 (“In England,
poets generally retained the actual shapes of the technopaigneia”); Higgins, Pattern Poetry, 208 (“almost all the English
pattern poetry uses shapes and forms derived from the Hellenistic Greek models”); and Higgins, “Pattern Poetry as
Paradigm,” Poetics Today 10, no. 2 (Summer 1989), 401–28, 414 (“The poet [of patterned verse] has not made
originality a priority but has worked within the traditions associated with the form he has chosen for a particular piece”).
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“[. . .] Herbert opened for himself the problem of defining an attitude toward the pagan [. . .] sources
from which the [poems] drew some of their meaning.”21
Figure 26.  The Altar of Dosiadas from W. R. Paton, trans., The
Greek Anthology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918),
5:132.
Reprinted by permission of the publishers and the Trustees of the Loeb Classical
Library from THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY, VOLUME V, Loeb Classical Library
® Volume 86, translated by W.R. Paton, p. 132, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, Copyright © 1918 by the President and Fellows of Harvard
College.  Loeb Classical Library ® is a registered trademark of the President and
Fellows of Harvard College.
Brown and Ingoldsby, “George Herbert’s ‘Easter-Wings,’” 131.21
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Figure 27.  The Wings of Simmias from W. R. Paton, trans., The
Greek Anthology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918),
5:126. 
Reprinted by permission of the publishers and the Trustees of the Loeb Classical
Library from THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY, VOLUME V, Loeb Classical Library
® Volume 86, translated by W.R. Paton, p. 126, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, Copyright © 1918 by the President and Fellows of Harvard
College.  Loeb Classical Library ® is a registered trademark of the President and
Fellows of Harvard College.
Yet this problem is itself an important dimension of the poems’ significance.  As Chana
Bloch has observed, one of Herbert’s fundamental concerns in The Temple is “making the old
new.”   My central contention, of course, is that “The Altar” is a re-creative text, in multiple22
overlapping senses; Herbert’s conversion of the pagan technopaigneia to Christian purposes both
reflects and embodies this important reformative endeavor.   He does not disguise the pagan origins23
of his shaped poems but rather embraces and even flaunts them; for Herbert to position “The Altar”
Spelling the Word: George Herbert and the Bible (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 113. 22
See also Van Thienen, “Anglican Recycling,” 199 (“[. . .] Herbert’s borrowings aimed at recycling—or
‘christianizing’—profane sources to define a new Anglican exempla”).
See Johnson, “Recreating the Word,” 58.  Herbert also re-forms one of his own Latin poems, an early23
disputatio from the Lucus that itself reworks ancient texts describing pagan sacrifices.  See M. Thomas Hester, “Altering
the Text of the Self: The Shapes of ‘The Altar,’” in A Fine Tuning: Studies of the Religious Poetry of Herbert and
Milton, ed. Mary A. Maleski (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1989), 95–116, 97.
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first among the pieces in “The Church” is for him to summon up associations with a pagan religious
structure, in which the altar was the first object one encountered upon entering the edifice.24
“The Altar,” for example, does not possess the form of a Christian altar but rather (as
Summers takes pains to point out when contesting the concept of an “extreme Anglo-Catholicism”
in Herbert’s work)  that of a Hebrew or even of a pagan sacrificial site.  And the tradition of25
technopaigneia likely began with the engraving of poems not in the shapes of pagan altars but on
the physical objects themselves.  However, for Herbert to adapt the pagan tradition of depicting
pagan altars in shaped poetry to the contemplation of Christ’s perfect Sacrifice—which obviated the
need for other sacrifices and for the pagan and Hebrew altars on which those sacrifices were
offered—is itself an extraordinarily powerful device of visual and historical rhetoric.  Converting
this pagan tradition to Christian purposes is simultaneously a commentary on and a poetic enactment
of the process of re-creation that the Crucifixion effected.  The Sacrifice of Christ as the incarnated
Word was both the embodiment and the fulfillment of Old Testament law; it was the means by which
God extended the grace of a new Covenant to His Creation, a new Covenant that thoroughly
realigned man’s relationship with the Divine and that re-created the human world.  “The Altar”
illustrates and imitates this process in poetic form.  As Herbert says in prose, the country parson is
Joseph H. Summers, The Heirs of Donne and Jonson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 95.  This24
effect is heightened by Herbert’s inclusion of “The Church-porch,” which Summers describes as in some respects “pre-
Christian,” as the first piece in The Temple.  Ibid.  In that long initiatory poem, heavily predicated upon a Horatian
poetics,  “Herbert put the traditional, classical [. . .] mixture of pleasure and profit to the uses of Christian didactic verse.” 
Ibid., 89.
George Herbert, 140.  Summers argues instead that examining the poem in the context of its tradition25
reveals it to be “religiously ‘low.’”  Ibid., 141.
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not ashamed to use any “forme”—“he reformes, and teaches” with it.   Such a re-formation (and26
re-creation) is precisely what Herbert accomplishes by exploiting the pagan origins of shaped verse
in “The Altar”: “to Christianize,” in Mary Ellen Rickey’s words, “a patently classical genre.”   The27
entire history of the technopaigneia tradition, including its pagan associations, is embedded within
“The Altar,”  and those associations are central to Herbert’s re-creative agenda in the pattern poem.28
After the Greek technopaigneia the next major development in the tradition of patterned
verse comes in the fourth century with the carmina quadrata of Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius, better
known to history as Porfyrius or Optatian.  His innovations defy easy description but readily register
on the eyes (Figure 28).  Resembling nothing if not a contemporary word-search puzzle,  this29
example of a carminum quadratum illustrates the defining principle of the form: it is composed in
the rough shape of a square.  Because the poem includes a secondary but complementary text
A Priest to the Temple, or, The Countrey Parson His Character, and Rule of Holy Life (London: T. Maxey,26
1652), 159 (emphasis supplied).  See also Stanley Stewart, George Herbert, Twayne’s English Author’s Series (Boston:
Twayne, 1986), 56.
Utmost Art: Complexity in the Verse of George Herbert (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966),27
121.  See also ibid., 15 (“The Altar, then, is no mere quaint vagary of a naive sensibility, as for two centuries it was
mistakenly thought to be, or even an eccentricity redeemed by its skillful combination of Biblical allusions, but rather
its maker’s declaration of God’s ability to turn all of experience, even pagan tradition, to His own”).
Dick Higgins observes that the English poets’ imitation of shapes from the ancient Greek technopaigneia28
“is an instance of evoking these works from the past more or less automatically.  [. . .]  [A] Greek used the wing form,
and so, if an English poet does the same, he evokes the Greek, at least to another Englishman who is familiar with the
literature.  In this way its meanings and associations are encoded in its shape.”  Pattern Poetry, 208.  A poet’s
incorporation of visual patterns or shapes into his verse was “perhaps comparable to the function of allusion that is so
much at the heart of our traditional verse.”  Ibid., 6.  Bart Westerweel sees Herbert imitating not just the form of these
poems but also some of their content; “he manages to preserve some of the idioms of his classical examples, turning them
into images with surprisingly fresh meanings.”  Patterns and Patterning, 73.  According to Charles A. Huttar, “Prominent
for the earliest sixteenth-century practitioners of the [emblem] form was a consciousness of their continuity with the
ancient world.”  “Herbert and the Emblematic Tradition,” in Like Season’d Timber: New Essays on George Herbert, ed.
Edmund Miller and Robert DiYanni, Seventeenth-Century Texts and Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 59–100,
61.
See P. G. Stanwood and Lee M. Johnson, “The Structure of Wit: ‘Is all good structure in a winding stair?’”29
in The Wit of Seventeenth-Century Poetry, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 1995), 22–41, 24 (“Optatian certainly constructed his poems with intense elaboration, but the finished
buildings, pushed together with such devotion, have the significance of a Times crossword”).
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cancelled out from the background, an intextus that can be read independently of the poem as a
whole, the poem also exemplifies a related form, the carminum cancellatum.
Figure 28.  Publilius Optatianus Porfyrius, “Carmen XIX,” c. 325. 
Zentralbibliothek Zürich (call number Rh 84,2).
The chi-rho monogram in this poem points to one of Optatian’s major contributions to the
tradition of patterned verse: he made it, as Jeremy Adler says, “a fit vehicle for Christianity” and
“prepared a metaphysical basis for the medium utilized by writers well into the Renaissance and
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beyond: the poem’s meaningful shape reflected the significant order of God’s universe.”   Christ30
is symbolically implicated in Optatian’s text in much the same way that the Living Word was
thought to be immanent in the fabric of reality, rendering both Himself and the Creation legible to
a sufficiently sensitive reader.31
Optatian’s use of the monogram also illustrates the importance of individual letters to the
form, an element of the shaped verse tradition that would significantly influence Renaissance
practice in general and Herbert’s entry into the genre in particular.  Martin Elsky positions the shaped
poems that developed from Optatian’s emphasis on letters within the context of Renaissance
linguistic theory, a fusion of Humanism, Neoplatonism, and cabalistic interests in which words were
“material things that belong to the same network of resemblances that endows natural objects with
allegorical meaning.”   Letters received as much attention as words in this theory, so much so that32
the process of forming words from letters was, according to Higgins, “a very sacred one indeed, part
of the divine game of realizing things out of their underlying numbers or letters.”   For example, a33
1603 treatise by Alexander Top, The Oliue Leafe; or, Vniuersall Abce, posited that God called the
22 letters of the Hebrew alphabet into being at the time of Creation in order to signify each of the
things He created.  According to Elsky, Top argued that “Hebrew letters are hieroglyphs intrinsically
“Technopaigneia,” 111.  For more on the relevance of the “book of nature” topos to seventeenth-century30
poetics, see Summers, George Herbert, 15; and Tuve, A Reading of George Herbert, 103–104.
Rosalie Colie notes that, for many early theologians, “it is axiomatic that the experience of the divine can31
be expressed only by the fundamental word for words that recollects, fits back all subsidiary words into itself, the logos.” 
Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 97. 
“George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 245.32
George Herbert’s Pattern Poems, 8.  See also Elsky, “George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 246–47.33
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connected to the things they represent,” so that “the material condition of written language is a
shadow of the spiritual meaning of its words.”34
Among the poets who contributed to the tradition of shaped verse during the Middle Ages,
Hrabanus Maurus stands out for his introduction of much more elaborate visual images into the
carminum cancellatum form.  Figure 29, a poem from De laudibus sanctae crucis, features an image
of Christ’s crucified body superimposed upon the background poem while the letters within Christ’s
form spell out several distinct intexti.  Christ’s halo, for example, not only reveals the Latin phrase
“King of kings and Lord of lords” hidden within the principal text, but also makes prominent use of
the Greek letters alpha, mu, and omega, which represent Christ’s status as the beginning, middle, and
end of Creation.
Elsky, “George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 251.34
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Figure 29.  Hrabanus Maurus, carminum cancellatum from De
laudibus sanctae crucis, c. 835.  Österreichische Nationalbibliothek,
Wien.
The fact that crucifixes and images of Christ’s body appear frequently in Hrabanus’ carmina
cancellata warrants emphasis.  His display of Christ’s corporeal form symbolically reenacts the
Incarnation in which Word became Flesh; Hrabanus’ text is simultaneously the background from
which Christ emerges and the framework that gives shape to His image.  The poem is therefore a
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superb piece of what James S. Baumlin has called incarnational rhetoric,  and it would have been35
an ideal model for Herbert to follow.   Given the fact that Hrabanus was an abbot, the poem must36
also be understood in a monastic context.  During the Middle Ages members of monastic
communities relieved the tedium of their solitude and prevented the sin of acedia or idleness by
means of projects requiring great skill and intellectual effort, projects that they considered to be
forms of recreation.   Because, according to Kenneth B. Newell, “all carmina were composed in the37
service of God, more painstaking skill and complexity in the lettering and ornamentation were
indicative of a stronger piety and were greatly to be desired.”   Thus, the obvious intricacy of38
Hrabanus’ poems enables the composition of those works to be recognized as a mode of playful
worship.   Finally, the fact that Hrabanus chose to depict the suffering Christ implicates the poem’s39
reader in a monastic process of meditation.
See John Donne and the Rhetorics of Renaissance Discourse (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,35
1991).
Hrabanus’ works were widely available in the seventeenth century.  Dick Higgins, “Pattern Poetry as36
Paradigm,” 410.
The monastic justification for recreation is that “such pleasure may dispel acedia and alleviate tediousness,37
thereby forestalling unprofitable restlessness.”  Understanding this fact “helps us to avoid the oversimple equation of
recreation with triviality.”  Glending Olson, Literature as Recreation in the Later Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1982), 113.  See also Alessandro Arcangeli, Recreation in the Renaissance: Attitudes towards Leisure
and Pastimes in European Culture, c. 1425–1675, Early Modern History (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),
15–16; and Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture (1948), trans. Alexander Dru (1952) (New York: New American
Library / Mentor-Omega, 1963), 38–39.
Newell, Pattern Poetry, 3, 15.  Jeremy Adler is therefore not entirely correct when he asserts that medieval38
pattern poets replaced the “whimsicality” of earlier technopaigneia “with a profound seriousness.”  “Technopaigneia,”
110.  The carmina cancellata of Hrabanus and others were a form of serio ludere, serious play in which whimsy and
gravity happily coexisted.
Gustavus Selenus exploited the resemblance between Hrabanus’ creations and play  in the Cryptomenytices39
et Cryptographiae (1624), which included poems by both Hrabanus and Optatian along with codes and puzzles.  Higgins,
“Pattern Poetry as Paradigm,” 409.  See also Stanwood and Johnson, “The Structure of Wit,” 24.
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Figure 30.  Stephen Hawes, untitled poem from The Conuercyon of
Swerers (London: Wynkyn de Worde 1509).  The British Library,
London.
© The British Library Board, Mic.A.778.(11.)
Patterned verse in English begins in 1509, when a late-medieval aesthetic still held sway in
Britain, with an untitled poem in Stephen Hawes’ The Conuercyon of Swerers.   As seen in Figure40
30, the poem explicitly refers to an accompanying illustration in which the suffering Christ presents
his wounded body as an object of meditative contemplation: “Behold thou my syde / Wounded so
See Church, “The First English Pattern Poems,” 637.40
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ryght wyde / Bledyng sore that tyde / all for thyn owne sake.”   Hawes’ adaptation of the form to41
English verse therefore incorporates not only Hrabanus’ use of the poem’s text as an object of
somber reflection about Christ’s Passion but also his emphasis on Christ’s corporal form.  In
addition, Hawes continues the tradition in which the composition of poetry is associated with a
virtuous, productive, and edifying form of recreation; as he writes earlier in the collection, his
objective in composing the poems was to “eschewe ydlenesse” and thereby to avoid the sinful vice
of acedia.42
In Hawes’ work one can witness a fusion of patterned verse with the distinct tradition of the
emblem book, which was nascent in Britain but long in vogue on the Continent by the early sixteenth
century.   The winged shape of Hawes’ untitled poem and the words which form that shape43
reciprocally reinforce the power of the accompanying image in much the same way that the discrete
components of an emblem—pictura (the image central to the emblem), inscriptio (the heading, title,
or motto appearing above the pictura), and subscriptio (the verse piece accompanying the emblem
and printed beneath it) —explicated and commented upon each other.  Rosemary Freeman has44
thoroughly documented the connections between emblematic practice in English literature and
The Gothic lettering, the relatively primitive typography, and the intervention of an image of Christ in41
Hawes’ poem combine to obscure the precise nature of the visual pattern that Hawes was constructing.  Church describes
it as “a pair of wings; the initial three lines contain one syllable.  The syllables increase until the middle point of the poem
is reached and then the length of the lines begins to decrease until the last three lines.”  Ibid.
Ibid.  Puttenham noted that some readers of patterned verse were occupied in a similar endeavor, for such42
poems were “fittest for the pretie amourets in Court to entertaine their seruants and the time withal, their delicate wits
requiring some commendable exercise to keepe them from idlenesse.”  The Arte of English Poesie, 75.
Perhaps the definitive study of how the emblem book tradition was adopted and inflected in English43
literature is Rosemary Freeman’s English Emblem Books (1948) (New York: Octagon Books, 1966).  See also Mario
Praz, Studies in Seventeenth-Century Imagery, 2nd ed. (1964), Sussidi eruditi (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,
1975).
Huttar, “Herbert and the Emblematic Tradition,” 61.44
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contemporary theories about the value of play and recreation.   Mildmay Fane’s 1648 emblem book,45
which Freeman describes as “a collection of poems consciously, and often indeed fantastically,
emblematic,” powerfully illustrates this connection.   His work’s Latin title, Otia Sacra, means46
“holy leisure” and thus strongly implies that the intimate relationship that arose during the Middle
Ages among play, meditation, and poetry persisted in English devotional poetry well into the
Renaissance.
The forms of patterned verse associated with the ancient Greek technopaigneia and those
derived from Roman and medieval carmina figurata ultimately converged, with the intervening
mediation of emblematic poetry, in a coalescence that manifested itself in what Adler calls “the
flowering of figured poetry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”   “At every point,” he says,47
“the form seems embedded in a network of contemporary practices, interests and beliefs.”   Central48
among these myriad connections was the idea, explored in depth by Michel Foucault,  that the49
human institution of language was not merely a set of arbitrary signs but rather a phenomenon deeply
affiliated with—and even embedded within—nature and the fabric of reality itself.   Poets and50
Freeman explains that the symbolism of an emblem “was just difficult enough to make the discovery of its45
meaning an intellectual adventure of a not too strenuous kind.”  “George Herbert and the Emblem Books,” 153.
Ibid., 150.46
“Technopaigneia,” 114.47
Ibid.48
See The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966), trans. Alan Sheridan (1970)49
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 35 (“In its raw, historical sixteenth-century being, language is not an arbitrary system;
it has been set down in the world and forms a part of it”).
Adler, “Technopaigneia,” 128.50
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critics also understood patterned verse in the context of their interest in the Cabbala.   The practice51
of reading in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was in some senses akin to decipherment.  Even
a text’s individual letters were, Anne Ferry says, “an emblem of divine order and a source of
power,”  and, as a consequence, according to John Reid, “letters received attention as physical52
objects themselves.”   The innovations of Optatian in this regard were especially influential53
examples for Renaissance practitioners of patterned verse who composed works in which the shapes
of letters featured as prominently as the shapes of things.54
Charles A. Huttar says that shaped verse “has come to be better appreciated as we have
learned more about its venerable pedigree, its standing in the aesthetic thought of the time, and its
artistic purposes.”   Although true as a general statement, this claim is especially applicable to the55
patterned verse of George Herbert.  Familiarity with the tradition within which Herbert was operating
makes it possible to appreciate the ways in which he worked—and played—with that tradition in
“The Altar,” and in turn to understand the poem in its full richness and complexity.
Herbert’s re-formation of the pagan elements of the shaped-verse tradition was intimately
personal; long before composing the poems of The Temple, Herbert was a well known writer of Latin
Ibid., 127.  See also Higgins, Pattern Poetry, 175–76 (“pattern poetry reappeared in the renaissance more51
or less concurrently with the spread of cabbalism”).  “Recent research has uncovered the full extent to which a fascination
for alphabetical symbolism, an interest in Hebrew as the original language and a science of visible letters were ongoing
concerns in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe.”  John Reid, “Observing the Law of the Letter: Order in
George Herbert’s Hieroglyphs,” Idéologies dans le monde Anglo-Saxon 8 (1995): 148.  Interest in the Cabbala during
the Renaissance was heavily inflected by Christian doctrine, as in Johannes Reuchlin’s De arte cabbalistica (1517),
which one observer describes as an example of Christian Cabbalism.  See Ana Hatherly, A Experiência do Prodigio:
Bases teóreticas e antologia de textos-visuais portugueses dos séculos 17 e 18 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional / Casa de
Moeda, 1983).
The Art of Naming (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 1.52
“Observing the Law,” 148–49.53
See Elsky, “George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 245.54
“Herbert and the Emblematic Tradition,” 76.55
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and Greek verse in the classical style, and much of his poetry was in the tradition of The Greek
Anthology.   These “elaborately ornamental poems,” as Joseph H. Summers calls them, themselves56
illustrate Herbert’s playful proclivities and Herbert’s interest in a ludic poiesis.   For example, in57
“In metri genus” (“On the Type of Meter”), Herbert writes “tot ludat numeris antiqua poesis,”
rendered in translation as “classic poetry frolics / In so many different meters.”   The word “ludat,”58
of course, might more appropriately be translated as “plays” than “frolics.”  More conspicuously
ludic in form and style is a series of anti-Papist poems playing on various anagrams of the word
Roma, including amor (“love”), oram (“frontier”), ramo (“branch”), armo (“shoulder”), and mora
(“delay”).   Of course, Herbert was already operating within a long tradition in exploiting these59
commonly recognized anagrams;  using them against instead of in praise of Rome, however, was60
itself a form a way of reworking that tradition.  Herbert, in fact, condemned the Puritan polemicist
Andrew Melville for composing poems that abandoned tradition: “For only fads are pleasing to the
Puritans; / Words and ways of doing things are changed.”61
Aspects of “The Altar” can be traced directly to Herbert’s early Latin and Greek poems.  In
Λοnι¬ Θυσία (“Reasonable Sacrifice”), Herbert writes that dead earth at the Creation was an altar
George Herbert, The Latin Poetry of George Herbert: A Bilingual Edition, trans. Mark McCloskey and56
Paul R. Murphy (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 1965), vi.  These poems—particularly Musae Responsoriae ad
Andreae Melvini Scoti Anti-Tami-Cami-Categoriam (“Poems in Response to the Scotsman Andrew Melville’s Con-
Oxford-Cambridge Accusations”)—are more explicitly and strongly anti-Puritan than anything Herbert ever wrote in
English.  The fact that this poem is in Latin, and therefore not likely to be as widely read as The Temple, might help to
account for the fact that many critics insist on a radically Protestant view of Herbert.  See ibid.
The Heirs of Donne and Jonson, 87.57
Herbert, Latin Poetry, 10–11.58
Ibid., 102–105.59
See, for example, Alan Cameron, “Ancient Anagrams,” American Journal of Philology 116, no. 3 (Autumn60
1995): 477–84; and Damien Nelis, “Wordplay in Vergil and Claudian,” Dictynna 3 (2006): 255–63.
Herbert, Latin Poetry, 9.61
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and that earth infused with the Divine breath became man; the two are ultimately united in Christ
so that “man becomes / The living altar of God.”   The concept that the individual human subject62
is fused through the efficacy of Christ’s Passion with the sacrificial altars of the Old Covenant is,
of course, a central focus of “The Altar,” an emphasis that will be explored more fully in the
conclusion of this section.  And the syllogistic form of the poem finds its origins in ancient texts
describing pagan sacrifices.63
Not surprisingly, the Christian components of the shaped-verse tradition are also germane
to Herbert’s re-creative purposes in “The Altar.”   As were many intellectuals during the64
Renaissance, Herbert was deeply invested in the trope of world as text.  An artistic tradition capable
of literalizing that concept as clearly and dramatically as Optatian’s and Hrabanus’ carmina
cancellata would have had an obvious appeal to Herbert for its myriad expressive possibilities. 
Pattern poetry, even in its earliest manifestations, Adler says, “came to reflect the nature of the world
as divine book.”   Both carmina are obvious poetic representations and imitations of the65
fundamental idea of the Incarnation—Word made Flesh.  In Optatian’s carminum in Figure 28, with
its intextus in the form of the chi-rho monogram representing the name of Christ, the letters of the
Word emerge from a pattern of letters which form words in multiple configurations.  In Hrabanus’
poem in Figure 29, the embodied Word in the form of the crucified Christ emerges from the words
of the carminum quadratum and takes form as a separate intextus composed of the separate cancelled
Ibid., 107.62
Philip Dust, “George Herbert’s Two Altar Poems,” Humanistica Lovaniensia 24 (1975): 278–87.  See also63
Hester, “Altering the Text of the Self,” 97–98.
See, for example, Christopher Hodgkins, Authority, Church, and Society in George Herbert: Return to the64
Middle Way (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), 165; and Barbara K. Lewalski, Protestant Poetics and the
Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 311–12.
“Technopaigneia,” 113.65
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words and letters.  Both examples foreground the concept of Christ’s immanence in the physical
world by displaying His symbolic and physical presence as immanent in the poems’ texts.
Herbert exploits this tradition in “The Altar,” a poem which physicalizes the metaphor of
Word made Flesh by converting letters and words into the image of the thing that it describes. 
Herbert contemplates Christ’s perfect Sacrifice in “The Altar” by claiming the redemptive power of
the Passion for himself (“O lett thy blessed sacrifice be mine” [“A,” 15]).  Optatian’s and Hrabanus’
contributions to the shaped-verse tradition enable Herbert to accomplish this innovation, in which
an entire poem, rather than a cancelled image within it, is given over to the idea of the Creation as
a legible text with Christ as its language and central message.  Herbert, therefore, is not merely re-
creating or re-forming an aspect of the tradition in which he his operating; he is also using that
tradition to comment on and to imitate the re-creative force of the Passion.
Herbert’s fascination with the idea of the Incarnation, Christ’s embodiment in human form,
points to another way in which Herbert reinvents the Christian elements of the patterned-verse
tradition in “The Altar.”  A poem like “The Bag” vividly, and perhaps even grotesquely, illustrates
Herbert’s engagement with the idea of Christ’s physicality.  Herbert describes the Word’s descent
into human form as a kind of “undressing” and His assumption of a physical body as an investiture
in “new clothes.”  The bag of the poem’s title ultimately proves to be the wound in Christ’s side,
which Herbert’s Christ offers as a depository for “any thing to send or write / [. . .] / Unto my fathers
hands and sight.”   Hrabanus and Hawes feature the suffering, pierced, and broken body of Christ66
prominently in their works in Figures 29 and 30.  Although “The Altar” does not figure Christ’s
George Herbert, The English Poems of George Herbert, ed. C. A. Patrides (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and66
Littlefield, 1974), 159–60.  Herbert uses similar imagery in “The Thanksgiving,” where he addresses Christ by saying
“all thy body was one doore.”  Ibid., 56.
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body, it contemplates the physicality of Christ by reference to the Incarnation and Passion as
efficacious sacrifices.  More significant, however, is the fact that the poem is an embodiment of a
physical object.  Henry Vaughan, that notorious imitator of Herbert, referred to shaped poems as
“Bodyed Idea’s.”   “The Altar” introduces the first series of poems in “The Church,” a section of67
The Temple named after the institution which is considered to be, as George Ryley stressed in his
1715 commentary on The Temple, the body of Christ.   Embodiment and physicalization, important68
dimensions of the patterned-verse tradition, are therefore present in modified or re-created forms in
“The Altar.”
These two ideas, the popular Renaissance trope of world as text and the centrality of
embodiment to the Christian tradition of shaped verse, fuse and lead into a third facet of that
tradition which Herbert exploits and reforms: Optatian’s use of letters as shapes in his carmina
cancellata.  As Elsky argues, the theory of the material basis of language was an important
dimension of the patterned-verse tradition, and the hieroglyphic significance of letters was in turn
a significant element of this theory.   It is by now uncontroversial that “The Altar” anamorphically69
resembles the capital letter I as well as an altar.   As a result, Elsky’s argument features a prominent70
lacuna.  Although Elsky describes “The Altar” by observing that “instead of letters being imprinted
“To Etesia (for Timander,) the First Sight,” in The Complete Poetry of Henry Vaughan, ed. French Fogle,67
The Stuart Editions Series (New York: New York University Press, 1965), 394.  See also Freeman, “George Herbert and
the Emblem Books,” 156.
Mr. Herbert’s Temple and Church Militant Explained and Improved (1715), ed. Maureen Boyd and Cedric68
C. Brown (New York: Garland, 1987), 20.
 “George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 246–47.69
See, for example, Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, 141; Lewalski, Protestant Poetics, 105; and Summers,70
George Herbert, 145.
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on a thing [. . .] a thing is imprinted in an arrangement of letters,”  he never discusses the71
significance of the fact that the poem is shaped like a letter as well as an object; he says that
“Herbert’s pattern poems spell God’s Word by building up letters into pictures” (258), but he never
notes that, in “The Altar,” that picture is itself a letter.
The fact that the thing that Herbert is imprinting in an arrangement of letters is another letter
is a profoundly reflexive and suggestive artistic choice because, in ways that even Elsky does not
acknowledge, “The Altar” “illustrate[s] the way Herbert sees meaning as divinely ordained in the
sensible elements of language” (252).  Among many circles during the Renaissance, letters were
understood to possess hieroglyphic qualities; they possessed a symbolic significance connecting
them to physical things (248).  In a commentary on Guillaume de Salluste du Bartas’ influential 1578
thesis Deuine Weekes and Workes, Simon Goulart stressed the continuities between the original
language of God, Hebrew, and its contemporary descendants, including English.  In particular,
Goulart argued that “the God-given capacity of language to signify persists through time,” and that
letters continue to possess nearly magical semantic significance (251).72
“George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 255.  Subsequent citations in this discussion appear as parenthetical71
references in the main text.
In his 1568 work De recta et emendata linguae Anglicae scriptione, dialogus, Thomas Smith described72
the process of forming words from letters as an exaedificare, a building.  Ibid., 248.  This idea creates a close connection
between my argument about “The Altar” and Stanley Fish’s claim about The Temple as a whole: “My thesis can be stated
simply: the temple of Herbert’s title is the ‘spirituall Temple’ that is built up by catechisms to be the dwelling place of
God.”  The Living Temple: George Herbert and Catechizing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 54.
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And the fact that the letter formed by the shape of the altar in Herbert’s poem is an I is highly
salient to his re-creative work in the piece: the shape of “The Altar” alters itself,  depending on73
one’s perspective,  so that it represents not only the site of a sacrifice but also the individual human74
subject.  It is, of course, that subject who is central to the theology of Reformed Christianity, because
it is the individual person upon whom Christ’s perfect Sacrifice was bestowed (an inversion of the
pagan and Hebraic idea that man offers sacrifices to God) and with whom God forges a personal
relationship through the mediation of Christ (an inversion of Roman Catholicism’s emphasis on the
Church as mediator of that relationship).   For a poet who saw profound significance in the ability75
of English poets to pun on the words son and sun,  the fact that a pagan or Hebrew altar could be76
altered into the shape of an I would have been extraordinarily important, an imitation of how
meaning is divinely ordained in the sensible elements of language.   For Herbert, this coincidence,77
as it might seem to us, would have embedded within it a mystical testimony to the truth of the
As Fish notes, “the pun is not beyond Herbert.”  Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth73
Century Literature, Medieval and Renaissance Literary Studies (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1994), 212. 
See also Mark Taylor, The Soul in Paraphrase: George Herbert’s Poetics, De proprietatibus litterarum: Series practica
(The Hague: Mouton, 1974), 51 (“[. . .] Herbert often shows a playful interest in the homographic, homophonic, or quasi-
homophonic resemblances of words”).
Colie has noted the anamorphic nature of the image generated by the poem.  Paradoxia Epidemica, 307. 74
Adler writes of its “visual ambiguity, where a second image emerges from the first like the product of a vision.” 
“Technopaigneia,” 133.  This notion, which brings to mind the kind of optical illusion that has often been exploited in
parlor games, returns us to the realm of the ludic, for the word “illusion” is derived from the Latin ludere, meaning “to
play.”
I am indebted to Albert C. Labriola for this observation, which he develops more fully in “The Rock and75
the Hard Place: Biblical Typology and Herbert’s ‘The Altar,’” George Herbert Journal 10, no. 1–2 (Fall 1986): 61–69.
Herbert, “The Sonne,” in English Poems, 173–74 (“Let forrain nations of their language boast, / [. . .] / I76
like our language, as our men and coast: / [. . .] / How neatly doe we give one onely name / To parents issue and the
sunnes bright starre!”).
See Reid, “Observing the Law,” 157 (“Herbert in effect harnesses the Adamic power of the letter so as to77
give it a specifically Christian function and signification”).
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conversion wrought by the New Covenant (and by the Reformation): a conversion, re-formation, and
alteration that is played out and played upon in the textual and visual fabric of the poem itself.78
B.  A CLOSE READING
“Nothinge so absurde”: Herbert at Play in “The Altar”
It is a critical commonplace that Herbert is squaring form with content in “The Altar,” but that is,
according to Rosalie Colie, only “the crudest sense” in which we can understand the poem.   Up to79
this point, I have been considering the poem not as a textual artifact but rather as an intervention in
a larger tradition of patterned verse.  However, turning to its textual contexts within the array of
poems in The Temple as well as to the language of the piece itself reveals a finer granularity of detail
that supports my conclusion in the previous section: Herbert is engaged in a playful mode of poiesis
in “The Altar,” one that imitates the incarnational qualities of Divine language by converting Word
into Flesh.  This section begins with a treatment of “The Altar” in its larger context, specifically
investigating its apparently incongruous position within The Temple and “The Church”; we shall
revisit in this connection the poem’s I shape, which not only resolves that seeming incongruity but
also becomes significant to the poem’s meaning in terms of its status as an emblem and its operation
as a figure for Herbert’s self.  Moving then toward an investigation of the language of “The Altar,”
the second segment of this section argues that recreation (or re-creation) and incarnationalism
become most evident in the text of the poem when it is understood as a structure designed to guide
a transformative reading, a gradual process of confusion and revelation that ends with an altered or
Austin Warren, Rage for Order: Essays in Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 3178
(“Occasionally Herbert seeks to incarnate the theme of a poem in its very shape”).
Paradoxia Epidemica, 195.  Colie also warns us that, not just with “The Altar” but with the poems of The79
Temple more broadly, “The more one tries to say something intelligent [. . .] the more gibberish one tends to talk.”  Ibid.,
190.
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re-created conception of the piece’s subject matter and of the reader’s relationship to God.  A brief
conclusion ends this section, which is followed by a discussion of the implications of the readings
that now follow.
1. “The Altar” in the Context of The Temple
Presumably referring to the fact that one of the shapes generated by “The Altar” is that of a
pagan or Hebraic sacrificial site, an altar that would have been positioned at the entrance to a larger
edifice, Stanley Fish cites the cardinal position of “The Altar” within “The Church” as a key problem
in need of a solution.   Why, in other words, is a non-Christian altar positioned at the beginning of80
a patently Christian work, particularly in light of the fact that this positioning seems to connote a
pagan or Hebraic temple rather than a Christian one?  Although I have already offered one solution
to that potential problem in the previous section—the idea that Herbert is foregrounding the non-
Christian origins of the shaped verse tradition in order better and more dramatically to display a
consecration and re-creation of that tradition with his entry into the genre—the question is also
addressed by the fact that the poem is shaped like the letter I, which is not only the English personal
pronoun denoting the self but also the Roman numeral one.81
Living Temple, 140.  John Hollander offers some tentative solutions to this ostensible problem—that the80
shape is the ruin of a classical altar or that it is “broken” (“A,” 1) “because it violates some of the traditional shaping of
the familiar technopaignia”—but his claims are insufficiently developed to be satisfactory.  Vision and Resonance: Two
Senses of Poetic Form (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 263.  For a more creditable set of possible
explanations, see Elsky, “George Herbert’s Pattern Poems,” 256–57.
As far as I have been able to ascertain, I am the first scholar of the poem to have noticed this dimension81
of its shape.  Others—like Labriola, “The Rock and the Hard Place,” 61, and Julia Carolyn Guernsey, The Pulse of
Praise: Form as a Second Self in the Poetry of George Herbert (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1999), 39, for
instance—have noticed the capital I shape and have exploited it in their readings, but no one has pointed out that the letter
I is itself multivalent.
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Taking this sense of the poem’s shape, it is possible to approach the poem as if it were a
dedicatory verse for the entire volume, or at least for its largest segment, “The Church.”   As Arnold82
Stein says, “[. . .] ‘The Altar’ introduces more than one hundred and fifty poems in which the poet
does not hold his peace.”   Or, as Summers declares, “In an important sense this, the first poem83
within ‘The Church’ . . . is the altar upon which the following poems (Herbert’s ‘sacrifice of praise’)
are offered, and it is an explanation of the reason for their composition.”   To read and understand84
the poem in this fashion is to give new meaning and significance to the phrase, “These stones to
praise thee may not cease” (“A,” 14); the “stones” in this case become connate not only with the
parts of the speaker’s “hard heart” (“A,” 10) but also with the poems that follow, each poem serving
as a stone used to construct The Temple.85
What should also be evident by this point is the profound complexity and multivalence of
this simple-seeming poem,  its tendency to signify excessively and therefore playfully.  Moreover,86
we should see a gesture in the direction of the incarnational: Herbert is collapsing his entire volume
Robert B. Shaw, The Call of God: The Theme of Vocation in the Poetry of Donne and Herbert (Cambridge,82
MA: Cowley Publications, 1981), 102.  For an argument that “The Altar” functions as a title-page to “The Church,” see
Paul Dyck, “Altar, Heart, Title-Page: The Image of Holy Reading,” English Literary Renaissance 43, no. 3 (September
2013): 541–71.
George Herbert’s Lyrics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 109.83
George Herbert, 142.84
John Hollander opines that one of Simmias’ egg-shaped poems is “about poetry, about creation and85
tradition, [. . .] and about its own shape.”  Vision and Resonance, 256.  To consecrate a pagan poetic form to Christian
purposes, and to place a notable example of that conversion first among a collection of verse, is in a sense to consecrate
poetry itself.
Helen Vendler asserts that “The Altar” is distinctly Herbert’s by virtue of “its peculiar mixture of apparent86
naïveté with genuine obscurity.”  The Poetry of George Herbert (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 61. 
“[. . .] Herbert, like most of the better poets of his period, was striving for maximal expressivity, for something not unlike
the psychedelic in our own era.  He shaped poetry to endow it with a new dimension.”  J. Max Patrick, “Critical Problems
in Editing George Herbert’s The Temple,” in The Editor as Critic and the Critic as Editor, by J. Max Patrick and Alan
Roper, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Seminar Papers (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial
Library, 1973), 1–40, 15.
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into a single poem, metonymically rendering a temple as an altar, just as he fuses the speaker’s heart
and self into the poem.   And, if one can be said to be the opposite of zero, we can see in Herbert’s87
use of the Roman numeral one as a shape for his poem another gesture, that of decipherment or de-
cipherment, which is relevant to “The Altar” in at least two senses.  First, pointing back to the
cabalistic elements of the shaped-verse tradition, an act akin to decipherment is required in order to
read and understand the work fully.  Second,  to decipher or “de-cipher” is to “un-zero,” to create
ex nihilo in a way that imitates the Creation by means of the Word.88
If, indeed, “The Altar” is what Summers calls “an emblem of the entire volume,”  then we89
can also connect its multiple shapes to the tradition of emblematic verse, a tradition with which we
may fairly assume Herbert was intimately familiar,  in a way that further reveals an incarnational90
dimension to the poem.  An emblem ordinarily contains three elements, pictura, inscriptio, and
subscriptio, which interact with and comment upon each other in order to produce a dense set of
meanings.  “The Altar” can be considered a kind of “telescoped emblem” in which all three of these
See John R. Mulder, “The Temple as Picture,” in “Too Rich to Clothe the Sunne”: Essays on George87
Herbert, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), 3–14, 9
(“The Temple is Herbert’s picture of himself as a poet whose disposition changes during the course of an affair with
God”). 
“The voice of God in the void, bringing order out of chaos, is one analogue of the Incarnation.”  Richard88
E. Hughes, “George Herbert and the Incarnation,” Cithara 4 (1964): 22–32, 24.  See also Summers, George Herbert,
145 (“to Herbert the hieroglyph did not exist as a total mystery or as isolated beauty, but as a beauty and mystery which
were decipherable and related to all creation”).  But see James Boyd White, “This Book of Starres”: Learning to Read
George Herbert (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 81 (“the speaker [. . .] presents himself not as a unit
or integer, but as divided at least into two”).
Heirs of Donne and Jonson, 96.89
Huttar, “Herbert and the Emblematic Tradition,” 64.  Rosemary Freeman situates George Herbert’s90
patterned verse, along with other poems in which he is particularly sensitive to imagery, within the emblem book
tradition.  “George Herbert and the Emblem Books,” 157.  George Puttenham perceives a connection as well.  Arte of
English Poesie, 84–85.
272
elements are fused into one in an imitation of the single yet triune Christian God.   The poem is not91
only the text of the emblem, the subscriptio, but its altar shape serves as the image or pictura and
its I shape as an inscriptio or motto that emphasizes the connection between the altar and the
individual believer: “O  lett thy blessed sacrifice be mine” (“A,” 15)—the speaker addresses Christ
directly, without mediation, and personally claims the benefit of His Sacrifice.   To have word and
image, word and thing, joined in this manner is yet another way in which Herbert intervenes in the
tradition in order to imitate the process of Incarnation in which Word becomes Flesh.
Herbert also makes a gesture in the opposite direction, converting Flesh into Word by
implicating himself within the poem’s text: “God’s creative problem,” Colie argues, “was to make
flesh of the Word; the poet’s to make word and words of the mortal flesh—in other words, God’s
incarnation must be reworked, worked the other way, so that the transient experiences of the mutable
body may lay some claim to immortality.”   Of course, the poem’s I shape hints broadly at this92
gesture by establishing an equation between the altar as a place of sacrifice and the individual
believer,  namely the author or the speaker.   But what might be lost without this insight is the93 94
significance of the final line: “And sanctify this Altar to be thine” (“A,” 16).  Unless we understand
that the altar of the poem is the speaker’s self and that the speaker is asking for grace to be bestowed
The term belongs to Jeremy Adler: “the figured poem conflates pictura and subscriptio into a single word-91
image, thereby to become a kind of telescoped emblem.”  “Technopaigneia,” 129.  However, Adler and the other critics
whom I have encountered do not extend their analyses to the point of seeing all three emblem elements present within
“The Altar.”
Paradoxia Epidemica, 141.92
“[T]he crucial premise of the poem is the absolute equation that has been effected between the speaker’s93
body and his verse (the stones of the altar are the pieces of his heart), crucial because it represents the complete collapse
of the distinction between narrator and narrative work.”  Barbara Leah Harman, Costly Monuments: Representations
of the Self in George Herbert’s Poetry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 188.
Lewalski considers this to be “The governing trope” within “The Church.”  Protestant Poetics, 105.94
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upon him in the form of a sanctification in which God and Christ take possession of him and his
soul, it would be easy to see the line as anomalous: an altar is not ordinarily a thing that is sanctified;
it is rather the place at which sacrifices are offered.  But Christ’s Sacrifice was offered on and to
each believer, completing the New Covenant’s inversion of pagan and Hebraic practice—man
offered sacrifices to God rather than God sacrificing Himself for man—which the poem’s conversion
of the shaped-verse tradition emphasizes.  This reading also explains at least part of the common
undergraduate question about “The Altar”: Why are certain words, including “heart” in line 5, often
rendered in large and small capitals in some published versions of the poem?   If we imagine the95
poem as the rough image of a person viewed from behind, the word “heart” appears in exactly the
position on the “body” where his physical heart would be: offset to the right slightly below the top
of the torso.96
Robert B. Shaw, contesting Stanley Fish’s reading of the poem as a “self-consuming artifact,”
imagines that the weaving of the self into the sense  of “The Altar” should rather provide “a sense97
of the divine plenitude” than “an annihilation [. . .] of the self”: “The grace of the Incarnation is such
that we may share in God’s omnipresence without exchanging our identities, as Fish would have it. 
God may do the tuning, but it is still from human instruments that notes of praise ascend.  In
Herbert’s poems, as in sacramental worship, the sacrifice accomplishes not an annihilation but a
See, for example, Herbert, English Poems, 47.95
“Modern criticism is fascinated with the subject of selfhood in Herbert.”  Cristina Malcolmson, Heart-96
Work: George Herbert and the Protestant Ethic (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 209.  See also Stephen
Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (1980) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984), 1 (“[I]n the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of identity
as a manipulable, artful process”). “[W]e may sometimes construe form as a second Herbertian persona.”  Guernsey,
Pulse of Praise, 16.
I allude, of course, to “Jordan (II).”  Herbert, English Poems, 116–17.97
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transfiguration of the self.”   I contend that it is ultimately the plenitude of Divine grace that Herbert98
is imitating in “The Altar.”  Through play, conceived as an excess or superfluity of expression and
signification as well as through the idea of re-creation, Herbert honors and worships his God.
2. The Language of “The Altar”
At the finest level of detail that we can examine, the text of the poem itself, we can also see
quite clearly traces of the ludic and of incarnationalism when we understand the poem as a structure
of language that fosters and engenders a particular type of reader response,  one in which the reader99
is at first perplexed but then is gradually yet surely guided through the poem’s many ambiguities.100
A broken Altar, Lord, thy servant reares
Made of á heart, & cimented with teares.
Whose parts are, as thy hand did frame;
No workemans toole hath touch’d y  same.e
5 A heart alone
Is such á stone,
As nothing, but
Thy power doth cut.
Wherefor each part
10 Of my hard heart
Meets in this frame,
To praise thy Name.
That, if I chance to hold my peace,
These stones to praise thee may not cease.
15 O lett thy blessed sacrifice be mine,
And sanctify this Altar to be thine. 
Call of God, 104.  See also Johnson, “Recreating the Word,” 55 (“The typology within ‘The Altar’98
embodies a spiritual conversion, a recreating of the Word within the human heart”).
To the extent that it relies upon reader response theory, my reading in this segment of this case study is99
indebted to Stanley Fish’s masterful approach to “The Altar” in Self-Consuming Artifacts, 207–15.  However, whereas
Fish understands the poem to be superseding itself as it develops from line to line, my own view is substantially different.
Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 61 (“The ‘allegory’ seems too simple at first glance [. . .].  But as soon100
as we begin to examine the terms in their interrelations, mysteries arise”).
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An encounter with the poem’s first line immediately introduces a degree of confusion in the
reader’s mind: the speaker claims to be erecting a “broken” Altar (“A,” 1), but in no sense does the
structure on the page appear to be imperfect.  To the contrary, its appearance is almost monolithic,
and particularly in manuscript form, one is immediately impressed by the great care that the writer
has taken to ensure that his lines of verse meet neatly “in this frame” (“A,” 11) (see Figure 25). 
Although we may be accustomed, even at this early point in “The Altar” and in “The Church,” to
Herbert’s penchant for self-deprecation, the process of simultaneous perplexity and revelation
continues in the very next line, in which we learn that the altar of the poem is “Made of á heart, &
cimented with teares” (“A,” 2).   On one level, this is a move in the direction of clarification, for101
we learn that there are really two altars in play in the poem: the altar on the page and the figurative
altar of the speaker’s broken heart.   Yet in the next line, we lose the clarity that we have just102
achieved when we learn that the parts of the figurative altar and of the speaker’s heart “are, as thy
hand did frame; / No workemans toole hath touch’d y  same” (“A,” 3–4).  First and foremost, wee
must wonder why a loving God would break the speaker’s heart, but also we must confront the
speaker’s unusual disclaimer of craftsmanship for his poem: “The ‘shape’ poem is perhaps the most
obvious manifestation of workmanship in poetry.”   Understanding the speaker’s allusion to Old103
Testament Scripture—“And if thou wilt make mee an Altar of stone, thou shalt not build it of hewen
Along the way, if we are especially attentive to Herbert’s love of pun and quibble, we shall notice that the101
speaker “reares” his altar (“A,” 1), building it upside-down on the page from top to bottom.  Fish has recognized this pun
(Self-Consuming Artifacts, 215), but commentary on “The Altar” has yet to recognize that the quibble has an
incarnational dimension: the poem is doing or enacting what it says in a way that meshes word and deed, Word and Flesh,
together perfectly.  It also draws attention, if we attend to it carefully, to our act of reading, making us very self-conscious
about our encounter with the poem in a way that accentuates its re-educative or re-creative effect.
See Strier, Love Known, 193; Ramie Targoff, Common Prayer: The Language of Public Devotion in Early102
Modern England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 101; and Taylor, “‘Use alone,’” 82. 
Clarke, Theory and Theology, 205.  See also Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts, 207 (“the first thing the poem103
does [. . .] is call attention to itself as something quite carefully made”).
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stone: for if thou lift vp thy toole vpon it, thou hast polluted it” —points us in the direction of104
conceiving the unhewn stones as part of the figurative altar rather than the printed one, but that same
understanding might also confuse a sensitive reader, for that would mean that throughout the first
four lines of “The Altar” the speaker has never referred to the shape on the page, a conclusion that
would seem to diminish the significance of that shape.
Greater clarity comes in the next portion of the poem, in what Ronald W. Cooley calls “the
central pedestal,” which pertains to “the life of the heart” as opposed to “the realm of external
action.”   The speaker, explaining that “A heart alone / Is such á stone, / As nothing, but / Thy105
power doth cut” (“A,” 5–8), answers one of the reader’s questions by revealing that his heart was
made of stone and therefore had to be cut, or “broken” (“A,” 1), by the action of Divine grace in
order to permit him to praise his Lord.   This answer is confirmed in the next lines—“Wherefor106
each part / Of my hard heart / Meets in this frame, / To praise thy Name” (“A,” 9–12)—which allude
Ex 20:25 (AV 1611).  This allusion also serves as an important reminder about the role of labor in much104
Christian theology.  Although Christianity privileges callings and vocations, or labor dedicated to the worship of God,
labor is principally viewed as a consequence of the Fall and of man’s first sin: “In the sweate of thy face shalt thou eate
bread, till thou returne vnto the ground: for out of it wast thou taken, for dust thou art, and vnto dust shalt thou returne.” 
Gn 3:19 (AV 1611).
“Full of All Knowledg”: George Herbert’s Country Parson and Early Modern Social Discourse, The105
Mental and Cultural World of Tudor and Stuart England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 21.  Cooley’s
description of the poem in this regard emphasizes another way in which “The Altar” is incarnational in design: Just as
“Easter-Wings” is driven by variations of line lengths that parallel the actions described in those lines, “The Altar” opens
and widens its lines when referring to the world of externals, narrowing and closing them when referring to the internal
operation of the speaker’s self.
This passage also alludes to Joshua 8:31, which repeated Moses’ command that the Israelites raise “an Altar106
of whole stones, ouer which no man hath lift vp any yron” (AV 1611), and exhibits Herbert’s tendency throughout The
Temple to deny his own artistry in crafting his poems.
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to the common biblical trope of the heart hardened by the taint of sin,  and which explicitly offer107
the praise that God’s grace has made possible.   Moreover, the words “this frame” (“A,” 11) seem108
finally to give the reader an unambiguous reference to the altar on the page, the means by which the
speaker offers his praise.  Yet questions remain.  Given the extraordinary self-consciousness required
for the speaker to deliver his praise in the shape of an altar, the explicit reference of “The Altar” to
its own shape appears for the first time terribly late in the poem.  And the praise that the speaker
offers to his God seems at this juncture to be conversely premature: he still, after all, possesses a
“hard heart” (“A,” 10).109
In the final four lines, the poem begins to open up again on a literal level, gradually widening,
and also in the sense that it provides the reader with solutions to these problems, solutions that
convert the reading experience and that re-create the poem in the mind of the reader.  We learn next
that the purpose of this altar of praise is to speak for its craftsman—“These stones to praise thee may
not cease” (“A,” 14)—if he should “chance to hold [his] peace” (“A,” 13).  The words “These
stones,” however, create a final block for the reader.  Previously the speaker has told us that his heart
is “à stone” (“A,” 6 [emphasis supplied]), so that we shift here from the singular to the plural.  To
be sure, the fact that the speaker’s heart has been fractured, presumably into multiple stones, might
“And I wil giue them one heart, and I wil put a new spirit within you: and I will take the stonie heart out107
of their flesh, and will giue them an heart of flesh.”  Ez 11:19 (AV 1611).  Another allusion suggests itself in the
truncation of the central lines: “[. . .] Circumcision is, that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter, whose praise
is not of men, but of God.”  Rom 2:29 (AV 1611).  Jeffrey S. Johnson argues that the narrowed lines literalize the
figurative act of circumcision (“Recreating the Word,” 58), which further supports the view that the poem is
incarnational.
See Marion White Singleton, God’s Courtier: Configuring a Different Grace in Herbert’s Temple108
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 84 (“[. . .] ‘The Altar’ is primarily concerned to point out the
mysterious ways of God which empower even the stony heart of man to praise his Maker”).
See Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 62 (“is it truly possible to have one’s heart converted into an altar109
by God and still remain hostile to him?”).
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justify the shift, but that maneuver seems clumsy and unsatisfying.  Instead, it exploits our
consciousness that we are reading not just an individual poem but the first entry in a collection, “The
Church,” so that the plural “stones” may be understood as a reference to the following poems and
so that we are forced to revise our conception of the stone that was the speaker’s heart: it is also the
altar on the page.  While the figure before us had seemed to be suspended from reference in the poem
for too long, “The Altar” finally reveals that it had been its own subject matter all along, and in the
process it becomes a singular, unitary, and therefore unhewn stone, precisely as the speaker had
promised several lines earlier.  Heart and verse, figurative and literal, fuse and coalesce  in this
penultimate gesture of transfiguration.  It is followed by the final couplet—“O lett thy blessed
sacrifice be mine, / And sanctify this Altar to be thine” (“A,” 15–16)—in which Christ’s Sacrifice
is invoked explicitly for the first time, the Sacrifice that makes possible the transfiguration that we
have just witnessed and in which Herbert has forced us to participate.   And, in a final incarnational110
move that can be seen in most typeset versions of the poem, Christ’s “SACRIFICE” fits perfectly atop
Herbert’s “ALTAR” in the poem’s final two lines.   This set of conversions and re-creations effects111
the kind of transfiguration that occurs in the Eucharist, not conceived as in the Roman Catholic
This “unification of the previously ‘split’ personality into the harmonious image of the priest at the altar110
provides appropriate closure for the poem.”  Ibid.  “By the end of ‘The Altar’, indeed, the altar is no longer imagined
as the place where man sacrifices to God but as the place of Christ’s sacrifice for man.”  White, “This Book of Starres,”
80.  “It is the fusion of these two conditions—the outer condition of acting and the inner condition of being acted
upon—that constitutes regeneracy.”  Cooley, “Full of All Knowledg,” 22.  “[T]he reader is forced [. . .] to expand the
frames of reference within which his understanding is moving.”  Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts, 209.
Herbert, English Poems, 47.111
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doctrine of transubstantiation but rather as a lively sacrifice of the heart—to which the poem’s altar
is equated—in the sacramental moment.112
3.  Words Accomplished in the Truth
[T]he words which were do continue; the only difference is, that
whereas before they had a literall, they now have a metaphoricall use,
and are as so many notes of remembrance unto us, that what they did
signifie in the letter is accomplished in the truth.113
—Richard Hooker
What Hooker describes is like what Herbert is doing in “The Altar.”  The letter (of the law)
has been fulfilled and accomplished (embodied) in the poem.  The letter has been realized (real-ized)
with a concreteness standing as testimony to the fact that Herbert sees the process he is modeling as
non-metaphorical, one having the highest degree of reality imaginable.  It is an expression of
enormous faith and commitment.  More than that, it is an imitation of the incarnational event itself
that acts in concert and cooperation with that event, that merges with the original and takes power
from it, and that lends itself to the operation of the Word becoming Flesh.114
Making the power of this work all the more stunning is the fact that it was likely written
without immediate plans for publication, perhaps to be read only among a small coterie of Herbert’s
R. V. Young goes further, asserting that this transfiguration “occurs pre-eminently in the sacrament of the112
Eucharist, most uncompromisingly when explained as transubstantiation, in which the words of the consecration enact
the transformation of the elements of bread and wine into the actual body and blood of Christ and thus present what they
represent.”   Doctrine and Devotion in 17th-Century Poetry, Studies in Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: D. S.
Brewer, 2000), 106.  Of course, Protestants in the Church of England were united in rejecting the doctrine of
transubstantiation, understanding the Eucharist rather as a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving.
Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, bk. IV, chap. 11.10 (1594), ed. Georges Edelen, in113
The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, gen. ed. W. Speed Hill (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977), 1:316.
“[. . .] Herbert did not merely write about the Incarnation: he saw poetry itself as a miniature version of the114
Incarnation, and each divine poem as a microcosm of the Incarnation.  The doctrine provided Herbert, not only with
subject, but with form, technique and meaning.”  Hughes, “George Herbert and the Incarnation,” 24.
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colleagues or even simply for his own pleasure and edification.  If this is the case, then we might
understand “The Altar” in Huttar’s terms “primarily as a compositio for meditation, a mandala,”115
or a device for private devotional practice.   As M. M. Mahood writes, “the reader has the sensation116
that he is listening to the poet at meditation or at prayer, eavesdropping on the ‘many spiritual
Conflicts’ of Herbert’s inner life in his last years at Bemerton.”   “The Altar” is, in other words,117
a kind of TOY,  and the task of the next section is to examine the consequences of this form of play118
on our understanding of English Reformation discourse, given the fact that Herbert is creating an
altar out of words at a time when the status of altars in the English Reformed Church is in a dramatic
state of flux.
“Herbert and the Emblematic Tradition, 77.115
Louis L. Martz, “The Action of the Self: Devotional Poetry in the Seventeenth Century,” in Metaphysical116
Poetry, ed. D. J. Palmer and Malcolm Bradbury, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1970),
101–21, 103 (“‘Devotion’ [. . .] is an active, creative state of mind, a ‘poetical’ condition, we might say, in which the
mind works at high intensity”).
“Something Understood: The Nature of Herbert’s Wit,” in Palmer and Bradbury, Metaphysical Poetry,117
123–47, 124.
Placing “The Altar” in my matrix of discursive play types is a delicate task.  In light of the poem’s status118
as a “private ejaculation,” its ranking on the methexis axis must be rather low, but the poem is decidedly not a TRICK. 
Although more telic than a pure TOY, because of the very clear direction in which the poem develops, “The Altar” might
be best understood as occupying the TOY-TRICK quadrant of the matrix.
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C.  IMPLICATIONS
Herbert and the Altars of the English Reformed Church
“The Altar,” along with the other poems of The Temple, has long appealed to audiences of a wide
range of confessional orientations,  with the partial consequence that the poem seems to generate119
endless critical controversy as scholars attempt to claim it for different points on the continuum of
English Reformed belief and praxis.  Lewalski sees Herbert’s use of biblical typology in the poem
as “characteristically Protestant”; Richard Strier resolutely claims that “The best critics of ‘The
Altar’ have recognized that it does not in any way refer to the Eucharist.”   On the other hand,120
Malcolmson finds evidence that Herbert is “forging an image that can illuminate what is true in the
approach of” both Puritans and high-Church figures; Kathleen Lynch also interprets “The Altar” as
evidence of “Herbert’s characteristically conciliatory stance,” a doctrinal posture that is distinctly
of the English via media.   Many other critics, of course, see the poem as Eucharistic in completely121
Herbert “has been, and continues to be, the exemplar for the English parson.  Whether the individual119
minister is High Church, Low Church, Evangelical, Charismatic, whatever, Herbert is portrayed as the prototype of the
parson, poet, teacher, and preacher.  He is the saint of Bemerton, the Ur-Vicar, the Echt-Rector.”  Justin Lewis-Anthony,
“If You Meet George Herbert on the Road . . . Kill Him! Herbertism and Contemporary Parish Ministry,” George
Herbert Journal 32, no. 1–2 (Fall 2008–Spring 2009): 31–42, 32.  See also Ilona Bell, “‘Setting Foot into Divinity’:
George Herbert and the English Reformation,” Modern Language Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1977): 219–41, 220
(“Everyone seems to love Herbert’s poetry, and many have claimed him as a posthumous ally”); Daniel W. Doerksen,
“‘Generous Ambiguity’ Revisited: A Herbert for All Seasons,” George Herbert Journal 30, no. 1–2 (Fall 2006–Spring
2007): 19–41, 19; Guibbory, Ceremony and Community, 44; and Graham Parry, The Arts of the Anglican Counter-
Reformation: Glory, Laud and Honour (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press 2006), 135.  Doerksen suggests that this
phenomenon might be the product of Herbert’s deliberate intent, as “the mature Herbert was not a partisan but a
moderate.”  Picturing Religious Experience: George Herbert, Calvin, and the Scriptures (Newark: University of
Delaware Press, 2011), 1.  Joseph L. Womack’s Working It Out: Growing Spiritually with the Poetry of George Herbert
(Richmond, VA: R. K. W. Publications, 2009), is evidence of Herbert’s continuing influence in Christian circles, even
beyond the pulpits and pews of the Anglican communion; it is essentially an ecumenical self-help book “directed to those
who are seeking spiritual guidance and are open to the possibility fo finding that guidance in poetry.”  Ibid., 3.
Lewalski, Protestant Poetics, 311; Richard Strier, Love Known: Theology and Experience in George120
Herbert’s Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 191.
Cristina Malcolmson, George Herbert: A Literary Life, Literary Lives (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave121
MacMillan, 2004), 62; Kathleen Lynch, “George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’ Name and Thing,” George Herbert Journal
17, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 41–60, 56.
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different senses.   R. V. Young, from the title of “The Altar” alone, sees evidence of “the medieval122
Catholic roots of Herbert’s piety.”   Thomas B. Stroup vigorously resists the claim of Joseph123
Summers that the poem is “religiously ‘low.’”124
My agenda within the following pages, however, is not to identify or locate George Herbert’s
absolute theological position based upon the lines of “The Altar.”  Instead, I am interested in
examining a curious juxtaposition of historical events.  Amy M. Charles’ standard biography of
Herbert presents evidence and analysis that can suggest 1617 as an approximate composition date
for the lyrics of The Temple,  and a number of historians of the English Reformed Church have125
identified that same year as a significant marker in the development and evolution of a sustained
controversy over church fabric, specifically the installation and use of altars in churches.   Herbert,126
in short, was making a remarkably provocative and rhetorically significant move by erecting an altar
out of words at roughly the same time that—contrary to the trend of many preceding decades of
Church history—altars were beginning to reappear in English churches.  “The Altar” is therefore
more than a verbal artifact or an intervention into the tradition of shaped verse; it is a commentary
See Paul Dyck, “Approaching the Table: Invitation and Structure in Herbert’s ‘The Church,’” George122
Herbert Journal 35, no. 1–2 (Fall 2001–Spring 2012): 45–54, 50 (describing “The Altar” as one of Herbert’s
“Eucharistic poems”).
Doctrine and Devotion, 107.123
“‘A Reasonable, Holy, and Living Sacrifice’: Herbert’s ‘The Altar,’” Essays in Literature 2 (1975):124
149–63, 149 (quoting Summers, George Herbert, 140–41).
A Life of George Herbert (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 80–87.125
See generally Kenneth Fincham and Nicholas Tyacke, Altars Restored: The Changing Face of English126
Religious Worship, 1527–c. 1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 74, 114–18; and Parry, Arts of the Anglican
Counter-Reformation, 12.
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on a dispute that was very much alive at the time during which the poem was composed, and it is an
important contribution to the discourse of the period.127
In order to understand “The Altar” in this historical context, let us begin by surveying the
events that surrounded the marquee year of 1617.   As Eamon Duffy has stated, “ultimately the128
Reformation came to be, quite literally, part of the furniture.”   In a frenzy of iconoclasm, altars129
were being pulled down throughout England by 1550 when Bishop Nicolas Ridley ordered their
abolition in the London diocese in May,  a move extended kingdom-wide by Edward VI’s Privy130
Council in November of that year; Archbishop Thomas Cranmer’s 1552 Book of Common Prayer
institutionalized the policy of altar-stripping even further by replacing earlier references to “altars”
Lynch, “George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’” 48 (describing the poem as “very much a part of” debates over127
the propriety of altars in English churches).
My account relies principally upon the following sources: Clifford Davidson, “George Herbert and the128
Architecture of Anglican Worship,” Anglican Theological Review 84, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 853–71; Eamon Duffy, The
Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2005); Fincham and Tyacke, Altars Restored; Guibbory, Ceremony and Community; Lynch, “George Herbert’s Holy
‘Altar’”; J. F. Merritt, “Puritans, Laudians, and the Phenomenon of Church-Building in Jacobean London,” Historical
Journal 41, no. 4 (December 1998): 935–60; Parry, Arts of the Anglican Counter-Reformation; and Virginia Chieffo
Raguin, “You Are What You Wear (and Use, and See): The Form of the Reform in England,” in Art, Piety and
Destruction in the Christian West, 1500–1700, ed. Virginia Chieffo Raguin, Visual Culture in Early Modernity (Surrey,
UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 65–89.
The Voices of Morebath: Reformation and Rebellion in an English Village (New Haven, CT: Yale129
University Press, 2001), 177.
But even earlier that year the Crown was evidently predisposed toward such action.  Bishop John Hooper,130
in a sermon preached at Court in March 1550, urged that “It were well then that it might please the magistrates to turn
the altars into tables, according to the first institution of Christ, to take away the false persuasion of the people they have
of sacrifices to be done upon altars; for as long as the altars remain, both the ignorant people, and the evil-persuaded
priests, will dream always of sacrifice.”  Early Writings of Bishop Hooper, ed. Samuel Carr (Cambridge: University
Press, 1843), 488.  Significant in this passage is Hooper’s maneuver to render the altar as a Church tradition belated with
respect to Christ and his adamant rejection of a sacramental view of the Eucharist as a sacrifice.  Both tradition and
sacrifice (the word and the idea), however, are central to Herbert’s “The Altar.”
284
with “tables.”   For Protestant reformers, the stone altars that had been common in English131
churches until that time were physical instantiations of the kinds of non-scriptural and human-
instituted ceremony that they wished to purge from English worship.  Perceiving the installations as
remnants of a Roman hegemony over the English Church, the reformers were quite right to imagine
stone altars as icons of Catholicism; they were, indeed, the inheritance of a rich medieval Church
fabric that pre-dated the Reformation.  Despite vigorous efforts, however, the stripping of the altars
during Edward’s short reign was left incomplete, for records indicate that during the Marian
resurgence of Roman Catholicism that followed, when altars were reinstalled in English churches,
only thirteen parishes were without stone high altars and every parish seems to have had at least a
wooden altar on which Mass could be said.  Early in her reign, Elizabeth I issued injunctions calling
for order in the removal of those altars, which reformers began again to pull down, but she ultimately
declared that the difference between altars and communion tables was a matter of indifference or
adiaphora, a signature move for the monarch who instituted the English via media through the so-
called Elizabethan Settlement.  Yet Elizabeth’s private chapel favored imagery and ceremony in the
high-Church style, evidence of what Kenneth Fincham and Nicholas Tyacke call a “conservative
outlook” that gave encouragement to the nascent Avant-Garde Conformists,  who were in a132
position by the end of Elizabeth’s era to publicly air their dissident views.
The gradual ascendancy of the Avant-Garde Conformist party throughout the course of James
I’s reign transformed influence into power with the accession of Charles I to the throne, leading
According to Lee Palmer Wandel, this move and others like it throughout Europe rejected “the temporal131
complexity of the altar, its linking of the Incarnation, death, and sacrifice to an eternal present through that altar’s very
materiality, its abiding presence within the space of each church.”  The Reformation: Towards a New History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 214.
Fincham and Tyacke, Altars Restored, 3.132
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toward a Laudian church policy between 1625 and 1640.  With respect to the revitalization of the
tradition of stone altars in English churches, this period has typically been the focus of historians
given the significance of pamphlet wars on the subject during the late 1630s, well after George
Herbert’s death.   The controversy had its roots in the Grantham case from 1627, in which Bishop133
John Williams—an influential figure in Herbert’s life and the man who had helped to bring about
Herbert’s ordination—ruled against a proposal to position the church’s communion table in an altar-
wise fashion.   In response, the priest Peter Heylyn published A Coale from the Altar in 1636; it134
was a vigorous attack on this decision and one that branded Williams as no better than a radical
Puritan: “[. . .] I should rather thinke, that it was writ by M . Cotton of Boston [. . .] or by some otherr
neighboring Zelote.”   Williams’ 1637 reply, The Holy Table, Name and Thing, pointed out the135
sacramental and Roman Catholic associations carried by altars as opposed to Reformed communion
tables: “the Sacrifice of the Masse abolished (ffor which Sacrifice onely Altars were erected) these
(call them what you please) are no more Altars, but Tables of Stone or Timber.  [. . .]  The proper
As early as 1625, however, pamphleteers began to speak out on the issue.  Richard Mountagu, for instance,133
acting under the protection of James I, published Appello Caesarem early that year.  Among the arguments that
Mountagu marshaled in support of the reinstitution of stone altars, tradition was a focal point: “of stone they were, it is
certaine, [. . .] before that Popery was heard of in the world, or in the Church of Rome it selfe.”  Appello Caesarem
(London: Matthew Lownes, 1625), 286.   Sacramental theology was also an important point of doctrine for Mountagu:
“Now though you may stumble and breake your shinns at the Altar; yet I hope you will not overthrow the Sacrifice.” 
Ibid., 287.
See, for example, John Spurr, The Post-Reformation: Religion, Politics and Society in Britain, 1603–1714,134
Religion, Politics, and Society in Britain Series (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2006), 79.
Peter Heylyn, A Coale from the Altar (London: Robert Milbovrne, 1636), 3.135
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use of an Altar is to Sacrifice upon, the proper use of a Table is to eat upon.”   Heylyn issued a136
rejoinder within only a matter of a few months, “to crush a spreading evil even in the beginning”;137
entitled Antidotum Lincolniense, the pamphlet accused Williams’ reply of supplying “every where
a Pillow for a Puritans Elbow,” and collated a number of passages from the reply to stand, column
against column, aside similarly themed excerpts from tracts by such Puritans as John Bastwick and
William Prynne.  Williams, found guilty in Star Chamber of suborning witnesses in the case, likely
after Laud had incensed Charles against him, was imprisoned in the Tower of London and left unable
to respond further.
Although this exchange is important to consider, above and beyond the fact that it generated
such light and heat, it was not the earliest significant example of Laudianism or incipient Laudianism
on the subject of altar installations in English Reformed Churches.   To the contrary, 1617 saw138
what Graham Parry calls “The first visible signs of the new concept of worship in the Church of
England,”  as Richard Neile in Durham repositioned the communion table from the middle of the139
choir to the site of the former high altar and as William Laud in Gloucester moved the communion
John Williams, The Holy Table, Name and Thing (London: Diocese of Lincoln, 1637), 16–17.  Kathleen136
Lynch argues that Williams’ title, distinguishing between the referent of the term and that term itself, bears a similarity
with the fact that in Herbert’s “The Altar” we see two altars, one on the page and one figurative in the speaker’s heart:
“‘The Altar’ marks the great metaphoric gaps which inescapably divide a word from referents as various as a generic
tradition, the object of representation, and the matter of sacramental presence.”  “George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’” 42. 
Given the importance of Williams as an influential figure in Herbert’s life, as well as these affinities, one must take quite
seriously Lynch’s claim that, despite Herbert’s use of altar imagery in the poem, he remained squarely within an English
via media consensus.
Peter Heylyn, Antidotum Lincolniense, Preface, unpaginated.  Because the preface is unpaginated, further137
citations, which would be of limited utility to the reader, will be omitted.
“[W]orship at an altar in the 1620s and 1630s is a manifestation of [. . .] a newly emergent Arminian threat138
to a long-standing Calvinist consensus in the church.”  Lynch, “George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’” 43.  See also Guibbory,
Ceremony and Community, 46; and Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590–1640,
Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 199–216.
Arts of the Anglican Counter-Reformation, 12.139
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table to an identical position in his church.  In the case of Laud at Gloucester, at least, surviving
records permit us some insight into the rationale that supported what had to have been perceived as
a controversial shift: Laud invoked not merely the practice of James’ royal chapel, which featured
a communion table positioned altar-wise, but also the Elizabethan injunctions themselves.  He
further directed prebendaries to bow toward the table during services, secured an order for repairing
the altar at Gloucester’s cathedral, and began fund-raising efforts for the installation of a new
organ.   Fincham and Tyacke have judged these developments at Durham and Gloucester to have140
been the product of “a concerted plan of action [. . .] rather than simply the workings of blind
chance,”  part of “a move [. . .] to convert communion tables into altars.”   Indeed, during the141 142
same year, James visited Scotland for the avowed purpose of bringing the Church in Scotland more
closely into alignment with English Church orthopraxis, and particularly to introduce the practice
of kneeling at communion; kneeling implies an inclosing rail, which in turn implies an altar rather
than a table.143
An important note at this juncture is to observe that some of this building and improvement program was140
likely animated by forces not unique to avant-garde conformity, forces that extended even to Puritan factions with the
English Church.  During the Jacobean period, at least 63 London parish churches “were either rebuilt or significantly
repaired and beautified.”  Merritt, “Phenomenon of Church-Building,” 940.  These efforts were not led solely by avant-
garde clergymen; “Rather, it was the more evangelical, Calvinist members of the ecclesiastical establishment [. . .] who
played the more prominent role.”  Ibid., 950.  Even Puritan parishes “undoubtedly supported a healthy investment in
church building and repair.”  Ibid., 953.  Although Merritt acknowledges a Laudian building program distinct from these
more broad-based efforts at improving church fabric, and although altar installations and the repositioning of communion
tables certainly fell within the ambit of the former category, churches had suffered from an extended period of neglect
and, in many cases of medieval church buildings, were simply unsuited to the needs of Protestant worship.  Ultimately,
however, altars were items of church fabric “that for all but the most ceremonial of reformers signified Roman
Catholicism.”  Dyck, “Altar, Heart, Title-Page,” 574. 
Fincham and Tyacke, Altars Restored, 115.141
Ibid., 74.142
See ibid., 114.143
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In the years that followed, Herbert was himself a builder of churches, not only reconstructing
the church at Leighton-Bromswold (so neglected that its roof had collapsed, rendering it unsuitable
for use for services) and that at Little Gidding (used for a time to store hay and pigs) but also
revitalizing and remodeling his own parish church at Bemerton.   Terry G. Sherwood reminds us144
that “Herbert’s commitment to the physical church and its furnishings is striking.”   Herbert,145
according to Paul Dyck, was “deeply involved in shaping and maintaining the materiality of the
church.”   We see this commitment at work, of course, in the titles of many poems from The146
Temple: “The Altar,” “Sepulchre,” “Church-Monuments,” “Church-Lock and Key,” “The Church-
Floore,” “The Windows,” and “The Crosse” all testify to Herbert’s interest in church fabric.   As147
one might expect on this basis, Herbert’s building projects have been described in terms that would
suggest a proto-Laudian bias: Izaack Walton says that the church at Leighton-Bromswold, for
instance, was “for the workmanship, a costly Mosaick; for the form, an exact Cross; and for the
decency and beauty, [. . .] the most remarkable parish church that this nation affords.”   Yet148
See Charles, Life of George Herbert, 121–31; and Paul Dyck, “Locating the Word: The Textual Church144
in George Herbert’s Temple,” in Doerksen and Hodgkins, Centered on the Word, 224–44.
Herbert’s Prayerful Art (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 95.  Indeed, Graham Parry goes so145
far as to call “Herbert’s attention to the architecture and fittings of the church [. . .] unprecedented in English poetry.” 
Arts of the Anglican Counter-Reformation, 134.
“Locating the Word,” 241.146
See Davidson, “Architecture of Anglican Worship,” 853 (“he is never far from the physical church147
building”).
Life of Mr. George Herbert, 33.  See also Dyck, “Locating the Word,” 225 (Herbert at Leighton-148
Bromswold constructed “a consciously shaped sacred space” of “expensive workmanship”); Guibbory, Ceremony and
Community, 46 (Herbert’s “special attention to the east end” resonates with a defense of “ceremony and ritual within the
church”); and Raguin, “You Are What You Wear,” 80 (seeing Herbert as reflecting “a brief revival, leading up to the
so-called Laudian reform”).  But see Parry, Arts of the Anglican Counter-Reformation, 132, 134 (although one might
be inclined “to hear Herbert’s as an authentic voice of the Laudian church,” his actual construction practice was much
more restrained and sober, focused on an Andrewesian decency of appearance rather than on sumptuousness and
extravagance).
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evidence of a lower-church or Calvinist orientation is also visible: the walls were painted with verses
from Scripture in a way that echoes the Word-centered worship of the Calvinists, and the reading
pew was positioned at the same level as the pulpit, with both facing the congregation, reflecting an
emphasis on both prayer and preaching as efficacious means of salvation.  With respect to the149
communion table—for assuredly tables rather than altars were installed under Herbert’s watch—it
was neither railed off nor turned altar-wise, but nave and chancel were separated from each other by
a low screen, suggesting something of a high-Church emphasis on the Eucharist as a distinctive site
of ceremony.   Indeed, against a reading of Herbert’s poetic references to church fittings as purely150
metaphorical,  it is worth stressing that Herbert’s reconstruction work “participated in an activity151
frowned upon by radicals,” in Dyck’s words; “Rather than seeing the medieval church building as
inherently idolatrous, Herbert followed the view widely held in the English church that such a
building could spell out the interiorization reformed theology required.”   In short, Dyck continues,152
Dyck, “Locating the Word,” 224, 225–27.  See also Merritt, “Phenomenon of Church-Building,” 956 (“The149
Laudians were after a different kind of beautification and seemliness”).
See Dyck, “Locating the Word,” 227.  See also Lynch, “George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’” 55 (observing that150
the movement of an altar from “behind a screen” was a characteristic feature of Reformed practice).  But see Charles,
Life of George Herbert, 232 (“even in his Cambridge days and in the midst of rather strong Puritan influences, he
considered the Communion table to be an altar and therefore to be placed against the east wall”).  However, “A powerful
presumption of high Anglicanism governs” Charles’ biography of Herbert.  Ilona Bell, “In the Shadow of the Temple,”
in Miller and DiYanni, Like Season’d Timber, 255–79, 259.
See generally Strier, Love Known.151
“Locating the Word,” 237–38.  See also Davidson, “Architecture of Anglican Worship,” 857 (“If [Herbert]152
is concerned with inwardness, it is an inwardness that does not stand very well without the external framework that is
the physical church”); and Greg Miller, George Herbert’s “Holy Patterns”: Reforming Individuals in Community (New
York: Continuum Press, 2007), ix (“unlike many of his Anglican contemporaries, Herbert imagined a significant
continuity with the pre-Reformation past”).
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“Herbert’s church, like his poetry, is eclectic, retaining elements of tradition and incorporating
elements of reform in an innovative blend, producing a space in which people can encounter God.”153
In examining the provocatively shaped and titled poem “The Altar” in this context, it is
nevertheless important to bear in mind that “It, simply put, remains an altar in a church, the ‘Altar’
in ‘The Church.’”   As both an altar and an image of an altar,  the poem cannot be read as simply154 155
a declaration that Herbert is a Protestant,  a proposition which strikes me as unquestionably true156
and not in need of further elaboration, and certainly not as a simple disclaimer of human artifice.  157
Rather, the poem exists in a state of extreme tension.   As Kathleen Lynch has observed, “The158
Church” begins with “The Altar” and ends with“Love (III),” in which the idea of a table where the
speaker does “sit and eat” is suggested,  therefore effecting an even broader, Temple-wide159
“Locating the Word,” 227.  “While Herbert expressed fairly specific views on worship style, he did so153
within the inclusive spirit of the Jacobean via media.”  Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 237.154
See Guibbory, Ceremony and Community, 16–19.155
Guibbory contests a number of readings that he perceives as arguing for Herbert’s “affinities with puritan156
spirituality.”  Ibid., 44.  See also ibid., 240n3.
See Strier, Love Known, 195 (“The final line puts human art in its place by decisively turning away from157
it just as it attains its perfection”).  Strier insists that “‘this Altar’ refers to the heart rather than to the poem” (ibid.),
minimizing the valuable insight that “The Altar” refers both to its own shape and to the speaker’s interior spiritual
condition.  Although Strier states that “Seeing where the poem refers to itself and where it does not” is critical to a
reading of “The Altar” (ibid., 191), his error is precisely in not recognizing that the poem does, at important junctures,
refer to itself.  As Guibbory puts it, “Though the Puritan distrust of invention in worship affects Herbert’s devotional
poetry, his attitude is more complex than those who see only his ‘radical devaluations of poetry’ admit.”  Ceremony and
Community, 65.  See also Margaret J. Oakes, “‘To be thy praise, / And be my salvation’: The Double Function of Praise
in The Temple,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 47, no. 2 (June 2005): 120–38, 134 (“It is a mistake to label
Herbert as ‘Calvinist’ when he chastises himself”); and Taylor, Soul in Paraphrase, 18 (one reason why Herbert’s verse
has been misread in this fashion is “The traditional if often unconscious view of Herbert [as] an essentially simple,
comparatively child-like, and unlettered [. . .] mind, a man good, devout, and totally without sophistication”). 
See Oakes, “‘To be thy praise,’” 125 (“[. . .] Herbert glorifies his God within a field of tension”).158
Herbert, English Poems, 192.159
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movement toward conversion or“transformation” than that which I have already posited.   I suggest160
that this tension also inheres also in the poem’s relationship to its historical context, and that it is a
“generative” tension, in Dyck’s words,  one that enables Herbert to forge a deeply personal path161
through the conflicted doctrine and practice of his era.
“The sacramental habit of mind,” according to Huttar, was pervasive in the Middle Ages, but
during the Renaissance it fell “under the shadow of a rationalism which eventually, in the
Enlightenment of the century’s close, would nearly eclipse it.”   During this period, therefore, “the162
consciousness of divine presence required more and more effort to maintain.”   Herbert’s163
provocative entry into period discourses with “The Altar,” I suggest, can be understood as part of
that Herculean effort.  The skill and thought required to compose the poem are daunting.  The skill
and thought required to appreciate it fully are equally intense.  In the wake of the Reformation, with
“George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’” 45.  Guibbory sees “The Church” as a work that moves from “The Altar”160
and “The Sacrifice” to “a series of Eucharistic poems,” and she understands “This focus on the altar rather than the
pulpit, the Sacrament rather than the sermon,” as a feature of The Temple which “aligns Herbert with defenders of
ceremony and ritual within the church.  [. . .]  Yet a persistent ‘puritan’ distrust of invention and formalism complicates
the volume.”  Ceremony and Community, 46.
See “Altar, Heart, Title-Page,” 548 (“That there are tensions [in ‘The Altar’] is not in doubt, but for Herbert161
they are emblematic tensions not violently iconoclastic ones, which is to say, the tensions are generative, allowing the
opening of a site of active and searching devotion rather than a devotional act of exclusion: the obliteration of image by
word”); and Lynch, “George Herbert’s Holy ‘Altar,’” 56 (Herbert’s positioning of “The Altar” at the beginning of “The
Church” “is certainly a generative provocation, one that initiates a line of investigation rather than one that defends an
absolute position”).
“Herbert and the Emblematic Tradition,” 63.162
Ibid.  Although this secularization model of the Reformation has been questioned by more recent163
scholarship, I find it to be a useful way of approaching Herbert’s work in “The Altar.”  Because the Reformation was
far from monolithic, we would be mistaken to reduce it entirely to a movement in the direction of the secular.  By the
same token, however, we would be mistaken either to assume that contemporary scholarship has explained the
Reformation fully or to conclude that it did not embrace some strains of thought captured, albeit imperfectly, by earlier
critics.
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its insistence on denying the “real presence” of the Eucharist,  perhaps this was the kind of effort164
necessary for Herbert to himself invoke the presence of God.165
First, “The Altar” invokes and engages with a wide range of religious traditions at a very
deep and fundamental level.  By playing with the tradition and history of patterned verse, Herbert
obliquely incorporates into his poem the religious belief systems of pagans, Jews, and Roman
Catholics.  Although, as I have argued, he converts, reforms, and re-forms those traditions in a
manner characteristic of English conformity, Herbert has taken great pains to ensure that nothing is
superannuated or left behind.  The move is eclectic and even ecumenical, one that perceives the
English Reformed Church as a continuation of, rather than as a complete break with, the material
traditions and practices that came before it.  It is a gesture that seeks and finds communion in at least
two senses: the Eucharistic sense of communion, to be sure, but also a communion with a different
and closely related unit of Christendom—the Roman Catholic Church.   “The Altar” is a piece of166
“[T]he reformers by and large were as concerned as their Roman Catholic enemies to maintain a doctrine164
of ‘real presence’ even while jettisoning the traditional scholastic logic that had supported it.  Misunderstanding of this
crucial issue [. . .] has contributed to a confessionally based rift in Donne and Herbert studies between, on the one hand,
Anglo-Catholic Martzians and, on the other, those whose via media readings veer in the direction of a ‘Protestant
poetics.’”  Robert Whalen, The Poetry of Immanence: Sacrament in Donne and Herbert (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2002), xiii–xiv.  See also Higgins, Pattern Poetry, 12 (“The Jesuit order had a long-standing tradition of
supporting pattern poems”).
For a sustained treatment of how, given the mandates of the English Reformation, “the spiritual cravings165
for communion with divinity addressed so fully by the Eucharist could also be addressed in poetry,” see Regina Mara
Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism: When God Left the World, Cultural Memory in the Present
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 8.
Achsah Guibbory would see in Herbert’s emphasis on and valuing of tradition a Laudian or “ceremonialist”166
approach to history, one that “argued for the antiquity of ceremonies, believing that tradition and precedent legitimized
them.”  Ceremony and Community, 28.  
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living memory that strives to find in the past something of the immediacy of other traditions’
experiences of the Divine.167
Moreover, as Jonathan Sheehan says, if “Protestants were [. . .] left with a space between the
physical fact of Christ’s sacrifice and the satisfaction that it performed,”  then that gap for Herbert168
needed to be filled, and to be filled with something tangible, for as Clifford Davidson writes, “How
else, it would appear, can the real become known but through the physical [. . .]?”   As I have169
suggested, “The Altar” is monolithic in its appearance on the page; it is almost relentlessly material
and physical, and the themes of materiality and physicalization resound clearly in my readings of the
poem that have emphasized how Herbert operates at play within its lines.  The poem’s bulk visually
echoes the physical heft of the stone altars that were being placed again in English churches at
around the time of its composition, and there is no trace within “The Altar” of the relative
spindliness possessed by a communion table.  It is almost as if, for Herbert, nothing less substantial
than an altar can serve effectively as the point of intersection at which man meets God, the point of
intersection that gestures back toward the Incarnation in which God met man.
Finally, the poem attempts a conciliatory mediation between the competing factions in the
period’s altar controversy.  The bivalent shape of “The Altar” in particular has the power to capture 
To be sure, the Protestant tradition offered the believer a different type of immediacy: the experience of167
being converted into a lively sacrifice during the occasion of worship.  And, indeed, Herbert’s poem embraces that kind
of experience, with its conversion of an altar to the individual believer’s self or I, and vice versa.  However, I am not
content to rest with this reading of the poem, in which Herbert seems to be struggling so fiercely with a multitude of
traditions.  I would suggest that something far more complex and rich is occurring within the lines of “The Altar.”
“The Altars of the Idols: Religion, Sacrifice, and the Early Modern Polity,” Journal of the History of Ideas168
67, no. 4 (October 2006): 649–73, 653.  See also ibid., 654 (“This separation of the Passion’s performance and its
function was, on a theoretical level, created by the difficulties of translating flesh into the word”).
“Architecture of Anglican Worship,” 871.169
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the two primary perspectives in the debate, what Guibbory calls “Puritan” and “ceremonialist.”  170
On the Puritan side, the poem’s I shape stresses the Reformation’s concern with interiority and with
the individual communicant’s direct relationship with God, unmediated by Church or sacrament. 
With respect to the ceremonialists, “The Altar” obviously appeals to a high-Church or avant-garde
orientation that would stress the centrality of the sacraments to salvation and to the Church’s proper
mission.  By fusing the two shapes into one, Parry says, “ceremonial worship comes together with
Calvinistic belief in a meeting of attitudes that were usually opposed.”   171
In the last analysis, “The Altar” reveals “how finely graduated were the different kinds of
formal worship in the 1620s” —“Until Laud and, later, the Civil War forced Englishmen to take172
sides,” Ilona Bell writes, “partisan lines were rarely rigid and sometimes far from clear.”   The173
poem is perhaps so widely popular precisely because it, according to Achsah Guibbory, “so fully
inscribes the ideological dissonances of the early seventeenth-century Church of England.”174
Ceremony and Community, 5–7.170
Arts of the Anglican Counter-Reformation, 135.  Guibbory argues that “The Altar,” as a shaped poem,171
resembles “the ‘set forms’ of worship that puritans disliked.”  Ceremony and Community, 66.  I remain unconvinced and,
in any event, prefer her argument that “[. . .] Herbert made poetry out of religious conflict, even as those conflicts made
poetry itself suspect, aware of its own threatened irrelevance.”  Ibid., 69.
Parry, Arts of the Anglican Counter-Reformation, 139.172
“In the Shadow of the Temple,” 261.173
Ceremony and Community, 78.174
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D.  CODA
Herbert on the Preacher’s Voice
Upon a first glance at A Priest to the Temple, or, The Countrey Parson His Character, and Rule of
Holy Life —George Herbert’s posthumously published prose guide for rural pastors in the Church175
of England—it seems that there would be little to connect Herbert’s sermon practice to the floridly
playful pulpit of John Donne.  Although we are handicapped in the case of Herbert by the fact that
none of his sermons survives in print, as opposed to the ten volumes of Donne sermons that have
been preserved and handed down to us, Herbert’s preference for the plain style is apparently clear
in his command that a country parson “is not witty, or learned, or eloquent, but Holy.”   In fact, a176
number of critics have read The Countrey Parson as a work expounding upon the Puritan ideal of
plain preaching or prophecying.   To characterize Herbert’s homiletics by reference to this isolated177
passage alone, however, is to miss some of the subtlety that Herbert brings to the subject of
preaching, both in The Countrey Parson and in his poem, “The Windows.”  Despite first
Publisher Barnabas Oley added the high-sounding “A Priest to the Temple” to Herbert’s own more humble175
title “The Countrey Parson,” likely to capitalize on the success of The Temple, which had been published earlier to great
acclaim, seemingly by all factions in the English Reformed Church.  Kristine A. Wolberg, “All Possible Art”: George
Herbert’s The Country Parson (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2008), 39 (“From the moment of
publication, The Temple and The Country Parson were admired by Puritan and Anglo-Catholic alike”).  I shall
henceforth refer to the text by using Herbert’s original title.
The Countrey Parson (London: T. Maxey, 1652), 23.  All further citations to The Countrey Parson (CP)176
will appear as parenthetical references in the main text and footnotes.
See, for example, Elizabeth Clarke, Theory and Theology in George Herbert’s Poetry: “Divinitie, and177
Poesie, Met,” Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 55 (seeing connections between
Herbert’s recommended practice and the work of Calvinist preacher and rhetorician Bartholomew Keckermann); O. C.
Edwards, Jr., A History of Preaching (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 414 (“While George Herbert is classified as
one of the metaphysical poets, his homiletical taste was much simpler than that of the preachers who share that
adjective”); Hodgkins, Authority, Church, and Society, 90 (“all that Herbert has to say about ‘showing holy’ identifies
him with a preaching tradition—exemplified by William Perkins’s Arte of Prophecying—that sought the clearest and
simplest signs for communicating the preacher’s inner life to his hearers”); and Wolberg, “All Possible Art,” 43 (“In his
day Herbert’s approbation of ‘plain’ sermonizing would have been immediately recognized as a Puritan value”).
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appearances, the sermonology that Herbert recommends possesses both ludic and incarnational
dimensions.
Indeed, “appearances” are deeply relevant to the structure of The Countrey Parson in general
and to that of chapter seven, “The Parson Preaching,” in particular.  Herbert, for example, notes that
to invoke the presence of God in a sermon is an especially effective preaching technique, which he
demonstrates with the following sample of language: “Oh let us all take heed what we do, God sees
us, he sees whether I speak as I ought, or you hear as you ought, he sees hearts, as we see faces: he
is among us; for if we be here, hee must be here, since we are here by him, and without him could
not be here” (CP, 26).  Herbert advocates the use of this rhetorical device in a sermon (for a
rhetorical device it is)  because “Such discourses shew very Holy” (CP, 27 [emphasis supplied]). 178
Herbert also recommends that the country parson capture his auditory’s attention “by turning often,
and making many Apostrophes to God, as, Oh Lord blesse my people, and teach them this point; or,
Oh my Master, on whose errand I come, let me hold my peace, and doe thou speak thy selfe” (CP,
24).   Again, this recommendation, and others that Herbert delivers in the same passage, is based179
on the fact that such techniques “appear exceeding reverend, and holy” (CP, 26 [emphasis
supplied]).
Not only does Herbert recommend invoking the presence of God, a well established rhetorical practice in178
homiletics, but he also deploys a number of other rhetorical techniques: asterismos, by prefacing his sentence with the
exclamatory word “Oh” in order to emphasize what follows (Arthur Quinn, Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase
[Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1993], 63); antithesis, by paralleling the structures of the two consecutive phrases,
“whether I speak as I ought, or you hear as you ought, he sees hearts, as we see faces” (HoRT, 16–17); and anadiplosis
in the repeated but repositioned word “here” in multiple consecutive phrases (HoRT, 10; GoE, 46).  Although my
objective in this coda is not an exhaustive classification of the tropes that Herbert uses in The Countrey Parson, this brief
catalog should, at a minimum, cast doubt on Clarke’s assertion that his recommendations to pastors do “not appear to
involve much technical rhetoric.”  Theory and Theology, 55.
A rhetorical technique that goes unnamed in this passage is aposiopesis, which Herbert demonstrates by179
breaking off his discourse, deferring further speech of his own, and asking God to continue for him.  HoRT, 20; GoE 118.
297
I do not, of course, highlight these terms of seeming and appearing in order to suggest that
Herbert is advocating a form of homiletical hypocrisy, concerning himself only with audience
impressions over the sincerity of revealed truth.  Rather, I am emphasizing the fact that Herbert as
a preacher is distinctly conscious of matters of performance in the pulpit, for acting is a form of
playing.   Kristine A. Wolberg writes that Herbert’s “interest is in the performance of prayer, not180
its content, not the pastor’s own heartfelt devotion.”   Stated otherwise, “Unlike nearly all181
Protestants on the topic of preaching, Herbert chooses to emphasize delivery and not exegesis, the
parson’s presence, not his text.”   Even when Herbert turns to the subject of textual182
exegesis—expressing a distaste for the practice of Donne and Lancelot Andrewes “of crumbling a
text into small parts”—he favors “a plain and evident declaration of the meaning of the text”
primarily for rhetorical reasons: Andrewesian crumbling “hath neither in it sweetnesse, nor gravity,
nor variety” (CP, 27).   And we must not neglect one of Herbert’s most noted directives to country183
pastors, his “first dictum” on preaching:  that they use “all possible art” to capture the souls of their184
See HL, 144 (“Drama is called ‘play’ and the performance of it ‘playing’”); and MPaG, 21 (“it is clear that180
theatrical presentations and dramatic interpretations rightly belong” in the category of play).  As Wolberg notes, “There
is something of the actor’s language” in the passages that I have been quoting.  “All Possible Art,” 27.
“All Possible Art,” 26.181
Ibid., 27.182
Gregory Kneidel argues that The Countrey Parson illustrates a “sophisticated pastoral rhetoric.”  “Herbert183
and Exactness,” English Literary Renaissance 36, no. 2 (April 2006): 278–303, 291.  According to Kenneth Graham,
not only does Herbert’s pastoral practice require rhetorical knowledge, but “holy practice is necessarily rhetorical” as
a whole.  “Herbert’s Holy Practice,” in George Herbert’s Pastoral: New Essays on the Poet and Priest of Bemerton, ed.
Christopher Hodgkins (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2010), 72–90, 76.  See also Philip Sheldrake, ed., Heaven
in Ordinary: George Herbert and His Writings, Canterbury Studies in Spiritual Theology (Norwich, UK: Canterbury
Press, 2009), 11 (referring to The Countrey Parson as “a work of rhetoric”).
Clarke, Theory and Theology, 55.184
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flocks (CP, 22).   All of these considerations lead Wolberg to conclude that The Countrey Parson185
has long been mischaracterized as a straight pastoral manual when it might be better considered as
a work in the tradition of the Renaissance courtesy book,  of which the extraordinarily ludic The186
Book of the Courtier by Count Baldesar Castiglione (1528) stands as the primary exemplar.187
Herbert’s rhetorical practice in the pulpit was also, based on the evidence we can glean from
The Countrey Parson, fundamentally embodied and profoundly physicalized.  Not limiting his
The phrase itself is similar to one found in The Temple, in the poem “Praise (II)”: “Wherefore with my185
utmost art / I will sing thee.”  Herbert, English Poems, 155 (emphasis supplied).  As we have seen with respect to “The
Altar” and in the poems considered in the coda to the previous case study, the art—or artistry or artifice—that Herbert
can bring to bear in praise of God is considerable.  It is also worth noting that this phrase supplies the title for Rickey’s
superb study, an attempt to enrich our understanding of Herbert’s ornate poetic techniques in light of the fact that “the
smoothness of his verse and the peculiar simplicity that it seems at first to emanate veil its genuine complexity.”  Utmost
Art, xiii.
See “All Possible Art,” 62.  See also Cristina Malcolmson, “George Herbert’s Country Parson and the186
Character of Social Identity,” Studies in Philology 85, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 245–66 (considering the volume to be an
entry in the character genre).  To the extent that Wolberg is correct in arguing that The Countrey Parson is not a typical
“theological manual” (“All Possible Art,” 19), many other assessments of Herbert’s prose work that describe its author
as being more radically Protestant will have to be re-evaluated.  See, for example: Clarke, Theory and Theology, 55
(linking Herbert’s preaching to that of Bartholomew Keckermann); Cooley, “Full of All Knowledg,” 6 (declaring that
disputes in Herbert criticism about the poet’s theological position “are more or less over” and declaring victory for
Lewalski’s Protestant Poetics model); Michael Schoenfeldt, Prayer and Power: George Herbert and Renaissance
Courtship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 55 (acknowledging that, although “It is impossible to guess”
how Herbert might have aligned himself in the Civil Wars that followed his death, “By deliberately situating himself in
the country [he] implicitly aligned himself with a region whose longstanding cultural antipathies to the court have been
viewed as a contributing factor to the Civil War”); and Ceri Sullivan, The Rhetoric of Conscience in Donne, Herbert and
Vaughan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3 (“Lewalski’s conclusion [. . .] has been difficult to challenge”). 
In the minority, but perhaps closer to the truth, is Gene Edward Veith, “‘Brittle Crazy Glass’: George Herbert, Vocation,
and the Theology of Presence,” in Hodgkins, George Herbert’s Pastoral, 52–71.  Veith characterizes Herbert’s “middle
way,” which “was attacked from all sides” during the seventeenth century (ibid., 53), as an instance of “the conservative
Reformation”: “the Reformation understanding of grace, faith, and the Bible expressed in terms of the historical liturgy
and a high view of the sacraments” (ibid., 52).  See also Douglas Swartz, “Discourse and Direction: A Priest to the
Temple, or, the Country Parson and the Elaboration of Sovereign Rule,” Criticism 36, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 189–212,
194 (arguing that The Countrey Parson “is very much in keeping with the centralizing conformity that characterized
Arminianism’s governmental program”).  But see John M. Adrian, “George Herbert, Parish ‘Dexterity’, and the Local
Modification of Laudianism,” Seventeenth Century 24, no. 1 (April 2009): 26–51, 38 (“Whereas Laud compels the parish
to conform to national standards, Herbert has his parson adapt to his parish”).
Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier (1528), trans. Charles S. Singleton (1959), ed. Daniel187
Javitch (New York: Norton, 2002).  For instance, the dialogue is structured around a metagame in which the characters
compete to determine which game they will later play—the amusement of “forming in words a perfect Courtier” prevails
(ibid., 19); one of the participants in the dialogue defines man as “a risible animal [. . .] which by nature is attracted to
pleasure, and desires rest and recreation” (ibid., 105); and the ultimate aim of the perfect courtier is declared to be the
task of leading the prince to virtue (ibid., 210) through “the veil of pleasure” (ibid., 213).
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advice to the words of a sermon or the manner of textual exegesis, he directs the country parson in
how to present his body, urging him in public prayer to “composeth himself to all possible reverence;
lifting up his heart and hands, and eyes, and using all other gestures which may expresse a hearty,
and unfeyned devotion” (CP, 17).  The parson’s vocalizations also warrant Herbert’s attention, as
he suggests that the ideal parson’s “voyce is humble, his words treatable, and slow; yet not so slow
neither, as to let the fervency of the supplicant hang and dy between speaking, but with a grave
livelinesse, between fear and zeal, pausing yet pressing, he performes his duty” (CP, 18).
Embodiment is central to Herbert’s sermon practice precisely because it is the task of the
preacher in some fashion to incarnate Christ and the Word through his physical presence in the
church and in the community.  As Gene Edward Veith says, “God’s Word manifests itself through
the preacher’s sermon just as a story from the life of Christ manifests itself in a stained-glass
window.”   And Herbert’s poem, “The Windows,” provides further insight into this incarnational188
ideal:
Lord, how can man preach thy eternall word?
He is a brittle crazie glass:
Yet in thy temple thou dost him afford
This glorious and transcendent place,
5 To be a window, through thy grace.
But when thou dost anneal in glasse thy storie,
Making thy life to shine within
The holy Preacher’s; then the light and glorie
More rev’rend grows, & more doth win:
10 Which else shows watrish, bleak, & thin.
“‘Brittle Crazy Glass,’” 65.  See also Eugene R. Cunnar, “Ut Pictura Poesis: An Opening in ‘The188
Windows,’” in Miller and DiYanni, Like Season’d Timber, 101–38, 133 (“For Herbert, the preached Word is not mere
Scripture; it is Christ, the Word Incarnate, mediated through the Holy Spirit and the grace bestowed upon and
internalized within the preacher, who, in turn, confronts the congregation not with mere words nor eloquent words, but
with Christ’s presence”).
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Doctrine and life, colours and light, in one
When they combine and mingle, bring
A strong regard and aw: but speech alone
Doth vanish like a flaring thing,
15 And in the eare, not conscience ring.189
The poem, in Wolberg’s words, must strike a Herbert scholar as “surprising” both because of its
“decided lack of confidence in language” and because of the ending that Helen Vendler describes
as “unhappy” in the sense that “it contends that, without an appropriate way of life to support them,
words are impotent.”   Yet the salience of the poem lies in the very fact that its distrust of language190
mirrors the great role that the pastor’s body plays in The Countrey Parson.191
“The Windows” begins with the question—perhaps the central question in Reformed Church
theology —of how it is possible for fallen man, as flawed and as distorted as “a brittle crazie glass”192
(“W,” 2), to preach the “eternall word” (“W,” 1) of God, both the perfect word of the Scriptures and
the good news of the incarnate Word that is Jesus Christ.  Almost immediately comes Herbert’s
answer: it is only through the power of Divine “grace” (“W,” 5) that God renders the mortal vessel
of the word and Word transparent so that the light of Christ can shine through him, like a window
(“W,” 5).  Herbert continues and elaborates on the metaphor by extending it to stained-glass
Herbert, English Poems, 84–85.  All further citations to “The Windows” (“W”) will appear as parenthetical189
references to line numbers in the main text.
“All Possible Art,” 17 (quoting Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 79).190
As Kenneth Graham puts it, “The Windows” is about matching word and deed: “instead of telling stories191
about others,” the ideal country pastor “illustrates the best of those stories with his own life.”   “Herbert’s Holy Practice,”
75–76.  To read “The Windows” properly in pari materia with The Countrey Parson therefore resolves the tension that
exists in the latter between being and seeming.  See also Malcolmson, “George Herbert’s Country Parson,” 251–52
(“Herbert is both coolly aware of the need to perform and insistent on countering the potential for hypocrisy and the
fragility of appearance by grounding authority on an internal holiness adamantly sincere and genuine”).
See Robert L. Entzminger, “Doctrine and Life: George Herbert and the Augustinian Rhetoric of Example,”192
George Herbert Journal 13, no. 1–2 (Fall 1989): 37–47, 37.
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windows in the poem’s second stanza.   In the same way that the stories of Christ’s ministry on193
Earth are “anneal[ed] in glasse” (“W,” 6) in the artistry of stained-glass windows, Christ can make
his “life to shine within / The holy Preacher’s” (“W,” 7–8).  In a pun on “rev’rend” (“W,” 9), Herbert
suggests that this grace alone makes the pastor worthy of the title that also describes the reverence
to which the Christian is called to show the Word.  The pastor, therefore, takes on more than mere
transparency—which would render the light behind “watrish, bleak, & thin” (“W,” 10)—but rather
the full panoply of color and beauty that represent Christ’s holiness and glory.194
Further explication of the poem requires that we return to The Countrey Parson and its
author’s desire to invoke the presence of God in his sermons (CP, 26).  Throughout that text, Herbert
insists that the role of the country parson is to become a model of Christ.  For example, the chapter
entitled “The Parson’s Library” begins rather unexpectedly with a claim that is not about books or
texts: “The Countrey Parson’s Library is a holy Life: for besides the blessing that that brings upon
it, there being a promise, that if the Kingdome of God be first sought, all other things shall be added,
even it selfe is a sermon” (CP, 142).  What we see, in other words, both in “The Windows” and in
The Countrey Parson, is a form of imitatio Christi.   Although “the poem emphasizes God’s195
We would do well to keep in mind that the church of Herbert’s imagination is one adorned not only with193
altars but also with these more colorful decorative elements, which precursors of Puritans destroyed—with some notable
exceptions—in  their iconoclastic rage against images.  See John Phillips, The Reformation of Images: Destruction of
Art in England, 1535–1660 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 94–95; and John Twyning, Forms of
English History in Literature, Landscape, and Architecture, Language, Discourse, Society (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012), 37–53.  Richard Strier’s claim that “The Windows” “could have been written by an iconoclast” is
rather suspect.  Love Known, 150.  See Clifford Davidson, “George Herbert and Stained Glass Windows,” George
Herbert Journal 12, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 29–39, 35 (the poem “depends for its meaning on accepting the value of painted
glass containing scenes from sacred stories”).
For a somewhat different close reading of the poem, see Sigrid Renaux, “George Herbert’s ‘The Windows’194
Illuminated: A Critical Approach,” George Herbert Journal 9, no. 1 (Fall 1985): 26–32.
We know that Herbert was familiar with the concept of imitatio Christi from references to a putative author195
of De imitatio Christi in The Countrey Parson itself.  Van Thienen, “Anglican Recycling,” 197n2.
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agency in this successful imitation,” Kenneth Graham says, “it is still the actions of the preacher’s
personal history that make credible the doctrinal story he tells.”   By successfully imitating the196
virtues of Christ in his public and private lives, the country pastor through the grace of God becomes,
as Judy Z. Kronenfeld describes it, “a link between the mortal and the eternal, that man may see
through the minister into the more than mortal.”197
Despite these commonalities, it is beyond doubt that Donne and Herbert had quite different
preaching styles:  Herbert’s art—in verse, prose, and pulpit—is one that conceals art;  Donne, on198 199
the other hand, flaunts his artistry and artifice, making them visible in a virtuoso display of difficultà.
Yet the concealment of art does not mean that artifice is absent.  To the contrary, Herbert’s style of
simplicitas, one that yields an appearance of effortlessness but that contains hidden within it a rich
complexity, is much closer to the Renaissance ideal of grace in art (and in spiritual matters) than
Donne’s.  It appears plain only when we fail to examine it closely.
In the next chapter, my conclusion, I shall develop the concept that spiritual grace is a kind
of Divine play as part of an effort to answer the question that I deferred from Chapter I: why might
“Herbert’s Holy Practice,” 76.  But see Veith, “‘Brittle Crazy Glass,’” 65 (“The preacher should accord196
himself with Christ who is in him, but this is not a moralistic attempt to imitate the virtues of Jesus.  Rather, it is a matter
of Christ’s work—the poem has Christ doing the annealing, Christ making his life to shine within the preacher—so that
the theology of presence intersects with justification by faith”).
“Probing the Relation between Poetry and Ideology: Herbert’s ‘The Windows,’” John Donne Journal 2,197
no. 1 (1983): 55–80, 70.  See also Swartz, “Discourse and Direction,” 205 (“God sees and speaks directly through the
parson”).  Swartz goes so far as to argue that “While Herbert recently has come to be associated with an essential
protestantism, he [. . .] proposes [in “The Parson Preaching”] not the absence but the concealing of the institutional
mediation between God and the ‘people.’” Ibid., 206.
As W. Fraser Mitchell would have it, Herbert was an outspoken critic of Donne’s “metaphysical” style. 198
English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson: A Study of Its Literary Aspects (1932) (New York: Russell and
Russell, 1962), 364.
See Cooley, “Full of All Knowledg,” 4; and Kathryn Walls, “‘Resorting to Sermons’: The Place of199
Preaching in William Baspoole’s The Pilgime and George Herbert’s The Country Parson,” George Herbert Journal 30,
no. 1–2 (Fall 2006–Spring 2007): 42–58, 51.
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the discourse practitioners whom I have been considering have chosen play as a means of imitating
the incarnational capacity of Divine language?
^
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Figure 31.  Frontispiece from Anonymous, The Vindication of
Christmas (London: G. Horton, 1653).  The British Library, London.
© The British Library Board, E.684.(1.)
As this early precursor of contemporary comic strips suggests, Puritans were often
objects of derision and mockery during the seventeenth century because, quite simply
put, they weren’t much fun.  The Puritan pictured here on the left, for example,
protests the “good cheere” that Father Christmas brings.  This final chapter, in
addition to exploring some of the implications of the foregoing analysis, offers some
personal reflections on why the Puritans were wrong—and about why discourse
practitioners during the Renaissance would use play as an imitative means of
worshiping the Divine.
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V.  CONCLUSION
End Game
[H]ow would they dare so ouer curiously, and carefully to maintaine
and keepe them, at the leastwise to wincke at them (as they almost
euery where doe) in that vaine & ungodly practise of daunsing [. . .]
which the very Pagans at all times and in all ages abhorred,
especiallye being once growne into an occupation and trade as a
practise most pernicious, wherein the sences are altogither captiuated
and made subject to unlawful fantasies, to unreasonable thoughts, and
wicked deuises.1
—Edward Hake
David’s dance has come to a close (at least as far as the pages of this dissertation are concerned) and 
now the dour Michal, like a Puritan, is prepared to sneer at his folly.   Alessandro Arcangeli has2
declared that “the Puritan revolution was bent on eliminating, together with traditional holiday
Edward Hake, A Touchestone for This Time Present (London: Thomas Hacket, 1574), 27.1
Although Edward Hake’s views on dancing were more extreme than those expressed by some other2
Puritans, his opinion is not a frank anomaly.  Stephan Gosson condemned dancing in very broad terms by complaining
of “the exercise that is nowe amonge us”: “banqueting, playing, pipying, and dauncing, and all such delightes as may win
vs to pleasure, or rocke vs to sleepe.”  The Schoole of Abuse (London: Thomas Woodcocke, 1587), 31.  Christopher
Shutte’s catechism for families represented Sabbath celebrations, including “the folowing of pastymes, gamyng,
daunsing, banquetting, and other outward pleasures,” as violations of God’s fourth commandment.  The Testimonie of
a True Fayth (London: Thomas Dawson and Tomas Gardyner, 1577), 10.  For a concise summary of other views on
dancing during the period, see Richard L. Greaves, Society and Religion in Elizabethan England (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 454–57.
Even the precedent of David’s dance did not convince the Puritans that the practice was licit as a mode of
worship: “Dauid daunced in deede, but is his dauncing and ours anie thing like? [. . .]  Neuer compare Dauid his dauncing
with ours, for there is no more likelihood betweene them, then is betweene heauen and hell.”  Samuel Byrd, A Friendlie
Communication or Dialogue between Paule and Demas (London: Iohn Harison, 1580), 37.
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pastimes, any occasion for fun [. . .].”   Although this statement might well be interpreted as a3
dangerously over-broad generalization,  it contains more than a mere kernel of truth: Puritans were4
not favorably disposed toward the ludic spirit of the Renaissance.   For the Puritan mind, according5
to Ritchie D. Kendall, play was associated with Romish tendencies: “the Catholic regressively sought
shelter in a world of ceremonial play, ignoring the more laborious worship God now demanded.”  6
While the humanists of the Renaissance “professed the dignity of recreation,” Marcia Vale says,
“Moralists and Puritans inveighed against the effeminate, foreign and new-fangled nature of
contemporary pastimes, and even at the height of the Elizabethan period they lamented the supposed
Recreation in the Renaissance: Attitudes towards Leisure and Pastimes in European Culture, c.3
1425–1675, Early Modern History (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 10.
For a contrary and arguably more nuanced view, see Bruce C. Daniels, Puritans at Play: Leisure and4
Recreation in Colonial New England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).  Given the fact that this source’s emphasis
is on Puritans in America from 1620 to as late as 1790, I have elected not to rely upon it here.  Moreover, there is an
argument that at least some of the subtlety that Daniels perceives is based on a misreading of period texts; Gregory M.
Colón Semenza has persuasively suggested that limited endorsements of lawful recreations by Puritan thinkers were
really “a sham.”  Sport, Politics, and Literature in the English Renaissance (Newark: University of Delaware Press,
2003), 55.  For example, consider John Northbrooke’s Treatise against Dicing, Dancing, Plays and Enterludes, with
Other Idle Pastimes (London: Thomas Dawson, 1579).  Northbrooke states that “playes which are for the exercise eyther
of the powers of mynde or bodie art not utterly forbidden.”  Ibid., 106.  Yet, as Semenza demonstrates, by this point in
the treatise any exception to the rule against traditional pastimes has been quashed by a more insistently anti-ludic
rhetoric.  Sport, 53–55.  “[. . .] Northbrooke is an extraordinarily subtle and crafty writer,” Semenza explains, and his
brief concession to play is likely “merely Northbrooke’s attempt to avoid seeming as precise as he actually is.”  Ibid.,
54–55.  Likewise, the common Puritan view that moderate recreation could serve the function of edification—a view
that we encountered earlier in the thinking of Samuel Byrd—renders play a mere instrumentality to another goal and,
therefore, not really play at all.  See HL, 13; and MPaG, 10.
See, for example, Ronald Hutton, The Rise and Fall of Merry England: The Ritual Year, 1400–17005
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 143 (the biblical precision of the Puritans “provides an ample enough
understanding of why hostility to seasonal customs should have abounded among those most conscious of Scripture and
most determined to remould the world according to its decrees”); and Robert W. Malcolmson, Popular Recreations in
English Society, 1700–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 6 (“The Protestant Reformation, in
rejecting so many of the habits and assumptions of the past, stimulated the growth of an outlook which was [. . .] intensely
suspicious of many established traditions”).
The Drama of Dissent: The Radical Poetics of Nonconformity, 1380–1590, Studies in Religion (Chapel6
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 97.  See ibid., 150 (Puritans stressed “The necessity of protracted
activity—strenuous, concrete, and public”).
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decline in society when compared with an earlier age.”   Protestant Sabbatarians believed, as7
Arcangeli explains, that “if rest and recreation belong in the work cycle [. . .] space for them needs
to be found within the working week: the Lord’s day is set out for a completely different purpose.”  8
“The Laudian party,” on the other hand, according to Leah S. Marcus, 
disseminated an image of the Anglican priest as a wellspring of jouissance—a village
master of ceremonies [. . .] who keeps up old parish customs and spreads good
fellowship, renewing the ties between the official hierarchy and alienated elements
of the local community through his irresistible merriment, his own comportment
disarming any suspicion that the ‘liberty’ of old pastimes was incompatible with
innocence.9
Indeed, as Laud’s power and influence dwindled in the years approaching 1640, she continues,
traditional games came to be “justified not on grounds of social utility, but as vehicles of divine
grace.”10
It is against this background that the central tasks of this final chapter can be situated.  In the
following pages, I shall first present the implications of the thesis that I have advanced in this
dissertation—that practitioners of discourse during the English Reformation were engaged in playful
acts that sought to imitate the Divine by creating texts in which Word could be incarnated as
The Gentleman’s Recreations: Accomplishments and Pastimes of the English Gentleman, 1580–1630,7
Studies in Elizabethan and Renaissance Culture (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1977), 3.
Recreation in the Renaissance, 83.  This was an ironic disposition given biblical support for the notion that8
the Sabbath was associated with God’s own time of rest: “And on the seuenth day God ended his worke, which hee had
made: And he rested on the seuenth day from all his worke, which he had made.”  Gn 2:2 (AV 1611).
The Politics of Mirth: Jonson, Herrick, Milton, Marvell, and the Defense of Old Holiday Pastimes9
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 16.
Ibid., 17.10
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Flesh—by recapitulating briefly where we have been and what we have learned from the foregoing
case studies.  That work being completed, the second section, a short final coda, will offer some
personal reflections and meditations on my thesis that might suggest to the reader why practitioners
of discourse during the Renaissance found in play such an amenable avenue for their approach to
worshiping the Divine.
A.  IMPLICATIONS
The State of the Game Revisited
This dissertation began with a review of the state of our knowledge with respect to the three
components of the argument that I have been developing in these pages: play, incarnationalism, and
imitation.  It is only fitting, therefore, to return to this theme by considering what contributions to
our understanding of Renaissance and Reformation discourses my study might have yielded.  I would
like to propose that three key insights have emerged from my examination of Renaissance discourse
practitioners in the context of the ludic: (1) we can now understand the works that those figures
produced more fully and appreciate their artistry more deeply by virtue of seeing them as part of a
broader pattern of worshipful imitation; (2) the definition and typology that I have developed for
describing and categorizing different kinds of ludic discourse are provisionally useful, although the
latter might ultimately be of greater utility in a study specifically oriented toward the tasks of
classification and comparison; and (3) the phenomenon of English Reformation discourse might
ultimately be so multifaceted that any schema straightforward enough to be heuristically
useful—even the highly nuanced model that I have been using in this dissertation—might lead
scholars toward oversimplification and distortion unless it were used with utmost caution.
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In keeping with my interest in formalism and my conviction that the study of aesthetics
remains an important critical enterprise, I suggest first that my investigation has been intrinsically
valuable to the extent that it has disclosed new meanings in the works under review and to the extent
that it has facilitated a greater awareness of the structural beauty of those works.  
Considering the sermonology of John Donne within the framework of ludic excess has
revealed that Donne’s pulpit speech crackles with a rich array of tropes, masterfully deployed to yield
the greatest and most intense possible response from his auditory.  To the same extent as his famed
verse, Donne’s sermons are complex structures of wit from the broadest conceptual levels to the
finest layers of detail that we have examined.  These works now disclose to us a fuller understanding
of Donne’s skill as an artisan of his language, and we are now able to recognize their true poignancy
as we witness Donne striving toward maximum expressivity, not simply as a poet but as a Christian
aiming for the redemption of discourse itself.
The visual works of Hans Holbein, William Scrots, and other artists of the Renaissance may
likewise now be viewed not as mere optical illusions, mindless fancies aping a popular if grotesque
trend toward perspectival distortion, but as attempts to redeem the fallen and therefore idolatrous
image.  Like the modernist pieces of Pablo Picasso and Marcel Duchamp that ached to depict not
only three dimensions but four upon two-dimensional surfaces, Holbein’s and Scrots’ works are
strange to us precisely because they seek more than mimetic representation; their goal is a God’s-eye
view of their subjects that simultaneously can evoke the presence of the Divine.
George Herbert’s “The Altar” has emerged from this dissertation not as a simple (or
simplistic) meditation upon faith accomplished through a quaint device but rather as a remarkably
complex visual and textual artifact that embeds within just sixteen short lines the entire genealogy
of discourses upon which it draws for its complex work.  If verse is the art of conceptual
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compression—the art of distilling the rambling content of prose into a more dense and potent
form—then Herbert reveals himself in the foregoing pages to be a true master of verse artistry, a poet
capable of making the complex seem pure and simple through a delicate and even tender concealing
of his art.
I also suggest that my definition and typology of discursive play afford critics a measurably
improved vocabulary for describing ludic discourse and its different possible forms.  To put it
simply, before this dissertation, and despite the recognition from many quarters that “loose talk”
about games dominated the field,  critics spoke of playful discourses without ever defining what11
might make a discourse ludic in the first instance, without ever applying the abundance of available
views of play to the particular context of discursive acts and practices.  The definition that I have
supplied, while offered tentatively and provisionally, is therefore a distinct step toward more
meaningful scholarship.
Likewise, the typology that I have offered provides an intelligible basis for distinguishing
different kinds of playful discourse from one another.  While it should be obvious that Donne in his
sermons and Herbert in “The Altar” are not playing in quite the same way, my typology allows us
to describe the differences with greater precision than was previously possible.  Donne is engaged
in a GAME with his auditory because he speaks with the expectation of an active response
(positioning his discourse high on the methexis axis) and because the discourse has a distinct telos:
salvation.  Herbert, on the other hand, is engaged in more solitary play, with his poem “The Altar”
emerging as a TOY-TRICK hybrid marked by minimal audience response and, given the multiple aims
of his discourse, a similarly low position on the telos axis.
Bernard Suits, “The Detective Story: A Case Study of Games in Literature,” Canadian Review of11
Contemporary Literature 12, no. 2 (June 1985): 200–19, 215.
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The reader will note, however, that I have done little comparative work in the preceding case
studies.  In other words, while I have used my typology to categorize the discursive play of both
Herbert and Donne, I have not drawn any conclusions directly from my finding that the two
discourse practitioners play differently with language.  Although conclusions of that nature were not
strictly necessary to my thesis, my endeavor in this dissertation not being principally oriented toward
a comparative study, they would have certainly provided a more rigorous test of the possible
effectiveness of my typology than I have supplied here.  I therefore offer that typology as a device
of only provisional utility; a comparative study might disclose more fully whether and to what extent
it can be useful for other scholars of ludics.
Finally, I suggest that my study has revealed new complexities in the spectrum of English
Reformation confessional positions, complexities that even the powerful schema that I have been
using in this dissertation does not fully capture; one might therefore conclude that heuristic models
of the English Reformation might ultimately be unable to account fully for the discourses of the
period unless they themselves became so complex as to be unwieldy.  For example, Daniel W.
Doerksen and Christopher Hodgkins place both Donne and Herbert within the category of Calvinist
Conformists,  but those discourse practitioners and others that I have considered do not quite fit into12
any single category in their schema.
Donne, with his evident passion for preaching, cannot be classified without complication or
reservation as a high-Church figure; the intensity of his commitment to a Word-centered liturgy with
a central role for the sermon does not permit anything so unambiguous, and in fact suggests a very
nearly Puritan orientation for him.  Yet his homiletical style is quintessentially of an Avant-Garde
“Introduction,” in Centered on the Word: Literature, Scripture, and the Tudor-Stuart Middle Way, ed.12
Doerksen and Hodgkins (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 13–27, 24.
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Conformist variety in its similarity, in some respects, to the pulpit oratory of Lancelot Andrewes. 
Indeed, I would contend that Donne goes far beyond Andrewes in terms of his reliance on the full
panoply of rhetorical and conceptual tools available to the period preacher.  Donne’s ludic sermons
are assuredly not of the plain style that would have marked a homily from a Puritan pulpit, but a
figure like Laud would not have approved of the enthusiasm with which they were delivered.   
Greater complications arise when considering Holbein, Scrots, and the anonymous artist
responsible for the corrugated anamorphosis that we considered in Chapter III, at least in part
because the schema that Doerksen and Hodgkins developed was designed principally for
characterizing the Jacobean rather than the Edwardian Church.   It is possible, however, to make13
some general observations.  First, we cannot without being guilty of anachronism categorize those
artists as Avant-Garde Conformists, much less as Laudians; those varieties of belief would have to
await the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods.  Yet by the same token it is not possible to
classify these figures unreservedly as Puritans either—although they took great pains in their works
to avoid the taint of idolatry by crafting images that possessed a lively presence, their willingness
to innovate so boldly in a ludic fashion marks them off from those who feared the power that images
possess in the first instance.
Herbert’s “The Altar” also challenges the explanatory and descriptive power of the schema
upon which I have relied.  Its altar shape cannot possibly be ignored given the events that surrounded
its composition, and that shape could suggest a high-Church orientation for Herbert.  But its
anamorphic I shape, suggestive of a Calvinist orientation, militates strongly against that
classification.  Likewise, Herbert’s advice to country parsons with regard to preaching is remarkably
Ibid.13
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ambiguous.  In some senses, Herbert seems to favor a Puritan plain style, while in others—and
particularly in the extravagantly ludic nature of the works that we considered—he resembles an
Avant-Garde Conformist.  In no sense is his positioning as a Calvinist Conformist within Doerksen
and Hodgkins’ schema stable or unproblematic.
Yet a schema is ultimately just that: a heuristic that provides a practical means for
investigating a complex subject rather than a point-by-point mapping of that subject onto a perfectly
accurate model.  I say this in order to stress that I am not taking Doerksen and Hodgkins to task for
failing to provide a more nuanced schema; rather, my point is simply that schemata themselves might
be unable to capture the richly complex world of the English Reformation.  Recall for a moment that
Antonio Foscarini observed twelve separate religious parties in England,  and then consider how14
unwieldy such a model might become if we were to develop one of such complexity.  I suggest only
that we use judiciously the tools that we possess instead of allowing ourselves to confuse those tools
with the more multifaceted reality that they heuristically represent.
One thing, however, should be certain based on my analysis and the schema upon which I
have relied—none of the discourse practitioners whose works I have analyzed can be said to fall
within the category of Non-Conforming Puritans.  We are not, in other words, dealing in this
dissertation with radical Reformers, whom I have already suggested cannot readily be classified as
players.  The phenomenon that I have been describing and illustrating in this dissertation, rather,
seems to be confined to higher-Church figures.  The next section, a final coda, explains why their
understanding of worship was such a fertile ground for the playful impulse.
Anthony Milton, Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant14
Thought, 1600–1640, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 7.
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B.  A FINAL CODA
Deus Ludens
My central argument in this dissertation has been that practitioners of discourse during the English
Renaissance engaged in an imitative worship of the Incarnated Word through play.  As I have been
characterizing this argument, it is composed of three strands: play, incarnationalism, and imitation. 
I wish to close by more tightly braiding those threads together and by answering a question that I
deferred from Chapter I:
Why would discourse practitioners choose play as a way to imitate and worship the Divine?
The answer to that question is contained in the subtitle of this final coda: Deus ludens.  God the
player.  God plays, too.  
According to Michael Edwards, there are three levels of biblical revelation: “creation, fall
and re-creation.”   I contend that, at each of these three levels, we and the discourse practitioners15
whom I have been considering could understand the persons of the triune Christian God of the
Renaissance as pursuing a play impulse. 
When hee prepared the heauens, I was there: when he set a compasse
vpon the face of the depth. / When he established the cloudes aboue:
when he strengthned the fountaines of the deepe. / When he gaue to
the sea his decree, that the waters should not passe his
commandement: when he appointed the foundations of the earth /
Then I was by him, as one brought vp with him: and I was daily his
delight, reioycing alwayes before him.
Prv 8:27–30 (AV 1611)
The voice of Wisdom in Proverbs adopts a ludic tone as she describes with great joy and
intimacy the process of Creation that is recounted from a much different perspective in Genesis.  She
Towards a Christian Poetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1984), 4.15
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rejoices in God’s crafting of the world, and she brings delight also to Him as His abundant goodness
overspills the heavens in order to create an ordered universe from nothing at all.  
“[W]e cannot truly grasp the secret of Homo ludens,” Hugo Rahner says, “unless we first,
in all reverence, consider the matter of Deus ludens, God the Creator who, one might say, as part of
a gigantic game called the world of atoms and spirits into being.”   The Creation is a ludic act16
precisely because, in Jürgen Moltmann’s words, “God is free.”   And as we have seen, this17
freedom—the freedom to act or not to act, the freedom to give or to withhold, the freedom to create
or to reside in a void—is a hallmark of play.  Moltmann continues to say of God that “When he
creates something that is not god but also not nothing, then this must have its ground not in itself but
in God’s good will or pleasure.  Hence the creation is God’s play, a play of his groundless and
inscrutable wisdom.  It is the realm in which God displays his glory.”   This is entirely consistent18
with the Renaissance view of God as one who, as Judith Dundas puts it, “perpetually plays the game
of wit, by writing metaphor into the universe, establishing the system of correspondences, and, in
general, astonishing man with relationships that only supreme ingenuity could devise.  According
to this school of thought, the poet’s wit is the means whereby he both imitates and expresses the
divine plan.”   This imitative act pursues the Incarnation because of Christ’s central role as the19
spoken Word through which the Creation was effected in the act of which all other versions of play
partake; as Rahner says, “not even the most inspired gesture of man at play can be other than a
Man at Play, trans. Brian Battershaw and Edward Quinn (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 9.16
Theology of Play, trans. Reinhard Ulrich (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 17.17
Ibid.18
“Levity and Grace: The Poetry of Sacred Wit,” Yearbook of English Studies 2 (1972): 93–102, 95.19
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clumsy, childish imitation of the Logos, who, since the beginning of time, has made play before the
face of the Father.”20
In the sweate of thy face shalt thou eate bread, till thou returne vnto
the ground: for out of it wast thou taken, for dust thou art, and vnto
dust shalt thou returne.
Gn 3:19 (AV 1611)
With the Fall comes death—and work.  “To the authors of the Bible,” Sebastian de Grazia
says, “work is necessary because of a divine curse.  Through Adam’s fall the world was become a
workhouse.  Paradise was where there was no toil.”   Discourse, too, becomes fallen as part of this21
curse: in Eden, “words and world,” Edwards asserts, “would presumably interpenetrate with ease. 
At the naming, therefore, the world, which was derived from God’s language and was god’s (spoken)
text, now became Adam’s text also.”   And with the Fall comes Babel, a biblical metaphor for what22
happens to discourse when God withdraws his favor from this world.  A world without the favor of
God is no longer a world of play, no longer a world of sense.
Man at Play, 9.  According to David L. Miller, “both Eastern and Western religious thought contain20
creation stories which rely on the word ‘play’ as a basic metaphor for understanding our world.”  Gods and Games:
Toward a Theology of Play (New York: World Publishing, 1969), 99.  Moreover, the earliest theologians of Christianity
were capable of seeing Christ as a figure at play.  Gregory Nazianzus, for example, writes:
For the Logos on high plays
stirring the whole cosmos back and forth, as he wills,
into shapes of every kind.
Quoted in ibid., 109.  And for Maximus the Confessor, “truly we deserve to be looked upon as a children’s game played
by God.”  Quoted in ibid., 109–10.
Of Time, Work, and Leisure (1962) (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1964), 35.21
Towards a Christian Poetics, 9.22
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For by grace are ye saued, through faith, and that not of your selues;
it is the gift of God.
—Eph 2:8 (AV 1611)
For all haue sinned, and come short of the glory of God, / Being
justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Iesus
Christ.
—Rom 3:23–24 (AV 1611)
And if by grace, then is it no more of workes: otherwise grace is no
more grace.  But if it bee of workes, then is it no more grace,
otherwise worke is no more worke.
—Rom 11:6 (AV 1611)
In these excerpts from Pauline epistles, we see that Divine grace, like play, is superabundant. 
It is gratuitous, like play, even in the etymological sense: free, spontaneous, voluntary —a gift,23
freely bestowed without any pretense of desert.   And it is pointedly distinct from the notion of work24
or works; it is wholly unearned—unlike death, which is “the wages of sinne” —and wholly25
unmerited.  Christ’s coming in human form re-creates the world and man’s relationship with the
Divine.  The Renaissance mind, with its close links between recreation and re-creation, could easily
have perceived in the overflowing grace of Christ’s coming a form of abundance that I have coded
as play.
“Play,” Robert E. Neale tells us, “is as illusive [sic] as the wind and can no more be caught
by theory than the wind can be trapped in a paper bag.”   This is a comforting notion for an26
Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., s.v. “grace.”23
“The relationship between Grace and game is neither strange nor strained.”  R. Darby Williams, “Two24
Baroque Game Poems on Grace: Herbert’s ‘Paradise’ and Milton’s ‘On Time,’” Criticism 10, no. 3 (Summer 1970):
180–94, 194. 
Rom 6:23 (AV 1611).25
Quoted in Miller, Gods and Games, 4–5.26
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emerging scholar in the field of ludics, for it permits him on occasion to miss the mark while
venturing for a kind of truth.  In that spirit, I offer a final hypothesis and a final question.
The Puritans won.  Despite the Restoration in 1660, it was the Puritan mode of discourse,
plain and direct, that the Royal Society adopted in its “attack on eloquence”  that same year and that27
governed the Enlightenment’s passion for reason at the dawn of an era that saw a growing secularism
accrete in a trend that continues to the present day.  What is different today, however, is the returning
dominance of a spirit of play in postmodern thought.  How much more fertile could that spirit be,
what kinds of creative wonders could it yield, if it were married—as it was in the Renaissance—to
a keen awareness of the presence of God?
^
William R. Mueller, John Donne: Preacher (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 101.  See27
also Frank J. Warnke, “Sacred Play: Baroque Poetic Style,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 22, no. 4 (Summer
1964): 455–64, 455 (“The indecorous mating of playfulness and seriousness, intellect and emotion, probably accounts
for the thoroughgoing rejection of Baroque poetry induced by the decorums of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”).
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